Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contract Theory | Buchanan | Brocker I 562 Contract Theory/Buchanan/Kersting: On the one hand, contract theories are individualistic in that they attribute the legitimacy of state rule and the recognition worthiness of normative principles to the consent of individuals; on the other hand, they are democratic, since they demand that power organisations and political-moral principles must answer equally to everyone. They are also proceduralistic: the criterion of legitimacy and justification is the possible contractual agreement of all. (1)(2) Brocker I 564 Contract Theory/Buchanan: Buchanan has developed a realistic contract theory that is consistently characterized by an economic reasoning and only accepts principles and institutions if they can only be traced back to the contractual harmony of subjective preferences. (see Kersting 2010) (3). Problem/Kersting: a contract is in a way a thought experiment, which cannot be understood by all concerned equally. Here there are arguments based on interests or situations (so-called "wisdom arguments"). Solution/Buchanan: his contract theory frees the economism of the contract content argument from the contractual moral bracketing and extends it to the entire structure of the contractualist argument. See Buchanan 1975 (4) See Anarchism/Buchanan. Brocker I 565 Contracts/Buchanan: Contract negotiations only take place when (...) it is advantageous for the natural state dweller with the best natural means of power. See Equilibrium/Buchanan. Brocker I 566 Negotiations/Buchanan: Negotiations are conducted to reduce unproductive defence costs. Both A and B recognize that they are better off if they can save on defence costs. Relationship: The "natural balance" (see Equilibrium/Buchanan) has a certain stability. The parties can only improve their position through a disarmament agreement. Brocker I 573 KerstingVsBuchanan: The starting position chosen by Buchanan is unsuitable (...) in terms of legitimation theory. On the basis of contract theories that operate with real, realistic, counterfactual idealizations and normative framework conditions, it is not possible to develop a satisfactory theory of justification or even one that does justice to the minimum conditions of justification theory. Brocker I 575 KerstingVsBuchanan: It is the violence in Buchanan that draws up the contracts. The coontract provides only the legal seal of natural power-sharing. 1. Wolfgang Kersting, Politische Philosophie des Gesellschaftsvertrags, Darmstadt 2005., S. 19-55 2. Wolfgang Kersting, Vertragstheorien. Kontraktualistische Theorien in der Politikwissenschaft, Stuttgart 2016, S. 9-34. 3. Wolfang Kersting, »Kritik des Wirtschaftsliberalismus«, in: ders. (Hg.), Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit. Die moralischen Grundlagen der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft, Frankfurt/M. u. a. 2010, 11-26. 4. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984. Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Contract Theory | Hobbes | Brocker I 575 Contract Theory/Hobbes/KerstingVsBuchanan/Kersting: Even Hobbes' theory is more acceptable than Buchanan's theory(1), because as a consequence of the descriptive-empirical - and in its truth content quite doubtful - assumption of an all-round threat symmetry (everyone must be careful of everyone) Hobbes receives a contractual situation that indirectly and directly realizes the fairness structure described by the above keywords. Hobbes' individuals are equal and act as equals in the contractual situation. This is the only reason why Hobbes' philosophy has been able to remain in the discussion for so long, because its natural state provides an empirical interpretation of a normative condition that we cannot do without if the contractual argument is to be of any theoretical justification relevance. Cf. >Contracts/Buchanan, >Contract theory/Buchanan. 1.Vgl. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984. Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Democracy | Surowiecki | I 331 Democracy/Surowiecki: we have a democracy, a) because it gives people a feeling of being involved in everything and being able to determine their own lives,... I 332 ...and that is why it contributes to political stability? Or b) Because citizens have the right to govern themselves, even if they use this right in a ridiculous way? Or c) Because democracy is an excellent instrument for making intelligent decisions and discovering the truth? What do voters think democracy is for? Can we understand this in the same way as a market? I 333 This contradicts the fact that politicians want to extend their power and be re-elected, which is not always to the benefit of the general public. Public Choice Theory/Politics/Economic Sciences/Buchanan/Surowiecki: thesis(1): the tendency is to suppress long-term problems in