Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Anti-Realism Wright I 15
Antirealism/Dummett: understanding must manifest itself in behavior: the use of sentences. - This leads to the distinction between (perhaps unrecognized) truth and acceptability of sentences and between what it causes respectively. Evidence transcendence/(s): even if evidence is given, truth can deviate). >Acceptability, >Assertibility, >Truth.
I 84
Semantic anti-realism/Dummett: when the meaning of a statement is to be set by the truth conditions, then truth cannot exceed our ability to recognize it. - ((s) Anti-realismVsassertibility: (s): circular when indexical). ---
I 102f
Anti-realism: thesis: truth is globally understood as superassertibility. >Super-assertibility.
Def Superassertibility/(s): Future assertibility under appropriate conditions.
>Assertibility/Wright.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Assertibility Brandom Brandom I 197
VsJustified Assertibility: Assertibilty conditions do not contain the entire meaning. >Assertibility conditions. ---
Rorty I ~ 325
(According to Rorty): assertible/Brandom/Rorty: in addition to the term "assertible" for the pure philosophy of language we still need "true". Especially for understanding how the language works as opposed to understanding how it spreads to the world. (Semantics/epistemology). Also naive: distinguishing the assertibility conditions of a statement as "descriptive meaning" and the consequences as "evaluative" importance, and thus abandon any need for harmony.
---
Brandom II 238
Assertibility Theories/Brandom: Thesis semantics must be oriented towards pragmatics (Brandom pro). >Pragmatics.
II 240
Two tasks: 1. assertive force, i.e. declaring accuracy, i.e. making a distinction between traits at all 2. saying when those traits are allowed.
II 241
a) what are the reasons, evidence b) directly ask whether a statement is true - "semantic assertibility"/Sellars: assertibility under ideal conditions.
II 242
BrandomVsSellars: hopeless: you cannot specify ideality; either it remains circular with recourse to the notion of truth, or trivial. (Also BrandomVsHabermas).
II 243
Brandom's own approach: Thesis rule-governed language game that allows to combine propositional contents that are objective in the sense that they detach from the settings of the speaker with declarative sentences - which splits assertibility into two parts: determination and authorization (two normative statuses) - goes beyond Behth, because it allows the distinction between right and wrong use. - (> Dummett:> chess).
II 254f
Semantic Theories/Assertibility/Brandom: Pro: Advantage: close connection to use - Problem: Dilemma: either a) linked to attitude or b) to the object - N.B.: Same assertibility conditions, but different truth conditions - the object could be red without me being able to say it. >Truth conditions
II 259
Solution: Conditional: "If the pattern is red, it is red" - Tautology: this is correct because it codifies a definition preserving inference - but not:
II 260
"If I am entitled to the assertion that the pattern is red, it is red"- not definition preserving.
II 261
Distinction between authorization and definition does not need the notion of truth.
II 261
BrandomVsAssertibility: does not distinguish between the status of the definition/authorization without the aid of incompatibilities (negation). Distinction between sentences that share the assertibility conditions and those that share the truth condition is not possible without the notion of truth. >Truth.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Assertibility Brandom Vs Assertibility I 198
VsJustified assertibility: assertibility conditions do not contain the whole meaning! Just as naïve: distinguishing the assertibility conditions of a statement as "descriptive meaning" and the consequences as "evaluative" meaning", and thus giving up any desire for harmony.
II 90
Assertibility/Brandom: its representatives also treat the aspect of the conditions (circumstances) as exhaustive and neglect the consequences of the use of the terms.
II 91
BrandomVs: assertions can have the same conditions but different consequences. E.g. "I’ll write a book about Hegel" - "I predict that I will write a book about Hegel": same circumstances, different consequences or determination. Meaning/Use/Dummett: if we have learned only the circumstances (conditions) for the use of a predicate, it may be that we have not seen through all connections with other terms.
II 242
A philosophical analysis of the concept of truth is therefore not necessarily made by a definition of the word "true". "Semantic assertibility"/Sellars: assertibility under ideal conditions.
II 262 ++
BrandomVsSellars: hopeless: you cannot specify ideality, either it remains circular with recourse to the concept of truth, or trivial. (also BrandomVsHabermas). Alternative/BrandomVsSellars: support with truth conditions. Disadvantage: we are no longer able to explain the correlation of the so defined semantic contents with linguistic expressions based on a direct alignment with the execution of moves, as does the alternative language game theory.
BrandomVsAssertibility: does not distinguish between the status of the determination/authorization without the auxiliary means of incompatibilities (negation).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001