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Cassirer | Ricoeur | I 22 Cassirer, Ernst/Symbol/Ricoeur: in his philosophy of symbolic forms he was inspired by Kant's philosophy, his declared aim being to go beyond the all too narrow framework of the transcendental method, which is limited to the criticism of the principles of Newtonian philosophy, and to explore all synthetic activities and all the areas of objectification corresponding to them. RicoeurVsCassirer: but is it legitimate to call these different "forms" of synthesis, in which the object depends on the function, these " abilities" (Vermögen) each of which produces and sets a world, symbolic? Per Cassirer: he was the first to ask the question of the regression of the language. Symbolic Form/Cassirer/Ricoeur: the term delimits, even before it represents an answer, a question: that of the arrangement of all "mediating functions" into a single function, which Cassirer calls "the symbolic". Def The Symbolic/Cassirer/Ricoeur: the symbolic denotes the common denominator of all ways of objectifying reality, of giving it meaning. The symbolic seeks above all to express the non-immediateness of our knowledge of reality. I 23 RicoeurVsCassirer: the Kantian transcendentalism (...) harms the work of description and classification of symbolic forms. The problem is that of the unity of language and the interweaving of its multiple functions in a single realm of speech. >Symbol/Ricoeur, >Sense/Ricoeur, >Interpretation/Ricoeur. Ricoeur: this problem seems to me to be better characterized by the term sign (...). >Symbol/Cassirer, >Sign/Ricoeur. RicoeurVsCassirer: What (...) is at stake is the specificity of the hermeneutical problem. By uniting all the functions of mediation under the title "symbolic", Cassirer gives this concept as much scope as he does the concept of reality on the one hand and culture on the other. [The fundamental difference disappeares]: that between unambiguous expressions and ambiguous expressions. >Sense/Ricoeur. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
Symbols | Cassirer | Ricoeur I 23 Symbol/Cassirer: E. Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, Weimar 1923/29, III, p. 109(1): "With it [the concept of symbol] we try to encompass the whole of those phenomena in which any kind of 'sense-fulfillment' of the sensual is represented at all - in which a sensual, in the way it exists and is, is at the same time special and embodied, a manifestation and incarnation of a sense - and we try to make a clear statement about the meaning of the sensual in the way it exists and is in the way it is perceived". RicoeurVsCassirer: >Cassirer/Ricoeur, >Symbols, >Sense, >Incarnation, >Existence, >Manifestation. 1. E. Cassirer, Ernst. 1923/29. Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, Weimar |
Cassirer I E. Cassirer The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Volume 1: Language (Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Language) London 1977 Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
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Cassirer, E. | Quine Vs Cassirer, E. | I 143 It is an illusion to think that our sentences, which can be easily translated into one another, are different linguistic incarnations of a certain intercultural proposition or meaning, they are rather nothing but mere variations of the same intra-cultural word usage. For theoretical propositions like "neutrinos have no mass" applies Wittgenstein's dictum "To understand a proposition is to understand a language." I 144 Ex Certain islanders are said to call pelicans their half-brothers. The islanders have a brief occasion proposition to which an islander always agrees when he is introduced to one of his actual half brothers or a pelican, and probably no comparably short sentence in the event that it is exclusively about the one half brother. The equipment of the German language is the complete opposite of that. Such difference are true cultural differences. Not infrequently (for example, in Cassirer) one comes up against the assertion: Cassirer: profound linguistic differences are ultimately differences of mindset or the way of seeing the world. QuineVsCassirer: this is often an indeterminacy of correlation. I 146 In proportion to how the radical translation is underdetermined by the totality of dispositions about linguistic behavior, also all of our theories and beliefs are forever underdetermined !. Here it may be objected that if two theories match in this way with respect to all possible sensory determinants, in an important sense it is no longer about two, but only about one theory. But nevertheless if two theories contradict with regard to individual sentences, then it is just a conflict betw. the parts. The principle of indeterminacy is noteworthy because translations usually progress step by step. I 147 The indeterminacy of translation has been less appreciated than its Proteus-like intra-linguistic counterpart in private worlds. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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