favour of short-term political interests. In reality, many regulations tend to serve regulated companies. >Public Choice-Theory, >J. Buchanan. I 334 SurowieckiVsBuchananan: the assumption that principles and public interest have no place in politics overlooks the fact that voters themselves did not think of broader goals and that interest groups exercise an almost complete control (...). James M. Buchanan/Gordon Tullock: Thesis: The average individual acts on the basis of the same overall value framework when he/she participates in the (...) market and is politically active. (2) SurowieckiVsBuchanan: this was simply an assumption that was not proven. The counterposition that different activities cause different values and behaviours in people was at least as plausible. We do not treat our family members like our customers. >Political Elections/Surowiecki, Political Elections/Buchanan, Political Elections/Riker. I 337 Politics/Information/Democracy/Surowiecki: although the Americans have been proven to have false information on many individual issues, it is likely that they will elect the candidate who makes the right decisions. Missing information is not a sign of lack of intelligence, but a sign of lack of interest in details. Surowiecki's thesis: An essential point of representative democracy is that it allows, politically in the cognitive sphere, the same Democracy/Surowiecki: is not an instrument for solving cognition problems, not a mechanism for recognising what is in the public interest. However, it is a system to deal with the most fundamental problems of coordination and cooperation. >Cooperation. 1. The Nobel Prize Lecture by James Buchanan (1986) offers an interesting view of the philosophical and conceptual foundations of the "public choice" theory, which Buchanan has elsewhere described as "politics without romanticism": http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1986/buchanan-lecture.html. 2. Mark Kelman, »On Democracy-Bashing – A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and ›Empirical‹ Practice of the Public Choice Movement«, Virginia Law Review 74/1988, S. 235, 252. |
Surowi I James Surowiecki Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005 |
| Efficiency | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 205 Efficiency/constitutional economics/Voigt: Normative constitutional economics (…) reinterprets the >Pareto criterion in a twofold way: It is not outcomes but rules or procedures that lead to outcomes that are evaluated using the criterion. The evaluation is not carried out by an omniscient scientist or politician but by the concerned individuals themselves: "In a sense, the political economist is concerned with 'what people want' " (Buchanan, 1959(1), p. 137). In order to find out what people want, Buchanan proposes to carry out a consensus test. The specification of this test will be crucial as to which rules can be considered legitimate. In 1959, Buchanan had actual unanimity in mind and those citizens that expect to be worse off due to some rule changes would have to be compensated. This test would thus be equivalent to a modified Kaldor-Hicks criterion. Later in life, Buchanan seems to have changed his position: hypothetical consent deduced by an economist will do in order to legitimize some rule (see, e.g., Buchanan, 1977(2), 1978(3), 1986(4)). VsBuchanan: This position can be criticized because a large variety of rules seem to be legitimizable depending on the assumptions of the scientist who does the process. Scientists arguing in favor of an extensive welfare state will most likely assume risk-averse individuals, while scientists who argue for cuts in the welfare budgets will assume people to be risk-neutral. >Constitutional economics, >Costs/Buchanan, >Constitutions/constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics. 1. Buchanan, J. M. (1959). "Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy." Journal of Law and Economics 2: 124-138. 2. Buchanan, J. M. (1977). Freedom in Constitutional Contract - Perspectives of a Political Economist. College Station, TX/London: Texas A&M University Press. 3. Buchanan, J. M.(1978). "A Contractarian Perspective on Anarchy," Nomos 19: 29-42 4. Buchanan, J. M. (1986). "Political Economy and Social Philosophy," in: J. M. Buchanan; Liberty, Market and State—political Economy in the 1980s, 261—274. New York: Wheatsheaf Books. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Government Debt | Buchanan | Boudreaux I 13 Government debt/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: „The essence of public debt, as a financing institution, is that it allows the objective cost of currently financed expenditure projects to be postponed in time. For the taxpayer, public debt delays the necessity of transferring command over resource services to the treasury.