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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Gains Tax | Fuest | Fuest I 7 Capital tax/Piketty/Fuest: Piketty (2014)(1) argues that governments should use tax policy to fight trends towards increasing inequality. He proposes that governments should levy higher taxes on capital income and wealth. The ambition is that higher taxes on capital income will reduce the after-tax return to capital and thus tend to reduce inequality of income and, ultimately, wealth. Wealth taxes would address wealth inequality directly. Problems: This proposal raises two questions: Distribution: firstly, how effective are capital taxes as an instrument for redistributing income, that is for reducing the (after-tax) return on capital? Growth: Secondly, what are the implications of this proposal for economic growth? VsCapital tax: An important objection to using capital income taxes as an instrument for income redistribution is that trying to do so will be self-defeating if capital is internationally mobile. Countries with a high income tax burden attract less investment, and the investment they do attract is less profitable (Becker et al. 2012)(2). Secondly, countries may rely on residence-based capital income taxes. Residence-based taxation at the corporate level is not very effective if corporate headquarters are internationally mobile or corporate group structures can be adjusted (Becker and Fuest 2010)(3). International mobility is slightly less problematic when it comes to capital income taxation at the personal level. Distribution: Opponents of higher capital income taxes emphasize that these taxes reduce incentives to accumulate capital. If the rate of time preference is given and determines the after-tax return on savings in the long term, and capital markets are frictionless (Judd 1985)(4), it follows that taxes cannot reduce the rate of return to capital and the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero. Fuest I 8 But other authors (e.g. Piketty and Saez 2013(5)) have argued that the existence of bequests, combined with capital market imperfections, can lead to different conclusions, with positive optimal tax rates on capital income. From this perspective, capital income taxes have the purpose of (i) indirectly taxing bequests and (ii) providing insurance against uninsurable uncertainty regarding future returns on capital. Redisribution: Should capital income taxation be increased to achieve more income redistribution? For instance, would it be desirable to abolish dual income taxation and tax capital income at progressive rates, like labour income? For a long time the enforcement of residencebased taxes on capital income was undermined by tax evasion through bank accounts held abroad. This was an important reason for reducing tax rates on capital income. But recent developments in international information exchange for tax purposes, in particular supported by the OECD and the US government, have made it significantly more difficult for taxpayers to evade these taxes. Growth: How can the tax system be changed to achieve more economic growth? In the literature on the link between tax structures and economic growth, the view is widespread that capital income taxes, and particularly corporate income taxes, are harmful for growth. For instance, a widely recognized study about the impact of tax structures on economic growth conducted by the OECD (Johansson et al. 2008)(6) concludes: The reviewed evidence and the empirical work suggests a “tax and growth ranking” with recurrent taxes on immovable property being the least distortive tax instrument in terms of reducing long-run GDP per capita, followed by consumption taxes (and other property taxes), personal income taxes and corporate income taxes. The interpretation of the results in Johansson et al. (2008)(6) and the empirical approach used in this study are the subject of an ongoing and controversial debate (see Xing 2012)(7). 1. Piketty, T. (2014), Capital in the 21st Century, Cambridge, MA: Belknap 2. Becker, J, C. Fuest and N. Riedel (2012), “Corporate Tax Effects on the Quantity and Quality of FDI”, European Economic Review 56, 1495-1511. 3. Becker, J. and C. Fuest (2010). “Taxing Foreign Profits with International Mergers and Acquisitions, International Economic Review 51, 171-186. 4. Judd, K. (1985). “Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model”, Journal of Public Economics 28, 59–83. 5. Piketty, T. and E. Saez (2013), “A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation”, Econometrica 81, 1851-1886. 6. Johansson, Å., C. Heady, J. Arnold, B. Brys and L. Vartia (2008), Tax and Economic Growth, OECD Economics Department Working Paper 28. 7. Xing, J. (2012). “Tax Structure and Growth: How Robust Is the Empirical Evidence?”, Economics Letters 117, 379-382. Clemens Fuest, Andreas Peichl and Daniel Waldenström. Piketty’s r-g Model: Wealth Inequality and Tax Policy. https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/forum1-15-focus1.pdf |
Fuest I Clemens Fuest (ed.) George R. Zodrow Critical Issues in Taxation and Development (Cesifo Seminar Series) Cambridge, MA 2013 |
