Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Action Theory | Habermas | III 369 Action Theory/Analytical Philosophy/Habermas: the analytical action theory ((s) following Grice, Austin) is limited to the atomistic action model of a solitary actor and neglects mechanisms of action coordination through which interpersonal relationships are formed. >P. Grice, >J.L. Austin. III 370 Therefore, it finds hardly any connection to the formation of social scientific concepts. The philosophical problems it creates are too non-specific for the purposes of social theory. >Sociology, >Method. HabermasVsAnalytical Philosophy/HabermasVsAnalytical Theory of Action: it goes back to Kant by asking about causality, intentionality and the logical status of explanations without penetrating into the basic questions of a sociological theory of action. >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Explanation. Instead, questions of coordination of action should be taken as a starting point.(1) >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas. III 371 HabermasVsGrice/HabermasVsBennett/HabermasVsLewis, David/HabermasVsSchiffer: the intentional semantics developed by these authors are not suitable for clarifying the coordination mechanism of linguistically mediated interactions, because it analyses the act of communication itself according to the model of consequence-oriented action. >Intentional Semantics, >St. Schiffer, >D. Lewis, >J. Bennett. Intentional Semantics/HabermasVsGrice: Intentional semantics is based on the contraintuitive idea that understanding the meaning of a symbolic expression can be traced back to the speaker's intention to give the listener something to understand. III 373 Solution/Habermas: Karl Bühler's organon model (see Language/Bühler), ((s) which distinguishes between symbol, signal and symptom and refers to sender and receiver) leads in its theoretical meaning to the concept of an interaction of subjects capable of speech and action mediated by acts of communication. >Interaction, >Subjects. III 384 Action Theory/Habermas: HabermasVsWeber: unlike Weber, who assumes a monological action model, Habermas considers a model that takes into account the coordination of several action subjects. He differentiates between action types according to situation and orientation: Action Orientation: success-oriented - or communication-oriented Action Situation: social - or non-social Instrumental Action/Habermas: is then success-oriented and non-social Strategic action: success-oriented and social (it takes into account the actions and interests of others). >Interest. Communicative Action: is social and communication-oriented (without being success-oriented). >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, >Agreement, >Success. 1.S. Kanngiesser, Sprachliche Universalien und diachrone Prozesse, in: K. O. Apel (1976), 273ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Facts | Lewis | Schwarz I 158 Facts/colors researcher Mary/Lewis: you can learn special items and representations even if you get information in Russian, - but there are no particular facts for Russians. - Real progress in knowledge: acquisition of new skills. - Mary/Lewis: The main thing is that there are not recent (physical) possibilities excluded, that is not possible. Explanation/(s): Example color researcher Mary/Frank Jackson: the color researcher Mary is in a closed room with a black and white monitor. She has any amount of literature about colors at her disposal. Question: is her knowledge sufficient to say that she knows everything about colors? >Color/Jackson, >Qualia/Jackson. Schwarz I 139 Moore's facts/Schwarz: For example, absences are often causes and effects. Something that only philosophers think about denying. Schwarz I 11 Moore's Facts/Lewis: are more certain than the premises of any philosophical argument that could be used to refute them. Schwarz I 15 Analysis/language/fact/Schwarz: strictly speaking, only words and sentences can be analyzed, not facts. Fact/Schwarz: nothing but true sentences: For example "the fact that it is snowing" means nothing else than "it is snowing". For example, "facts about snow are necessarily determined by facts about precipitation": is equivalent to a long conjunction of sentences like "necessary if there is no precipitation, it does not snow either", etc. Schwarz I 62 Mathematics/actuality/fact/Lewis/black: as with possible