“ James M. Buchanan, “Confessions of a Burden Monger” (1964)(1). Boudreaux I 14 [It was a] consensus by mid-twentieth century economists that debt-financed projects are paid for by citizen-taxpayers at the time the projects are undertaken rather than by future generations. „New orthodoxy“/Buchanan: Buchanan called [this]“the new orthodoxy.” It was an orthodoxy because it was widely taken to be obviously true, and it was new because it sprung from Keynesian economics, which in 1958 was only 22 years old. Tradition: Until John Maynard Keynes published his General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money in 1936(2), most economists - from Adam Smith in the mid-eighteenth century through economists in the early twentieth century - understood that the costs of government projects funded with debt are passed on to the future generations who, as citizen-taxpayers, must repay the debt. KeynesianismVsSmith, Adam: This understanding was rejected by the new orthodoxy ((s) Keynesianism) and replaced with the insistence that projects funded with borrowed money are, just like projects funded with currently collected taxes, paid for at the time the projects are undertaken. The new orthodoxy does recognize that debt financing nevertheless leaves a legacy for future citizen-taxpayers. In the case of [a] hypothetical hydroelectric dam built in 2021 with borrowed funds, citizens are obliged in 2051 to repay the debt that was incurred 30 years earlier. To do so they must, in 2051, pay more in taxes or suffer cuts in government programs (or some combination of the two) (…). Boudreaux I 15 But, the new orthodoxy continues, if the bond is owned and submitted for redemption by nationals, then apart from some relatively negligible costs incurred in carrying out the process of transferring the funds from citizen-taxpayers to citizen-bondholders, redemption imposes no net burden on nationals. Although those citizens who pay the debt are worse off as a result of paying more in taxes or receiving less in government services, other citizens - those who receive repayment of the debt - are better off by the same amount. Just as a household is made neither richer nor poorer if a wife transfers money to her husband, a nation is made neither richer nor poorer if one group of citizens transfers money to another group of citizens. Using the phrase that mid-1950s economists employed to describe this situation, nationals in 2051 might say, “We owe it to ourselves.” BuchananVsNew orthodoxy/BuchananVsKeynesianism: According to Buchanan, the new orthodoxy’s fatal flaw is its insistence that the costs of debt financing are incurred in the periods when the debt-financed programs are undertaken. Boudreaux I 16 And if this insistence is wrong, then the older, pre-Keynesian understanding is correct that programs funded with debt today are paid for by citizen-taxpayers tomorrow. Therefore, by using debt to finance government programs, we, today’s citizen-taxpayers, can indeed consume at the expense of our children and grandchildren. >Public finance, >Interest rates, cf. >Time/Rothbard. Solution/Buchanan: The key insight in Buchanan’s criticism of the new orthodoxy and, hence, of his revitalization of the older, classical view is the realization that creditors who lend money to the government do so voluntarily. But these creditors lend to the government only because they believe that the interest payments they will receive in exchange make such loans worthwhile for them. These creditors are not the purchasers of the debt-financed projects; instead, they are purchasers of future interest payments that make it worthwhile for them to sacrifice their consumption today. Thus, debt-financed government projects are not paid for by the government’s creditors. After all, the very reason the government in 2021 borrows the funds to build the dam is to relieve today’s citizen-taxpayers from having to pay for it. Yet someone has to pay for the dam! Who? Buchanan’s answer is that the dam is paid for by citizen-taxpayers in 2051, who are obliged to repay the debt. >Taxation. KeynesianismVsBuchanan: Adherents of the new orthodoxy respond by saying that if the debt is repaid to fellow citizens, there is no net reduction in aggregate national wealth. The repayment, they maintain, is merely a transfer, as if from the left hand to the right. BuchananVsVs: Buchanan, however, argued that this reasoning is mistaken. If the creditors in 2021 had not loaned [the money] to the government, they would have done something else with their money - something else of nearly equivalent value to lending to the government - such as, for instance, lending [the money] to private companies. >Time preference, >Opportunity costs. Credit/repayment: Buchanan assumed, not unrealistically, that credit markets are competitive. From this assumption it follows that the attractiveness to creditors of lending to the government is only marginally greater than (that is, is largely equivalent