Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equivalence Theorem | Barro | Mause I 277 Equivalence Theorem/government debt/Ricardo/Barro: Thesis: the financing of public expenditure via taxes or via government debt is equivalent. However, this requires a number of restrictive assumptions. The theorem goes back to Ricardo, but was only brought into its present form by Barro. (1) N.B.: The question is whether additional expenditure makes sense in consideration of the need for private cutting consumption to finance it, but not in what way it is financed. Reason: If government debt rises, private households will anticipate future tax increases and adjust their consumption patterns accordingly. VsEquivalence Theorem: the empirical relevance of these questions can be questioned. For example, there could be altruism between the generations: Parents plan with a basically infinite time horizon. Another problem: it is also assumed that the path of expenditure policy is independent of the financial instrument used. This is only plausible if intergenerational altruism works and voters are perfectly informed. Behavioral Economics/BuchananVsRicardo/BuchananVsBarro/BuchananVsEquivalence theorem: if government debt is perceived less strongly than taxes, debt-financed higher spending may be politically enforceable. Then Ricardo's equivalence collapses. (2) This problem also exists when the capital markets are not perfect, allowing households to easily shift consumption between the present and the future, even without public debt instruments. VsBarro: another problem: distorting taxes: If you move away from the first best tax system, it may well play a role for the welfare of individuals whether the state is in debt. Hereto: Solution/Barro: subsequently introduced the argument of tax smoothing into the discussion. (3) In this case, it makes sense to compensate for fluctuations in tax revenue by increasing and reducing government debt, but to keep tax rates relatively constant. BarroVsKeynesianism: The reason for this is not an economic policy countermeasure for Keynesian motives, but the fact that welfare losses caused by distorting taxes increase disproportionately with tax rates. For further problems see >Growth/Diamond. 1. Robert J. Barro. 1974. Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political Economy 82 (6): 1095– 1117. 2. James M. Buchanan & Richard E. Wagner. Democracy in deficit. The political legacy of Lord Keynes. New York 1977. 3. Robert J. Barro. 1979. On the determination of the public debt. Journal of Political Economy 87 (5): 940– 971. |
EconBarro I Robert J. Barro Rational expectations and the role of monetary policy 1976 EconBarro II Robert J. Barro David B. Gordon Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policcy 1983 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Equivalence Theorem | Ricardo | Mause I 277 Equivalence Theorem/government debt/Ricardo/Barro: Thesis: the financing of public expenditure via taxes or via government debt is equivalent. However, this requires a number of restrictive assumptions. The theorem goes back to Ricardo, but was only brought into its present form by Barro. (1) N.B.: The question is whether additional expenditure makes sense in consideration of the need for private cutting consumption to finance it, but not in what way it is financed. Reason: If government debt rises, private households will anticipate future tax increases and adjust their consumption patterns accordingly. VsEquivalence Theorem: the empirical relevance of these questions can be questioned. For example, there could be altruism between the generations: Parents plan with a basically infinite time horizon. Another problem: it is also assumed that the path of expenditure policy is independent of the financial instrument used. This is only plausible if intergenerational altruism works and voters are perfectly informed. Behavioral Economics/BuchananVsRicardo/BuchananVsBarro/BuchananVsEquivalence theorem: if government debt is perceived less strongly than taxes, debt-financed higher spending may be politically enforceable. Then Ricardo's equivalence collapses. (2) This problem also exists when the capital markets are not perfect, allowing households to easily shift consumption between the present and the future, even without public debt instruments. VsBarro: another problem: distorting taxes: If you move away from the first best tax system, it may well play a role for the welfare of individuals whether the state is in debt. Hereto: Solution/Barro: subsequently introduced the argument of tax smoothing into the discussion. (3) In this case, it makes sense to compensate for fluctuations in tax revenue by increasing and reducing government debt, but to keep tax rates relatively constant. BarroVsKeynesianism: The reason for this is not an economic policy countermeasure for Keynesian motives, but the fact that welfare losses caused by distorting taxes increase disproportionately with tax rates. For further problems see >Growth/Diamond. 1. Robert J. Barro. 1974. Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political Economy 82 (6): 1095 – 1117. 2. James M. Buchanan & Richard E. Wagner. Democracy in deficit. The political legacy of Lord Keynes. New York 1977. 3. Robert J. Barro. 1979. On the determination of the public debt. Journal of Political Economy 87 (5): 940– 971. |
