Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deduction | Dummett Vs Deduction | I 96 Explanation: DuhemVsFraassen: unification merely fictitious assumption to simplify - DuhemVsDeduction - DuhemVsDeductive-Nomological Model - FraassenVsDuhem: the empirical substructure of the theory should be isomorphic to that of the phenomena -DuhemVsFraassen: that’s only very roughly possible - (Cartwright ditto). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Deduction | Duhem Vs Deduction | Cartwright I 103 CartwrightVsDeductive-Nomological Model/CartwrighVsDeduction/CartwrightVsHempel: Explanations are rarely ever really deductive. Therefore, the generic-specific point of view receives little support from our practice. Many philosophers still follow the DN-model even today. This is because the explanations only set in after extensive scientific work. CartwrightVs: This overlooks the fact that physics itself already begins with (arbitrarily chosen) models. I 127 Facts/Physics/Laws/Cartwright: even if the fundamental laws remain in their original form, the steps of deriving from them are not dictated by any facts. That’s a problem: CartwrightVsDeductive-Nomological Model, CartwrightVsHempel, CartwrightVsGrünbaum. Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: therefore are not simply "better". I 151 CartwrightVsDeductive-Nomological View: instead: the approach by Duhem: Science as organization (order) of knowledge. I 162 CartwrightVsDeductive-Nomological Approach/VsD-N/CartwrightVsHempel: causality is not the only problem. This fails to explain even Humean facts of association. 1) because the fundamental laws are corrected during the derivation. (Essay 6) 2) often laws from different areas are pieced together. (Essay 3) |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Deduction | Cartwright Vs Deduction | I 103 CartwrightVsDeductively nomological model/CartwrighVsDeduction/CartwrightVsHempel: statements are rarely actually deductive. Therefore, the generic-specific point of view obtains little support from our practice. Many philosophers still follow the DN model today. This is because the statements only set in after extensive scientific work. CartwrightVs: that overlooks the fact that physics itself already begins with (arbitrary) models. I 127 Facts/Physics/Laws/Cartwright: even if the fundamental laws remain in their original form, the steps of derivation from them are not dictated by any facts. That’s a problem: CartwrightVsDeductively nomological model, CartwrightVsHempel, CartwrightVsGrünbaum. Fundamental laws/Cartwright: are not simply "better" because of this. I 151 CartwrightVsDeductive-nomological view: instead: the approach of Duhem: Science as an organization (order) of knowledge. I 162 CartwrightVsDeductively nomological approach/VsD N/CartwrightVsHempel: causality is not the only problem. Humean facts of the association are not explained by this, either. 1) because the fundamental laws are corrected during the derivation. (Essay 6) 2) often laws from different areas are pieced together. (Essay 3) |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| deductive- nomolog. | Versus | I 96 Explanation: DuhemVsFraassen: Unification merely fictitious assumption to simplify - DuhemVsDeduction - deductive-nomological model DuhemVs - FraassenVsDuhem: the empirical substructure of theory should be isomorphic to the phenomena - DuhemVsFraassen: that is more than very roughly - (Cartwright ditto). |
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