Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 79 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absoluteness | Putnam | III 122 Absoluteness/absolute reality/PutnamVsDescartes: the representatives of absoluteness have the wrong tendency to equate secondary qualities with the sensation of secondary qualities. Even Williams seems to assume a picture of the world without colors. >Reality, >Quality, >Sensation, >Perception, >Sensory impression. Williams: Williams ideally assumes a "theory of knowledge and of error". >Recognition, >World/Thinking, >Bernard Williams. III 132 Absolute Reality/Williams: absolute reality tells us, but not foreign scientists, how we understand it. Cf. >Reality/Maturana. PutnamVs: so absolute reality exists only locally. Absolute Reality/Putnam: absolute reality would also require convergence. QuineVsConvergence: convergence has an inscrutability of reference. >Inscrutability, >convergence. III 134 Absolute Reality/Williams: absolute reality functions without normative terms. PutnamVs: precisely this leads to the problem of indeterminacy of translation. Putnam: many true descriptions of the world in different vocabularies are possible. >Vocabulary. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Acts of Will | Nietzsche | Danto III 136 Will/Nietzsche/Danto: If it is true that Nietzsche tries to escape the usual distinction between mental and material, then the will to power must seem contradictory. After all, "will" is an expression concerning the mental. (See Causality/Nietzsche, I, Ego, Self/Nietzsche, Subject/Nietzsche). Danto: That is not true. As with Schopenhauer, we have to combine connotations in Nietzsche concerning the usual and mental with the concept of "will" in the metaphysical sense. The will to power is not limited to the mental. If we do not respect this, we cannot understand Nietzsche. NietzscheVsActs of Will: Nietzsche attacks the "Acts of Will", which are not only accepted by philosophers. Danto III 137 Acts of Will/Danto: Acts of Will behave to actions like causes to effects. Hume/Danto: Hume rejected the idea that we could have an experience that corresponds to our idea of the causal nexus, how our will becomes active through our body parts or thoughts. Hume: we have absolutely no idea how the will works. Nevertheless, Hume accepts acts of will. >Regress. NietzscheVsHume: is more radical, there is simply nothing that can be proven to be linked to our actions. Danto III 138 Thinking/Certainty/Subject/NietzscheVsDescartes: Nietzsche disproves the Cartesian thought that our own mental processes are immediately transparent to us, that we know about our way of thinking. He disproves it by setting up a series of interlinked thoughts and letting them "freeze": When Descartes talks about his doubts about reality being at least certainly his own doubts, he drags a lot of tacit assumptions with him. NietzscheVsDescartes: if his argumentation boils down to an "It is thought", our belief in the concept of substance is already assumed and a subject is accepted.(1) >Reality/Nietzsche, >Subject/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 577. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Animals | Lorenz | Dawkins I 121 Animal/Lorenz: (The so-called evil) thesis: emphasizes the moderate and fair character of the fights of animals. They fight basically according to rules and prefer the bluff to the deadly seriousness. Submission gestures are recognized by the winner. Animals fight with "gloved fists." DawkinsVsLorenz: this interpretation can be disputed, also the human is not the only being who kills his own fellow-human beings. In fact, unreserved fighting fury also entails costs. I 125/126 Aggression/Evolutionary stable strategy/ESS/Maynard Smith: Strategy: "Attack when the enemy flees, chase it, when it fights back, run away." Dawkins: this must not be understood as a deliberately developed strategy of the individual! I 126 Definition Evolutionary stable strategy/ESS/Dawkins: an evolutionary stable strategy is one that - if the majority of the members of a population adopts it - cannot be surpassed by any alternative strategy. --- Lorenz I 71 Animal/Descartes: an animal does not act but is passive. McDougalVsDescartes/Lorenz: a healthy animal is active. |
Lorenz I K. Lorenz Das sogenannte Böse Wien 1963 Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Causal Theory of Knowledge | Davidson | I (e) 95 Causal Theory of Knowledge: senses do not matter - only in learning, but then they matter contingently (VsSkepticism). I (e) 93 DavidsonVsDescartes/DavidsonVsSkepticism: in basic cases words necessarily refer to the types of objects that cause them - then there is no room for Cartesian doubt. >Causal theory of reference/Davidson. >Beliefs/Davidson, >Skepticism. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Certainty | Nietzsche | Danto III 138 Thinking/Certainty/Subject/NietzscheVsDescartes: Nietzsche disproves the Cartesian thought that our own mental processes are immediately transparent to us, that we know about our way of thinking. >Cartesianism, >Descartes, >Consciounsness/Nietzsche. He disproves it by setting up and "freezing" a series of interrelated thoughts: When Descartes talks about his doubts about reality being at least certainly his own doubts, he drags a lot of tacit assumptions with him. >cogito, >Skepticism. NietzscheVsDescartes: if his argumentation boils down to an "It is thought", our belief in the concept of substance is already assumed and a subject is accepted.(1) 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 577. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Change | Descartes | Esfeld I 210 Since every body is divisible, there is no physical shape that cannot disappear. Cf. >Substance. I 211 Change/Movement/Descartes: what persists can therefore only be the physical area as a whole. This can be called essentialism, but it is different from atomism and Aristotelianism. There is no variety of particular essences. >Essence, >Essentialism. I 212 Substance/Kant: only the whole of matter persists in all change. (Like Descartes). Matter/Descartes: "physical", "material" and "extended" are synonymous for Descartes. EsfeldVsDescartes: his position is ambiguous: a) No substance can cease to exist, so we can only allow one substance. b) On the other hand, he assumes that the parts of the physical substance itself are substances! There should be a real difference between the parts. Def Real Difference/Descartes: Difference between substances. Matter/Space/Descartes/Esfeld: Matter = Space! Identifying matter with space implies that physics can be reconstructed without being confined to material things in addition to space. Further consequence: Areas of space may have physical properties, but they cannot move. I 213 Space = matter/Esfeld: This possibility of identification is the only thing I take over from Descartes. >Space. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Cogito | Hintikka | II 113 Cogito/Descartes/Hintikka: the cogito is not a premise whose conclusion would be the sum. Solution/Hintikka: it is an act of thinking that proves the existence of the subject itself. Analogously: a speech act also proves the existence of itself to the subject. Mark Twain says: "I exist". HintikkaVsDescartes: Problem: 1. What kind of entity is this, which should prove "res" with it? 2. To answer the question, what has been proved at all, we need to clarify the status of the entity. E.g. Italo Calvino: Charlemagne asks a knight why he has closed the visor. He answers: "Sir, I do not exist". II 114 Existence/non-existence/subsistence/Hintikka: in this example, the knight does not exist in a certain way, but in another, namely, in which he can be the hero of history. N.B.: i.e. here the speech act is not a conclusive proof of its existence ((s) within fiction). >Non-existence, >Fiction, >Proof. Cogito/Descartes/Hintikka: it would have been wrong, too, had Descartes concluded: "Cogito, ergo Descartes exists". ((a) So for the "I", which is explicit in "sum", insert the name). Analog: e.g. if someone tells me in the street: "Mark Twain exists" that would be just as little evidence for the existence of Mark Twain. It would have to be him who performs the speech act. Cogito/knowledge/Hintikka: problem: Descartes must also know additionally that the questionable thinker is this entity, or that type of entity. Existence/identity/entity/identification/Quine/Hintikka: Quine: "No entity without identity": that is, Descartes needs to know something about himself to be able to say about himself that he exists. Solution/Hintikka: we must distinguish two types of cross-world identification (cross-identification): a) perspective (subject-centric) identification: this is not subjective, even if it is relative to a person II 115 (It only uses one coordinate system defined by reference to the user. It itself depends on objective general principles.) b) public (object-centered) identification. >Cross-world-identifiacation, >Identification. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Cogito | Kant | Danto I 179 KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanies thinking. --- Bubner I 107 "I think"/Kant: forms the last performance of the synthesis, which cannot be derived further. Here, the action-character is most obvious. Self-consciousness produces the unity ipso actu in connection. >I think/Kant, >Thinking/Kant, >Self-consciousness/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Cogito | Lacan | Pagel I 51 Cogito/LacanVsDescartes: "I think where I am not, so I am where I do not think." Cf. >Body, >I think. |
Lacan I Gerda Pagel Jacques Lacan zur Einführung Hamburg 1989 |