EconRic I David Ricardo On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Feminism | Barry | Gaus I 418 Feminism/Barry/Weinstein: Justice as impartiality (...) preserves the liberal public versus private goods distinction that feminists have claimed reinforces patriarchy. >Utilitarianism/Barry. Barry nevertheless concedes that domestic violence and marital rape are public concerns. Privacy: The personal is indeed largely political. MendusVsBarry: But as Susan Mendus perceptively worries, 'what is to block the move to the kind of society which Barry fears - one in which very little is left to private judgement and almost everything to public scrutiny and censure?' (1998(1): 183). Feminism: In short, Barry's feminism risks collapsing the private into the public, imperilling his liberalism. BarryVsVs: Barry responds, accusing Mendus of 'alarmism' and denying that prohibiting domestic violence and marital rape would 'open the floodgates' to tyrannizing (utilitarian) impartiality. He insists that rightful public intervention in some cases won't lead 'inexorably to public intervention in other cases where that is wrong' (Barry, 1998(2): 256).* Surely this begs the question. >Impartiality/Barry. * Also see Phillips (1999a)(3) for a liberal feminist account of the dangers of radically overpoliticizing the personal. 1. Mendus, Susan (1998) 'Some mistakes about impartiality'. In P. Kelly, ed., Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 176-85. 2. Barry, Brian (1998) 'Something in the disputation not unpleasant'. In P. Kelly, ed., Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 186-257. 3. Phillips, Anne (1999a) 'The politicisation of difference'. In John Horton and Susan Mendus, eds, Toleration, Identity and Diffeænce. London: Macmillan, 126-45. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
EconBarry I Brian Barry Sociologists,economists, and democracy Chicago 1970 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Government Debt | Buchanan | Boudreaux I 13 Government debt/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: „The essence of public debt, as a financing institution, is that it allows the objective cost of currently financed expenditure projects to be postponed in time. For the taxpayer, public debt delays the necessity of transferring command over resource services to the treasury.“ James M. Buchanan, “Confessions of a Burden Monger” (1964)(1). Boudreaux I 14 [It was a] consensus by mid-twentieth century economists that debt-financed projects are paid for by citizen-taxpayers at the time the projects are undertaken rather than by future generations. „New orthodoxy“/Buchanan: Buchanan called [this]“the new orthodoxy.” It was an orthodoxy because it was widely taken to be obviously true, and it was new because it sprung from Keynesian economics, which in 1958 was only 22 years old. Tradition: Until John Maynard Keynes published his General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money in 1936(2), most economists - from Adam Smith in the mid-eighteenth century through economists in the early twentieth century - understood that the costs of government projects funded with debt are passed on to the future generations who, as citizen-taxpayers, must repay the debt. KeynesianismVsSmith, Adam: This understanding was rejected by the new orthodoxy ((s) Keynesianism) and replaced with the insistence that projects funded with borrowed money are, just like projects funded with currently collected taxes, paid for at the time the projects are undertaken. The new orthodoxy does recognize that debt financing nevertheless leaves a legacy for future citizen-taxpayers. In the case of [a] hypothetical hydroelectric dam built in 2021 with borrowed funds, citizens are obliged in 2051 to repay the debt that was incurred 30 years earlier. To do so they must, in 2051, pay more in taxes or suffer cuts in government programs (or some combination of the two) (…). Boudreaux I 15 But, the new orthodoxy continues, if the bond is owned and submitted for redemption by nationals, then apart from some relatively negligible costs incurred in carrying out the process of transferring the funds from citizen-taxpayers to citizen-bondholders, redemption imposes no net burden on nationals. Although those citizens who pay the debt are worse off as a result of paying more in taxes or receiving less in government services, other citizens - those who receive repayment of the debt - are better off by the same amount. Just as a household is made neither richer nor poorer if a wife transfers money to her husband, a nation is made neither richer nor poorer if one group of citizens transfers money to another group of citizens. Using the phrase that mid-1950s economists employed to describe this situation, nationals in 2051 might say, “We owe it to ourselves.” BuchananVsNew orthodoxy/BuchananVsKeynesianism: According to Buchanan, the new orthodoxy’s