| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Object Permanence | Baillargeon | Slater I 86 Object Permanence/Baillargeon: Thesis: Piaget (1954)(1) object permanence - an awareness that an object continues to exist when not available to the senses (literally „out of sight, out of mind“) - was not fully acquired until the second year of life had dominated thinking about early infant cognition. BaillargeonVsPiaget: (Baillargeon, Spelke and Wasserman (1985)(2) showed that infants as young as 5 months of age and later 3.5 months of age, Baillargeon 1987(3)) appeared to remember the continued existence of hidden objects and are aware that they maintained some of their physical properties. The key was to move away from the Piagetian criteria of active retrieval (e.g., reaching) for a hidden object as a measure of knowledge. Solution/Baillargeon: [she used] the so-called violation of expectation (VoE) paradigm: it is built on the idea that infants will orient more to novel or surprising events than familiar or expected ones (see Charlesworth, 1969(4). Slater I 87 In particular, [Baillargeon] found that between 3.5 and 12 months of age infants became sensitive to the height (Baillargeon, 1987(3); Baillargeon & Graber 1987(5)), location (Baillargeon & Graber, 1988)(6), and solidity of hidden objects (Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos, & Black, 1990)(7). Baillargeon and colleagues also gradually pieced together infants’ understanding of the physical support relations that can exist between objects placed next to or on top of one another (Baillargeon, 2004(8); Needham & Baillargeon, 1993(9), 2000(10)). Experiment/Drawbridge study/HaithVsBaillargeon: (Haith 1998)(11)the conclusion of the drawbridge study are a product of „rich interpretation“ (Haith 1998) on the part of the researchers, rather than rich conceptual abilities on the part of young infants. Slater I 88 Haith: There was always a more parsimonious perceptual explanation for the infants’ responses. >Object permanence/Haith. Drawbridge study/VsBaillargeon: Rivera, Wakeley, and Langer (1999)(12) Thesis: young infants simply have a general preference to look at the 180-degree rotation for cognitively uninteresting reasons (e.g., longer-lasting movement). Like Haith: Baillargeon’s findings can be explained without any attribution to an ability to think about an unseen object. VsBaillargeon: Bogartz, Shinskey, and Schilling (2000)(13): the relatively high looking times to the 180-degree impossible event in the original drawbridge studies reflected a simple familiarity preference rather than a mental representation of a hidden object. Slater I 89 After nearly two decades of argument in the literature and two highly anticipated debates on this topic at major conferences (Haith vs. Spelke at the Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD), 1997; Baillargeon vs. Smith at the International Conference for Infant Studies (ICIS), 1998), it became clear that behavioral methods alone were not going to produce a scientific consensus. Two key questions that emerged from these debates are (1) what actually constitutes evidence of object permanence (i.e., does passive surprise suffice or is active engagement required?) and (2) where and how does this competence originate? >Object permanence/neuroscience, >Object permanence/connectionism. 1. Piaget, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child. New York: Basic Books. 2. Baillargeon, R., Spelke, E. S., & Wasserman, S. (1985). Object permanence in five-month-old infants. Cognition, 20, 191–208. 3. Baillargeon, R. (1987). Object permanence in 3 1/2-and 4 1/2-month-old infants. Developmental Psychology, 23, 655–664. 4. Charlesworth, W. R. (1969). The role of surprise in cognitive development. In D. Elkind & J. Flavell (Eds), Studies in cognitive development. Essays in honor of Jean Piaget (pp. 257–314). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Baillargeon, R., & Graber, M. (1987). Where’s the rabbit? 5.5-month-old infants’ representation of the height of a hidden object. Cognitive Development, 2, 375–392. 6. Baillargeon, R., & Graber, M. (1988). Evidence of location memory in 8-month-old infants in a nonsearch AB task. Developmental Psychology, 24, 502–511. 7. Baillargeon, R., Graber, M., DeVos, J., & Black, J. (1990). Why do young infants fail to search for hidden objects? Cognition, 36, 255–284. 8. Baillargeon, R., (2004). Infants’ reasoning about hidden objects. Evidence for event-general and event-specific expectations. Developmental Science, 7, 391-414. 9. Needham, A., & Baillargeon, R. (1993). Intuitions about support in 4.5-month-old infants. Cognition, 47, 121–48. 10. Needham, A., & Baillargeon, R. (2000). Infants’ use of featural and experiential information in segregating and individuating objects: A reply to Xu, Carey and Welch (2000). Cognition, 74, 255–284. 11. Haith, M. M. (1998). Who put the cog in infant cognition? Is rich interpretation too costly? Infant Behavior and Development, 21, 167–179. 12. Rivera, S. M., Wakeley, A., & Langer, J. (1999). The drawbridge phenomenon: Representational reasoning or perceptual preference? Developmental Psychology, 35, 427–435. 13. Bogartz, R. S., Shinskey, J. L., & Schilling, T. H. (2000). Object permanence in five-and-a-half-month-old infants? Infancy, 1, 403–428. Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman, „Object permanence in Infancy. Revisiting Baillargeon’s Drawbridge Experiment“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Object Permanence | Haith | Slater I 87 Object permanence/Experiment/HaithVsBaillargeon/Haith: (Haith 1998)(1) the conclusion of the drawbridge study are a product of „rich interpretation“ (Haith 1998) on the part of the researchers, rather than rich conceptual abilities on the part of young infants. Slater I 88 Haith: There was always a more parsimonious perceptual explanation for the infants’ responses. In explaining the Drawbridge findings, Haith suggested that infants continue to see the box even once it is visually occluded due to a kind of lingering visual memory trace; and consequently infants look longer at the “impossible” event not because it is impossible but because of the novelty of seeing one physical object pass through another physical object. The infants’ response to novelty, it is argued, need not depend on any physical knowledge at all, but merely on the fact that in the real world objects generally do not appear to pass through other objects unimpeded. >Object permanence/Baillargeon, >Object permanence/developmental psychology, >Object permanence/Connectionism. 1. Haith, M. M. (1998). Who put the cog in infant cognition? Is rich interpretation too costly? Infant Behavior and Development, 21, 167–179. Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman, „Object permanence in Infancy. Revisiting Baillargeon’s Drawbridge Experiment“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Object Permanence | Neuroscience | Slater I 90 Object permanence/neuroscience: Tallon-Baudry and colleagues (1998)(1) reported that there was a significant increase in temporal cortex activity when adults were prompted to keep the image of a hidden object in mind. This finding along with the discovery that this type of activity can be detectible in the infant brain (Csibra et al., 2000)(2) formed the basis for an entirely new line of object permanence research in infants by Kaufman and colleagues. First, Kaufman, Csibra, and Johnson (2003)(3) measured brain responses in infants while they watched videos of a toy train entering and leaving a toy tunnel. Each trial was predetermined to be a “possible” or “impossible” trial. 1) Infants looked longer at the impossible event than the possible event. 2) Kaufman et al. found significant right-temporal cortex activity of infants in the times and conditions in which there was a hidden object that could elicit mental representation. This activity was temporally and spatially similar to Tallon-Baudry’s (1998)(1) finding with adults suggesting that the neural processes underlying hidden object representation in infants and adults are similar. Slater I 91 Arguably, if out of sight were really out of mind for young infants, it would also be “out of brain,” and this was not the case. However, this argument is only partially persuasive as infants might be remembering the object without any real conception or perception of the object having continued to exist. That is, this brain activity could relate to either an expectation formed between the reaching hand and the object’s appearance or it could relate to a memory for the object unrelated to a perception that the object continues to exist. Solution: Kaufman, Csibra, and Johnson (2005)(3) presented infants with pictures of toys that disappeared in one of two different ways: they disintegrated they appeared to become occluded (which is consistent with continued existence). This time, no hand was involved in the action. The study was chosen to test the hypothesizes that this brain activity is related to a perception of the object’s continued existence rather than a simple memory trace for something that had been previously seen. Cf. >Object permanence/Baillargeon; >Vs Baillargeon. Again, the results were that right-temporal brain activity increased following an object occlusion event but not after a disintegration event, indicating that right-temporal activity in the infant brain (as in the in the adult brain) is related to object processing relevant to continued existence and is important for the understanding of object permanence. In another study (Southgate, Csibra, Kaufman, & Johnson, 2008)(4) there was an increase in brain activity related to a toy’s occlusion. Interestingly though, this activity was not apparent when a face was hidden. This leads to the intriguing possibility that, at least for young infants, the brain mechanisms used to remember the existence of objects are not used to remember faces. Slater I 92 This result is consistent with behavioral studies demonstrating that infants are not very good at remembering the locations of occluded faces (Mareschal & Johnson, 2003)(5). 1. Tallon-Baudry, C., Bertrand, O., Peronnet, F., & Pernier, J. (1998). Induced y-band activity during the delay of a visual short-term memory task in humans. The Journal of Neuroscience, 18, 4244–4254. 2..Csibra, G., Davis, G., Spratling, M. W., & Johnson, M. H. (2000). Gamma oscillations and object processing in the infant brain. Science, 290, 1582–1585. 3. Kaufman, J., Csibra, G., & Johnson, M. H. (2005). Oscillatory activity in the infant brain reflects object maintenance. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 102, 15271–15274. 4. Southgate, V., Csibra, G., Kaufman, J., & Johnson, M. H. (2008). Distinct processing of objects and faces in the infant brain. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20, 741–9. 5. Mareschal, D., & Johnson, M. H. (2003). The “what” and “where” of object representations in infancy. Cognition, 88, 259–276. Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman, „Object permanence in Infancy. Revisiting Baillargeon’s Drawbridge Experiment“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |