Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cultural Relativism | Deci | Corr I 450 Cultural Relativism/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: cultural relativists (e.g., Markus, Kitayama and Heiman 1996)(1) have claimed that the need for autonomy is not relevant for Eastern, collectivist cultures. Self-Determination TheoryVsCultural Relativism/DeciVsRelativism/RyanVsRelativism: SDT argues that satisfaction of the basic needs is essential for all people, several cross-cultural studies have been done to confirm that need satisfaction is essential in cultures that are vastly different. >Self-Determination Theory, >Self-Determination. Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan (2003)(2) investigated the internalization of the values of individualism (a strongly endorsed Western value) and collectivism (a strongly endorsed Eastern value) within four disparate cultures (Turkey, Korea, Russia and the United States). [They] found that the higher people’s relative autonomy for both individualist and collectivist practices, the higher their level of psychological wellbeing in each of the four cultures. That is, to the degree that people in any culture can enact a value autonomously, even if it does not match the dominant value of their culture, those individuals will display higher levels of wellbeing. >Autonomy, >Culture, >Cultural psychology, >Cultural differences. 1. Markus, H. R., Kitayama, S. and Heiman, R. J. 1996. Culture and basic psychological principles, in E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, pp. 857–913. New York: Guilford Press 2. Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y. and Kaplan, U. 2003. Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: a self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientations and well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84: 97–110 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Cultural Relativism | Ryan | Corr I 450 Cultural Relativism/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: cultural relativists (e.g., Markus, Kitayama and Heiman 1996)(1) have claimed that the need for autonomy is not relevant for Eastern, collectivist cultures. Self-Determination TheoryVsCultural Relativism/DeciVsRelativism/ RyanVsRelativism: SDT argues that satisfaction of the basic needs is essential for all people, several cross-cultural studies have been done to confirm that need satisfaction is essential in cultures that are vastly different. >Self-Determination Theory, >Self-Determination. Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan (2003)(2) investigated the internalization of the values of individualism (a strongly endorsed Western value) and collectivism (a strongly endorsed Eastern value) within four disparate cultures (Turkey, Korea, Russia and the United States). [They] found that the higher people’s relative autonomy for both individualist and collectivist practices, the higher their level of psychological wellbeing in each of the four cultures. That is, to the degree that people in any culture can enact a value autonomously, even if it does not match the dominant value of their culture, those individuals will display higher levels of wellbeing. >Autonomy, >Culture, >Cultural psychology, >Cultural differences. 1. Markus, H. R., Kitayama, S. and Heiman, R. J. 1996. Culture and basic psychological principles, in E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, pp. 857–913. New York: Guilford Press 2. Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y. and Kaplan, U. 2003. Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: a self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientations and well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84: 97–110 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Cultural Relativism | Self-Determination Theory | Corr I 450 Cultural Relativism/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: cultural relativists (e.g., Markus, Kitayama and Heiman 1996)(1) have claimed that the need for autonomy is not relevant for Eastern, collectivist cultures. Self-Determination TheoryVsCultural Relativism/DeciVsRelativism/ RyanVsRelativism: SDT argues that satisfaction of the basic needs is essential for all people, several cross-cultural studies have been done to confirm that need satisfaction is essential in cultures that are vastly different. >Self-Determination Theory, >Self-Determination. Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan (2003)(2) investigated the internalization of the values of individualism (a strongly endorsed Western value) and collectivism (a strongly endorsed Eastern value) within four disparate cultures (Turkey, Korea, Russia and the United States). [They] found that the higher people’s relative autonomy for both individualist and collectivist practices, the higher their level of psychological wellbeing in each of the four cultures. That is, to the degree that people in any culture can enact a value autonomously, even if it does not match the dominant value of their culture, those individuals will display higher levels of wellbeing. >Autonomy, >Culture, >Cultural psychology, >Cultural differences. 1. Markus, H. R., Kitayama, S. and Heiman, R. J. 1996. Culture and basic psychological principles, in E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, pp. 857–913. New York: Guilford Press 2. Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y. and Kaplan, U. 2003. Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: a self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientations and well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84: 97–110 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Relativism | Putnam | VII 436 Realtivism/Putnam: my main concern in the book "Truth, Reason and History": Putnam: thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat. "Companions in guilt" argument: in case of partial relativism, the total relativism threatens (PutnamVsHarman). --- Williams II 503 PutnamVsCultural Relativism/PutnamVsRelativism/M. Williams: internal contradiction: e.g. if I as a cultural relativist say that if you say that something is true according to the standards of your culture, then I say, in reality, that this is true according to the standards of my own culture. I cannot express the transcendental assertion which is the heart of relativism that all cultures are in the same position. Opposition: truth for a culture is something absolute, which contradicts the alleged relativity. >Cultural relativism. --- Putnam III 139f Relativism/PutnamVsWilliams: Williams acts as if science would consist of objective individual judgments, whereas one would have to take or reject the "culture" as a whole. --- V 141 Consciousness/PutnamVsLocke: that stones do not have consciousness, is a fact about our notion of consciousness. Problem: that makes truth ultimately dependent on our cultural standards. V 165 Relativism/tradition: relativism is easy to refute, because relativsm itself had to set absolutely, otherwise its position is not more secure than any other. PlatoVsProtagoras (relativist): it is a regress to say: "I think that I think that snow is white". PutnamVsPlato: it does not follow that it must be iterated indefinitely, just that it could. Modern Relativism/discourse relativity/Foucault: everything is relative, also the relativism. Vs: problem: if we say "absolutely true relative to person P", then there is no total relativism. No relativist wants the relativism apply to everything. --- I (i) 241 Justified Assertibility/Dewey/Rorty: justified assertibility depends on the majority in a culture. >Assertibility. Norms and standards are historical and reflect interests. PutnamVsRorty: justified assertibility exists regardless of the majority, but it is not a transcendental reality but a characteristic of the concept of entitlement. PutnamVsRelativism/VsRealism: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside the language. I (i) 249 Relativism/Putnam: the world is not a "product" (of our culture), it is only the world. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Relativism | Quine | II 44 Theory: rewording: E.g. assuming, we swap electron and molecule - any empirical statement (with theoretical term) is rated opposite - solution: we mark the theoretical terms and assign them to the two theories: then no problem, no relativism. V 89 Relative Identity/Geach: (Geach, Reference and generality, p. 39f)(1): Identity only makes sense with regard to a general term such as "the same dog". QuineVsGeach: this certainly applies to the beginning of language learning. Identity/Showing/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in showing twice and saying, "This is the same as that". Then one could still ask. "The same what?" Example: One could have pointed once at the dog and once only at the ear. Solution: You can easily say a is identical to b. Whether a is the same dog or the same ear depends on whether a is a dog or an ear. QuineVsGeach: this makes his relativism untenable once you get used to the identity speech. Identity/Quine: but is still relative in a deeper sense. 1. Geach, Peter T., Reference and Generality, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1962) II 44 Relativity of Theories/Quine: A theory formulation merely implies its categorical observational sentences without being implied by them. Therefore, the observation conditionals implied by two theory formulations can all be identical without the formulations implying each other. II 45 Let us assume that in a situation there is no possibility of harmonisation by reinterpretation of the terms. We would probably not know that they are empirically equivalent. Because that they are, one usually gets out by the discovery of such a reinterpretation. Nevertheless, we want to assume that they are empirically equivalent. Further assumed: all categorical observations are de facto true, although this is not known either. Further conditions for the truth of one theory or the other certainly cannot be set. Question: are they both true? Quine: I say yes. But even they can be logically incompatible despite their empirical equivalence, which raises the spectre of >cultural relativism. Because each of them is obviously only true from its point of view. QuineVsCultural Relativism: The spectre can easily be dispelled: by a step that is as trivial as the interchange of "electron" and "molecule": Since the two theoretical formulations are incompatible, they have to evaluate a certain sentence in the opposite direction. Since they are nevertheless empirically equivalent, this sentence must contain terms that are not sufficiently determined by observation criteria. Then we might as well pick out one of these terms and treat it as if it were two independent words, one belonging to one theory, the other to another. II 46 We could indicate this by the notation. By consistently maintaining this spelling, we could resolve any conflict between these theories. From then on, both could be accepted as terminologically different true descriptions of one and the same world. The threat of truth relativism has been averted. XI 121 QuineVsCultural Relativism/Lauener: is contradictory in itself. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Cultural Relativism | Quine Vs Cultural Relativism | II 45 Suppose all categorical observation sentences were indeed true, although even that is not known. Other conditions for the truth of one or the other theory can certainly not be made. Question: are they both true? Quine: I say yes. But even they can be logically incompatible, despite their empirical equivalence, which evokes the scare of >cultural relativism. Because each is apparently true only from its standpoint. QuineVsCultural Relativism: The scare can be easily dispelled: with a step that is as trivial as the interchange of "electron" and "molecule": As the two theoretical formulations are incompatible, they must evaluate a particular sentence oppositely. Since they are nevertheless empirically equivalent, this sentence must contain terms that are not sufficiently determined by observation criteria. Then we might as well pick out one of these terms and treat it as if they were two independent words, one belonging to one theory, the other to the other one. II 46 We could characterize this by the notation. By consistently maintaining this notation we could settle any conflict of these theories. Both could thenceforth be allowed as terminologically different true descriptions of the same world. The threat of truth relativism is averted. Observation sentences correspond with the theory holophrastically (as whole sentence) regardless of their internal structure except for the possible content of the logical implikation links between formulations and categorical observation sentences. The language needs to be neither divalent nor realistic, it does not even need anything that is clearly recognizable as terms or reference or contain any identifiable ontology. XI 121 QuineVsCultural Relativism/Lauener: self-contradictory. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Disquotation | Putnam Vs Disquotation | Putnam VII 431 Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism: >Disquotationalism). Truth/Putnam: is a property - >PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (R. Rorty, The Mirror of Nature): truth is no property. --- Horwich I 455 Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism"). Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory, Horwich I 456 and that the knowledge of the truth conditions was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions. Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y". ((s) eliminative reductionism). PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions. Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise. Instead: Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true). Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 --- Horwich I XIV VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (disquotational scheme). Horwich I XVI Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows. --- Horwich I 457 Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because: If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity". Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game. Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically. Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities. --- Williams II 497 Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition. Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory. Williams II 502 Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide. PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion. M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that? Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence. PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use. Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification. Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth. Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 EconWilliams I Walter E. Williams Race & Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination? (Hoover Institution Press Publication) Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2011 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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