to) the attractiveness of using their money in other ways. And so when in 2051 the government’s creditors are repaid, they are made no better off (or worse off) than they would have been had they used their money differently in 2021. Repayment of the debt does not make the repaid creditors anything but marginally richer than they would have been had they instead invested their money in alternative projects. But repayment does make the citizen-taxpayers who foot the bill poorer by the full amount of the repayment. >Credit. Boudreaux I 19 Note that Buchanan’s argument that each debt-financed project is paid for by the future citizen-taxpayers who must service the debt holds regardless of whether the project is wasteful or productive. Debt/taxation/Buchanan: Buchanan’s argument should not, therefore, be interpreted as counselling against any and all debt financing. He explicitly recognized that it is appropriate to finance some projects with debt rather than with current taxation. Projects that yield benefits to future citizen-taxpayers are appropriately paid for by those future taxpayers rather than by current taxpayers who derive no benefits from such projects. In such cases, debt financing is a vehicle for handing the bill to those who will receive the benefits. Free rider/Buchanan: This ability of current taxpayers to use debt financing to free-ride on the wealth of future generations led Buchanan to worry that government today will both spend excessively and fund too many projects with debt. >Moral hazard. Boudreaux I 20 Democracy/Buchanan: Tomorrow’s citizen-taxpayers, after all, are not today’s voters. Thus, the interests of these future generations are under-represented in the political process. To reduce the magnitude of this problem, Buchanan endorsed constitutional rules that oblige governments to annually keep their budgets in balance. Constitution/Buchanan: His fear that the opportunity for debt financing of government projects and programs would be abused was so acute that it led him to endorse a balanced-budget amendment to the US Constitution. His participation in a political effort to secure such an amendment is one of the very few specific, ground-level policy battles that he actively joined. >Constitution/Buchanan. Boudreaux I 21 Government Debt: When analyzing the activities of government, the costs and benefits of government policies fall on individuals, not on aggregates or groups. The argument that domestically held public debt is no burden because “we owe it to ourselves” is revealed as fallacious once we recognize that the aggregate – ourselves - is really composed of many individuals, some of whom will pay the taxes to finance the debt repayment, and some of whom will receive the proceeds when they redeem the bonds they hold. 1. Buchanan, James M. (1964). “Confessions of a Burden Monger”. Journal of Political Economy Vol. 72, No. 5 (Oct., 1964), pp. 486-488. 2. Keynes, J. M. [1936] The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Macmillan. Mause I 279 Government Debt/Buchanan: Question: Is it basically acceptable for citizens to give their representatives the opportunity to deficit finance their budgets? (Prerequisite: the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem does not apply; see Terminology/Economic Theories). Brennan/Buchanan: No: Deficit financing would be systematically used to finance expenditures beyond the desired level and past the tax resistance of citizens.(1) >Generational Justice/Diamond, Equivalence Theorem/Barro. See also BuchananVsBarro. 1. Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, The power to tax. Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution. Cambridge 1980. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Law | Buchanan | Brocker I 567 Law/Contracts/Contract Theory/Buchanan: Law transforms only the uneven distribution that has arisen naturally into a legally fixed uneven distribution. That this transformation is taking place at all is due to the fact that those who are worse off in natural distribution also benefit from disarmament and the establishment of law. See Contract Theory/Buchanan, Equilibrium/Buchanan. Problem: there is still the danger of instability, because it is better for everyone to live in a contractual state and not in a pre-contractual one - nevertheless one profits from breaches of contract! And in two ways: a) you enjoy the contractual advantages and b) you benefit from a breach of the law. Solution/Buchanan: there must be a superordinate instance. The existence of the state owes its existence to this necessity. See Constitution/Buchanan. Brocker I 571 Finally, Buchanan is even considering the possibility of a slavery contract (1) (see Slavery/Buchanan). KerstingVsBuchanan/KerstingVsEconomism: This passage shows the immorality of economism. Economistic reductionism drives out the traditional normative meaning of the