fatal flaw is its insistence that the costs of debt financing are incurred in the periods when the debt-financed programs are undertaken. Boudreaux I 16 And if this insistence is wrong, then the older, pre-Keynesian understanding is correct that programs funded with debt today are paid for by citizen-taxpayers tomorrow. Therefore, by using debt to finance government programs, we, today’s citizen-taxpayers, can indeed consume at the expense of our children and grandchildren. >Public finance, >Interest rates, cf. >Time/Rothbard. Solution/Buchanan: The key insight in Buchanan’s criticism of the new orthodoxy and, hence, of his revitalization of the older, classical view is the realization that creditors who lend money to the government do so voluntarily. But these creditors lend to the government only because they believe that the interest payments they will receive in exchange make such loans worthwhile for them. These creditors are not the purchasers of the debt-financed projects; instead, they are purchasers of future interest payments that make it worthwhile for them to sacrifice their consumption today. Thus, debt-financed government projects are not paid for by the government’s creditors. After all, the very reason the government in 2021 borrows the funds to build the dam is to relieve today’s citizen-taxpayers from having to pay for it. Yet someone has to pay for the dam! Who? Buchanan’s answer is that the dam is paid for by citizen-taxpayers in 2051, who are obliged to repay the debt. >Taxation. KeynesianismVsBuchanan: Adherents of the new orthodoxy respond by saying that if the debt is repaid to fellow citizens, there is no net reduction in aggregate national wealth. The repayment, they maintain, is merely a transfer, as if from the left hand to the right. BuchananVsVs: Buchanan, however, argued that this reasoning is mistaken. If the creditors in 2021 had not loaned [the money] to the government, they would have done something else with their money - something else of nearly equivalent value to lending to the government - such as, for instance, lending [the money] to private companies. >Time preference, >Opportunity costs. Credit/repayment: Buchanan assumed, not unrealistically, that credit markets are competitive. From this assumption it follows that the attractiveness to creditors of lending to the government is only marginally greater than (that is, is largely equivalent to) the attractiveness of using their money in other ways. And so when in 2051 the government’s creditors are repaid, they are made no better off (or worse off) than they would have been had they used their money differently in 2021. Repayment of the debt does not make the repaid creditors anything but marginally richer than they would have been had they instead invested their money in alternative projects. But repayment does make the citizen-taxpayers who foot the bill poorer by the full amount of the repayment. >Credit. Boudreaux I 19 Note that Buchanan’s argument that each debt-financed project is paid for by the future citizen-taxpayers who must service the debt holds regardless of whether the project is wasteful or productive. Debt/taxation/Buchanan: Buchanan’s argument should not, therefore, be interpreted as counselling against any and all debt financing. He explicitly recognized that it is appropriate to finance some projects with debt rather than with current taxation. Projects that yield benefits to future citizen-taxpayers are appropriately paid for by those future taxpayers rather than by current taxpayers who derive no benefits from such projects. In such cases, debt financing is a vehicle for handing the bill to those who will receive the benefits. Free rider/Buchanan: This ability of current taxpayers to use debt financing to free-ride on the wealth of future generations led Buchanan to worry that government today will both spend excessively and fund too many projects with debt. >Moral hazard. Boudreaux I 20 Democracy/Buchanan: Tomorrow’s citizen-taxpayers, after all, are not today’s voters. Thus, the interests of these future generations are under-represented in the political process. To reduce the magnitude of this problem, Buchanan endorsed constitutional rules that oblige governments to annually keep their budgets in balance. Constitution/Buchanan: His fear that the opportunity for debt financing of government projects and programs would be abused was so acute that it led him to endorse a balanced-budget amendment to the US Constitution. His participation in a political effort to secure such an amendment is one of the very few specific, ground-level policy battles that he actively joined. >Constitution/Buchanan. Boudreaux I 21 Government Debt: When analyzing the activities of government, the costs and benefits of government policies fall on individuals, not on aggregates or groups. The argument that domestically held public debt is no burden because “we owe it to ourselves” is revealed as fallacious once we recognize that the aggregate – ourselves - is really composed of many individuals, some of whom will pay the taxes to finance the debt repayment, and some of whom will receive the proceeds when they redeem the bonds they hold. 1. Buchanan, James M. (1964). “Confessions of a Burden Monger”. Journal of Political Economy Vol. 72, No. 5 (Oct., 1964), pp. 486-488. 