worlds, there is no actual information: For example, that 34 is the root of 1156 tells us nothing about the world. Schwarz: For example that there is nobody who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. Schwarz I 133 Fact/Schwarz: if you understand them as classes of space-time regions, this is not an alternative at all, but only a terminological variant. Def Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: true propositions (1986f(1),189,Fn 15). I.e. classes of possible worlds. Then there are facts that unambiguously correspond with Lewis's classes of space-time regions, but one can no longer distinguish "right" causes and effects from wrong ones. Cause/Effect/Event/Event/Act/LewisVsBennett/Schwarz: Event as fact: Problem: To Distinguish "Right Causes": Similarity is not a solution here: Example Xanthippe's becoming a widow: here one cannot refer to similarity of regions. 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Intention-Based Semantics | Habermas | III 369 Intention-Based Semantics/Action Theory/Habermas: the analytical action theory ((s) following Grice, Austin) is limited to the atomistic action model of a solitary actor and neglects mechanisms of action coordination through which interpersonal relationships are formed. >P. Grice, >J.L. Austin. III 370 Therefore, it finds hardly any connection to the formation of social scientific concepts. The philosophical problems it creates are too non-specific for the purposes of social theory. HabermasVsAnalytical Philosophy/HabermasVsAnalytical Theory of Action: it goes back to Kant by asking about causality, intentionality and the logical status of explanations without penetrating into the basic questions of a sociological theory of action. Instead, questions of coordination of action should be taken as a starting point.(1) >Causality, >Intentionality, >Explanation, >Causal explanation. III 371 HabermasVsGrice/HabermasVsBennett/HabermasVsLewis, David/HabermasVsSchiffer: the intentional semantics developed by these authors is not suitable for clarifying the coordination mechanism of linguistically mediated interactions, because it analyses the act of communication itself according to the model of consequence-oriented action. >St. Schiffer, >D. Lewis, >Semantics. Intentional Semantics/HabermasVsGrice: Intentional semantics is based on the contraintuitive idea that understanding the meaning of a symbolic expression can be traced back to the speaker's intention to give the listener something to understand. III 373 Solution/Habermas: Karl Bühler's organon model (see Language/Bühler), ((s) which distinguishes between symbol, signal and symptom and refers to sender and receiver) leads in its theoretical meaning to the concept of an interaction of subjects capable of speech and action mediated by acts of communication. 1.S. Kanngiesser, Sprachliche Universalien und diachrone Prozesse, in: K. O. Apel (1976), 273ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Interpretation | Ayers | Rorty VI 360 Interpretation/Bennett: Thesis: we can only understand Kant today by clearly indicating with the help of today's concepts what his problems were, which are still problems today, and what Kant did for their solution. >Meaning Change, >Theory change, >Translation, >Hermeneutics. VI 361 M. AyersVsBennett: that means that it is impossible to understand a philosopher of the past today according to his own conceptuality. Ayers: Thesis: We should try to establish the same relationship between thinking and feeling as he himself did. RortyVsAyers: one does not get far with this, if one no longer believes in terms like "mental capacity", etc. Ayers exaggerates the contrast between "our" and "his" terms. >R. Rorty. |
Ayers I M. Ayers "Locke" in: Arguments of the Philosophers London 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Meaning Change | Ayers | Rorty VI 361 Meaning change/M.AyersVsBennett/Rorty: [to assume a meaning change] would mean that it is impossible to understand a philosopher of the past today according to his own terms. Solution/Ayers: instead, we should try to establish the same relationship between thinking and feeling, like he himself. RortyVsAyers: one does not get far with this, if one no longer believes in terms like "mental capacity", etc. Ayers exaggerates the contrast between "our" and "his" terms. |
