Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Darwinism | Popper | Mayr I 87 Darwinism/PopperVsDarwinism: (Popper 1974): "no verifiable theory, but a metaphysical research program ...." this criticism was later revoked by Popper. >Darwinism, >Evolution. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Darwinism | Nietzsche | Pfotenhauer I 5 Darwinism/Evolution/Nietzsche/NietzscheVsDarwinism/Pfotenhauer: Darwin's theory of evolution, which makes selection into a principle according to the measure (...) of selection performances to external conditions, is not liked by Nietzsche; he even hates it: "[...]this is the moral.... the middle ones are worth more than the exceptions"..."I am appalled by the formulation [of this] moral." Added Fragments, Spring 1888, KGW VIII, p. 95ff). --- Danto III 197 Darwinism/NietzscheVsDarwinism/Nietzsche/DantoVsNietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche falls too often into the stupidest misconceptions of Darwinism by equating survival with excellence. He overlooks what Th. H. Huxley has already noticed: Evolution/Darwinism/Huxley, T. H.: the slightest change in the chemical composition of our atmosphere is enough to ensure that perhaps only a few lichens survive and thus become the masters of the world. Danto III 268 Darwinism/NietzscheVsDarwinism/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche was convinced VsDarwin that the disabled survive and the abled ones perish. Danto: apart from this tenacious belief, which is as easily attacked by Huxley's famous refutation as its flip side (See Darwinism/Huxley, Th. H.), it is difficult to see why Nietzsche wanted people to see him as an anti-Darwinist. Danto III 269 Survival/Nietzsche: According to Nietzsche, whether you preserve yourself or not has nothing to do with the blind exercise of the will to power, which characterizes every thing at every moment. Something survives, insofar as it emerges victoriously from the struggle of the will; but it does not fight to survive - if so, it would be exactly the other way round: above all, something alive wants to omit its power - life itself is the will to power: self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent consequences of it.(1) >Will/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI. 2, S. 21. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Darwinism | Huxley | Danto III 197 Darwinism/NietzscheVsDarwinism/Nietzsche/DantoVsNietzsche/Danto: all too often Nietzsche falls into the stupidest misconceptions of Darwinism by equating survival with excellence. He overlooks what Th. H. Huxley has already noticed: Evolution/Darwinism/Huxley, Th. H.: the slightest change in the chemical composition of our atmosphere is enough to ensure that perhaps only a few lichens survive and thus become the masters of the world. |
HuxleyA I Aldous Huxley Science, Liberty and Peace London 1946 HuxleyTh I Thomas Henry Huxley Lectures On Evolution Whitefish, MT 2010 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Evolution | Vollmer | Evolutionary Epistemology/Vollmer: in the evolution of science, there are no "mutations" because there is no "offspring" in scientific theories - Evolutionary epistemology is only useful insofar as subjective knowledge structures are inherited. --- I 51 The evolutionary epistemology does not have the concept of truth of pragmatism - it is not proven by success. --- I 75 Success/Vollmer: only proves that the hypothesis was not entirely wrong. --- I 217 VsEvolution theory/VsDarwinismus. Circular. VollmerVsVs: it is wrong that "Fitness" can be defined without recourse to "surviving". --- I 260 Fitness is not determined by the survival of the individual, but by reproductive success, more food, more habitat, more partners, more offspring, etc. --- I 264 Entropy/Evolution/life/Vollmer: contrary to popular belief it is not always a measure of disorder - under special conditions (low total energy and existence of lasting interactions or inclusion by external forces) the increase in entropy even includes an increase of order and structure - thus the second law does not contradict the origin of living things. --- I 279 Adaptation/selection/VsEvolutionary Epistemology is no falsification - the original eye is not falsyfied by the eye of the eagle - proper mapping does not matter - transferring the selection theory on cognitive skills can only succeed if there is objective truth and if knowledge is more useful than error (Simmel, 1895) - VollmerVsVs: this is not an argument VsEvolution - no matter who is adapting to whom - Co-adaption. --- I 298 Evolution/success/Vollmer: the accuracy of knowledge cannot be inferred from evolutionary success - otherwise naturalistic fallacy - confusion of facts with norms. --- II 190 Evolution/time direction/Vollmer: due to cosmic expansion there are no two moments of evolution identical - (> time arrow). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Evolution | Gould | Dennett I 412 Evolution/Gould theory: the key difference in evolution is not simple adaptation but speciation. (DennettVs). Gould: thesis: species are fragile but have unalterable structures. There are no improvements in species, only closed discarding. Correct level: the correct level are not the genes but entire species or clades. Species/Gould/(s): species are not going to be improved, but discarded. Level/explanation/Dennett: as software/hardware: some is better explained on one level, others is better explained on a different level. >Explanation, >Darwinism. Gould I 88ff Evolution/Darwinism/individual/Gould: individuals do not develop evolutionary, they can only grow, reproduce and die. Evolutionary changes occur in groups of interacting organisms. Species are the units of evolution. Orthodox Darwinism/Gould: thesis: gene mutate, individuals are