Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Facts | Austin | I 231 Fact/Austin: "fact" is just another term for "true statement" (pro Brandom, VsAyer). To each true statement, there is one and only one and exactly corresponding fact. >Correspondence theory. (Ayer: but for every fact there are many (Davidson: infinitely many) true statements. But Brandom: T = true statement (in the sense of "aserted") (>Brandom I 841). >Assertions. AyerVsAustin AyerVsBrandom. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Idealism | Ayers | Rorty VI 402 Ayers about Locke/Rorty: a striking example for the transmission of unsuitable problems. RortyVsAyers: Ayers book about Locke is only a pretext for his criticism of what he calls "linguistic idealism" (AyersVsSellars). |
Ayers I M. Ayers "Locke" in: Arguments of the Philosophers London 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Interpretation | Ayers | Rorty VI 360 Interpretation/Bennett: Thesis: we can only understand Kant today by clearly indicating with the help of today's concepts what his problems were, which are still problems today, and what Kant did for their solution. >Meaning Change, >Theory change, >Translation, >Hermeneutics. VI 361 M. AyersVsBennett: that means that it is impossible to understand a philosopher of the past today according to his own conceptuality. Ayers: Thesis: We should try to establish the same relationship between thinking and feeling as he himself did. RortyVsAyers: one does not get far with this, if one no longer believes in terms like "mental capacity", etc. Ayers exaggerates the contrast between "our" and "his" terms. >R. Rorty. |
Ayers I M. Ayers "Locke" in: Arguments of the Philosophers London 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Meaning Change | Ayers | Rorty VI 361 Meaning change/M.AyersVsBennett/Rorty: [to assume a meaning change] would mean that it is impossible to understand a philosopher of the past today according to his own terms. Solution/Ayers: instead, we should try to establish the same relationship between thinking and feeling, like he himself. RortyVsAyers: one does not get far with this, if one no longer believes in terms like "mental capacity", etc. Ayers exaggerates the contrast between "our" and "his" terms. |
Ayers I M. Ayers "Locke" in: Arguments of the Philosophers London 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Meaning Change | Rorty | I 293f Meaning Change/Rorty: Question: Did the Greeks refer to prudence with the expression Sophrosyne? >Reference. Rorty: This question can be rejected with the hint that there is for expectation; in a completely different culture this expression would be implantable; no particular reason. We have to make ourselves familiar with the exotic language game. >Relativism, >Cultural relativism, >Context dependence. In the case of science, however, such an attitude seems unnatural. Here we want to say that out there is something, laws to which one should refer or at least one has referred to. Rorty: "whiggistic" winner perspective: tells us, Aristotle spoke in reality of gravity, when he spoke of a natural settling movement, sailors would have, when they spoke of unicorns, referred to the horns of narwhals in reality, "heat flow" is a misleading description of the energy transfer between dancing molecules. >Theory change. I 301 Meaning/truth/existence/Change of Theories/Meaning Change/Quine/Rorty: Quineans would say, the question, whether they meant the same back then, is not raised. - It's more about the truth values. >Truth values, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Meaning/Intending, >Assertibility. Rorty: a) Aristotle said something wrong about movement, or b) He said something true, but that was not movemnt. RortyVsAyers: with this, one will not get far if one does no longer believe in concepts like intellectual property etc. Ayers exaggerates the contrast between our and his concepts. I 315 ff Semantic change/change of theory/reference/Rorty: solution: the functioning of an expression should be better seen as the picking out of objects, than as the description of reality. - So either a) reference as a basis, or b) also accepting reference as conventional. - Searle-trawson-Criterion: "What would make most of his opinions true." I 318 Solution: distinction reference: a) philosophical - b) "Speaking about" (common sense) - Rorty: it is only about existence. - Therefore, no criterion for reference possible. I 321 RortyVsReference Theory/Theory of Reference: 1. Semantic search for the objects is hopeless. - 2. Hopeless: to strive for an epistemological refutation of skepticism. >Skepticism. --- III 103 Meaning change: Adorno/Horkheimer/Rorty: pro - PutnamVs. --- IV 131 Term/Meaning change/Conceptual change/Change of theories/Rorty: terms that got a new twist through a thinker: E.g. Aristotle: ousia Descartes: res Hume: impression. Wittgenstein: game Einstein: simultaneity. Bohr: Atom. >Theory Change, >Incommensurability. --- VI 361 Interpretation/Rorty: in such approximation efforts, the procedure is obviously anachronistic. But when that happens consciously, there is no objection. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Philosophy | Ayers | Rorty VI 408 Philosophy/AyersVsRorty: the following theses are generally represented by the same people 1. Realism/antirealism is an important distinction 2. Dummett is right: these antirealism/realsim conflicts have been the most decisive in the history of philosophy. --- VI 409 3. Wilson is right when it expresses doubts about the contingency of the problems. 4. Ayers is right, one must not allow one's own metaphysical and epistemic theories to be influenced by one's own politics and morality. 5. Color: the problem of "the nature of color" is not solvable. The same is true of the body-soul problem. 6. Descartes' skepticism is ahistorical. 7. Sellars and Davidson are wrong when they say that the sensory organs merely play a causal role. Pro McDowell: Revival of Empiricism. 8. Identity with oneself is not dependent on description, but on intrinsic, nonrelational features. Some terms are rigid. 9. Recognition of the unspeakable is praiseworthy intellectual modesty. 10. Locke's "Essay concern human understandig" is not a signpost, but a work still to be explored that contains not yet articulated truths. RortyVsAyers: in all 10 theses above, Ayers and I have diametrically opposed views. --- VI 410 Rorty: we will never be able to establish a "purely logical" argument for or against one of the ten theses. --- VI 411 "Linguistic Idealism"/Rorty: conflict term of AyersVsSellars. RortyVsAyers: a lot has to be already in the language before a plausible appeal to the taste of onions is possible at all. --- VI 412 This also includes the notion of an inner "Cartesian stage". This also includes the notion of "consciousness" (as a notion of the 17th century). |
Ayers I M. Ayers "Locke" in: Arguments of the Philosophers London 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Realism | Ayers | Rorty VI 407 Realism/Antirealism/Davidson: the affirmation of the slogan, the real and the truth are "independent of our beliefs," is as idle as its affirmation. Cf. >Anti-Realism. RortyVsAyers: so we can also throw the distinction realism/"idealism" into the rubbish of history. |
Ayers I M. Ayers "Locke" in: Arguments of the Philosophers London 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Sense Data Theory | Ayer | Sellars I 16 Ayer: Proposal: that the speech of the sensory data is merely another language. Thus, no increase in importance in comaprison to our everyday speech. E.g. "the tomato facing is confronting S with an arched red sense-datum" is actually the same as "the tomato seems to be red and arched for S" (Sellars I 5!) SellarsVsAyer: a code does not add anything. >Code, >Experience, >Perception, >Appearence, >Observation language. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ayer, A. J. | Austin Vs Ayer, A. J. | I 231 Fact / Austin: "fact" is just another term for "true statement" (VsBrandom, VsAyer) for every true statement there is one and only one and exactly corresponding fact. (Ayer: but for every fact there are many (Davidson: infinitely many) true statements. (Brandom pro, AyerVs). |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Ayer, A. J. | Black Vs Ayer, A. J. | III 25 Rationality/Circularity/Self-justification/Reasoning/RationalityVsVs/Black: what we need is proof that what we regard as rational practice (procedure), is truly rational. That our idea of good evidence is correct. Problem: purely formal evidence would not be applicable for it, and everything else would not answer the question. That does not mean that the inductive method is irrational within science. It just might be irrational if there were a standard of rationality which would not be achieved. In fact, rationalitysets the standard itself according to which arguments are valued as rational or irrational. (Baltimore, 1956, S 75). Ayer/Black: does not speak explicitl about of our problem with rationality, but his argument can be transferred to it. He could then say: Rationality/Ayer/Black: he might say: no proof is possible, because nothing is allowed at this stage as evidence. Ayer: if it is clear that there can be no logical superior law, then it should not be worrying that something can be decisive in its own right. III 26 Science/Rationality/Justification/Self-affirmation/Ayer/Black: Ayer’s view then leads to the following: scientific method is what scientists accept as what justifies the conclusions accepted by them. Belief/Justification/Standard/Black: Our standard for the justification of our beliefs (in science) is an appeal to