| Cogito | Nietzsche | Danto III 139 Cogito/I think/NietzscheVsDescartes/Nietzsche/Danto: (F. Nietzsche: Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI., 2 p. 23f): When I break down the process that is expressed in the phrase 'I think', I get a number of bold assertions, the reasoning behind which is difficult, perhaps impossible - for example, that I'm the one that thinks that it must be something at all that thinks that thinking is an action carried out by a being which thinks as a cause that there is an 'I', finite, that it is already determined what is to be described with thinking - that I know what thinking is. But if I hadn't already decided about it with myself, according to what should I measure that what is happening isn't perhaps 'wanting' or 'feeling'?(1) >Thingking/Nietzsche, >Subject/Nietzsche. Cogito/Descartes/Danto: In order to do Descartes justice: these are, unlike doubt, individual cases of thought. Descartes leaves it open whether he might not doubt at all, but not whether he thinks or not. >Skepticism, >Skepticism/Descartes. 1. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2. p. 23f. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Cogito | Nozick | II 87 cogito/Descartes/LichtenbergVsDescartes: has not established that "he thinks," but only that "it thinks". >Skepticism/Descartes, >Doubts, >I think. Problem/Nozick: What is my knowledge that I am? >Knowledge, >Self-knowledge, >Self-consciousness, >Self-identification, >Consciousness. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Conceivability | Chalmers | I 73 Conceivability/Idea/Chalmers: when two worlds resemble each other in terms of all micro-physical conditions, there is no room for the notion that they differ in terms of higher-level properties such as biological phenomena. >Possible worlds, >Distinctions, >Levels/order, >Properties, >Phenomena. This unimaginability is not caused by any cognitive limitations. It is rather logically impossible that these worlds differ. >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Experience. I 98 Imagination/Conceivability/argument/proof/VsChalermers: some may argue that conceivability is not an argument - there may always be details which have not been taken into account. ChalmersVsVs: but then one would have to specify somehow which details these are. Chalmers: the only way in which conceivability and possibility are disjointed is connected to necessity a posteriori: e.g. the hypothesis that water is not H2O seems conceptually coherent, but water is probably H2O in all possible worlds. >a posteriori necessity. Necessity a posteriori/Chalmers: however, necessity a posteriori is irrelevant to the problem of whether our conscious experience is explainable. >Explanation/Chalmers. I 99 Conceivability/Chalmers: one might think that one could imagine a situation in which Fermat's last sentence is wrong. But it would turn out that the situation was described wrongly. As it would turn out, the terms were misapplied. I 130 Idea/Conceivability/VsDescartes/Chalmers: Descartes' argument from the mere conceivability is considered as rejected. From the fact that it is conceivable that A and B are not identical does not follow that they are not. VsChalmers: Is that not true to the same extent for the zombies' example? >Zombies. I 131 ChalmersVsVs: the difference is that it is not about identity here, but about supervenience! >Supervenience, >Identity. If one can imagine the existence of all physical properties without the existence of conscious properties, then it is simply that the physical facts do not exhaust everything. This is something completely different. Supervenience is also much more fundamental here. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Consciousness | Carnap | VI 174 Consciousness/Carnap: Area of objects given to the self (eigen-bewusste Gegenstände"). Consciousness forms the basis of the self-psychological. It is supplemented by the "unconscious" objects. VI 226 Consciousness / Carnap: consciousness is earlier than the self. Even other minds are established before the I. - CarnapVsDescartes: the existence of the self is not a judgment of the given facts - from the "cogito" there is no inference to a "sum". VI 92 State of Consciousness/Schlick: is a unit and cannot be analyzed in the real sense. (Carnap pro). >Other minds, >I, Ego, Self. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Consciousness | Chisholm | I 112 Consciousness/Chisholm: all my opinions are direct attributions - I am the subject of these attributions, but not their content. >Content, >I, Ego, Self, >Attribution. I/ChisholmVsDescartes: no certain propositions about themselves - existence also not property I am sure of - consciousness defined through self-presenting property - no direct access. I 130 Consciousness/unity/Chisholm: a person who realizes that they see something and realizes that they hear something is also aware that they see and hear something - Outsourcing/Mention/Use - Chisholm: but it is not sure that consciousness is the same. I 133 Self-awareness: goes beyond direct attribution: subject must know that the properties are attributed to itself. >Awareness, >Self-consciousness. I 131f Consciousness/Unit/Kant: the subject does not need to unite the ideas, but it must be able to - self-awareness: a) direct attribution of a property, b) going further: here, the subject must also know that it is the object of direct attribution itself - Accuracy results from observation, many people never observe. II 193 ff Two-Aspects Doctrine/Fechner: People have inner (mental) and external aspects (not two sides of the same coin) - they differ only by point of view! (No identity theory) - both do not have to be based on a being - VsFechner: only interesting if yet another sense can be connected to the "inner" - Fechner: being is monistic - but also: FechnerVsMonism: only makes sense if the world is perceived uniformly - as self-appearance, everything is ultimately spirit. >Aspects, >Monism, >Dualism, >Anomalous monism. II 198f FeiglVsFechner: all his examples are basically for external things! (Fechner has seen that himself) - also the interior of the body is physical. - So the crucial difference does not even exist. Fechner: ultimately only metaphorical. Stubenberg, Leopold. Chisholm, Fechner und das Geist-Körper-Problem. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Consciousness | Sellars | Rorty I 203 "Psychological nominalism": Sellars: thesis: any consciousness of varieties, similarities, facts and abstract entities, is a linguistic matter. The acquisition of language does not even presuppose the awareness of the varieties, similarities and facts, related to the so-called immediate experience. >Language acquisition, >Similarity, >Distinctions, >Dissimilarities, >Objects, >Seeing, >Seeing-as, >Knowledge, >World/thinking. Consciousness/Sellars (as Rorty) distinguishes between two types of consciousness: a) distinguishing behavior, b) consciousness as a movement in the logical space of reasons. Distinguishing behavior a) can also be found in rats, amoebas and computers. >Computer model/Sellars, >Logical Space of reasons. --- Frank I 264 Consciousness/SellarsVsSartre/SellarsVsDescartes: the thesis of self-transparency and self-disclosure of consciousness is the "myth of the given". >Myth of the Given/Sellars. Roderick M. Chisholm (1981): The First Person. An Essay on Reference and Intentionality, Brighton 1981 |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Correctness | Brandom | I 24 ff Correctness/judgment/Kant/Brandom: normative, not governed by natural laws - contradictions not prohibited by natural laws. >Contradictions, >Judgments. I 48 KantVsDescartes: not correctness of representations, but of inferences is crucial. >Inference, >Representation. I 403 Definition correct: an inference from p to q is correct (in the sense of preserving the commitment) if the truth conditions of p are a subset of those of q. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Dualism | Ryle | Flor I 258 Dualism/Descartes/Flor: 1. The body is in space and time, the mind only in time. 2. The body can be described mechanically, the mind cannot be described in this way. 3. The body is publicly observable, the mind is private. 4. A person has direct knowledge, (privileged access) through introspection and evidence of their consciousness - other minds can never be accessible. 5. The mind is understood as the sum of inner processes and conditions that may in turn cause physical processes or activities and states - RyleVs: mechanical processes cannot act on quasi-mechanical processes and vice versa. >RyleVsDescartes, cf. >Cartesianism. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Duration | Bergson | Gadamer I 74 Durée/Bergson/Gadamer: (...) the first book by Henri Bergson, "Les données immédiates de la conscience" [is] a critical attack on contemporary psychophysics, which, like Natorp (>Experience/Natorp), was just as decisive in developing the concept of life as it was in opposing the objectifying, especially the spatializing tendency of psychological concept formation. Here we find very similar statements about this and its unfragmented concretion as in Natorp. Durée: Bergson coined the famous expression of durée for this, which expresses the absolute continuity of the psychic. Bergson understands it as "organisation", i.e. he defines it from the mode of being of the living (étre vivant), in which each element is representative of the whole (représentatif du tout). He compares the inner penetration of all elements in consciousness with the way in which all sounds penetrate each other when listening to a melody. Life/BergsonVsDescartes: For Bergson, too, it is the anti-Cartesian moment of the concept of life that he defends against objectifying science(1). >Cartesianism, >Descartes, >Objectivism, >Objectivity. 1. H. Bergson, Les données immédiates de la conscience, p. 76f. |
Bergs I Henri Bergson Durée et Simultanéité. À propos de la théorie d’Einstein, Paris 1922 German Edition: Dauer und Gleichzeitigkeit: Über Einsteins Relativitätstheorie Hamburg 2014 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Epistemology | Locke | Rorty I 159 Epistemology: Problem, how can we know whether our internal representations have accuracy. Locke: confusion of a mechanical theory of the operations of our mind with a "foundation of our knowledge claims." Rorty I 160 SellarsVsLocke: same error as the naturalistic fallacy: the attempt to completely dissolve epistemic facts in non-epistemic facts. How could he be of the opinion, a causal theory about how an opinion is acquired, is an indicator of entitlement, with which you have that opinion? Rorty: because he did not think of knowledge simply as a justified true opinion, because he did not think of our knowledge as a relation between a person and a proposition. >Naturalistic fallacy. --- Euchner I 17 Knowledge/Locke: basis: sensations (sensory impressions) - they must be processed by reason and reasoning ability to conclusions - they help to recognize the existence of God. >Sensory impression. I 30 Knowledge/Locke: not logical deduction but observation of mental processes - "inner sense". I 31 Both perception and reflection are passive. >Perception/Locke, >Reflection. --- Arndt II 193 Definition knowledge/Locke: Perception of the relation or conflict of ideas - real knowledge: determinism of ideas (necessary but not sufficient condition.). Def Real Truth/Locke: not only verbal. >Truth/Locke. II 195 Demonstrative knowledge: through mediation of other ideas. Sensitive knowledge: existence of things that are present to the senses- Intuitive knowledge: the certainty that the perceived idea is such a one as the mind perceives it. - intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible safe knowledge. VsDescartes: not recognizing predetermined conceptual content. - Instead empirically simple given ideas in mind. >Idea/Locke, >Recognition. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 Loc II H.W. Arndt "Locke" In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
| Errors | Millikan | I 94 Mistake/Falsehood/False/Error/Deception/Naturalistic fallacy/Millikan: nothing can be described as broken by looking at only this single, isolated thing. Normality/solution: it is always about how a thing "is supposed to be". Problem: also false beliefs and false sentences do not show for themselves alone that they are wrong. Even senseless sentences do not show their senselessness in themselves. >Context dependence. Rationalism/MillikanVsRationalism: rationalism must therefore be false in relation to intentionality. MillicanVsDescartes: Cartesian reflection alone does not even show the intentional character of our beliefs and ideas. >Rationalism. I 171 Error/Deception/Showing/index word/Millikan: e.g. there are two items on the table, an ashtray that I do not consider an ashtray, and a thing that is not an ashtray, but I think that it is an ahstray and say: "this is a nice ashtray". Question: Did I say with this that the ashtray is beautiful, even though I meant the other object? E.g. I hold up a book and say "This belonged to my grandfather". I am wrong, however, and hold up the wrong book. I 172 What I said is, of course, wrong. Not so clear is whether what I have meant is something different than what I said. Millikan: Thesis: here it is not the case that I and my token of "this" meant different things. Solution: "this" is ambiguous in relation to the Fregean sense. >Fregean sense, >Ambiguity. MillikanVsTradition: philosophers have often neglected this. Solution/Millikan: perception can lead to temporary concepts in us. Temporary concepts/intensions/Millikan: Intensions are then tied to our abilities to trace and reidentify things. Provisional concept: e.g. this coffee cup is for me completely indistinguishable from a dozen others, but at the moment it is my cup. I 173 Question: Does this even count as a concept? The ability to trace the object leads to an inner concept. This leads to the distinction between perception and thought. Thinking/Millikan: when thinking is not mediated by perception, the objects you think of are not indexed. Perception: here the objects are indexed. >Perception, >Indexicality. I 174 Error/Deception/Index Word/Perception/Misidentification/Millikan: E.g. Suppose I am wrong when I identify a recurring object. Then my inner concept has two senses, it has an ambiguous Fregean sense. 1. derived sense from the ability to trace the object 2. inner concept which I already had before "This" is ambiguous. >Index words. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Existence | Kant | W. Breidert Berkeley aus Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen, J. Speck (Ed) Göttingen 1997 I 236 Reality/Kant Schopenhauer: God does not guarantee the existence. --- Danto I 195 Existence/predicate/Kant/Danto: E.g. 100 possible dollars: the term "100 dollars" remains the same, whether it is occupied in the real world or not. - Someone who says "I have 100 dollars, but they do not exist," does not abuse the concept 100 dollars, but the one of having. - ((s) So existence does not follow from the term). I 196 Def existence/Russell: "There is an example of what is being discussed." --- Kant I 73 Existence/Kant: the feeling of existence has no concept - there can be nothing proved here. VsDescartes: "I think, therefore I am": error: to conclude from the concept to the existence of a thing. >cogito, >I think/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Explanation | Duhem | I XVII Explanation/Duhem: Explanations are reserved for the metaphysicians' claim to knowledge. I 6 If a physical theory is to be an explanation, it has only reached its goal when it has eliminated sense perception and has grasped the physical reality. >Perception, >Prediction. I 40 Explanation/Descartes/DuhemVsDescartes: Descartes has never attempted to connect the law of refraction with his explanatory theory of light. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Externalism | Davidson | Glüer II 185 Externalism/Putnam/Kripke: Externalism is about correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal theory. Externalism/DavidsonVsKripke, DavidsonVsPutnam: Externalism is about complete sentences and interpretation. Reference of single words/Davidson: is a theoretical construct - ((s) derived from whole sentences). I (a) 8 Def Externalism/Davidson: Events and objects by which a belief is evoked determine at the same time their content. DavidsonVs: (s) nothing outside the mind determines a belief. Externalism: shows the correctness (not infallibility) of the majority of judgments - (Davidson Pro). I (d) 72 Externalism/Davidson: pro this variant: Externalism stems from twin earth examples, not from linguistic division of labor. Therefore it is no threat of the first person authority. Radical interpretation: interpreter has to find out the factors, by means of indirect evidence, that first determine the content of the thought of the others - there is no room for error for one's own content because the same factors determine both thoughts. I (d) 74 Externalism/Burge: two forms: a) social, meaning from linguistic practice (community) b) importance of causal history (learning history) dependent on the individual. Burge: causal relationship to the object in order to comprehend content. DavidsonVsBurge: does not protect against error. Frank I 626ff Externalism/Davidson: It does not matter if mental states are individuated by something outside, just like sunburn ceases to be on the skin because it has an external cause. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Frank I 663 Externalism/first person/authority: If thoughts are externally determined, then the subject does not necessarily need to know what it thinks of - if the externalism is correct, then: VsFrege: thoughts cannot be completely comprehended. VsDescartes: inner states are not certain. Burge: False use of terms: There is the possibility to not know one's own thoughts. DavidsonVsBurge: Beliefs depend on other beliefs, therefore less strong possibility of error - DavidsonVsBurge: Intent of successful communication has no necessary connection to the correct identification of meaning. I 663-667 Externalism: Putnam: Distinguishing inner and "ordinary" external beliefs - Fodor: "methodological solipsism": is only observing internal states. Burge: External factors find their way into the determination of the contents via "thought experiments". - E.g., wrongly used terms: wrong beliefs about oneself e.g. "I have arthrite in the bones".) >Arthrite/shmarthrite. DavidsonVsBurge: initially pro: the content is not determined by what is going on in the person, but: content is determined so strong holistically that individual confusion of ideas cannot be so decisive, and therefore no rigid rules for the attribution of thoughts, we are not compelled to ascribe to the words of another person the same meaning as that person him- or herself. I 676 Mind/tradition/DavidsonVsDescartes: If there were a stage with alleged representatives of the objects, how can the mind pave its way out? - Anyway, the "objects" do not interest him, but their cousins, the propositions. But the mind has not the solution "in mind": externalism: all that helps to determine the object must likewise be grasped by the mind when it should know in which state it is. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Forces | Leibniz | Holz I 97f Single/substance/force/Leibniz: every single substance is to be understood as a force center. The present state carries within itself the law of its generation and the law of its continuation. Force/Leibniz: Time, movement and change are manifestations of the original active force (vis primitiva activa) or of the striving for change of state (appetitus). >Substance/Leibniz. I 99 Force/Passivity/Leibniz: force also includes the ability to adapt one's own condition passively to the changes of the other substances. (Suffering). Thus the original force is divided: in vis activa and vis passiva. Leibniz also calls the "points of force" "metaphysical points." >Metaphysics/Leibniz. I 100 The original force is on all sides by the individual substances, which cannot be unfolded at will. Thus the derived forces are only modifications of the original force. Force/LeibnizVsDescartes: mere expansion is not enough! Therefore, one must add the force. I 101 The merely extensive mass carries in itself no principle of qualitative distinction, since expansion is purely quantitative. Only in this way movement and change can occur. Nature must be explained from its own concept. I 106 Possibility/Leibniz: Possible things are always equipped with the active power to strive for reality. Otherwise nothing would exist. One cannot say with reason "certain possibilities" would have the tendency, "others" would not have them. Force/Leibniz: is the act of capability equipped with striving. Reality/Leibniz: there are (infinitely many) gradations between possibility and reality. >Reality/Leibniz. I 107 Single/Substances/Leibniz: points of force. I 108 Ambiguous: "acting in itself" and "acting upon oneself". The latter denotes precisely the transition of the outward action. The unity of both types of force is repeated at every point of force. The individual substances have spontaneity. They have no other action or suffering than that which they themselves produce. Absolute autonomy of substances. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Functionalism | Chalmers | I 15 Functionalism/Lewis/Armstrong/Chalmers: Lewis and Armstrong tried to explain all mental concepts, not only some. >D. Lewis, >D. Armstrong. ChalmersVsLewis/ChalmersVsArmstrong: both authors made the same mistake like Descartes in assimilating the psychological to the phenomenal. >ChalmersVsDescartes, >R. Descartes, >Consciousness, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Experience, >Knowing how. E.g. When we wonder whether somebody is having a colour experience, we are not wondering whether they are receiving environmental stimulation and processing it in a certain way. It is a conceptually coherent possibility that something could be playing the causal role without there being an associated experience. >Stimuli, >Qualia, >Colors, >Color Words, >Causal Role, >Experience. I 15 Functionalism/Consciousness/ChalmersVsFunctionalism/ChalmersVsArmstrong/ChalmersVsLewis/Chalmers: There is no mystery about whether any state plays a causal role, at most there are a few technical explanatory problems. Why there is a phenomenological quality of consciousness involved is a completely different question. >Introspection. Functionalism/Chalmers: he denies that there are two different questions. ((s) Also: ChalmersVsDennett). I 231 Functionalism/Consciousness/Chalmers: two variants: Functionalism of the 2nd level: Among these, Rosenthal's approach of thoughts of the second level about conscious experiences and Lycan's (1995) (1) approach about perceptions of the second level. These theories give good explanations for introspection. Functionalism of the 1st level : thesis: only cognitive states of the 1st level are used. Such theories are better in the explanation of conscious experiences. Since, however, not all cognitive states correspond to conscious experiences, one still needs a distinguishing feature for them. Solution/Chalmers: my criterion for this is the accessibility to global control. I 232 Kirk: (1994) (2): Thesis: "directly active" information is what is needed. Dretske: (1995) (3): Thesis: Experience is information that is represented for a system. Tye: (1995) (4): Thesis: Information must be "balanced" for purposes of cognitive processing. >Information. I 250 Functionalism/VsFunctionalism/Chalmers: the authors who argue with inverted Qualia or lacking Qualia present the logical possibility of counter-arguments. This is sufficient in the case of a strong functionalism. The invariance principle (from which it follows that conscious experiences are possible in a system with identical biochemical organization) is a weaker functionalism. Here the merely logical possibility of counter examples is not sufficient to refute. Instead, we need a natural possibility of missing or inverted qualia. >Qualia/Chalmers, >Exchanged spectra. Solution: to consider natural possibility, we will accept fading or "dancing" Qualia. I 275 Functionalism/Chalmers: the arguments in relation to a lacking, inverted and dancing Qualia do not support a strong, but the non-reductive functionalism I represent. Thesis: functional organization is, with natural necessity, sufficient for conscious experiences. This is a strong conclusion that strengthens the chances for > artificial intelligence. See also Strong Artificial Intelligence/Chalmers, >Artificial Consciousness, cf. >Strong Artificial Intelligence. 