subject to selection and species evolve evolutionary. I 131 Evolution/Gould: Thesis: I do not imagine evolution as a ladder, but rather in the form of a shrub with many branches. Therefore: the more species the better. I 133 The importance of this point can be seen in the development of molecules. The number of differences between amino acids clearly correlates with the time since the diversion of development lines. The longer the separation, the greater the differences. This is how a molecular clock was developed. The Darwinians were generally surprised by the regularity of this clock. After all, the selection should proceed at a noticeably different speed for the different development lines at different times. I 134 VsDarwinism: the Darwinists are actually forced to contemplate that the regular molecular clock represents an evolution that is not subject to selection, but to the random fixation of neutral mutations. We have never been able to separate ourselves from the concept of the evolution of the human being, which puts the brain in the centre of attention. The Australopithecus afarensis disproved what had been predicted by astute evolutionary theorists such as Ernst Haeckel and Friedrich Engels. Tradition: general view: that the upright gait represented an easily attainable gradual development, and the increase in brain volume represented a surprisingly rapid leap. I 136 GouldVs: I would like to take the opposite view: in my opinion, the upright gait is a surprise, a difficult event to achieve, a rapid and fundamental transformation of our anatomy. In anatomical terms, the subsequent enlargement of our brain is a secondary epiphenomenon, a simple transition embedded in the general pattern of human evolution. Bipedality is not an easy achievement, it represents a fundamental transformation of our anatomy, especially of the feet and pelvis. I 191 Evolution/Gould: evolution essentially proceeds in two ways: a) Definition phyletic transformation: an entire population changes from one state to another. If all evolutionary changes were to occur in this way, life would not last long. This is because a phyletic transformation does not lead to an increase in diversity and variety, only to a transformation from one state to another. Now that extinction (by eradication) is so widespread, everything that does not have the ability to adapt would soon be destroyed. b) Definition speciation: new species branch off from existing ones. All speciation theories assume that splits occur quickly in very small populations. With the "sympatric" speciation, new forms appear within the distribution area of the previous form. Large stable central populations have a strong homogenizing influence. New mutations are impaired by the strong previous forms: they may slowly increase in frequency, but a changed environment usually reduces their selective value long before they can assert themselves. Thus, a phyletic transformation of the large populations should be very rare, as the fossil finds prove. It looks different in the periphery: isolated small populations here are much more exposed to the selection pressure, because the periphery marks the limit of the ecological tolerance of the previous living beings. I 266 Evolution/Biology/Gould: evolution proceeds by replacing the nucleotides. II 243 Evolution/Gould: thesis: evolution has no tendency. II 331 Evolution/Gould: official definition of evolution/Gould: evolution is the "change of gene frequencies in populations". (The process of random increase or decrease of the gene frequency is called definition "genetic drift".) The new theory of neutralism suggests that many, if not most, genes in individual populations owe their frequency primarily to chance. IV 199 Evolution/species richness: the change from a few species and many groups to a few groups and many species would occur even in the case of purely coincidental extinction if every speciation process at the beginning of life's history had been accompanied by average major changes. IV 221 Evolution/Gould: pre-evolutionary theory: a pre-evolutionary theory is "the chain of being": it is the old idea that every organism is a link. It confuses evolution with higher development and has been misinterpreted as a primitive form of evolution, but has nothing to do with it! The thesis is emphatically antievolutionary. Problem: there are no links between vertebrates and invertebrates IV 223 Intermediate form: the theory assumed asbestos as an intermediate form between minerals and plants due to the fibrous structure. Hydra and corals were seen as an intermediate form between plants and animals. (Today: both are animals of course.) Absurd: it is absurd to assume a similarity between plants and baboons, because plants lose their leaves and baboon babies lose their hair. IV 346 Evolution/Gould: evolution is not developing in the direction of complexity, why should it? |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Evolution | Agassiz | Gould I 170 ff Evolution/Biology/AgassizVsDarwinism/AgassizVsEvolution/Gould: In the second half of the 19th century, the theory of phylogeny being repeated by ontogenesis was the best guide for biologists to divide living beings into higher and lower forms. According to this theory, the children repeat in the growth of earlier developmental stages the following: embryos have gill slits, like a fish, later a three-chambered heart like a reptile, and later the tail of a mammal. > Recapitulation theory. One variant of this thinking is Louis Agassiz' "triple parallelism", unity of paleontology, comparative anatomy, and embryology. It refers to actual precursors of primitive organisms.