Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Avramides, A. | Davidson Vs Avramides, A. | Avramides I 97 Method/Theory/Avramidis: Basically, you cannot resolve the difficulty by appealing to counterfactual circumstances in which these problems do not exist. There is simply no actual or possible situation in which the beliefs and intentions of a language user are accessible regardless of language comprehension. This is the full strength of Davidson’s doubt. DavidsonVsAvramides: thus Davidson also doubts the profound epistemic asymmetry: he doubts that we can distinguish observations at the surface of deeper possibilities. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Avramides, A. | Grice Vs Avramides, A. | Avramides I 164 GriceeansVsAvramides: The analysis in question was that propositional attitudes are relations to sentences in the theory language. This allows seeing semantics and psychology as interdependent and simultaneously attribute thoughts to speechless beings. GriceansVsAvramides: would look at the matter the other way around: the apparent entailment of ontological asymmetry to conceptual asymmetry should be taken as evidence that this type of analysis of propositional attitudes is fundamentally wrong. Because if you can attribute thinking without language (Thw/oL) in a sensible way, then it would seem as if our psychological concepts are independent of semantic ones. Avramides: No side has more than prima facie evidence. Anti-reductionism: can claim conceptual symmetry without being limited to ontological symmetry. And it can accept thinking without language. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Avramides, A. | Reductionism Vs Avramides, A. | Avra I 90 Radical Interpretation/RI/Avramides: is quite obviously indeed a gradual approach? Avramides: I do not want to deny that, but that we need assumptions about beliefs and meanings simultaneously in early stages. ReductionismVsAvramides: this is the point where my opponent may step in and see an opportunity for an epistemic asymmetry: what is implausible, is not a gradual approach, but the concomitant thesis that radical interpreter needs a complete evidence basis for beliefs and intentions of the unacquainted speaker before he finds out anything about his language. AvramidesVsVs: this implausible thesis notwithstanding, the gradual approach of radical interpretation is as follows: the interpreter forms hypotheses on simple beliefs... (>see Bennett 1985) and all these hypotheses remain revisable until the end. In later stages, we then simultaneously deal with beliefs and meaning. I 158 ReductionismVsAvramides: Subjective Mind/AvramidesVsReductionism: is incompatible with the fact that the mind is only contingently connected with behavior. I 159 A subject can never be separated from its very own experience. VsAvramides: Important Argument: such a subjective concept can be constructed, without significant reference to the behavior! VsAvramides: neither is it necessary to make any significant reference to the third person perspective! I.e. reductionism (reductive Gricean) does not automatically lead to the objective mind. I.e. that a subjective concept of mind is therefore compatible with the fact that mind is only contingently connected with behavior. AvramidesVs: I admit that I cannot prove that this objection is incorrect, but is important to me that my approach allows to combine the first person and third person perspectives. I 160 Without connection to behavior there is no proper understanding of the first person perspective. And this leads to an objective Cartesian (or incomplete) picture. (55 +). |
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| Avramides, A. | Cartesianism Vs Avramides, A. | Avra I 108 CartesianismVsAvramides: could protest against the assumption of a necessary divine position. Avramides: with that he would steal out of the necesity of deep epistemic asymmetry (EA). Cartesianism/Avramides: is, unlike Loar, not committed to any physicalism. For him it is not about future science. Divine Position/Cartesianism: (a variant of Cartesiansim) can even say that the divine position will not in principle be able to recognize the intangible substance within us. That commits him to a realism that evades an epistemic argument. Deep EA/Avramides: precisely to prevent this, I have formulated the deep EA: ((s) see above I 95 counterfactual conditional: if (per impossible) someone else's thoughts were knowable without language, then they would not be constitutive for language). This commits Cartesianism to the fact that if (per impossible) if we could reach this intangible realm, we could also grasp someone else's intentions without understanding the language of the stranger. Thus, the Cartesian, like the physicalist, is committed to deep EA between the semantic and the pychological. |
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| Functionalism | Avramides Vs Functionalism | Avra I 152 objective spirit: cannot use normal behavior for attributing prop. att. I 153 To avoid this the theory of mind must not only refer to behavior but to Armstrong’s "behavior proper". (Which also refers to the mind). Problem: circularity. Avramides: the relevant behavior is not physical! It is impregnated with the mental. Behavior/FunctionalismVsAvramides: the functionalist cannot accept this view of behavior. (because of the circle) If he was also a follower of Grice, he would insist that we can characterize the psychological without reference to interpreted behavior (behavior proper), and that we can reconstruct the semantic, in psychological terms, which in turn are not mentalistically characterized. AvramidesVsFunctionalism: but then he is committed to an objective view of the mind. Also: if he has settled on a non-mentalistic characterization of the inputs and outputs, then he must say what distinguishes mental systems from non-mental ones that have the same functional organization. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Reductionism | Dummett Vs Reductionism | Avramides I 146 DummettVsLocke/VsIdealism/DummettVsReductionism/Avramides: Dummett says above that the idealistic MT is not irreparable, but it is then obliged by an objective (objectivistic) image of the mind. Avramides: because of the reduction the Gricean must assume that linguistic behavior is only contingently related to propositional attitudes. He must therefore separate the theory of propositional attitudes from the behavior. Avramides: any theory that denies that the mind manifests itself in linguistic behavior, refers to an objective image of the mind. Functionalism/propositional attitude/GriceansVsAvramides: It might be objected that I have overlooked one theory all the time, in spite of everything: functionalism! It allows us to refer to behavior with propositional attitude, but not language behavior. This makes it attractive for the Gricean. I 147 Avramides pro functionalism: it gives a subjective (subjectivist) image of the mind. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
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