|Deliberative Democracy||Social Choice Theory||Gaus I 146
Deliberative democracy/social choice theory/Dryzek: Deliberative democracy has three prominent sets of critics, who otherwise have absolutely nothing in common: social choice theorists, ifference democrats, and sceptical egalitarians. Cf. >Democracy/Riker, >Democracy/Social choice theory.
Gaus I 147
Dryzek: [social chice theory] (...) provides a set of warnings about what democratic politics could be like if political actors behaved in Homo economicus fashion, and ifno mechanisms existed to curb these behavioural proclivities and their consequences. Deliberative democracy provides both a communicative paradigm of personhood and mechanisms to bring Homo economicus and his interactions under control (a non-deliberative alternative can be found in Shepsle's 1979(1) idea of structure-induced equilibrium).
Now, social choice theorists can still try to pour cold water over deliberation because it is easy to
demonstrate that the very conditions of free access, equality, and unrestricted communication conducive to authentic deliberation are exactly the conditions conducive to instability, arbitrariness, and so strategic manipulation (van Mill, 1996(2); see also Grofman, 1993(3): 1578; Knight and Johnson, 1994)(4).
VsVs: Deliberative democrats can reply that there are mechanisms intrinsic to deliberation that act to structure preferences in ways that solve social choice problems (Dryzek and List, 2003(5)). For
example, deliberation can disaggregate a dimension on which preferences are non-single-peaked (one major cause of cycles across three or more alternatives that are at the root of the kind of instability Riker identifies) into several dimensions on each of which single-peakedness prevails (Miller, 1992)(6).
VsDemocracy: To the extent this deliberative reply succeeds, then the social choice critique undermines only an aggregative account of democracy in which all actors behave strategically, and can actually be deployed to show why deliberation is necessary.
1. Shepsle, Kenneth (1979) 'Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional voting models'. American Journal of Political Science, 23:27—60.
2. Van Mill, David (1996) 'The possibility of rational outcomes from democratic discourse and procedures'. Journal of Politics, 58:734-52.
3. Grofman, Bernard (1993) 'Public choice, civic republicanism, and American politics: perspectives of a "reasonable choice" modeler'. Texas Law Review, 71: 1541-87.
4. Knight, Jack and James Johnson (1994) 'Aggregation and Deliberation: On the possibility of democratic legitimacy'. Political Theory, 22: 277-96.
5. Dryzek, John S. and Christian List (2003) 'Social choice theory and deliberative democracy: a reconciliation'. British Journal of Politica1 Science, 33: 1-28.
6. Miller, David (1992) 'Deliberative democracy and social choice'. Political Studies, 40 (special issue): 54—67.
Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications
Gerald F. Gaus
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
|Democracy||Jonas||Brocker I 611
Democracy/Politics/Ecology/JonasVsDemocracy/Jonas/Brocker: In order to make the "no to non-existence" (1) of human and nature effective, Jonas would rather rely on political elites (2) and state coercive means than on the power of argument in a deliberative democracy in which the citizens themselves bring about the necessary changes. (Context: See Ethics/Jonas, Ecological Imperative/Jonas).
Brocker I 612
Democracy/Jonas: must at least be "temporarily (...) suspended". (3) Responsibility/BrockerVsJonas: here it remains open how "responsibility" is to be assumed in concrete terms. (See Responsibility/Jonas.)
1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 250.
2. Ibid. p. 263
3. Hans Jonas, »Naturwissenschaft versus Natur-Verantwortung. Hans Jonas im Gespräch mit Eike Gebhardt«, in: Dietrich Böhler (Hg.), Ethik für die Zukunft. Im Diskurs mit Hans Jonas, München 1994, p. 211.
Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
|Democracy||Fukuyama||Brocker I 806
Democracy/Fukuyama: is the model of order that relatively satisfies the human need for social recognition better than other systems. With the victory of this model, the battle for recognition ends and, according to Fukuyama, the driving force of history is stopped. However, this is a Pyrrhic victory, because the individual needs the fight. FukuyamaVsDemocracy: one of the shortcomings of the democratic model is social inequality. Fukuyama also does not predict a quick victory for democracy. The struggle for them continues between a so-called post-historical world (in the industrialized countries of the Global North) and a historical world (in the industrializing countries of the Global South).
In relative terms, however, the democratic system produces the least inequality.
The democratic system itself is a good to be aspired to.
FukuyamaVsDoyle, Michael/FukuyamaVsRussett, Bruce: Fukuyama shares the thesis of Doyle (1986)(1) and Russett (1993) (2) that democracies are peaceful among themselves, but wars between democracies and non-democracies are likely. But he goes beyond that and sees a potential cause of war in the constant striving for recognition.
Brocker I 808
Democratization/History/Fukuyama: For Fukuyama, the spread of democracy began in the mid-1970s with the - according to Huntington - so-called "Third Wave of Democratization". This began with the Clove Revolution in Portugal in 1974, then spread to Latin America, Eastern Europe and East Asia, and finally came to a temporary end in Africa. See History/Fukuyama, Universal History/Fukuyama.
Brocker I 815
Democracies/MillerVsFukuyama/MaceyVsFukuyama: 1. Fukuyama overestimates the actual spread of democracies and their alleged consequences. He sees many states as liberal-democratic which do not deserve this name, e.g. Iran, Peru, Singapore. (4) (written 1992). 2. VsFukuyama: The interaction between capitalism and democracy does not even function smoothly in the USA. (1)
3.VsFukuyama: Fukuyama blurs the differences between democratic systems, especially between inclusive and exclusive democracies. (1) But it is precisely this blindness that leads to the misconception that an expansion of democracies leads to the end of history.
Solution/Miller/Macey: Thesis: The story is just beginning! And in the sense of a struggle for the system that can best be connected to a capitalist economic system.
Liberalism/MillerVsFukuyama/MaceyVsFukuyama: When Fukuyama speaks of liberal democracies, he makes no distinction between liberalism and democracy. In reality, however, there is a difference depending on whether rights take precedence or majority decisions.
The wider the sphere of the
Brocker I 816
individual rights, the more difficult it will be to organise majorities. Fukuyama's mistake is to describe democracies as liberal as soon as they recognize certain rights (property, free market economy). In reality, however, many of the states Fukuyama classifies as democracies are not liberal.
1. Michael W. Doyle, „Liberalism and World Politics“, in: American Political Science Review 80/4, 1986, p. 1151-1169.
2. Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World, Princeton 1993.
3. Jonathan R. Macey/Geoffrey P. Miller, “The End of History and the New World Order. The Triumph of Capitalism and the Competition between Liberalism and Democracy”, in: Cornell International Law Journal 25/2, 1992, p. 277-303.
4. Ebenda p. 281f.
Anja Jetschke, „Francis Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018
The End of History and the Last Man New York 1992
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
|Governance||Isocrates||Höffe I 48
Governance/Rule/Isocrates/Höffe: Xenophanes' contemporary Isocrates (436-338 B.C.) praises Alexander's father, the Macedonian King Philip II, as leader of the Hellenes, i.e. not of a single city republic, but of all of Greece, and calls on the Greeks to unity. Hellenism: In Panegyrikos, a ceremonial speech, he sings a self-critical praise for Greekism, the closest to Athens as the cradle of all human culture.
Peace: In the speech of peace, Isocrates transfers the unity of the Greek cities to the unity of the citizens and in Philippos elevates the Macedonian king to the rank of a "head of unity".
IsocratesVsDemocracy: In the Areopagitikos - Athens' highest court meets on the Areopagus - he criticizes radical democracy because of its busyness.
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016