good reasons. ((s)> "good scientific practice"). Standard/Evidence/Justification/Ayer: but there is no proof for the quality of the standard itself. Important argument: the result is that even if experience shows that relying on reasons is not sufficient in some areas, that our ongoing reliance on reasons was not even discredited by that in the same area. BlackVsAyer: unlike himself, I find that indeed very troubling! Because I believe that it supports the irrationalist. Irrationalism/VsRationalism/Black: From this position, one can say that if there are no reasons for rationality, there is no reason against irrationality. Then there is also no possibility for relativism (cultural relativism), to defend itself against a serious revolt against the standards (i.e. also against culture-specific standards). |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Ayer, A. J. | Brandom Vs Ayer, A. J. | Ayer I 285 Basis sentences / Ayer: with which are they confronted? With facts. But what are the facts? Fact / AyerVs: false equivalence of facts with true propositions. (BrandomVsAyer) Brandom facts = true statements - Ayer: facts are not the same as true statements. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Ayer, A. J. | Davidson Vs Ayer, A. J. | Frank I 639 Asymmetry/Authority/Perspective first person/third person/Ayer: (The Concept of a Person): similar to Ryle: self-attributions may be erroneous. Authority/Ayer: self-atrributions similar to those of eyewitnesses, compared with second-hand reports. DavidsonVsAyer: unsatisfactory: 1) this does not tell us why the first person should rather be in the position of an eyewitness 2) the comparison does not show what the first person authority actually is. Self-attribution/Davidson: often has no clues! (Like Wittgenstein). At best, the eyewitness has induction available, he can also be unreliable. But a person never loses its right I 640 to be right in terms of their own attitudes. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Ayer, A. J. | Russell Vs Ayer, A. J. | VI 85 Description/sentence/Russell: occurs an (certain) identification in a sentence, this sentence does not have a constitutive element, which corresponds to the labeling as a whole. --- VI 86 Example Three parts: "Scott," "is" "the author". Here "the author" is not a constitutive part of the sentence. reason: Usefully is a sentence which can be negated. E.g. useful: "The unicorn does not exist", "the largest finite number does not exist". But one could not say if the unicorn would be a constitutive part of the sentence. Russell: Then the unicorn cannot be part of any fact. So statements are no facts. (VsAustin, VsAyer, VsBrandom). |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Ayer, A. J. | Sellars Vs Ayer, A. J. | I 16 Sense-data/Ayer: proposal: that the talk about the sense-data is simply another language. Thus, no increase in meaning relative to our everyday speech. I 17 E.g. "The tomato faced S with a curved red sense datum" is actually the same as "The Tomato seems to be red and curved for S." Sense-data/code/Sellars: one could accumulate a code now so much until it is no mere code anymore. Then you have to deny terms such as "quality", "is", "red", "color", "determined", "all" etc. the full status of their counterparts in the everyday speech, if they occur in the speech on the sense-data! They act more as evidence! The expressions from which the two "descriptions" (D) all sense-data is red and I 18 (E) some sense-data is not red exist, remind us thus of the logical inconsistency of propositions like E.g. All elephants are grey and some elephants are not grey. But beware! While it is all right if you derive "Some elephants have a certain "pink shading" from the proposition "Some elephants are pink", it would certainly be wrong wanting to derive from some sense-data is pink" the proposition "Some sense-data have a certain "pink shading". I 20 SellarsVsAyer: a code adds nothing, the understanding of the sense-data language as a code, neither. Data/Sellars: empirical - content/Sellars: theoretical entities. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Ayer, A. J. | Hempel. Vs Ayer, A. J. | II 112 Demand for Partial Confirmability/(2.3)/Ayer: his criterion is supposed to determine by content that a statement S has an empirical sense if observation statements can be derived from S together with suitable auxiliary hypotheses, which cannot be derived from the auxiliary hypotheses alone. HempelVsAyer: Although this is more similar to the logical structure of the verification, it is much too permeable. ((s) >Quine-Duhem Thesis/QDT: allows just any auxiliary hypothesis). Hempel: E.g. "If the absolute is perfect, then this (!) apple is red". This allows the derivation of the observation statements, which obviously does not follow from the auxiliary