2. Keynes, J. M. [1936] The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Macmillan. Mause I 279 Government Debt/Buchanan: Question: Is it basically acceptable for citizens to give their representatives the opportunity to deficit finance their budgets? (Prerequisite: the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem does not apply; see Terminology/Economic Theories). Brennan/Buchanan: No: Deficit financing would be systematically used to finance expenditures beyond the desired level and past the tax resistance of citizens.(1) >Generational Justice/Diamond, Equivalence Theorem/Barro. See also BuchananVsBarro. 1. Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, The power to tax. Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution. Cambridge 1980. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Interventions | Kalecki | Mause I 231 Interventions/Post-Keynesianism/Kalecki: KaleckiVsNew Political Economy/KaleckiVsBarro/KaleckiVsGordon: While the New Political Economy (Public Choice) (1) wants to link selective state intervention to institutional framework conditions in order to limit the scope for monetary policy, post-Keynesianism rather sees the danger that discretionary ((s) selective) monetary and fiscal policies remain too passive and therefore the output level for political reasons remains unnecessarily long below the production potential, combined with economic unemployment. (2) John B. TalyorVsKalecki: See Taylor Rule/Taylor. 1. Barro, Robert J., und David B. Gordon, Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, (1), 1983. S. 101– 121. 2. Cf. Michal Kalecki, In Collected works of Michal Kalecki, Hrsg. Jerzy Osyatinski. Oxford 1973. |
EconKale I Michal Kalecki The political aspects of full employment Oxford 1973 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Interventions | Public Choice | Mause I 230f Interventions/New Political Economy/Public Choice: The danger of dynamic inconsistency is particularly emphasized by the New Political Economy. Problems: lack of credibility, time inconsistency ((s) delay or lack of effects). (1) For example, inadequate expectation formation and anticipation can be used temporarily in the markets to achieve the employment target. Problem: Lack of credibility: e.g. The announcements of the central bank are no longer considered credible and market participants take higher inflation rates into account in their economic plans. Solution/New Political Economy: institutional framework conditions that change the central bank's decision-making calculations. Accordingly, either the room for manoeuvre of monetary policy makers must be limited by means of rules and legal requirements or the costs of inflation must (...) be increased. Post-KeynesianismVsNew Political Economy: Rather, the danger is seen here that discretionary ((s) selective) monetary and fiscal policies will remain too passive and therefore the output level will remain below the production potential for unnecessarily long for political reasons, combined with cyclical unemployment. (2) John B. TalyorVsBarro: See Taylor Rule/Taylor. 1. Barro, Robert J., und David B. Gordon, Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, (1), 1983. S. 101– 121. 2.Vgl. Michal Kalecki, In Collected works of Michal Kalecki, Hrsg. Jerzy Osyatinski. Oxford 1973. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Multiculturalism | Barry | Gaus I 257 Multiculturalism/Barry/Kukathas: According to Barry, multiculturalism is inconsistent with liberalism and a respect for liberal values and should therefore be rejected. (Barry 2001)(1) Galston: [William] Galston has termed 'Reformation liberalism'. Unlike 'Enlightenment liberalism', which emphasizes the importance of individual autonomy, 'Reformation liberalism', Galston maintains, values diversity and sees the importance of 'differences among individuals and groups over such matters as the nature ofthe good life, sources of moral authority, reason versus faith, and the like' (1995(2): 521). BarryVsGalston: Barry rejects this distinction, but is especially critical nonetheless of those who are members of the diversity-promoting liberalism camp. Barry rejects three major arguments advanced in support of Reformation liberalism. 1) The first is that liberal theory values respect for persons and this implies respect for the cultures to which individuals belong. To this Barry replies that illiberal cultures often violate the requirement of equal respect and to that extent they do not deserve respect (2001(1): 128). 2) The second argument is that liberalism values diversity because it increases the range of options available to individuals. To this Barry responds that liberals prize individuality rather than diversity (2001(1): 129). 