Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bundle Theory | Kripke | I 78 Relevance of theory-dependent properties (VsBundle Theory). >Relevance, >Theory dependence. Bundle theory/(s): the bundle theory states that the meaning of names consists of a certain set of properties associated with a name, e.g. Moses. Then the meaning of the name Moses would be, among other things, "the one who led the people out of Egypt". Kripke: so this means that some properties are more important than others. However, a theory must specify how this weighting is to proceed. All bundle theories are ill at times because they do not specify exactly what a sufficient number of properties must be met. I 79 What are the relevant properties? If you say, "Moses did not exist", this can mean many things: it can mean: "the Israelites did not have a leader" or "their leader was not called Moses" or "there was no man who accomplished all this". >Properties/Kripke. Kripke: the essential point is that we know a priori that Moses, if the biblical story is essentially wrong, did not exist. The biblical story does not indicate any necessary qualities of Moses, so he could have lived without accomplishing any of these things. >Necessary/Kripke, >Necessary de re/Kripke. I 80 One could say "the Jonah of the Book never existed", as one could say "the Hitler of Nazi propaganda never existed". Existence is independent of representation. >Existence/Kripke, >Presentation, >Description dependence/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Relevance | Kripke | I 78 Relevance of theory-dependent properties (VsBundle Theory). Bundle theory/(s): thesis: the bundle theory states that the meaning of names consists of a certain set of properties associated with a name, e.g. Moses. Then the meaning of the name Moses would be, among other things, "the one who led the people out of Egypt". Kripke: so this means that some properties are more important than others. However, a theory must specify how this weighting is to proceed. All bundle theories are ill at times because they do not specify exactly what a sufficient number of properties must be met. >Bundle theory/Kripke. I 79 What are the relevant properties? If you say,"Moses did not exist", this can mean many things: it can mean: "the Israelites did not have a leader" or "their leader was not called Moses" or "there was no man who accomplished all this. Kripke: the essential point is that we know a priori that Moses, if the biblical story is essentially wrong, did not exist. The biblical story does not indicate any necessary qualities of Moses, so he could have lived without accomplishing any of these things. I 80 One could say "The Jonah of the Book never existed", as one could say "The Hitler of Nazi propaganda never existed". Existence is independent of representation. >Properties/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bundle Theory | Newen Vs Bundle Theory | New I 233 Def Reference/Newen: Relation between the occurrence of a singular term and the object thus designated. ((s) i.e. general terms do not refer?). Names/Proper Names/Newen: two problems: 1) Reference definition: how is the reference determined 2) Meaning: what is the meaning of a name. Names/Description Theory/Newen: E.g. "Aristotle": the meaning would then be "student of Plato". Vs: Problem: it could be that someone does not know that Aristotle was a student of Plato, but otherwise uses the name correctly. Bundle Theory/Solution/Searle/Newen/(s): it should not happen that a single failure refutes the entire theory, therefore, a bundle of descriptions should be decisive, not a single description. I 234 Bundle Theory/Reference Definition/Searle/Newen: Searle's bundle theory simultaneously regards itself as a theory of reference definition. Names/Proper Names/KripkeVsBundle Theory/KripkeVsDescription Theory/KripkeVsSearle/Kripke/Newen: (modal argument): there is a necessary condition for Def meaning equality/Kripke: (meaning equality) if two expressions a1 and a2 have the same meaning, they are mutually replaceable in sentences that are introduced by the modal operator "It is necessary that", without changing the truth value. I 235 E.g. It is necessary that Aristotle is K. Here, "student of Plato" is not usable. Hence the name "Aristotle" (quotation marks by Newen) cannot have the same meaning as "student of Plato". Description Theory/Meta-Linguistic/Names/Newen: special case description theory of proper names: the so-called meta-linguistic description theory: E.g. the meaning of the name Aristotle can be specified with the description "The bearer of the name "Aristotle"." Point: this description captures the context-independent knowledge of a speaker with respect to the name. KripkeVs/Newen: if the modal argument is also true for the meta-linguistic theory, it cannot be right: it is indeed necessary that Aristotle is Aristotle, but not necessary that Aristotle is I 236 the bearer of the name "Aristotle". He could have been given a different name. Object Theory/Meaning/Names/Proper Names/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of a name is the designated object. A variation of this theory is Russell's theory of the meaning of logical proper names. ("dis", etc.) Epistemology/VsRussell/Newen: Russell's epistemology proved untenable. Solution/Newen: Reference definition by a description: "The only object that satisfies the description associated with the concept "E" (quotation marks by Newen)". Frege: was the first to specify this (in his theory of sense and meaning) Names/Frege/Newen: the Fregean meaning of a name is the designated object. Reference Definition/Frege/Newen: through description. This is Frege's theory of sense. Sense/Frege/Newen: through description (= reference definition for proper names). Names/Frege/Newen: Frege combines an object theory of meaning with a description theory of reference definition. I 237 ((s) KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsDescription Theory/Newen/(s): Kripke also criticized the description theory of reference definition: E.g. Schmidt was the discoverer of the incompleteness theorem, not Gödel. Nevertheless, we refer with "Gödel" to Gödel, and not to an object which is the singled out with a description that can be true or not.) Solution/Kripke: causal theory of proper names. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Various Authors | Kripke Vs Various Authors | I 57 Kripke: It would be interesting to compare Lewis’ notions with the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics by Wheeler and Everett. I believe that this notion of physics could suffer from analog philosophical problems. KripkeVsEverett. I 77 KripkeVsBundle theory: prevalent, one version would be, e.g.: (1) for every name "X" there is a corresponding batch of "phi" properties, so that the speaker A means: "phi X". I 78 This thesis is true because it can easily be a definition! The following theses are, however, all wrong I believe. (2) A believes that one of the characteristics or some together pick out a particular individual object and only one. KripkeVs: That just means that A thinks that they are doing it. Whether he is right is a different thesis.That he is right, is another thesis. (3) When the majority or a decisive set of properties from the batch are fulfilled, then y is the referent of "X". KripkeVs: that would therefore mean that certain characteristics are more important than others. However, a theory must specify how this weighting is done.+ I 117 Ruth Barcan-Markus: Identities between names are necessary. If somebody thinks that Cicero and Tullius are identical, and actually uses the two as a name, then it is thereby bound to the thesis that his opinion is a necessary truth. Mark speaks of a "mere tag". QuineVsMarkus: One beautiful evening, we could give the proper name "Hesperus" to planet Venus. One day before dawn, we could give a new proper name to the same planet, this time "Phosphorus". If we discover that it was the same planet twice, then our discovery is an empirical one. And not because the proper names were descriptions. III 413 Ontology/Kripke: thanks to Tarski and the difficult convention T our discourse is committed to the existence of ships and molecules, buildings and even lemons! KierkegaardVsHegel: His philosophy is bizarre (peculiar, funny). KripkeVsWallace: dito! Why should an astronomer who found a new planet be informed that he does not have any "ontological commitments" according to the sQ? |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
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