hypothesis. ((s) But it does not allow to call a green apple red). Stace: "principle of observable species": "The facts that are denied or affirmed, must be of a type or class so that it is logically possible to observe some facts immediately, which are cases of that class or species. If a statement asserts or denies facts about a class, so that it is not logically possible to observe them directly, then the statement is not significant. II 113 HempelVsStace: this is undecided, he does not say how we determine those classes. And that is precisely what the criterion was supposed to do. Moreover, we can always form a class that contains the fact f together with the fact which is expressed by an observation statement at our discretion, which makes f a member of a basically observable class!. Therefore, the first part of the principle, like Ayers original wording, already includes everything. Criterion of Meaning/Ayer: Additionally: a statement has a meaning if it can be derived from observation statements together with an auxiliary hypothesis. HempelVsAyer: too permeable ((s) >"fake theories".) Modification of 2.3/Ayer: limits the auxiliary hypothesis to statements that are either analytical or can be verified independently. Conjunction/HempelVsAyer: this new criterion fulfills the demand for full falsifiability of an arbitrary conjunction S u N and thus has unintended empirical significance for this one. ChurchVsAyer: Suppose there are any three observation statements, none of which implies any of the others alone, then follows for an entirely arbitrary statement S that either itself or its negation has an empirical sense according to Ayers new criterion. |
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| Ayers, M. | Rorty Vs Ayers, M. | VI 408 Philosophy/Rorty: we have distinguish clear clearly between questions of the tasks of philosophy and content-related topics such as e.g. knowledge, and express ourselves as clearly as possible about their mutual relationship. Philosophy/Rorty: the following theses tend to be represented by the same people 1) Realism/Anti-Realism important distinction 2) Dummett is right: these Antirealism/Realism struggles have been decisive in the history of philosophy. >Antirealism, >Realism. VI 409 3) Wilson was right to express doubts about the contingency of problems. 4) Ayers is right to say that we must allow our own metaphysical and epistemological views to be influenced by our politics and morals. 5) Color: the problem of the "essence of color" is not solvable. The same is true, consequently, for the body-mind problem. 6) Descartes' >skepticism is ahistorical. 7) Sellars and Davidson are wrong when they say that the senses merely play a causal role. Pro McDowell: revival of empiricism. 8) self-identity is not dependent on description, but on intrinsic, non-relational features. Some terms are rigid. 9) Recognition of the unspeakable is laudable intellectual modesty. 10) Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding`" is not a guide, but a work that is yet to be studied and still holds not yet articulated truths. RortyVsAyers: in all 10 theses above, Ayers and I represent diametrically opposed views. VI 410 Rorty: we will never be able to establish a "purely logical" argument for or against one of the 10 theses. VI 411 "Linguistic Idealism"/Rorty: battle cry of AyersVsSellars. RortyVsAyers: a lot it must be established in language before a plausible reference to the taste of onions is at all possible. VI 412 This includes the notion of an inner "Cartesian stage". >Cartesianism. This includes the notion of "consciousness" - (As 17th century notion). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Brandom, R. | Ayer Vs Brandom, R. | I 285 Basis sentences: what are they are confronted with? With facts. But what are the facts? Fact / AyerVs: false equivalence of facts with true propositions (BrandomVsAyer!). Brandom: facts = true statements - Ayer: Facts are not the same as true statements. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Interpretation | Bennett, J. | Rorty VI 360 Interpretation/Bennett: Thesis: we can only understand Kant today if we can clearly indicate, with the help of today's concepts, what his problems were, which of them are still problems today, and what Kant contributed to their solution. VI 361 M. AyersVsBennett: that would mean that it would be impossible to understand a philosopher of the past today according to his own conceptuality. Ayers: Thesis: "we should try to establish the same relationship between thinking and feeling as he himself". RortyVsAyers: You do not get far with that if you do not believe in terms like "mental faculty" anymore. Ayers exaggerates the contrast between "our" and "his" concepts. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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