| Capital Gains Tax | Piketty | Fuest I 7 Capital tax/Piketty/Fuest: Piketty (2014)(1) argues that governments should use tax policy to fight trends towards increasing inequality. He proposes that governments should levy higher taxes on capital income and wealth. The ambition is that higher taxes on capital income will reduce the after-tax return to capital and thus tend to reduce inequality of income and, ultimately, wealth. Wealth taxes would address wealth inequality directly. Problems: This proposal raises two questions: Distribution: firstly, how effective are capital taxes as an instrument for redistributing income, that is for reducing the (after-tax) return on capital? Growth: Secondly, what are the implications of this proposal for economic growth? VsCapital tax: An important objection to using capital income taxes as an instrument for income redistribution is that trying to do so will be self-defeating if capital is internationally mobile. Countries with a high income tax burden attract less investment, and the investment they do attract is less profitable (Becker et al. 2012)(2). Secondly, countries may rely on residence-based capital income taxes. Residence-based taxation at the corporate level is not very effective if corporate headquarters are internationally mobile or corporate group structures can be adjusted (Becker and Fuest 2010)(3). International mobility is slightly less problematic when it comes to capital income taxation at the personal level. Distribution: Opponents of higher capital income taxes emphasize that these taxes reduce incentives to accumulate capital. If the rate of time preference is given and determines the after-tax return on savings in the long term, and capital markets are frictionless (Judd 1985)(4), it follows that taxes cannot reduce the rate of return to capital and the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero. Fuest I 8 But other authors (e.g. Piketty and Saez 2013(5)) have argued that the existence of bequests, combined with capital market imperfections, can lead to different conclusions, with positive optimal tax rates on capital income. From this perspective, capital income taxes have the purpose of (i) indirectly taxing bequests and (ii) providing insurance against uninsurable uncertainty regarding future returns on capital. Redisribution: Should capital income taxation be increased to achieve more income redistribution? For instance, would it be desirable to abolish dual income taxation and tax capital income at progressive rates, like labour income? For a long time the enforcement of residencebased taxes on capital income was undermined by tax evasion through bank accounts held abroad. This was an important reason for reducing tax rates on capital income. But recent developments in international information exchange for tax purposes, in particular supported by the OECD and the US government, have made it significantly more difficult for taxpayers to evade these taxes. Growth: How can the tax system be changed to achieve more economic growth? In the literature on the link between tax structures and economic growth, the view is widespread that capital income taxes, and particularly corporate income taxes, are harmful for growth. For instance, a widely recognized study about the impact of tax structures on economic growth conducted by the OECD (Johansson et al. 2008)(6) concludes: The reviewed evidence and the empirical work suggests a “tax and growth ranking” with recurrent taxes on immovable property being the least distortive tax instrument in terms of reducing long-run GDP per capita, followed by consumption taxes (and other property taxes), personal income taxes and corporate income taxes. The interpretation of the results in Johansson et al. (2008)(6) and the empirical approach used in this study are the subject of an ongoing and controversial debate (see Xing 2012)(7). Some basics for Piketty: >Cambridge Capital Controversy, >Geoffrey C. Harcourt, >Capital reversing, >Capital/Joan Robinson, >Exploitation/Robinson, >Reswitching/Robinson, >Reswitching/Sraffa, >Reswitching/Economic Theories, >Neo-Keynesianism, >Neo-Neoclassical Theories. 1. Piketty, T. (2014), Capital in the 21st Century, Cambridge, MA: Belknap 2. Becker, J, C. Fuest and N. Riedel (2012), “Corporate Tax Effects on the Quantity and Quality of FDI”, European Economic Review 56, 1495-1511. 3. Becker, J. and C. Fuest (2010). “Taxing Foreign Profits with International Mergers and Acquisitions, International Economic Review 51, 171-186. 4. Judd, K. (1985). “Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model”, Journal of Public Economics 28, 59–83. 5. Piketty, T. and E. Saez (2013), “A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation”, Econometrica 81, 1851-1886. 6. Johansson, Å., C. Heady, J. Arnold, B. Brys and L. Vartia (2008), Tax and Economic Growth, OECD Economics Department Working Paper 28. 7. Xing, J. (2012). “Tax Structure and Growth: How Robust Is the Empirical Evidence?”, Economics Letters 117, 379-382. Clemens Fuest, Andreas Peichl and Daniel Waldenström. Piketty’s r-g Model: Wealth Inequality and Tax Policy. https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/forum1-15-focus1.pdf |