Ayers I M. Ayers "Locke" in: Arguments of the Philosophers London 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Social Theory | Habermas | III 460 Social Theory/Habermas: their main problems are: 1. the extension of the teleological concept of action, 2. the relativization of the purpose activity to a model of understanding that not only presupposes the transition from consciousness to the philosophy of language, but the communication-theoretical development and radicalization of language analysis itself. >Speech Act Theory, >HabermasVsSpeech Act Theory, HabermasVsGrice, HabermasVsBennett, HabermasVsAustin, HabermasVsLewis. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bennett, J. | Esfeld Vs Bennett, J. | I 218 "Feldmetaphysik"/Bennett/Spinoza: so nennt Bennett die Position, die er Spinoza zuschreibt. Er meint, daß sie mit der heutigen Physik übereinstimmt. Esfeld: in dieser Position kann die gesamte Materie in der Tat als eine Feld angesehen werden. Ich ziehe aber die Formulierung "Holismus der Materie als Holismus des Raumes" vor. EsfeldVsBennett/Vs"Feldmetaphysik": wir sind nicht festgelegt, das Feld mit dem Raum zu identifizieren. Der entscheidende Punkt ist aber: die gesamte Materie ist ein Feld, das mit dem Raum identisch ist. I 220 Materie/Raum/Esfeld: Materie mit dem Raum zu identifizieren läuft nicht darauf hinaus, die Materie zu eliminieren. Sie ist nur nicht etwas "zusätzliches zum Raum". Auch Partikel und Felder sind nicht zusätzlich. EsfeldVsBennett: Körper werden nicht auf Eigenschaften des Raumes reduziert. Da Materie und Raum dasselbe sind, ist, physikalische Eigenschaften zu haben, die etwas zu einem Teil der Materie machen, dasselbe wie, die Eigenschaften zu haben, die etwas zu einem Teils des Raumes machen. I 223 Raum/Holismus/Esfeld: es ist jedoch nicht zwingend, den Holismus des Raums auf diese Weise zu konzipieren! >Bennett: Raum/Materie/Holismus/Spinoza/Bennett: (1988): in einem zweiten Schritt eliminiert Bennett die Zuschreibung von Eigenschaften zu den Gebieten des Raums. Der Raum selbst ist das einzige Subjekt der Prädikation. Alle Eigenschaften werden direkt von gesamten Raum prädiziert. Lokalisierung: um diese Eigenschaften zu lokalisieren muß man Indexwörter wie "hier" und "dort" hinzufügen. Bsp "Der Raum ist lokal schleimig* ". BennettVsQuantoren: nutzlos: es gibt nur ein Ding, von dem Eigenschaften ausgesagt werden können. ((s) Der Raum als Ganzes). Raum/Materie/Bennett/Esfeld: das zeigt, daß es zwei Formen von Holismus des Raums gibt: 1. Bennett: Typ B. (top down): wir beginnen mit den Eigenschaften des Ganzen. Als Eigenschaften des Ganzen sind es intrinsische Eigenschaften. Nichtsdestoweniger zeigen diese eine interne Struktur innerhalb des Ganzen an! Bsp es sind nicht Eigenschaften dergestalt, daß der Raum einfach F und G ist. I 224 Statt dessen ist ein Gebiet F und eine anderes G. Diese Eigenschaften sind es also, die etwas zu einem Teil machen! Wir können deshalb den 2. Typ: A (bottom up) des Holismus anwenden: diese Eigenschaften zeigen die Weise an, wie die Teile des Raums miteinander verbunden sind. Raum/Materie/EsfeldVsBennett: abgesehen von der Interpretation von Spinoza gibt es keinen Grund, warum wir den Holismus des Raumes so konzipieren sollten. Denn die betreffenden physikalischen Eigenschaften sind lokal instantiiert. Es ist angemessener den Holismus des Raums in Begriffen von Punkten oder Gebieten zu konzipieren. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Bennett, J. | Lewis Vs Bennett, J. | Schwarz I 133 Cause/Effect/Event/Fact/LewisVsBennett/Schwarz: Event as fact: Problem: to distinguish "true causes": Resemblance is not a solution here: e.g. Xanthippe's widowhood: you cannot refer to resemblance of >regions. Schwarz I 134 Overlapping events. E.g. if seen as fact, the writing "rr" in "Larry" cannot be defined because of overlapping regions. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Bennett, J. | Rorty Vs Bennett, J. | VI 395 RortyVsBennett: wrongly acribes Locke certain notions. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Bennett, J. | Avramides Vs Bennett, J. | Avra I 17 Avramidis Bennett: Bennett/Avramidis: (Griceans, modified): Proposes a community of speakers who use a communication system that does not rely on Grice’ intentions and beliefs: the "Plain Talk" ("direct speech", "simple speech", "candid speech"). Def Plain Talk/Bennett: the speakers rely on the listener, they believe in the form of a generalization: whenever an utterance U is uttered, a particular proposition p is true. This is how they can do without a speaker’s intention. BennettVsGrice: if this simpler analysis is true, we do not need the more complicated one. (65). BennettVsVs: but Bennett himself believes that the Gricean is capable of withstanding this: GriceVsVs: Solution: "Background fact": if the speaker did not want to transmit p, the utterance U would have been inappropriate under the generalization that whenever U is uttered, p is true. (Bennett 1976 p.172). I 18 This saves the introduction of complex propositional attitudes in the analysis. Modification: the audience is presented with "intention dependent evidence for the proposition". AvramidesVsBennett: the modification is not necessary, it is already covered by Grice’ original analysis. Avra I 18 Communication/LoarVsBennett: Not only is this kind economy unnecessary, the elimination of the intentions removes something essential. The fact that intentions, expectations and beliefs should be simple in ordinary communication and personal relationships, seems to me so improbable that it surprises me why this should be a more realistic view. (70). I 121 Def Register/Bennett: A theoretical expression that stands for whatever in relation to an animal, and that validates predictions about its behavior (evaluates it, rates it yes/no) based on facts about its environment. (Bennett 1976, p.52). Avramides: Registering is necessary but not sufficient for belief. E.g. cruise missiles with thermal infrared equipment: can be described as reacting but not as learning. Belief/Bennett: We achieve sufficient conditions, if we add the ability to learn to registering. (see Bennett 1976, p 84). DavidsonVsBennett: Instead distinction subjective state/objective world. AvramidesVsDavidson: one could argue that the awareness of this distinction is the possession of the concept of belief. Davidson: this awareness is belief about a belief. Scaring/Davidson: only reaction to a stimulus. AvramidesVsDavidson: then there is certainly still room between the act of being surprised and the possession of the concept of belief. This allows, for example: the ability to learn that Bennett propagates. DavidsonVsBennett: rejects his approach, because his (Davidson’s) concept of awareness (of the distinction subjective / objective) is very strong. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Various Authors | Hacking Vs Various Authors | I 98 Argument of Cosmic Coincidence: a good theory explains phenomena as contiguous which have not previously been thought of as related. Conversely, we arrive at the same raw entities with very different thought processes. I 227 Reichenbach: "Argument of the same cause" - also Salmon: E.g. Brownian movement, Avogadro number: you always come to the same number in different ways. HackingVs: petitio principii. Language/Bennett: developed, E.g. because one native wanted to warn another that a coconut was about to fall from a tree. HackingVsBennett: racist! In general, conjectures about the origin of language have a tendency to be unimaginative and patronizing. I 249 Bacon: "An experiment which is not preceded by theory is related to the natural sciences like the sound of a child’s rattle to music". HackingVsBacon: an experiment can be made out of mere curiosity and be equally fruitful!. I 299 Theory/Observation/Hanson: Noticing and observing are skills and abilities. E.g. positron. HackingVsHanson: you cannot train an assistant to make accurate observations without teaching him big theory. (still practiced in England today). |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Interpretation | Bennett, J. | Rorty VI 360 Interpretation/Bennett: Thesis: we can only understand Kant today if we can clearly indicate, with the help of today's concepts, what his problems were, which of them are still problems today, and what Kant contributed to their solution. VI 361 M. AyersVsBennett: that would mean that it would be impossible to understand a philosopher of the past today according to his own conceptuality. Ayers: Thesis: "we should try to establish the same relationship between thinking and feeling as he himself". RortyVsAyers: You do not get far with that if you do not believe in terms like "mental faculty" anymore. Ayers exaggerates the contrast between "our" and "his" concepts. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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