Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chinese Room | Chalmers | I 323 Chinese Room/Searle/Chalmers: Searle's argument is directed against the possibility of understanding or intentionality. >Intentionality/Searle, >Intentionality, >Understanding, >Translation. ChalmersVsSearle: we separate intentionality and understanding from the possibility of having conscious experiences. >Experience. We split Searle's argument into two parts: (1) No program achieves consciousness. >Consciousness. (2) No program achieves intentionality (understanding). Searle believes that (1) implies (2), others doubt that. Strong artificial intelligence: if (1) is true, the strong Artificial Intelligence thesis fails, but if (1) can be refuted, even Searle would accept that the Chinese Room argument failed. The connection of consciousness and understanding can be set aside, it is not a decisive argument against artificial intelligence. >Artificial Intelligence, >Strong Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial General Intelligence, >Human Level AI. FodorVsChinese Room: (Fodor 1980) 1: Fordor considers the connection to the environment of the system. >Environment. ReyVsChinese Room: (Rey 1986) 2 dito. BodenVsChinese Room: (Boden 1988) 3 Boden shows functional or procedural approaches of intentionality. ThagardVsChinese Room: (Thagard 1986) 4 dito. Chalmers: it is about intentionality (understanding) and does not refute the possibility of consciousness (conscious experiences). Chinese Room/Chalmers: the argument states that a program is not sufficient, e.g. for the experience of a red object when implemented in a black and white environment. Then consciousness needs more than one relevant program. Strong Artificial IntelligenceVsChinese Room/Strong Artificial IntelligenceVsSearle: it is the whole system to which you have to attribute consciousness, not the individual elements. SearleVsVs: that is implausible. Chalmers: in fact, it is implausible, if the inhabitant of the room should have no consciousness, but the inhabitant together with the paper. I 324 Disappearing Qualia: the argument can also be applied to the Chinese Room (... + ...) >Qualia/Chalmers. I 325 Dancing Qualia: dito (... + ...) Conclusion/Chalmers: a system of demons and paper snippets both of which can reduce the number of demons and snippets, has the same conscious experiences as e.g. to understand Chinese or to see something red. >Reduction. Chinese Room/Chalmers: 1. As described by Searle, the stack of paper is not a simple stack, but a dynamic system of symbol manipulation. 2. The role of the inhabitant (in our variant: the demon, which can be multiplied) is quite secondary. When we look at the causal dynamics between the symbols, it is no longer so implausible to ascribe consciousness to the system. >Symbol manipulation. I 326 The inhabitant is only a kind of causal mediator. 1. J. Fodor, Searle on what only brains can do. Behavioral and Brain sciences 3, 1980, pp. 431-32 2. G. Rey, Waht's really going on in Searle's "Chinese Room", Philosophical Studies 50, 1986: pp. 169-85. 3. M. Boden, Escaping from the Chinese Room, in: Computer Models of Mind, Cambridge 1988. 4. P. Thagard, The emergence of meaning: An escape from Searle's Chinese Room. Behaviorism 14, 1986: pp. 139-46. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Chinese Room | Pauen | Pauen I 149f Chinese Room/Searle: (Searle 1980) (VsFodor) if the thesis of the Chinese Room were true, it would mean that verbal behavior as a criterion for the attribution of consciousness is in principle unsuited. - VsTuringtest. - functional features are no guarantee of meaning. >Meaning, >Semantics, >Syntax, >Understanding, >Language, >Translation. I 151 VsChinese room: the occupant does not take into account the situation and no previous questions. - The system cannot detect repetitions. - The system is not capable of learning. - The smallest deviations cause devastating affects. >Learning, >Contextuality, >Speaking, >Communication, >Repetition, >J. R. Searle. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Chinese Room | Searle | I 60 ff Chinese Room: the whole system or its occupant does not understand Chinese, but behaves deceptively so. VsComputer model: understanding is crucial in reality. >VsChinese Room. I 236 Chinese room: semantics is not intrinsic to the >syntax. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chinese Room | Pauen Vs Chinese Room | Pauen I 150 Chinese Room/Searle/Pauen: (1980) would mean that verbal behavior as a criterion for the attribution of consciousness is fundamentally unsuitable! Significant consequences: not only additional argument VsTuring test. Can be transferred to all verbal utterances, and eventually to the entire functionalism. Functional features would not guarantee meaning. VsChinese Room/VsSearle/Pauen: 1) it is possible that computers fulfill other sufficient conditions for instantiating consciousness. I 151 2) (more important): even his own argument requires the condition which he denies at the same time. When searching for the neural conditions of consciousness, one must first make sure that the organisms studied have consciousness! (Circular!). This security can only be gained through behavior. 3) The situation differs in many aspects not mentioned by Searle from the usual speaker situation. The occupant has no opportunity to respond to the speaker situation! He cannot take into account any previous questions. He cannot detect any repetitions. Variant: should it be possible to take several steps into account, a combinatorial explosion threatens. Only a much more complex system would have the necessary skills to cope with that. But it is precisely in such a case that it would no longer be plausible that the system has no awareness! Even then the system would be neither flexible nor trainable. The slightest deviation or spelling errors have devastating effects. I 152 Meaning-relevant distinctions are inseparable from irrelevant ones. ((s) These are arguments in the sense of Searle insofar as real consciousness must have just these properties.) VsSearle/(s): the arguments are directed against Searle insofar as the fiction of the Chinese Room could not go undetected. Lanz I 296 VsSearle/VsChinese Room: (Lanz): the brain is also a purely syntactic machine. I.e. in the end, the approach taken by cognitive science is the only way: to look out for subpersonal cognitive processes under as many realistic assumptions as possible. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Searle, J.R. | Verschiedene Vs Searle, J.R. | Lanz I 296 VsSearle/VsChinese Room: (Lanz): the brain is also a purely syntactic machine. So in the end there is nothing left but the path taken by cognitive science: to look for subpersonal cognitive processes under as many realistic assumptions as possible! Münch III 332 Homunculi/pictorial representation/HolensteinVsSearle: it is a popular argument against pictorial representation of mental images that they must be viewed by homunculi who merely shift the problem of coding. Holenstein: this is an ontological prerequisite that does not meet scientific standards! The assumption of homunculi requires special justification! Instead of recourse, a regulated use of a physical structure of the brain is also possible. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 Tetens IV 115 Def Meaning/Searle/Tetens: an expression has meaning if the speaker expresses meaning with it! (Mental act of "giving meaning"). Artificial Intelligence/TetensVsSearle: the machine can also do the "giving" of meaning with the help of the programmer! So not only "pure syntax" in the machine, as Searle means, but also semantics. Tetens IV 117 Tetens: let us assume that we would come to the conclusion that a machine can only behave like a human being if it completely resembles the human organism. Then we would not learn anything about humans from it that we do not already know. In this respect the artificial intelligence is philosophically neutral. Searle I 26 VsSearle: I was accused of representing "property dualism" and "privileged access" and believed in "introspection". I 27 But I did not represent that explicitly anywhere. Searle I 126 Searle Thesis: my approach in the philosophy of mind: the biological naturalism. VsSearle: this is sometimes confronted with the following argument: if we can imagine that the same behavior can be produced by a zombie without consciousness, then why did evolution produce consciousness at all? I 127 But it is a false assumption that every biologically inherited trait must give the organism an advantage in selection. For example, the passion for alpine skiing certainly has a biological basis that is not the result of practice or training. It may be that we have more general biological needs that are satisfied by these activities. I 288 Foot Note: There is a distinction between what is selected and what is selected for. III 39 GiddensVsSearle: against the description of the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules. |
Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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