Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chinese Room | Lanz | I 296 Chinese RoomVsComputer Model/VsSimulation as an explanation of skills. Chinese RoomVs computer model / VsSimulation as an explanation of capabilities: The thought experiment of the chinese room was developed by J. R. Searle to show that the mind or its activity cannot be simulated by a computer. Another consequence is that simulation cannot be used to explain (human) abilities. See also further entries for Chinese Room. |
Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Chinese Room | Searle | I 60 ff Chinese Room: the whole system or its occupant does not understand Chinese, but behaves deceptively so. VsComputer model: understanding is crucial in reality. >VsChinese Room. I 236 Chinese room: semantics is not intrinsic to the >syntax. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Computer Model | Rorty | I 259 Vs Analogy Brain/Computer/Rorty: this Analogy is trivial, because a program only codifies a set of operations, and explains thinking as little as a set of logical formulas explains the laws of inference. A code adds nothing! (No additional insight). >Computation. I 262 Rorty (referring to Dodwell): As long as we are at the level of subroutines, we cannot be attributed to specified intelligence and character. No more than the talk of "red sensations" determines the assumption of internally red entities. However, if we ascend to the hardware level, the anthropomorphism is no longer appropriate. >Computer model/Dodwell. If we restricted ourselves to the hardware level, sensations would play no role anymore. Then, the computer analogy is no longer relevant, as little as with unicellular organisms. Complicated physiology arouses the need for psychology! I 263 RortyVsComputer Model (Hardware/Software): depends on the choice of the level of abstraction I 281 Question: how can the computer figure out that the current patterns flowing through the wire are the sum of the cash earnings of the day? ((s) This is determined only from the outside as an interpretation.) Rorty: it is not about studying the mode of operation at all. We will not clarify whether we should concede robots personal rights by better exploring how they work. >Robots. VI 184f Computer/Pragmatism: The question of whether computers have consciousness, which is so important for Searle and Thomas Nagel, does not even arise for pragmatism. >Artificial consciousness, >Pragmatism. The only form to confront of the world is the same for people as for computers. Cf. >Artificial Intelligence. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Computation | Searle Vs Computation | Lanz I 295 Computation/computer model of the mind/Lanz: thesis when a program contains the functional analysis of a psychological ability then the machine on which the program is running, owns this psychological ability. The standing behind the program functional analysis then explains what this ability is based on. (SearleVs). SearleVsComputer model/Lanz: E.g. speech understanding. >Chinese room. The rules for the passenger are such that the Chinese from the outside would get the impression that they led a normal conversation. I 296 But: the successful imitation or simulation of a psychological ability is not a sufficient condition that the simulating machine has the simulated capacity, nor that an explanation of this psychological ability was given |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Functionalism | Searle Vs Functionalism | Lanz I 295 Functionalism/Lanz: promises a way out by adopting a level of information processing, the causal and semantic elements 'somehow' integrated. SearleVsFunctionalism/Lanz: there is no explanatorily useful level between folk psychology and neurobiology. The speech of subpersonal cognitive processes is absurd. Cf. >functions. Lanz I 296 SearleVsFunctionalism: there is no explanatorily useful level between folk psychology and neurobiology. The speech of subpersonal cognitive processes is absurd. Computation/computer model of the mind: if a program contains the functional analysis of a psychological ability then the machine on which the program is running owns this psychological ability. The standing behind the program functional analysis then explains what this ability is based on! (SearleVs). SearleVsComputer model: E.g. speech understanding. > Chinese room. The rules for the passenger are such that the Chinese outside get the impression that they led a normal conversation. I 296 But: the successful imitation or simulation of a psychological ability is not a sufficient condition that the simulating machine has the simulated capacity, nor that an explanation of this psychological ability was given. (> simulation/Deutsch). (>Forgery). Chinese roomVsComputer model/VsSimulation as an explanation for skills. |
Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
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