Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Emergence | Chalmers | I 129 Emergence/Consciousness/Chalmers: it is sometimes asked why I do not assume that consciousness emerges from physical facts. >Consciousness/Chalmers. ChalmersVsEmergence: the well-known examples of emergence, e.g. Self-organization in biological systems or patterns in bird flocks are not analogous to consciousness. >Self organisation. Consciousness: should be emergent in a much stronger sense. E.g. Broad 1925 (1): >Determinism, >Predictions, >Levels/order. Emergence/Broad: According to his thesis, emergent properties are not even predictable from all known physical properties of a more basic level. ChalmersVsBroad: this is a strong variant of the property dualism. I 130 It would require additional fundamental laws. >Property dualism, >Laws of nature, >Completeness. 1. C. D. Broad, Mind and Its Place in Natur, London 1925 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Propositions | Prior | I 12/13 Propositions/Prior: propositioes are logical structures (i.e. no real objects), (facts and phrases are not). >Objects, >Intensions, >Facts, >Sentences. Therefore propositions are language independent. >Language dependency, >Language independence, >Translation, >Meaning. I 19 Proposition/fact/Prior: "Grass is not pink": complex sentence on grass, not sentence about "proposition" Grass is pink"". >About, >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 29 Proposition/Prior: you cannot only think P, but also about P, but other form than about objects: E.g. "__ thinks that the proposition __ is absurd": because the second gap is not for name but a sentence. >Names, >Sentences, >Meta language, >Thinking. "about"/Prior: belief-that, thinking-that: this is never about propositions, but about what propositions are about. "about" is systematically ambiguous, what it means depends on what kind of name or quasi-name (for example, numbers) follows it. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. I 42 Propositions/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: no matter from what "order" are always truth functions of independent sentences. I 52 Propositions/Prior: have only Pickwick's importance. (WittgensteinVsBroad: (W II 94), there is not a "special" meaning besides the "ordinary" B.) - Proposition/Church: propositions have the property, "to be the concept of truth or falsehood". >Thoughts, >A. Church. I 53 Proposition/Prior: when we speak of propositional identity, we are forced, to no longer see them as logical constructions. We need to treat them as real objects. (PriorVs). >Intensions, >Intensionality, cf. >Hyperintensionality, >Identification, >Individuation. I 53 Name/proposition/Prior: "the proposition that p" only apparent name. >Names, >Names of sentences. I 64 Identity of propositions/Prior: no substantive equivalence. >Equivalence, >Material equivalence. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Broad, C.D. | Moore Vs Broad, C.D. | Avramides I 20 Analysis/Moore: two types of analysis: 1. eliminate confusion about a term 2. make our thoughts clearer. Broad: represents (1): Analysis reduces ambiguity. (>Quine (1960) Word and Object §53) MooreVsBroad: represents (2): analysis should make our thoughts clearer. It is not about clarity for our everyday life but about philosophical analysis. (Moore 1966a, p.168, Moore 1966b) |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Broad, C.D. | Sellars Vs Broad, C.D. | I 24 To Seem/to appear/relations/Sellars: "A seems to be φ for S". Question: whether this relation can be analyzed. Sense-data theorists: yes. Thesis: the sense-data theory provides an analysis of "to appear". Broad: "If in fact nothing is elliptical in my mind, then it is difficult to understand why a penny seems to have an elliptical and no other form". (He relies on sensory data as a means to explain the facts of this form.) SellarsVsBroad: if it would be right to analyse "s appears to be φ for S" on the basis of sense-data then no one should assume that x seems to be φ for S without at the same time assuming that S has sense-data! However, the same does not apply when the proposition will be explained on the basis of sense-data and not analyzed! As at least with some types of explanations someone may be convinced of a fact without being convinced of its explanation! |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Broad, C.D. | Wittgenstein Vs Broad, C.D. | II 94 Dialectics/Wittgenstein: the dialectical method is a very robust process and one which we really use. VsDialectics/VsBroad: but it should not create a more complex sentence out of two. It should be about finding ambiguities. --- II 96 A priori/empirical/Broad/Wittgenstein: Broad suggests a distinction between these two terms. WittgensteinVsBroad: these are not two types of sentences. a priori: that must be a sentence whose meaning guarantees its truth. But the meaning requires that we verify the sentence. ((s) Verificationism: cannot accept analytic truths). --- II 98/99 Broad differentiates apriori and empirical terms and names "ideal boundaries" (the perfect circle, etc.) and categories (causality, etc.) as the only "plausible" examples for a priori terms. WittgensteinVsBroad: E.g. Under the microscope a straight line turns out to be crooked. Such thing can be explained by the distinction between visual space and physical space. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Frege, G. | Prior Vs Frege, G. | I 50 Truth Value/PriorVsFrege: Problem: the term "truth value": was invented by him, but originally for mathematical contexts. Value: to be "greater than 0" is, strictly speaking, not the "value" of a function for a given argument. The value for this argument is not a property of a number (e.g. to be > 0). But a number! The value of a function is different for different arguments and is not the whole collection (Frege: value curve!) of values. Frege: sentences designate objects that are called truth and falsity. Namely in the same way as number names (numerals) and formulas contain the number names, designate numerals. Which number is designated by a given function expression depends on which number is designated by the expression argument, and by nothing else. Prior: if the analogy is to last, then whether truth or falsity is designated must depend on what is designated by the argument sentence ((s) the cited belief), and on nothing else ((s) i.e. it would always have to be believed that grass is green, simply because it is true - absurd.) Prior: E.g. that it is not the case that the grass is pink, just like 2-1 > 0 (and also other things, such as is its own square!), according to Frege this is not simply supposed to be "true", but "the true thing". That is to correspond to the fact that 2-1 is not only "> 0", but the number 1! I 51 And that it is not the case that the grass is pink is "the true thing" (truth), precisely because the grass is pink is "the false thing". Analogy: "the false thing" as in: (1 + 1) 1 is the number 1, precisely because 1 + 1 is the number 2, because that grass is pink is the wrong thing just like (3-1) 1 is the number 1, because 3-1 is the number 2. There are no different truths. PriorVsFrege: all this follows if Frege's analogy is true. But of course it is false. Truth and falsity are more like properties of what sentences designate. That is what Frege wanted to avoid. But we have said above that sentences denote nothing. Propositions/Prior: only have Pickwickian meaning! (WittgensteinVsBroad: (Wittgenstein II 94): There is not one "special" meaning apart from the "ordinary" meaning) Prior: but we know enough to see that this is harmless. We know what it means, that 1 is > 0, namely, since for each φ and each ψ if exactly one thing φs and no thing ψs, then more things are φ-ing than are ψ-ing. Def "more than". I 51/52 Function/Sentence/Prior: it is a function of the sense of "grass is pink" to be expressed by the sentence "X believes that grass is pink". Distinction without Difference/Prior: but that makes no difference! That this is not the case, is exactly what makes the belief false. There is no thing that is designated with "grass is pink". (VsFrege: i.e. also not "the wrong thing", but that is not what Frege meant, either). Truth functions and belief functions are functions of the same argument!(?). Def Proposition/(Thoughts?)/Church: have the property of "being the concept of truth or falsity." Thoughts/PriorVsFrege: among the functions of his thought we have those that are related to each other, just as the functions of the true and false are related to each other and we can omit the latter as superfluous. But the extensionalists have made the stone that we have jettisoned their milestone! PriorVsFrege: Conclusion: sentences do not designate anything, not even "the true thing" or "the false thing". Extensionalism/Prior: Thesis: sentences have truth values as their "extension". I 53 PriorVs: they have that as little as predicates have classes as their extension. For truth values and classes are both logical constructions and very similar ones at that! And not "objects". (PriorVsPlatonism, VsExistence of classes and truth values as objects). Names/Variables/Prior: there is a doctrine among American logicians that every bound variable stands for a name. PriorVs: that is too eccentric a criterion for names. Ontology/Individual/Prior: in reality, combines the principle that only individuals are real with the view that the only way for us to grasp individuals linguistically is to treat them as applications of nouns. And that their application is unique is something that can be expressed within the system, and not with Russell's logical proper names (this, or descriptions) I 166 but with Lesniewski's functor "e" or "This __ is a __". Description/ Frege: for him, the expression "the such and such" itself an individual name (individual name, singular name). PriorVsFrege: there are no individual names! Instead, the expression occurs as part of a longer functor that carries out the individuation. This/Oxford: many there are not happy about Russell's logical proper names. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sense Data | Broad, C.D: | Sellars I 24 Sense-data theory / Broad / Sellars: Main Representative: Broad: thesis: sensory data explain why a tilted round plate appears elliptical - SellarsVsBroad: Difference Explaining / Analyzing: with some observations we can be convinced of a fact without being convinced of the statement - analysis : here you can not. Sense-data theorists: the sense-data theory provides an analysis of "appearing". |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Sinnesdaten | Sellars, W. | I 24 Sense-data theory / Broad / Sellars: main representative: Broad: sense-data explain e.g. why a tilted round plate appears elliptical - SellarsVsBroad: Difference Explain / Analyze: with some observations one can be convinced of a fact without being convinced of the statement - Analysis: here you can not. Sense-data theorists: the sense-data theory provides an analysis of "appearing". |
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