Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Connectionism | Churchland | Fodor IV 199 Fodor/LeporeVsConnectionism: the connectionist draws diagrams in which the labeling (designation of the nodes) say what the intentional interpretation is supposed to be. --- IV 200 But no theory explains how the node comes to its designation. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: Churchland makes the same mistake. This is only semantics by stipulation. It does not matter whether semantics is postulated for points or whole dimensions. Problem: what should decide whether brown and dark blue correspond rather to regions (places) or dimensions? It does not provide any semantics at all because the brain does not represent colors as frequencies. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Connectionism | Field | II 68 Connectionism/VsConnectionism/Field: Connectionism cannot map the systematics of thoughts. - Even animals have such a system. >Neural networks, >Connectionism, >Thinking, >Thoughts, >World/thinking. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Connectionism | Pinker | I 128 ff - 145 Neural Networks/Pinker: Learning/Problem: there are incorrect reinforcements with "XOR" (exclusive or; Sheffer stroke). Solution: we have to interpose internal >representation. I 142 Neural nets/Rumelhart: neural nets return all errors. "Hidden levels": several statements that can be true or wrong can be assembled into a complex logical function, the values then vary continuously. The system can place the correct emphasis itself if input and output are given - as long as similar inputs lead to similar outputs, no additional training is required. >Homunculi. I 144f Connectionism/Rumelhart: the mind is a large neural network. - Rats have only fewer nets. PinkerVsConnectionism: networks alone are not sufficient for handling symbols - the networks have to be structured in programs. - Even past tense overstretches a network. Precursors: "association of ideas": Locke/Hume/Berkeley/Hartley/Mill >Association/Hume. 1) contiguity (context): frequently experienced ideas are associated in the mind 2) Similarity: similar ideas activate each other. >Similarity/Locke. I 146 Computer variant: is a statistical calculation with multiple levels. I 147 VsConnectionism: units with the same representations are indistinguishable. - The individual should not be construed as the smallest subclass. I 151 Connectionism cannot explain compositionality of representation. >Compositionality. I 158ff Recursion/Recursive/Neural Networks/Memory/Pinker: recursion solution for the problem of an infinite number of possible thoughts: Separation of short/long-term memory. The whole sentence is not comprehended at once, but words are processed individually in loops. >Recursion/Pinker. I 159 Networks themselves have to been as recursive processor: for thoughts to be well-formed. I 166 Neural Networks/Pinker: the networks do not reach down to the rules - they only interpolate between examples that have been put in. >VsConnectionism. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Representation | Fodor | Rorty I 269 ff Rorty: Fodor's image of the internal representations has nothing to do with our mirror of nature that we have adopted. What is decisive is that with respect to Fodor's "Language of thought" the skeptical question "how exactly do the internal representations represent reality?" cannot be asked! There is no gap. --- Fodor IV ~ 122 Representation/Fodor/Lepore: having a thought is not an action, therefore it is not subject to beliefs like speech acts. >Speech act, >Belief, >Thinking, >Actions. IV 124 Representation/Fodor/Lepore: today: representations have functional roles qua constituents of propositional attitude but the content must not depend metaphysically nor conceptually on their functional role. >Functional role, >Content. IV 126 Representation/tradition/Fodor/Lepore: their explanation does not use beliefs, wishes, etc. so the causal role is determined only by non-semantic properties. Representations are not used for anything. Computation/Fodor/Lepore: thesis: the causal role of representations is governed by the same syntactic properties that affect their compositionality. >Compositionality. IV 128 Not representations are interpreted, but propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc. The representations themselves are also inaccessible to radical interpretation. IV 127f Interpretation: objects are not representations but propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc. IV 201 Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies. The brain represents red things as red and as aunts as aunts (not as objects with certain psychophysical properties). Otherwise we could find out anything with introspection. There are very different interpretations of its diagrams (VsConnectionism). >Connectionism. --- Newen I 133 Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor presumes localizable, specifiable representations. VsFodor: today you rather assume neuronal networks. Representation: is preconceptual, e.g. spatial orientation. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Connectionism | Pinker Vs Connectionism | I 146 Def Connectionism/Pinker: Variant of the computer theory of the mind: the main form of information processing are statistical calculations with multiple levels. Vs: despite the promising name "neuronal" they are not particularly realistic models of the brain. For example, a "synapse" (i.e. the weighting of a link!) can switch between stimulating and inhibiting properties. And information can flow both ways at an "axon" (connection). VsConnectoplasm/VsConnectionism: has major difficulties with 5 tasks of everyday thinking: I 147 1) No individuality: if networks work with the same representations, they are indistinguishable from each other! Only generalities (classes, vegetables) can be represented, but not a specific horse. It is not a solution to let the node for horses become twice as be active, because this state does not differ from the twice as large the belief that the properties of a horse are present or the properties are present in double scope. It would be a mistake to regard the individual as a very, very specific subclass. I 151 VsConnectionism/VsAssociationism: 2) Problem: Def Compositionality/Pinker: the possibility that a representation is made up of parts, while their meaning results from the meanings of the parts and the way they are combined. E.g. Compositionality is the key feature of all the human languages. I 153 Language: E.g. distinction baby saw chicken/chicken saw baby shows that this is not a collection of separate units. Neural Networks/Compositionality/Language: Problem: compositionality is surprisingly hard to cope with for the connectoplasm. When active/passive are distinguished, then at the price that you no longer know who does something to whom. I 154/155 We have the units: Baby eats and snail is eaten. If we wanted to distinguish between poodle and baby, we do not know whether the poodle saw that the baby ate the snail, or vice versa. The unit that the baby eats does not say anything about what it eats, and the (separate) unit for snail is eaten does not say by whom. The problem cannot be solved by weighting again. Solution: the mind needs a representation of the statement itself. Our model therefore needs an extra layer of units. This structure is very similar to normal, language-like Mentalese. The components of the logic, predicate, argument, and statement must adjust themselves again. In addition, quantification to eliminate I 156 E.g. "every 45 seconds someone suffers an accident, poor fellow." "Someone"/Quantification/Pinker/(s): x can be stand for "someone". (Everyday language translation). PinkerVsConnectoplasm: Problem: Interference, "disastrous forgetting": if the weighting for addition is changed, for example is newly introduced for the addition of 2, then it may be that the addition of 1 is forgotten. ("crosstalk"). I 165 PinkerVsConnectoplasm: the connectoplasm is so underprivileged that you often have to build networks with the worst combination: with too many innate structures in conjunction with too much input from the environment. This is how knowledge becomes useless if the question itself changes only a little. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
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