Piketty I Thomas Piketty Capital in the Twenty First Century Cambridge, MA 2014 Piketty II Thomas Piketty Capital and Ideology Cambridge, MA 2020 Piketty III Thomas Piketty The Economics of Inequality Cambridge, MA 2015 Fuest I Clemens Fuest (ed.) George R. Zodrow Critical Issues in Taxation and Development (Cesifo Seminar Series) Cambridge, MA 2013 |
| Capitalism | Böckenförde | Brocker I 780 Capitalism/Böckenförde: at the height of the financial crisis, Böckenförde wrote a fundamental critique of economic conditions. (1) Here the idea of an extensive individualism of ownership and an interest in purchasing proclaimed as a natural right is criticized. On the other hand, a Thomist-inspired idea of solidarity is put forward and justified. BöckenfördeVsCapitalism. >Thomas Aquinas, >Community. 1. Ernst.Wolfgang Böckenförde „Woran der Kapitalismus krankt“ 2009, abgedruckt in: Böckenförde 2011, p. 64-71. Tine Stein, „Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat – Verfassung- Demokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Böckenf I Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde State, Society and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law, London 1991 German Edition: Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit. Studien zur Staatstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht Frankfurt 1976 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Marxism | Habermas | III 216 Marxism/Habermas: Hegel has become effective through an uncritical appropriation of the dialectical conceptual apparatus; the unity of theoretical and practical reason is built into the basic concepts of critique of political economy in such a way that the normative foundations of Marxian theory... III 217 ...have been darkened until today. >Pure Reason, >Practical Reason, >Ethics, >Theory of Knowledge, >G.W.F. Hegel. In Marxism this ambiguity was partly circumvented, partly concealed, but not actually eliminated: circumvented by the division of Marx' social theory into social research and ethical socialism (M. Adler); and concealed both by an orthodox connection to Hegel (Lukács, Korsch) and by an assimilation to the more naturalistic development theories of the 19th century (Engels, Kautsky). These theories form the bridge over which the topic of rationalization, which was initially dealt with in historical philosophy, was transferred to sociology.(1) >Sociology. IV 222 Lifeworld/Marxism/Habermas: the Marxist critique of bourgeois society starts with the circumstances of production because it accepts the rationalization of the lifeworld, but wants to explain the deformations of the rationalized lifeworld from conditions of material reproduction. >Lifeworld/Habermas. This approach requires a theory that operates on a broader basic conceptual basis than that of the "lifeworld". It must neither identify the environment with society as a whole nor reduce it to systemic contexts. >Society, >Systems, >Systems theory. IV 399 Marxism/VsCapitalism/Habermas: The starting point of all criticism of capitalism was the question of whether the conversion of prebourgeois normatively organized labor relations to the medium of money (see Money/Habermas, Money/Parsons), whether thus the monetization of the labor force IV 400 means an intervention in living conditions and areas of interaction which themselves are not integrated in the form of media and cannot be detached painlessly, i.e. without social-pathological effects, from structures of communication-oriented action. IV 504 Marxism/HabermasVsMarxism/Habermas: Marx's approach demands an economically abridged interpretation of the developed capitalist societies. For these, Marx rightly claimed an evolutionary primacy of the economy. However, this primacy must not tempt us to tailor the complementary relationship between the economy and the state apparatus to a trivial superstructure-based concept. Solution/Habermas: in contrast to the monism of value theory, we have to reckon with two control media and four channels through which two complementary subsystems subject the lifeworld to their imperatives. The reification effects can result equally from the bureaucratization and monetization of public and private spheres of life. IV 505 The economicist approach fails in view of the pacification of the class conflict and the long-term success that reformism has achieved in European countries since the Second World War in the broad sense of a social-democratic program. >Interventionism/Habermas. 1. J. Habermas Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus, Frankfurt, 1976. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Monetary Policy | Keynesianism | Mause I 224 Monetary Policy/Keynesianism/KeynesianismVsNeoclassics: Liquidity trap: if interest rates are low, so that no actor expects further rate cuts, the additional liquidity of monetary policy measures is no longer used to buy bonds. In this case, there will not be the desired interest rate cuts, which should lead to additional demand for goods in the economy as a whole. This is referred to as a liquidity trap, which leads to the ineffectiveness of monetary policy. VsNeoclassics, VsCapital Market Theory see Capital Market Theory/Neoclassics. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
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