Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Consequentialism | Nagel Vs Consequentialism | III 71 Def Consequentialism: (the view that it is about what should happen objectively, not what we do). DeontologyVsConsequentialism: is often challenged with two particular types of reasons which each seem to have the relative form, and whose existence apparently is independent of neutral values: 1) Reasons of autonomy: desires, obligations, personal relationships. 2) Claims of others not to be mistreated. (Not neutral, though, but derived from the relative claim of every individual, not to be mistreated themselves). Def Deontology/Nagel: restricts what we are allowed to do in the service of both neutral and autonomous values. (Nagel pro). Problem: deontology can be explained with relative reasons, but it is precisely that which allows doubts about the existence of these reasons. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Deontology | Mackie Vs Deontology | Stegmüller IV 227 Deontology/Stegmüller: does not lead to objectivism! DeontologyVsconsequentialism: Moral imperatives may not be of the form: "Act so that you will achieve a specific outcome" ((s) without regard to the means). MackieVsDeontology: no morality can do without consequentialist considerations. IV 228 Morality/Mackie/Stegmüller: gives up the nowadays customary separation between the morally good and the non-morally good. "moral fairness". IV 230 When it comes to the introduction of principles that curtail the negative consequences of the limits of human sympathy, then these principles should be eligible to be endorsed by any position. Even if no agreement on the content of ideals can be achieved, what should be achievable is an agreement on the method of the settlement of differences. IV 266 Rights/Mackie: difference. 1. viewed from the outside: securing spaces of freedom. 2. viewed from the inside: results in a diversity of objectives, choice. MackieVsTeleology/MackieVsDeontology: both unsatisfactory. Morality/ethics/Mackie: Thesis: primacy of rights over duties and objectives. IV 267 Ethics/life/Mackie: there is no "fix life plan". There is a right to a flexible behavior of choice. Rights/Mackie: cannot be absolute, since they may conflict with each other. Rights prima facie need not be identical to those that evolve over time. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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