(1) 1. L. Agassiz, |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Functional Explanation | Bigelow | I 323 Definition Functional Explanation/Function/Bigelow/Pargetter: with a functional explanation we describe existing patterns by reference to future events or states. It is possible that these may never occur. Why: we explain, e.g. why we have teeth by pointing out their function. Problem: to explain the function of causally inactive patterns or elements. I 324 Problem: because the future conditions may not even arise, we do not describe any real properties. Properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: properties of a system are derived from its causal history, not from its function! Therefore, they do not depend on the function of the system! Backwards causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is simply excluded with this. Function/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore, the function of a system is correspondingly redundant. The function can of course be mentioned, but description is more than mentioning possible effects. Functional Explanation/Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: there are three approaches that we consider to be generally correct. They all have in common that functions have no significant explanatory power. I 325 E.g. Evolution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the theories of functional explanation do not allow to explain evolution by saying that a pattern has formed because it fulfils a certain function. Functional Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: our theory will be a realistic one. I 332 Functional Explanation/function/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: we want a theory that is forward oriented. Functions can and should be explained by reference to future events and states. Analogous to the explanation of dispositions. Analog: our explanation has an analog: the explanation of the evolution-theoretical concept of survival (fitness). (Lit. Pargetter 1987)(1). VsDarwinism/VsDarwin/Bigelow/Pargetter: frequent objection: the "survival of the able" is an empty tautology. BigelowVsVs: the objection is based on the assumption that fitness could only be determined retrospectively. He also assumes that the fact that some individuals survive is exactly what constitutes efficiency. (circular). BigelowVsAetiologic theory: is based on the same misunderstanding. It then claims that also the property of having a function is a retrospective property constituted by the history of survival. Thus, the concept of function is deprived of its explanatory potential. I 333 Circularity/Bigelow/Pargetter: this objection is often erroneously raised VsDarwinism. Fitness/solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: however, it is not defined retrospectively, but is analogous to a disposition. Subjunction/subjunctive/conditional/fitness/Bigelow/Pargetter: Fitness is a subjunctive property: it determines what would happen if these or that circumstances were to occur. This subjunctive property supervenes on the morphological character of the individual or species. There is no circularity. Biological function/Bigelow/Pargetter: the same applies to them as to fitness. They are two sides of the same coin. Fitness/Bigelow/Pargetter: means looking forward. 1. Pargetter, R. (1987). Fitness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68. pp.44-56. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Darwin, Ch. | Popper Vs Darwin, Ch. | Mayr I 87 PopperVsDarwinism: (Popper 1974): "no verifiable theory, but a metaphysical research program ...." this criticism was later revoked by Popper. >Darwinism, >Evolution. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Darwin, Ch. | Verschiedene Vs Darwin, Ch. | Gould II 101 CuvierVsEvolution: he concluded from his principle of interaction that evolution had to be excluded. II 136 VavilovVsDarwin: variation does not take place in all directions, but arranged in classes of chemistry and crystallography, which are analogous. Vavilov has underemphasized the creative role of the environment. II 328 The opponents of Darwin always bring the same litany: Darwin must have been wrong - the order cannot arise by chance (e.g. KoestlerVsDarwin). Pinker I 403 Mortimer AdlerVsDarwinism: (Philosopher) 1940: Evolution could not have taken place, because there was also no three-and-a-half-sided triangle. Darwin: It is quite possible that intermediate forms have occurred in the past. Natural Species/Darwin: is not an ideal type, but a population. Vollmer I 260 Selection/Vollmer: there is no serious argument that the selection principle is circular. VsDarwinism/Tautology: the argument against Darwinism that it is tautological is misguided: "Survival of the survivor": VollmerVsVs: Fitness is not determined by the survival of the individual, but by reproductive success, more food, more living space, more partners, more offspring, etc. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Darwin, Ch. | Bigelow Vs Darwin, Ch. | I 332 VsDarwinism/VsDarwin/Bigelow/Pargetter: common objection: the "survival of the fittest" is an empty tautology. BigelowVsVs: the objection assumes that fitness could only be determined retrospectively. It also assumes that the fact that some individuals survive is precisely what constitutes the fitness. (circular). BigelowVsAetiological theory: based on the same misunderstanding. It then claims that even the property of having a function is a retrospective property that is constituted by the story of survival. Thus the concept of function is robbed of its explanatory potential. I 333 Circularity/Bigelow/Pargetter: This objection is often raised falsely VsDarwinism. Fitness/Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: but not retrospectively defined, but it is analogous to a disposition. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
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