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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical Theory | Habermas | IV 560 Critical Theory/Habermas: the ideology-critical examination with tradition can only aim at the truth content of philosophical concepts and problems, at the appropriation of their systematic content because criticism is guided by theoretical assumptions. >Truth content. At the time of Adorno, Benjamin, Marcuse, Löwenthal and Fromm, Critical Theory was still based on Marxist philosophy of history, namely the belief that the productive forces developed an objectively bursting force. Only under this condition could critique limit itself to "raising awareness of the possibilities to which the historical situation itself has matured"(1). >Th. W. Adorno, >W. Benjamin. Habermas: without a theory of history there could not be an immanent criticism of the figures of the objective mind. Otherwise, it would have to surrender historically to the respective standards of an epoch. The research program of the 1930s stood and fell with the historical-philosophical confidence in a rational potential of bourgeois culture that would be released in social movements under the pressure of the developed productive forces. >Philosophy of history, >Historiography, >History. Ironically, however, Horkheimer, Marcuse IV 561 and Adorno strengthen the assumption, particularly through their ideology-critical works, that culture loses its autonomy in post-liberal societies and is incorporated into the drive of the economic-administrative system in the de-sublimated forms of mass culture. >M. Horkheimer. Only instrumental reason, spread out into totality, is embodied in the totally administered society. This transforms everything that is into real abstraction (see Terminology/Marx). But then what is seized and distorted by these abstractions must escape empirical access. >Abstraction. HabermasVsCritical Theory: Critical Theory could not yet ascertain its normative foundations in historical philosophy. This soil was not viable for an empirical research programme. This was also shown by the fact that a clearly defined object area such as the communicative everyday practice of the lifeworld, in which structures of rationality are embodied and where processes of reification can be identified, was missing. >Lifeworld, >Rationality. Critical Theory suddenly contrasted the consciousness of individuals with the inwardly, intrapsychically only prolonged social integration mechanisms. Solution/Habermas: on the other hand, the theory of communicative action of the reasonable content of anthropologically deep-seated structures can be asserted in an analysis that is initially reconstructive, i.e. unhistorical. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. IV 562 It writes structures of action and understanding, which can be read from the intuitive knowledge of competent members of modern societies. There is no way back to a history theory that does not separate a fortiori between problems of developmental logic and development dynamics. >Progress. 1. H.Marcuse, Philosophie und Kritische Theorie, in. Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, Hg.6, 1937, S. 647. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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