3) The third argument is that liberalism attaches great importance to the public/private distinction, and so should be committed to nonintervention in the private realm. To this Barry replies that liberalism has historically challenged the sanctity of parental and paternal authority, and sought to protect individuals from the groups to which they belong. Individuals/Barry: Individuals must be free to associate in any way they like (consistent with the law protecting the interests of those outside the association). But there are two important conditions: all participants in the association should be sane adults, and their participation should be voluntary (2001(1): 148). Group rights: Groups may then do as they please, provided those who do not like the way a group's affairs are run are able to exit without facing excessive costs (2001(1): 150). Problems/VsBarry: Barry's view imposes serious constraints, then, on the operation of groups. In the end, what it tolerates is only what Fish calls 'boutique multiculturalism'. (>Multiculturalism/Fish). It requires that illiberal practices not be condoned, that parents be required to send their children to school, and that generally the state ensures that children are appropriately educated and not made the victims of creationists and religious zealots - even if they are their parents. >Religion/education/Multiculturalism. Egalitarianism: In the end, Barry's view amounts to a reassertion of liberal egalitarianism as a doctrine that is simply incompatible with multiculturalism. VsBarry: (For criticisms of Barry see the papers in Kelly, 2002(3); Per Barry: for another defence of liberal egalitarianism see Kernohan, 1998(4).) 1. Barry, Brian (2001) Cultuæ and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Oxford: Polity. 2. Galston, William (1995) 'Two concepts of Liberalism', Ethics, 105(3): 516-34. 3. Kelly, Paul, ed. (2002) Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Cultuæ and Equality and Its Critics. Oxford: Polity. 4. Kernohan, Andrew (1998) Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Oppression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
EconBarry I Brian Barry Sociologists,economists, and democracy Chicago 1970 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Rawls | Barry | Gaus I 94 Rawls/Barry, Brian/Waldron: Some commentators (e.g. Barry, 1995)(1) have expressed doubts about Rawls’s self-criticism(2) that the adoption of this ‘thin theory’ ((s) >Good/Rawls) means that A Theory of Justice was rooted in a particular comprehensive conception. WaldronVsBarry: But it is pretty clear that large parts of Rawlsian justice would not work without this thin theory of the good and of the importance of self-respect. The thin theory of the good and the notion of self-respect are implicated in the non-negotiable status that Rawls accords to freedom of conscience, for example, as well as in the general doctrine of the priority of liberty, the doctrine of the priority of opportunity, and his argument to the effect that citizens in a well-ordered society will not be motivated by material envy. 1. Barry, Brian (1995) ‘John Rawls and the search for stability’. Ethics, 105 (4): 874–915. 2. Rawls, John (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’. Journal of Philosophy, 77 (9): 515–72. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
EconBarry I Brian Barry Sociologists,economists, and democracy Chicago 1970 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Artificial Intelligence | Hofstadter Vs Artificial Intelligence | II 701 HofstadterVsBarr: Confusion of the levels: "Cognition as an arithmetic process": even if the neurons cope with humming in an analogous way, this does not mean that the epiphenomena themselves are also arithmetic. Example : If taxis stop at red, this does not mean that traffic jams stop at red. (> Distribution/ >Properties): You should not confuse the properties of objects with the properties of collections of these objects. On one level something can be a calculation, on another it is not! (>Consciousness, State of Mind, State of Brain). II 704 HofstadterVsArtificial Intelligence: many representatives of "information processing" neglect the lower level. HofstadterVsArtificial Intelligence: whose main premise is that thoughts on their own level are themselves computational entities. (School of "Information Processing"). Active Symbols/Hofstadter: but there is no force at a higher level ("program") that orients itself downwards and pushes the symbols back and forth. Active symbols must incorporate what is necessary into their structures. In such a (hitherto hypothetical) program, the symbols themselves are active. |
Hofstadter I Douglas Hofstadter Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid German Edition: Gödel, Escher, Bach - ein Endloses Geflochtenes Band Stuttgart 2017 Hofstadter II Douglas Hofstadter Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern German Edition: Metamagicum München 1994 |