traditional concepts of the moral world. To speak of a slave's right to be left alive would have been condemned as intolerable cynicism. Economism is a twin brother of scientism. Buchanan's conceptual framework for the initial state of a philosophical theory of justification is so large and far-reaching that it itself can encompass the negation of all moral interpersonal relationships, apartheid and slavery, as constitutional-contractualist states. But then the question arises as to whether such a radically naturalized scenery can be suitable for the generation of social and political principles of assessment and design that can be accepted. If rights are the result of contractual agreement under realistic conditions - and an agreement generally only comes about if everyone hopes it will benefit - then contractual establishment of rights will only be achieved when the use of force becomes uneconomical, when blackmailing, intimidation and murder cost too much. But that only means that the law seals inequalities constituted by violence. It is characteristic of Buchanan's conception that the traditional opposition between violence and law has lost its leading function. 1. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984. Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Majorities | Buchanan | Brocker I 569 Majorities/State/Constitution/Economic Theory/Buchanan: (see State/Buchanan, Constitution/Buchanan): Change. Buchanan leaves no doubt that unanimity is for him the only acceptable normative yardstick on which the legitimacy of any decision-making process regarding the creation and financing of public goods must be based. That therefore (...) only state service beyond legal protection is legitimate which is in everyone's interest; for only if it is in everyone's interest can it be assumed that they would have agreed to it. ((s) Cf. Reflective Equilibrium/Rawls, Veil of Ignorance/Rawls.) Brocker I 570 Amartya SenVsBuchanan: this is precisely what reinforces existing inequalities: because the burdens on the financing of public goods beyond legal protection also affect those who do not benefit from them. (1) 1. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco u. a 1970, S. 25. Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Political Elections | Buchanan | Surowiecki I 333 Political Elections/Buchanan/Surowiecki: Public Choice Theory/Politics/Economic Sciences/Buchanan: Thesis: the tendency is to suppress long-term problems in favour of short-term political interests. In reality, many regulations tend to serve regulated companies. (1) Surowiecki I 334 SurowieckiVsBuchananan: the assumption that principles and public interest have no place in politics overlooks the fact that voters themselves did not think of broader goals and that interest groups exercise an almost complete control (...). James M. Buchanan/Gordon Tullock: Thesis: The average individual acts on the basis of the same overall value framework when he/she participates in the (...) market and is politically active. (2) >J. Buchanan, >Political Representation, >Electoral Systems. 1. The Nobel prize lecture by James Buchanan (1986) offers an interesting view of the philosophical and conceptual foundations of "public-choice" theory, which Buchanan has described elsewhere as "politics without romanticism": http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1986/buchanan-lecture.html. 2. Mark Kelman, »On Democracy-Bashing – A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and ›Empirical‹ Practice of the Public Choice Movement«, Virginia Law Review 74/1988, S. 235, 252. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Surowi I James Surowiecki Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005 |
| Slavery | Buchanan | Brocker I 570 Slavery/Contract Theory/Economic Theory/Buchanan: Buchanan's starting point is the state of nature (see Natural State/Buchanan) with a natural inequality (differently distributed talents). This is the basis of Buchanan's assumption that contracts must be concluded to deal with this inequality and give everyone the opportunity to improve their situation. Since this type of contract (see Contracts/Buchanan, Contract Theory/Buchanan) leads to instability, another type of contract is necessary: post-constitutional contracts (see also Constitution/Buchanan). In the situation of inequality, even slavery is conceivable as the most extreme case: "Under such conditions, similarities can arise between the disarmament contract, which may be negotiated, and the contract of slavery, in which the 'weak' agree to produce goods for the 'strong' in exchange for a little more than the naked existence, which they do not have for sure under anarchist conditions. A contract of slavery - like the other contracts - would define individual rights, Brocker I 571 and to the extent of its mutual recognition, mutual benefits would be guaranteed if, as a result, the costs of defence and conquest were reduced. (1) KerstingVsBuchanan: this passage shows the immorality of economism. Economistic reductionism drives out the traditional normative meaning of the traditional concepts of the moral world. To speak of a slave's right to be left alive would have been condemned as intolerable cynicism. Economism is a twin brother of scientism. 1. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984, S. 85f. Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| State (Polity) | Buchanan | Brocker I 568 State/Buchanan: Buchanan's approach leads to a separation of law and state. The state only stands for the validity of the legal system. See Constitution/Buchanan. According to Buchanan, the state becomes the embodiment of the arbitrator who controls the parties, assuming that everyone tries to cheat. (1) Buchanan cites the universal desire for disarmament as the reason for the conclusion of contracts in order to reduce costs. Brocker I 569 Protective State/Buchanan: a protective cover to ensure the exchange of private goods. Problem: this does not secure the handling of public goods. Productive State/Buchanan: Question: Which regulatory system must be introduced to ensure the possible and reasonably desired improvement in the situation compared to natural distribution or to a society consuming only private goods? Solution/Buchanan: the post-constitutional contract (which presupposes the constitutional contract to secure private property) creates a genuinely political system for the creation and distribution of public goods. >Majorities/Buchanan, >Public Goods. Brocker I 570 Amartya SenVsBuchanan: this is precisely what reinforces existing inequalities: because the burdens on the financing of public goods beyond legal protection also affect those who do not benefit from them.(2) 1. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984, S. 96f. 2. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco u. a 1970, S. 25 Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Boudreaux I 21 State/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: „The state has its origin in, and depends for its continuance upon, the desires of individuals to fulfil a certain portion of their wants collectively. The state has no ends other than those of its individual members and is not a separate decision-making unit. State decisions are, in the final analysis, the collective decisions of individuals.“(1) Government Debt/Boudreaux/Holcombe: When analyzing the activities of government, the costs and benefits of government policies fall on individuals, not on aggregates or groups. The argument that domestically held public debt is no burden because “we owe it to ourselves” is revealed as fallacious once we recognize that the aggregate—ourselves—is really composed of many individuals, some of whom will pay the taxes to finance the debt repayment, and some of whom will receive the proceeds when they redeem the bonds they hold. Boudreaux I 74 State/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: Ideally, the outputs of the productive state result from collective agreement in which individuals exchange their tax payments for the collectively produced outputs - outputs such as pollution abatement, roads, and municipal parks. Problem: But how can citizens determine the size and range of duties of the productive state that will be most welfare-enhancing? How can they ensure that the state does what the people wish it to do and only what they wish it to do? (…) Buchanan’s answer was to limit the activities of the state to those that command agreement from all of its constituents. But this benchmark of consensus on state activities presents a challenge. >Agreement/Buchanan, >Democracy/Buchanan, >Government/Buchanan. In the real world, people have not agreed to the activities of the state. Under what conditions could people be depicted as being in agreement with institutions to which they have not actually agreed? >Solution/Buchanan: Buchanan extended the market-exchange logic - one in which all parties to an exchange voluntarily agree to it - to collective activity >Collective Action/Buchanan. 1. James M. Buchanan, “The Pure Theory of Government Finance: Suggested Approach” (1949) |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