| Barrow, J.D. | Kanitscheider Vs Barrow, J.D. | II 105 KanitscheiderVsBarrow: the purpose of a measurement is the registration, i.e. leaving a permanent trace, not the subjective experience. II 107 KanitscheiderVsBarrow: realism is simply the most rational metaphysical assumption to understand the cognitive interaction between man and the world. II 108 KanitscheiderVsBarrow: phenomena, in biological terms, are also traces of the things that are formed via the information channel of a conscious animal. Therefore, evolutionary biology, when expanded to the cognitive process, leads the approach of the subjectivist constitution of the world by last observer in terms of quantum mechanics ad absurdum! KanitscheiderVsBarrow: one could possibly also consider a split interpretation of physics and biology such that the biological realism only makes sense on this level of complexity, but cannot be sustained on the fundamental physical level of description. But then there is also a dilemma regarding the demarcation: between biology and QM there is still the molecular level of the chemical systems, the viruses, the DNA and the pharmacological objects. A quasi-continuum of systems of all sizes. A split ontology would provoke the question, at which magnitude the philosophical interpretation of the status of the systems switches. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Idealism | Verschiedene Vs Idealism | Kanitscheider II 105 KanitscheiderVsBarrow / KanitscheiderVsTipler: extreme idealism. The central role of consciousness in this thesis sees to it that the chain of consciousness may never stop, that it reach all the events and the space-time must allow merging all observation chains. There must therefore be no event horizons. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Various Authors | Hofstadter Vs Various Authors | II 108 Arthur Koestler: VsKoestler: "Koestler's Fallacy": general inability to see that unusual events is likely in the long run. Reason: 1. Because we do not notice non-events, we misjudge the basis. 2. We are weak in the assessment of event combinations. 3. We overlook the principle of equivalence of curious coincidences: for one theory of the supernatural, one chance is as good as another. II 482 Sapir-Whorf-Thesis: Language controls thinking. A programmer in the language X can only think in terms offered by the language. (HofstadterVsWhorf) VsWhorf: the power of a great literary work does not come from the language into which the author was accidentally born, otherwise all Russians would have to be great writers. It also stems from the history of his experiences and his ability to make experiences. II 486 Language/Hofstadter: Question: Why is there not a single word for the phrase "Come and have a look" after so many thousand years, e.g. "Kamhuseda"? Also novels have not become shorter in the last 200 years! Reason: The ideas have another dimension. II 688 Artificial Intelligence: Avon Barr: "information-processing cognition model". "Everything interesting about cognition happens above the 100 millisecond level, the time it takes to recognize your mother. VsBarr: just as well you can say:" everything above this level..., the time you need to recognize your mother." II 701 VsBarr: confusion of levels: "cognition as arithmetic process": even if the neurons cope with sums in an analogous way, this does not mean that the epiphenomena themselves also do arithmetic. Example: if taxis stop at red, this does not mean that traffic jams stop at red. II 701 Simon: (Artificial Intelligence pioneer): Common ground between the brain and information-processing processes is obvious. VsSimon: How can he believe that? Computers still do not have subcognitive actions in the most elementary sense. There is no common sense program. ((s) See Hofstadter II 696) Def Intelligence/Simon/Newell: mind, bound in any matter that can be arranged into patterns. II 703 Symbol/HofstadterVsSimon/Nevell: for me has more to do with representative expressiveness (representation). To represent something else, something must be immensely rich. HofstadterVsSymbol Manipulation, "symbol processing": the manipulation of meaningless signs is not enough to generate understanding, although it is enough to enrich them with meaning in a limited sense of the word. (Gödel, Escher, Bach, Chapters II to VI). II 704 Computer/Artificial Intelligence/AI/Consciousness/HofstadterVsSimon/Newell: Problem: they see the computer as lifeless, passive objects and also the symbols as passive. Denotation /Hofstadter: does not happen at all on the level of symbols! Also the single ant is not "symbolic". II 720 Thinking/Boole: believed he could grasp the "laws of thinking" through rules for manipulating claims. II 723 Cognition/VsSimon/Newell: Thesis: In every truly cognitive system there must be several levels that allow a rigid syntax at the lowest level to develop into a fluid semantics at the highest level. Symbolic events are reversed into non-symbolic events. II 724 Symbol/Newell: a physical symbol is actually identical to a Lisp Atom with an attached list. ("property list"). HofstadterVs. Symbol/Bits/Hofstadter: Bits are not symbols. Meaning/Lisp/Hofstadter: The logic of Lisp does not rise from a lower level. It is fully present in the written program, even when there is no computer. |
Hofstadter II Douglas Hofstadter Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern German Edition: Metamagicum München 1994 |
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