| Tax Competition | Brennan | Saez I 113 Tax Competition/Buchanan/Brennan/Saez/Zucman: [there is a] view that tax competition in and of itself is a good thing—without it, governments would be too big. According to this world view, defended by political scientist Geoffrey Brennan and economist James Buchanan among others,4 democratically elected majorities tend to overtax property owners, who then become victims of the tyranny of the majority. To prevent this risk, governments need to be subject to powerful constraints, such as the one imposed by international competition. The idea fits into a long intellectual tradition that seeks to curtail democracy - especially the democratic regulation of property - via nondemocratic institutions, such as constitutional rules and courts.(1) According to this view, when it comes to taxation, people are unable to govern themselves rationally. Saez/Zucman: Although it can be tempting to dismiss this theory as a fringe libertarian fantasy and an American oddity, it would be a mistake to underestimate its influence. Saez I 114 SaezVsBuchanan/SaezVsBrennan: In the real world, the costs of tax competition far outweigh its supposed benefits. >Tax Competition/Saez/Zucman, >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Taxation. 1. Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan. Collected Works: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. The Power to Tax. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000. |
EconBrenn I Geoffrey Brennan James A. Buchanan The power to tax. Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution Cambridge 1980 |
| Tax Competition | Buchanan | Saez I 113 Tax Competition/Buchanan/Brennan/Saez/Zucman: [there is a] view that tax competition in and of itself is a good thing—without it, governments would be too big. According to this world view, defended by political scientist Geoffrey Brennan and economist James Buchanan among others,4 democratically elected majorities tend to overtax property owners, who then become victims of the tyranny of the majority. To prevent this risk, governments need to be subject to powerful constraints, such as the one imposed by international competition. The idea fits into a long intellectual tradition that seeks to curtail democracy - especially the democratic regulation of property - via nondemocratic institutions, such as constitutional rules and courts.(1) According to this view, when it comes to taxation, people are unable to govern themselves rationally. Saez/Zucman: Although it can be tempting to dismiss this theory as a fringe libertarian fantasy and an American oddity, it would be a mistake to underestimate its influence. Saez I 114 SaezVsBuchanan/SaezVsBrennan: In the real world, the costs of tax competition far outweigh its supposed benefits. >Tax Competition/Saez/Zucman, >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Taxation. 1. Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan. Collected Works: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. The Power to Tax. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 |
| Tax Competition | Saez | Saez I 109 Tax Competition/Saez/Zucman: In 2019, the International Monetary Fund asked a slate of experts for their views on the future of corporate taxation and tax competition. Most of the fund’s interlocutors answered that tax competition was “likely to intensify” in the foreseeable future.(1) Some countries, the experts agreed, will always offer lower taxes than their neighbors (...) Saez I 110 SaezVS/ZucmanVs: This view is wrong. There is nothing in globalization that requires that the corporate tax should disappear. The choice is ours. Saez I 111 To see how we could escape our current predicament, we must start by understanding why we have failed, so far, to address the fiscal challenges presented by globalization. 1) Financial globalization is a recent phenomenon. Close to 20% of the world’s corporate profits are made by companies outside of the country where they are headquartered today.(2) Before the 2000s, that figure was less than 5%. 2) (...) the activities of multinational corporations are opaque. Companies are generally not required to publicly disclose in which countries they book their profits. 3) (...) successful lobbying by the tax-dodging complex. The transfer pricing industry lives by the system of corporate taxation created in the 1920s; it has a vital stake in preserving it. For example, if companies, instead of being taxed subsidiary by subsidiary, were taxed as consolidated entities, there would be no point in computing the prices of transactions between subsidiaries. The transfer pricing industry would become obsolete overnight. >Tax Competition/Buchanan. Saez I 114 SaezVsBuchanan/SaezVsBrennan: In the real world, the costs of tax competition far outweigh its supposed benefits. (...), there is no progressive income tax possible without a strong enough corporate tax, because with low corporate rates, rich people morph into companies and transform the income tax into a (hardly enforceable) consumption tax. >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Taxation. 1. International Monetary Fund. “Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy,” IMF Policy Paper no. 19/007, March 2019. Appendix 1, p. 47. 2. Tørsløv, Thomas, Ludvig Wier, and Gabriel Zucman. “The Missing Profits of Nations.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 24701, 2018. |
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