1. W. G. Lycan, A limited defense of phenomenal information. In: T. Metzingwr (ed), Conscious Experience, Paderborn 1995. 2. R. Kirk, Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness. Oxford 1994. 3. F. Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge 1995 4. M. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge 1995. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Given | Sellars | Frank I 264 Myth of the given/consciousness/SellarsVsSartre/SellarsVsDescartes: the thesis of self-transparency and self-disclosure of consciousness is the "myth of the given". Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 --- Sellars I 4 Something that is given/Sellars: this is about factual knowledge, not about objects. >Sense data theory/Sellars. I 59 Myth of the Given/Sellars: thesis that there is a level of individual facts a) that presuppose no further knowledge b) that this non-inferential knowledge is the final appeal body. SellarsVs: error: to assume that knowledge must be inferential. >Inference, >Conclusions, >Knowledge, >World/thinking, Vs: >Consciousness/Sellars, >Concepts/Sellars. I 67 Myth of the Given/Sellars: thesis that observation constructs authenticating, non-linguistic episodes by itself whose authority is transferred to linguistic and quasi-linguistic executions. SellarsVs. > |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Humanism | Vico | Gadamer I 25 Humanism/Vico/Gadamer: G. Vico's text De nostri temporis studiorum ratione(1) is a defence of humanism, mediated by Jesuit pedagogy, and is directed as much against Jansenism as it is against Descartes. (VicoVsDescartes, VicoVsJansenism). >R. Descartes, >Jansenism. This pedagogical manifesto of Vico, like his draft of a "new science", is based on old truths. He therefore refers to the >sensus communis, the communal sense, and to the humanistic ideal of eloquentia, moments that were already present in the ancient concept of the wise man. "Speaking well" (eu legein) has always been an ambiguous formula in itself and by no means a mere rhetorical ideal. It also means saying the right thing, that is, the true thing, not just the art of speaking, the art of saying something well. Rhetoric/Vico/Gadamer: It is well known that in ancient times this ideal was proclaimed by the teachers of philosophy as much as by those of rhetoric. Rhetoric has always been at odds with philosophy and claimed to convey the true wisdom of life to the idle speculations of the "sophists. Vico, who was himself a teacher of rhetoric, is thus part of a humanistic tradition that dates back to antiquity. Humanities/Vico/Gadamer: Obviously this tradition is also important for the self-conception of the humanities, and in particular the positive ambiguity of rhetorical ideal, which is not only under the verdict of Plato, but also under the verdict of the anti-rhetorical methodologism of modern times. >Sensus communis/Vico. 1 .J. B. Vico, De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, mit Übertragung v. W. F. Otto. 1947. |
Vico I Giambattista Vico Prinzipien einer neuen Wissenschaft über die gemeinsame Natur der Völker Hamburg 2009 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| I, Ego, Self | Anscombe | Frank I 76 I/Anscombe/Schaede: complicated argumentation: 1) If there is a reference for the expression "I", i.e. a singular entity exists to which "I" refers directly, then Descartes is right, if anyone. VsDescartes: his theory, however, cannot explain specific peculiarities of the expression "I": e.g. the immunity against misidentification. >Misidentification, >incorrigibility. So Descartes is wrong and Elisabeth Anscombe is right. Anscombe thesis "I" has no referees at all! Course of the argumentation: first, Descartes' position is made as strong as possible to make some brief, almost essayistic remarks on Anscombe's own position at the end. I 77 I/Anscombe: why does it have to be certain? E.g. John Smith himself could not know that he is John Horatio Auberon Smith, who is mentioned somewhere. He could quote this text and speak of himself without knowing it! When using "I", only the reference is specified (the speaker), but not the (changing) meaning! >Reference, >Meaning. Question: Does "I" work like a proper name? From a logical point of view (where the meaning is not relevant) it does syntactically! E.g. but only an idiot would sign "I". Uncorrectability (immunity against misidentification): is not yet guaranteed by self-reference. I 82 "I"/Anscombe: the peculiarity of this expression lies in its strict situation-relatedness. It follows that "I" should not be emphatically substantiated to an "I"! The question remains: do "I" thoughts imply thoughts with "here" and "this", or is the implication just reversed? Frank I 99 I/Body/Anscombe: "I" is not identified by the body: e.g. the bishop could mistake the lady's knee for his own, but will he mistake the lady herself for himself? Frank I 100 Then that for which "I" stands would have to be the Cartesian ego. >cogito. Assuming it is my body: e.g. I am in a situation (water tank with lukewarm water, unable to move) where I am practically deprived of my body. However, I can still think, "I do not want this to happen again." The I is thus not identical with the body. >Body, >Self-reference. Thinking is just what is guaranteed by the cogito. I 101 I/Anscombe: for "I" there is only the use! I/Ambrose Bierce: ("The Devil's Dictionary"): ...the idea of two that are I is difficult, but subtle. I 102 I/Anscombe: Thesis solution: "I" is neither a name nor any other type of expression whose logical role it is to refer. (I has no reference). I 103 I/Logic/Anscombe: we still accept the rule of the logician that the proposition is true if the predicates are true. But that is not a sufficient description of "I". Because it does not differentiate between "I" and "A". The truth definition of the whole sentence does not determine the meaning of the individual phrases. Accordingly, the logical rule does not justify the idea that "I" from the mouth of x is another name for x. But the rule means that the question "whose assertion?" was all decisive. For example, a translator could repeat the author's "I". >Quote, >Indirect speech. It follows: "I am E.A." is not at all an assertion of identity. An assertion of identity would be: "This thing is E.A." But there is also the proposition: "I am this thing here". >Quasi-indicator, >He/he himself. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Evans | Frank I 24 I/EvansVsDescartes: the I is the body! - The I-centered space becomes an objective world place only when the subject can transfer it to a public map and recognize it. - The convertibility of the speaker's perspective, which has been described demonstratively, requires an independent space. --- Frank I 485f I/Evans: 1. void of criteria, 2. limited access (not everyone, not at any time) - 3. the manner of givenness is dependent on the existence: I must be in the place to say "here", but change is possible ("new meaning, old meaning "). --- I 488 I-thoughts are de re. (They need information). --- I 503 I/GeachVsDescartes: instead of "I get into a terrible mess!" I can also say: "This is really a terrible confusion" - Strawson: "There is a pain" instead of "I have pain". EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: a part of the reference is to make its audience do something. --- I 504 I/Evans: our view of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand the following without being able to justify or decide it: e.g. "I have been stilled" - "I will die". --- I 545 "Here"/"I"/Evans: "here" and "I" are equal, both are not possible without the other. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Geach | Frank I 503 I/GeachVsDescartes: instead of "I get into a terrible mess!" I can also say: "This is really a terrible confusion". Strawson: also "there is pain" instead of "I am in pain". EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: for reference, it is necessary to get one's audience into something. >Reference, >Relations, >Pain, >Situation, >Description, >Self-identification, >Gareth Evans, >R. Descartes, >Dualism. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Strawson | I 123 Doctrine of non-possessing/I/self/consciousness/Strawson: (probably not Wittgenstein's position/StrawsonVs) Representative of this doctrine: "OP" (our philosopher). Descartes: thesis: the uniqueness of a body should be sufficient to evoke the idea that the experience is attributed to it. Strason: it was just unfortunatly expressed in terms of possessing. Our PhilosopherVsDescartes: then it would be inadmissible, to assume an "ego" additionally, whose sole function of this is "possessing". Difference: body has experience causally, contingently. I 124 "Ego" has them necessarily, conceptually (wrong). Solution/Our Philosopher: only things whose possession is logically transferable, can ever be possessed - experiences are then no ownership of the subject. StrawsonVsOur Philosopher: is using himself the false possession term. I 125 Actually our experience in this particular sense are our own, and only identifiable by that. StrawsonVsDescartes/VsOur Philosopher: there are not two uses of "I". >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. I 126 From particular experience of the subject arises not the necessity of a self-concept. Cf. >Self-consciousness/Strawson, >self-identification/Strawson, >self-ascription/Strawson. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| I, Ego, Self | Wittgenstein | Frank I 38ff I/Wittgenstein: Object-use by means of external characteristics: To erroneously believe a bump on the forehead - subject-use: immediately, no criteria, no self-identification no error possible. - Genitive subjectivus: Statement of the person, not about people - no characterization, no error. >Incorrigibility, >self-identification. Frank I 43 I/Wittgenstein: "I have a toothache" and "He has a toothache" are not values of a common propositional function. - "I have a toothache" denotes no owner. Sydney Shoemaker (I968): Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, in: Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), 555-578 --- Hintikka I 99 Nature/property/possession/Wittgenstein: de facto, but not essential relationship. The relation of possession is not part of the essence of objects. One of these objects is also the empirical ego. In this sense, Wittgenstein says: "The solipsism coincides with pure realism". >Solipsism. --- Wittgenstein II 226 I/WittgensteinVsDescartes "I" has no outstanding position among the words - it is simply used in the language practice. >Use, >Practise, >Language. --- Wittgenstein IV 91 I/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 5631 there is no sense in which in the philosophy can be talked non-psychologically about the ego - the philosophical ego is not the human - not the body - 5.64 it shrinks to a point - to this point reality is coordinated - the subject is the limit of the world - with that it can be shown that solipsism is correct. - But it is not impossible to say it. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Idealism | Leibniz | Holz I 59f Idealism/LeibnizVsDescartes: in order not to fall into an irrational transcendental idealism, the rationality of the factual must be proved. To this extent, Leibniz is definitely not a precursor of Kant. >Rationalism/Leibniz, >Proof/Leibniz, >Idealism/Kant, >Reality/Descartes. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Ideas | Rorty | I 74 "Idea of idea," Berkeley / Rorty: makes it possible to make the concept of an extended substance superfluous. - BerkeleyVsDescartes. >Substance/Descartes, >Substance, >Substance/Berkeley, >Berkeley, >Descartes. II (f) 129 Berkeley / Rorty: Thesis: "nothing but another idea can be like an idea" - RortyVsBerkeley: He should have said - only one sentence may be relevant to the truth of another seentence - ((s)> Coherence Theory). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Identification | Evans | Davidson I 20 Identification/demonstratives/Evans: identification is always demonstratively (ostensive definition, pointing). - Therefore the thought of a unicorn is no idea. >Unicorn example, >Non-existence, >Acquaintance, >Ideas. DavidsonVsEvans: there are no objects that are immune to misidentification (DavidsonVsDescartes). >Incorrigibility. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Imagination | Nagel | I 82ff Of course, we can be wrong in some of our judgments about what is inconceivable and what is not. It is possible that a statement whose falsity we could not imagine still may be untrue. Mere external information about how we got there to hold the statement to be true is not enough. We may also have imagined something right, but later find out that we have described our actions incorrectly. I 87ff Imagination: not even temporarily can we "bracket" the basic thought that the contraposition is valid and replace it with the purely psychological observation that we consider the falsity of this statement unimaginable (DescartesVs). I 88 NagelVsDescartes: demon: the idea of confused thoughts also contains the disentangled thought. >Descartes. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Individuation | Brentano | Chisholm I 34 Individuation/I/Self/Idea/I/Intention/Brentano: in the self-evident mental states presented by us, we never capture any individualizing properties. I 35 All my properties, which I can readily grasp, are such that they can at least be theoretically immediately exemplified in different things. (BrentanoVsDescartes). >Self-identification. |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Inscrutability of reference | Putnam | III 122 Absolute Reality/PutnamVsDescartes: their representatives have the wrong tendency to equate secondary qualities with the sensation of secondary qualities. Even Williams seems to visualize a picture of the world without colors. Williams: the ideal case would be a theory of knowledge and error. >Bernard Williams. III 132 Absolute Reality/Williams: absolute reality explains to us, but not to foreign scientists, how we understand it. >Reference. PutnamVs: so it exists only locally. Absolute Reality/Putnam: absolute reality would also require convergence. >Convergence. QuineVsConvergence: convergence has an inscrutability of reference. >Inscrutability/Quine. III 134 Absolute Reality/Williams: absolute reality is without normative terms. PutnamVs: that is why we have the problem of indeterminacy of translation. Putnam: thesis: there are many possible true descriptions of the world in different vocabularies. III 133 Reference/Fodor: according to Quine's criticism of the inscrutability (indeterminacy) of reference: we have to abide to the individual sciences or everyday linguistic causality. >Indeterminacy lf translation, >Gavagai. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Intersubjectivity | Descartes | Stroud I 37 Intersubjectivity/Community/Stroud: We might feel that our social life gives us security in terms of our knowledge. DescartesVsIntersubjectivity: His skepticism even affects the certainty that there is a community of people around us. >Solipsism, >Sketpicism. I 38 Important Point/StroudVsDescartes: Then there is also no common knowledge about the "veil". >Knowledge, >Certainty. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Knowledge | Kant | Stroud I 130 Knowledge/skepticism/KantVsDescartes: Who reads a proof needs to know at the end. Problem: this is only possible in the sciences, not in philosophy. KantVsTradition: Kant treats knowledge of the outer world always indirectly or inferentially. Solution/Kant: immediate perception / = consciousness of external things. That is a sufficient proof of their reality. - With inferential access skepticism would be inevitable. Per skepticism: forces to show that we have acquired our knowledge. KantVsMoore/Stroud: Moore does not show this. I 134 Skepticism/Kant: is refuted only by a proof of realism. >Reality/Kant, >Perception/Kant, >Experience/Kant, >Realism/Kant, >Skepticism. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Language | Locke | Black II 130 Language/Locke/Black: to transmit thoughts - (>ideas). --- Euchner I 33 Language/Locke: 1. recording 2. communication of thoughts 3. ease and speed of communication. Language also is a prerequisite for society. >Communication, >Society. --- Euchner I 170 Language/Locke/Euchner: today: Locke fails to recognize the irreducible linguistic basics of empirical perception - but the correction has already been created: to include also abstract and general ideas among the empirically given, of which each reconstruction of knowledge must start. >Idea/Locke, >Perception/Locke, >Perception/today's theories, >Reality/today's theories, >Language/today's theories. --- Arndt II 181 Language/knowledge/LockeVsPascal/VsPort Royal/Arndt: 1. no necessary relations between concepts 2. It is not clear how their content determination leads to mind independent objects. Language/Descartes/Pascal: subsequent codifying of objects. Locke: actual constitution of objects. II 183 Linguistic expression/Locke: "nodes" in which ideas, summarized in the mind, find their stable expression. We must refrain from words and look at meanings. - But the ideas are something almost finished. Arndt: problem: then indicators more representative than synthetically. Words: signify directly the idea, objects only indirectly. II 188 Ideas/meaning/Locke: analysis of ideas identical to the analysis of the meanings - language: not only a means of communication but also of knowledge. Clarity/LockeVsDescartes: in his view bound to naming. Presupposes the possibility of clear signification. II 199 Language: is signifier at the same time and presupposes objectivity. II 206 Language/Locke: is already finished: no one creates the abstract idea "fame" before he has heard the name. - So independence of the mixed modes of the existence of the signified - thus one can understand names before they were applied to existing things (!) E.g. So punishments can be established for not yet committed acts. Punch line: dependence on community is result of the independence of the existence of the signified. Translation: problem: nominal essence: change from community to community. Language ultimately relates to particular therefore we learn name first. >Translation, >Names. --- Saussure I 34 Language/Locke: These words are signs of ideas in consciousness - ideas in turn are signs for objects outside of consciousness. >Signs, >Words. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 Loc II H.W. Arndt "Locke" In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
| Locke | Höffe | Höffe I 241 Locke/Höffe: (...) John Locke (1632-1704) [founded] British empiricism. >Empiricism. LockeVsDescartes/LockeVsHobbes: In epistemology he develops a counterpoint to Descartes' rationalism and in political philosophy an alternative to Hobbes' absolutism. >Th. Hobbes, >R. Descartes, >Absolutism, >Rationalism. However, because of his epistemological empiricism and his political and economic liberalism, additionally because of his demand for a child-oriented education and finally because of his plea for a certain religious tolerance, he rises quickly to European fame, and rightly so. More than any other thinker, he shaped the philosophical, political and economic world view of the bourgeois age. To this day he is valued as a classic of epistemology, political philosophy and, not least, pedagogy. Höffe I 242 In early writings such as the Tracts on Government (1660/61), Locke did not yet represent liberal political views. For example, he advocates state supervision of religious services. Biography: Although he is a champion of liberal ideas, he also earns money from the slave trade. >Liberalism, >Slavery. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Materialism | Leibniz | Holz I 101 Materialism/Leibniz/Holz: materialism is often misunderstood as idealistic. ((s) Because it has strongly influenced Hegel). On the other hand, the materialistic approach is strongly to be emphasized. I 102 Matter/LeibnizVsDescartes: impenetrability is not enough! Descartes understood the bodies as immobile. Substantial being needs a bearer. >Substance/Descartes, >Reality/Descartes. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Matter | Kant | Danto III 266 Matter/Body/KantVsDescartes/Kant/Danto: Kant adhered to a dynamic theory of matter. He turned against Cartesian physics, according to which everything can be explained by the geometric properties of matter. The basic physical concept of the Cartesians was extension. Kant replied, not by extension would bodies take up space, but by intensity. >Matter/Descartes. Kant: Matter is the moveable, as long as it fills a space. Fulfilling a space means resisting all moving things, which through its movement is trying to penetrate into a certain space (...). The general principle of the dynamics of material nature is: that everything real of the objects of external sense, which that is not merely the determination of space, must be seen as a moving force; that is, whereby the so-called solid or the absolute impenetrability, as an empty concept, must be expelled from the natural sciences and be replaced by a force driving back.(1) Danto: Kant implicitly invoked this honor in his confusing discussion of intense magnitudes in the section 'Anticipations of Perception of First Criticism.(2) Danto: Mass is defined there by the intensity with which matter fills a given space. >Space/Kant. 1.I. Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, in: Werke in 10 Bänden Ed. W. Weischedel, Special Edition, Vol. III, Darmstadt 1983) (second main piece: Erklärung 1, Lehrsatz 1; Allgemeine Anmerkung zur Dynamik). 2. Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Acitivity, Cambridge, 1963, pp. 232f). |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Meaning | Davidson | I (c) 64 Meaning/Davidson: Quine has revolutionized our understanding of communication by having shown that there is not more about meaning than what a person with the associated facilities is able to learn by observing. Causal theory of meaning/VsDescartes: Senses do not matter - only in learning, but then contingently. (VsScepticism) >Causal theory of reference, >Skepticism. I (c) 47 Def Meaning (interpretation): The meaning of a sentence is given by the fact that the sentence is assigned a semantic space in the structure of records that make up a language . The meaning of a sentence consists in being the holder of this place and no other place in the macro structure of the language. This is the only content of the concept of meaning for Davidson. >Sentence meaning, >Meaning theory. Glüer II 53 DavidsonVsSocial nature of meaning: Idiolect in principle is also to be interpreted (via causal hypotheses). Putnam/Kripke: causal theory: correct link between word and object. DavdisonVsPutnam: Interpretation of whole sentences. >Use theory, >Interpretation, >Radical interpretation. Rorty VI 419 DavidsonVsQuine/Rorty: Davidson rejects the notion of "stimulus meaning": this would be like Newton’s attempt to climb to the "Newton of the mind". Instead: distal theory of meaning. There is no "central region" between linguistically formulated beliefs and physiology. >Proximal theory. Davidson I 95 Causal theory of meaning: Meaning does not matter - only in learning, but then contingent (VsSkepticism). I 99 DavidsonVsPutnam: that meanings are not in the head is not due to special names for natural kinds, but due to broad social character of language. >Natural kinds, >Communication. Glüer II 50 Meaning/Davidson/Glüer: The interpretation is given by the fact that the semantic space of a sentence is located in the structure of sentences that make up the language - (multiple languages = truth - theories) possible - Def Meaning/Davidson: then consists in being the holder of this unique place in the macro structure of the language. Glüer II 51 Meaning/Tarski/Davidson: Tarski-type theories are not based on meaning as defined entities (pro Davidson : Meaning is not fixed ultimately) - consequences: 1. DavidsonVsTarski: actually spoken language becomes ultimately irrelevant - 2. The trivial thesis that meaning is conventional, must be abandoned. Frank I 672 Sunburn-example/Davidson: as sunburn is still a reddening of my skin, even though it was caused by the sun - not only external causation leads to the fact that meanings are not in the head - otherwise, pro Putnam: meanings are not in the head, but rather simple propositional attitudes. >Propositional attitudes. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Mental States | Dennett | Rorty VI 144 Rorty: (According to Wittgenstein: what would it look like when the sun revolved around the earth (i.e. just like it?) Qualia/Dennett: (like Smart and Place): "How would it look if there really were nothing more than a compound of electrochemical processes in your brain?" Cf. >Brains in a vat. Dennett I 274 Mind/Dennett: "PDP": Model of parallel distributed processing. Davidson, like Dennett: therefore the mind is not its own residence. VsDescartes. >Mind/Davidson. Mind/Meaning/Dennett: there once was a time when neither existed, nor error or function and no reasons. They were created along the way of the tiny improvements that evolution brought with it. (Finite regress). I 274ff Finite sequence of steps, without ever having to draw a line. Mind/Dennett: that's what mind is: no wonder apparatus, but a huge, semi-designed and self-transformaing compound of small appliances, each of which has its own designhistory and plays its own role. >Homunculi. I 283 Robot/Dennett: from the fact that we are descended from robots (e.g. hemoglobin, etc.) does not follow that we are robots! We are descended from bacteria, but we are not bacteria. Neither are we monkeys. But we are composed of robots! I 525 Mind/Evolution/Dennett: today, each and everyone of us is able to understand ideas that would have been unthinkable for geniuses from the generation of our grandparents. II 183 Mind/Dennett: a human mind without paper and pencil, without language to compare notes and making sketches is something we’ve never met. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Mental States | Rorty | Rorty I 28 Wittgenstein, Strawson: there is nothing but the human body, VsDescartes. >Dualism, >Monism, >Cartesianism. Non-spatiality is not a clear criterion for a mental state, because the concept of the state is so unclear, neither spatial nor non-spatial. >Materialism, >Physicalism, >Functionalism. I 77f Ryle: opinions, wishes and feelings (traits of reason and character) can be thought of as something that requires the human itself as a substrate, and not a non-material medium. This is more difficult with sensations, mental images and thoughts. >Beliefs, >Desire, >Emotions, >Thoughts, >Thought objects, >Objects of belief, >Psychological theories on personality traits. I 77ff State: this above argument makes it so easy to consider sensations, etc. not as states of things, but rather as things themselves. (RortyVs). This allows some contemporary philosophers to afford mental things without a soul. Cf. >Mental objects/AI research. I 80 Def Neutral monism: considers the mental and the material as two "aspects" of an underlying reality. - Reality accessible with intuition (Bergson). Reality also to be identified with the material and the perception (Russell, Ayer). The only way to escape skepticism. (Dewey, James). >Skepticism, >Skepticism/James, >Bergson. I 106f RortyVs: you cannot find a "neutral material" which is neither mental nor physical, and has its own powers and dispositions. Therefore, you simply postulate it. But that does not help. >Substance, >Substratum. Frank I 581 Mental/Rorty: a) Events: sensations, thoughts, etc. b) states that are no events: opinions, moods, intentions, etc. >Intentions, >Intentionality, >Sensation, >Event, >State. Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 Rorty I 60 Idea/mind/Antiquity/Rorty: antiquity had no concept of the mental and no concept of a mind separated from the body - no concept of idea - no concept of consciousness. >Ancient philosophy. Idea: new with Locke - this only makes epistemology possible. >Idea/Locke, >Ideas. I 117 Mind/mental/RortyVsRyle: Ryle believed to have avoided the image of the mirror, but he failed in the attempt to prove that there are no uncorrectable reports. >Mental states/Ryle, >Ryle, >Incorrigibility. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Method | Descartes | Holz II 37 Rationalism/Holz: for rationalism it goes without saying to break down terms or facts into simpler components. >Rationalism. Method/Descartes: A method consists in the order and disposition of what the mind's gaze must focus on in order to discover a certain truth. Holz II 37 Intuition/Descartes: intuition is not the changing testimony of the senses, but such a simple and distinct understanding of the pure and attentive mind. So everyone can grasp with the mind that he/she exists, that he/she is aware that the triangle has three sides. Holz II 38 Method/Intuition/HolzVsDescartes: The process leads to an incalculable abundance of details, if no distinction is made between the essential and the insignificant. This is a problem in psycho-spiritual and social-historical investigations. >Relevance, >Essence. In the age of mathematics and natural sciences this remains inarticulated! Descartes' concept of intuition is imprecise because he assumes subjective belief. Def Intuition/Holz: intuitive knowledge is knowledge of the simple, which can no longer be broken down into parts. |
Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Mind | Chalmers | I 11 Mind/Chalmers: conscious experience is not all there is to the mind. Cognitive sciences has had almost nothing to say about consciousness, but about mind in general as the internal basis of behaviour. >Cognitive psychology, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Behavior. Mind/Chalmers: a) phenomenal concept of mind: the conscious experience of mental states. That is what I will concentrate on. >Spirit, >Mental states, >Experience. b) The psychological concept as a causal or explanatory basis of behaviour. ChalmersVsDescartes: Descartes may have been partly responsible for a conflation of the two concepts. >R. Descartes, >Causal Explanation. I 14 Mind/Psychology/Ryle/Chalmers: in philosophy, the shift in emphasis form the phenomenal to the psychological was codified by Gilbert Ryle (1949) (1) who argued that all our mental concepts can be analysed in terms of certain kinds of associated behaviour, or in terms of dispositions to behave in certain ways (E. g. Lycan 1987 (2)). >G. Ryle, >Dispositions. ChalmersVsRyle: Ryle intended all mental concepts to fall within the grasp of his analysis. It seems to me that this view is a nonstarter as an analysis of our phenomenal concepts such as sensation and consciousness itself. >Sensation. But Ryle’s analysis provided a suggestive approach to many other mental notions, such as believing, enjoying, wanting, pretending and remembering. >Memory, >Thinking, >Desires, >Beliefs. ChalmersVsRyle: technical problems: 1. It is natural to suppose that mental states cause behaviour, but if mental states are themselves behavioural then it is hard to see how they could do the job. >Weakness of will. 2. it was argued (Chisholm, 1957 (3), Geach, 1957 (4)) that no mental state could be defined by a single range of behavioural dispositions, independent of any other mental states. E.g. if one believes that it is raining, one’s behavioural dispositions will vary depending on whether one has the desire to get wet. It is therefore necessary to invoke other mental states in characterizing the behavioural dispositions. (GeachVsRyle, ChisholmVsRyle). >P. Geach, >R. Chisholm. 1. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Oondon 1949 2. W. G. Lycan, Consciousness, Cambridge 1987 3. R. Chisholm, Perceiving Ithaca, NY, 1957 4. P. Geach, Mental Acts, London 1957 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Mind Body Problem | Descartes | Putnam V 108 Def Interactionism/Putnam: The interactionism is a theory, according to which spiritual events interact with physical ones. Whereby the direction of origin could be in one direction as well as in the other. Descartes: The mind could influence matter if it was very, very ethereal (pineal gland). This theory is notorious. V 109 The most naive version of interactionism assumes that the mind is a kind of ghost that lives in the bodies. Vs: But it is not clear why we should have such complicated brains at all, it could be a very simple control mechanism. >Interacitonism. Descartes: (refined) mind and brain form a substantial unity. Somehow it is the mind-brain unity that thinks, feels, and represents a personality. I.e. that the mind is not what we commonly call the mind, but the unity of brain (body) and mind. >Brain, >Mind, >Spirit. PutnamVsDescartes: This is obscure: a unity of two substances. >Substance. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Mind Body Problem | Kripke | I 164 Identities: e.g. pain is the excitation of C fibers (types of mental states, types of physical states). >Pain/Kripke. Nagel/Davidson: it is an alleged impossibility of a correlation of psychological and physical properties. I 165 Descartes: the mind is different from the body, because the mind could exist without the body. I 166 KripkeVsDescartes: Descartes might as well have derived these conclusions from the premise that the body could have existed without the mind. >Counterfactuals/Kripke. A theory which states that a person is nothing beside or above their body, just like a statue is nothing beside or above the matter, would have to defend the necessary thesis that a person exists iff their body exists and also has a certain physical organization. >Identity theory/Kripke, >Physical/Psychic. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Object | Davidson | I (b) 16 ff Thought/Knowledge/DavidsonVsHume: there are infinitely many properties, so ignorance of the imagined objects is possible Hume/Descartes: ... it is necessary to find objects for which mistakes are impossible. As objects that are necessary what they seem to be. DavidsonVsDescartes: Such objects simply do not exist. Not even appearances are all what they seem to be. Also, the aspects of sense data cannot be protected against misidentification, insofar as they are real objects. We must drop the idea that there are inner objects or mental images in the required sense. No "internal objects", no "uninterpreted given", "no stream" within a schema (VsSchema/content). >Scheme/Content, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mentalism. Frank I 678 Objects/Putnam/Fodor: a) "true inward", "in front of the mind", "conceived" by him - b) those who identify thoughts in the usual way. (external) - Davidson: I agree that there are no objects that serve both purposes - ((s) not an excellent class). - Putnam: the two cannot coincide, because otherwise the mind could not be deceived. Ideas/impressions/Hume: "are as it seems and seem as it is" - DavidsonVsHume: such objects do not exist - neither abstract nor concrete, neither public nor private. Even propositions do not exist - there is no object that would satisfy the dual function to be in front of the mind and also to determine the content of the thought - otherwise one could not be deceived. - meaning depends on the types of objects and events which have caused the person acausally to take the words as applicable. But the agent cannot ask himself/herself whether he/she regularly applies them correctly, because his/her regularity gives them importance. - Thus, authority of the first person and social character go hand in hand. >First Person. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Objects of Thought | Burge | Frank I 704 Self-Knowledge/Content/Thoughts/Burge: the content of the first-level thought is fixed by non-individualistic (external) background conditions. >Content, >Circumstances. Through its reflexive, self-referential character, the second-stage thought inheres this content. Fra I 705 Since fake content does not logically undermine such self-knowledge, it is clear that it is not necessary to know the enabling conditions. DescartesVs. BurgeVsDescartes: it is wrong to conceive of one's own thoughts as objects, and to attribute to oneself a special faculty of infallibility. Either the new entity of an ability is introduced as new entities or special objects. OckhamVs. E.g. propositions which can only be thought when they have been fully understood, or imaginations whose esse is their percipi. These would be objects about which you could not make mistakes, like objects that could be seen from all sides at the same time. >Incorrigibility, >Self-knowledge. |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Person | Kant | Strawson V 142 Person/personal identity/Descartes: (not physical!) - Our ordinary concept brings very well empirically applicable criteria for numerical identity of a subject with itself (concept!). But not by self-ascription - "I" is simply used without criteria. >Criteria/Kant. KantVsDescartes: the only criteria would be: "the same person", "the same soul" - that would be circular. >Circular reasoning, >Temporal identity. V 146 Kant: there is no inner intuition of the subject. >Subject/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Person | Locke | Graeser I 224 Person/Locke: by identity of consciousness, not the numerical identity of the substance. Euchner I 55f Person/Locke: awake/sleeping: not the same person (probably the same human being). Person: someone who attributes past actions to himself. Man/humanLocke: bound to shape. VsDescartes: when separated from the mental it is possible that a contemporary man was the person Nestor, but not the man Socrates. >Personal identity. Ethics: a drunk person is not liable if without consciousness. >Ethics, >Morals/Locke. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Physicalism | Schiffer | I 138 SchifferVsPhysicalism: it must be wrong, because if there are true ascriptions of belief, they cannot be shown without mentalist or intentional vocabulary. >Beliefs/Schiffer. I 142f Def Ontological physicalism/Schiffer: thesis: ontological physicalism has no irreducible psychological entities. Def Sententialist physicalism: there are no psychological sentences (which is wrong). If there are any, the two physicalisms fall together. Def Sententialist Dualism: there are true psychological sentences. Belief properties: if there are any, belief propositions and Sententialist Dualism cannot be true. - Ontological Dualism/SchifferVsDescartes: is unreasonable. Sententialist Dualism/ontological physicalism/Schiffer: because both are true, there are no belief propositions. NominalismVsDualism/Quine: If the Sententialist Physicalism is wrong, there are no true beliefs. >Dualism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Proof of God’s Existence | Leibniz | Holz I 72 Ontological proof of God/Holz: the derivation of the axiom "only one being is necessary" is only equivalent in the outer form with the ontological proof of God. In fact, it differs, otherwise it would dissolve pantheistically in the world. Leibniz: God can only be thought of as universal. I 78 Principle of Variety/Principles/Thinking/Leibniz: the formal principle of thinking is based on the principle of variety. ((s) Because you cannot think of a single thing without relation to anything else.) >Principles/Leibniz. Double movement/ascent/descent/Leibniz/Holz: from the certainty of the perceived multiplicity one can now ascend to the infinitesimal boundary concept "all beings at the same time". Divine proof/LeibnizVsDescartes/Holz: this is similar to Descartes' proof of God, but in a modified form: it makes a difference whether I assume God as the creator outside, or the totality of the whole (and thus within). (>Exterior/interior/Leibniz). |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Reality | Davidson | I (e) 90 Reality/World/Quine: proximal theory (the meaning is localized at the nerve endings) shut off from the world, which is perhaps quite different - ultimate source of evidence: irritation - DavidsonVsQuine. Cartesian separation; gap - also separation of scheme and content - DavidsonvsDescartes/DavidsonVsQuine: once one is decided to close that gap, one cannot specify what the evidence actually was evidence for. Rorty VI 63 ff World/Putnam/Goodman (VsWilliams)/Rorty: there is no real suchness of the world. Davidson: the contribution that the world is contributing is inseparable from the part we contribute ourselves. Glüer II 126 World/Reality/Reality/Glüer: new: "see change" in contemporary philosophy, revision of the relationship of the human mind to the rest of the world. From the "subjective" to the "objective". On the object side, the world thus, there are no objects that could be represented. Fact/tradition/glower: there are material objects and events, but a true proposition claims not only that they exist, but that they are in a certain relationship to each other, also called fact. >Facts/Davidson. Glüer II 127 DavidsonVsRepresentation: such a representation relation cannot exist. Because there are no facts! Any attempt to analyze the correspondence of facts and beliefs leads to the fact that we must say that a true belief is consistent with all the facts of the world, with the overall reality. We experience nothing in this way. >Representation/Davidson. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Reason | Brandom | I 395 Reason/Brandom: we are rational beings exactly as far as our recognition of discursive determinations makes a difference for what we will do next. >Discourse, >Actions. I 399 Mind/Brandom: Thesis: we gain mutual recognition out of our ability to say "we". >Recognition. --- II 213 Definition mind/Brandom: the conceptual ability to understand rules - KantVsDescartes: normative rather than descriptive. >Mind, >Understanding, >Rules, >Score keeping model. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Representation | Brandom | I 155f Kant-Hegel representation: Experience: inferential activity. Representation > de re attribution. Other authors on attribution. I 900 Representational contents: linguistic through and through, but not purely linguistic. The representational dimension of propositional contents becomes explicit through the social perspective nature of accounting. >Content. --- Rorty VI 179 ff Representation/Brandom/Rorty: wants to save them from Davidson, who threw them out with the bathwater. The representationalist semantic theory contains an undeniable insight: whatever has a high propositional content necessarily has such a representational side; nothing which does not have this aspect would be seen as an expression of his proposition. BrandomVsDavidson. Rorty: With this he does not mean that truth is a property, it is in fact only about approval, not about description (>metaphysics). --- Bandom I 127 Representation/Brandom: problematic: there is no room for the concept of error: representation requires accuracy - statement truth - representation is not possible without practice: red dots, blue lines on the map. >Practise, >Experience, >Error, >Deception, >Correctness. VsDescartes: does not explain what it means to understand representation, namely understanding how we are responsible for them. I 126 Representation is not an expression. I 130 VsDescartes: it is about the correctness of the representation prior to understanding. Cf. >Understanding. I 145 BrandomVsRepresentation: unclear how to come to the concept of propositional content. I 923 Representation/SearleVsDavidson: content must be understood intrinsically and before analysis - but representation of signs, sounds not intrinsic, mere object of nature - derived intentionality comes from original intentionality of the mind. I 404f Representation/Brandom: from Descartes dualistic worldview of representation and the represented. four aspects: 1) Apart from "true", representation also needs "refers to" and "means" >Reference, >Meaning. 2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts >Extension, >Intension. 3) "of" in de re-contexts: something true of Kant but not of Hegel >de re 4) Correctness of judgment and inference. >Judgment, >Inference, >Correctness. I 412 ~ BrandomVsRepresentation: instead expressive role. I 482 Representation/Brandom: Minority (Davidson): between propositionally rich intentional states and facts - Majority: no semantic priority is the result of the pragmatic prevalence of propositional - representation is initially representation of things, Reil and properties- Brandom: if this is true, allocation of intention and success cannot be explained at the level of propositional content. I 719 Representation/Brandom: E.g. McCarthy: propositional content as worldview depends on the facts in relation to the objects they represent - representation in this sense is fundamental intentionality. >Propositional content, >Intentionality. I 719f Representation/Brandom: a) pre-conceptual: does not require grasping the specific contents - e.g. orienting oneself with a map (also possible non-linguistically) E.g. interpreting a cloud as a sign of rain.Cf. >Map example, >Natural signs/Armstrong. b) as part of a discursive practice: E.g. infer from symbols that there is a river between two cities. I 722 Assertions and beliefs with a high propositional content are necessarily representationally substantial, because their inferential structure is essentially a social one. >Propositional content. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Representation | Esfeld | I 136 ~ Representation: harmless: beliefs represent things and facts of the world but they are not the original semantic property of beliefs. EsfeldVsDescartes: representation is intentional, not preconceptive. >Intentionality, >Representations/Descartes. Representation/Descartes: 1st A belief represents things. 2nd Access is only guaranteed by representation. 3. The things of which we are conscious, are representations (strong representation, realism). >Beliefs, >Realism. Fodor: Fodor is pro Descartes, the content of belief states is derived from original representative content. Problem: which causality is effective right now? Which characteristic is relevant? This does not allow conclusions. >Jerry Fodor. I 144ff Representative semantics/Esfeld: Vs: similarity is not an explanation. But which one is the correct causal relation? >Similarity, >Explanation, >Semantics. VsRepresentation: a causal relation is not fixable. A representation cannot distinguish between reference (extension) and meaning (intension) - meaning is therefore not in the head. >Reference, >Causal relation, >Meanings are not in the head. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Sensory Impressions | Descartes | Stroud I 8 Senses/Descartes: Even if we know that we can be deceived, it is not wiser to assume that we are always being deceived than to think we would never be. Stroud: we should not assume all our senses to be fundamentally unreliable. >Deceptions. Stroud I 16 Senses/Knowledge/Descartes: E.g. If he knows that he is sitting at the fireplace, he thinks that he knows it due to the senses. But he also knows that it is compatible with the fact that he is only dreaming. VsDescartes: if we allow a dreaming person to know something (e.g. mathematics, mathematical truths), does this not show that Descartes is wrong with his skepticism? VsVs: this is not shown by that. >Certainty, >Skepticism, >Knowledge, >Perception. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Skepticism | Anscombe | Frank I 79 I/Descartes/Anscombe: pro: the conception of "I" cannot be a "self" and it must guarantee that the speaker is necessarily present. This shows how powerful the approach of Descartes is. The conception is the "thinking of thoughts". >I, >cogito, >R. Descartes. I/Anscombe: Error immunity: 1. The speaker must exist, 2. The referent must exist, 3. The referent exists as the one who is meant. >Meaning/Intending, >Reference. I/Body/AnscomeVsDescartes: E.g. I am tied up in a large water tank and cannot move. I think, "I will not let this happen to me again." Thus it becomes clear that a body cannot be a referent of "I", but a Cartesian res cogitans. >Body, >res cogitans. Problem: the Cartesian ego fulfills the criteria of the guaranteed reference,... Frank I 80 ...but does not solve the problem of Locke: who guarantees that the referential object is in different "I" thoughts the same? >I, Ego, Self, >Person/Locke. AnscombeVsDescartes: he cannot even be sure that "I" does not refer to several thinkers at the same time! I/Skepticism/Anscombe: Solution: "I" refers to nothing! So it is error immune. This follows from the failure of logic in determining the meaning and the failure of Descartes' in determining the referent. Question: Why did not someone come up with this solution earlier? Because of the "grammatical illusion of a subject". The questions about meaning and referent of the "I" are meaningless, however! >Meaning, >Grammar. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Skepticism | Austin | Stroud I 41 AustinVsSkepticism: Descartes merely undertook a re-definition of "knowledge". - E.g. someone asserted there were no doctors in New York - in that, he performs a re-definition of "doctor": as someone who could cure within 2 minutes. StroudVsAustin: Descartes goes deeper. SomeVsDescartes: knowledge does not require what Descartes asserts: not dreaming and knowing that. - Knowledge/Stroud: if VsDescartes is right, then knowledge did not have to a) be entirely under logical consequence or b) penetrate all the logical consequences of our knowledge. (StroudVsVs) Stroud I 45 AustinVsSkepticism: "Enough is enough": it is not necessary to prove everything at all times in order to be able to claim knowledge. - The skeptic only asserts a lack of information. - StroudVsAustin - Austin: a "real" goldfinch is no more than a goldfinch. - Stroud: it would be absurd to argue philosophically against our usual knowledge, but that is not true of Descartes. - Dream/Austin: There are recognized procedures for distinguishing it from wakefulness - otherwise we could not use the words. I 47 Austin: it can be qualitatively distinguished whether you are actually being presented to the Pope, or just dreaming about it. Stroud I 48 Strong Thesis/Skepticism/Terminology/Descartes: We cannot know that we are not dreaming. - Austin's central thesis: the questioning of knowledge is hardly ever permitted in everyday life (if we are dreaming) - there must be specific reasons. - Austin thesis: you cannot always fool everyone. - Then Weaker Thesis/Austin: there must be a reason to doubt that we are awake - stronger: we always have to doubt it. I 57 Austin: E.g. what is considered inappropriate? -> Distinction truth/assertibility (because of the different conditions). >Truth conditions, >Assertibility conditions. Stroud I 64/65 Skepticism/Descartes/Stroud: (deeper than the one disputed by Austin) - can neither accepted be in everyday life nor in science. - Emphasis on theory and practice. Stroud: standards of justification vary from case to case - in the speech act there is no general instruction regarding what we need to consider. Stroud I 74 Def "Paradigm-Case Argument"/Knowledge/Truth/Oxford/Terminology/Austin/Stroud: in the mid-50s it was thought the skeptic would have come to the conclusion that in certain situations both S and non-S apply. Cf. >Dialethism. StroudVsAustin: in order to question the concept of "knowledge" we have ask how and why it was used. - Airplane-E.g. "He does not know" is definitely correct before the aircraft is on the ground) - But that is not the distinction between knowledge and ignorance. - Therefore, we cannot draw a skeptical conclusion from our language use. >Use, >Use theory, >Knowledge. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Skepticism | Davidson | I (d) 67 Skepticism/Davidson: As a minimum assumption one can assume that we are at least right with regard to our own person. Such a realization, however, is logically independent of what we believe about the world outside. So it cannot provide a foundation for the science and beliefs of the healthy human understanding. >Beliefs/Davidson. Rorty VI 166 Skepticism: the skeptic says: from the fact that we must think of the world in a certain way does not follow that it is indeed so. He encounters all claims with the question "How do you know that?" DavidsonVsSkepticism: that can be pathologized and omitted (like FregeVsSkepticism): the skeptic is not curable, because even in his/her next utterance he/she cannot assume that his/her words still mean the same as before. Skeptics: Why should not necessary assumptions be objectively wrong? It is common to all skeptical arguments that the skeptic understands the truth as a relation of correspondence between the world and belief, knowing that this can never be verified. DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: The "problem of the outside world" and the "other minds" rests on a false distinction between the "phenomenological content of experience" (tradition) and the intentional states that one attributes to a person on the basis of their causal interactions with the environment. >Other minds. Davidson I (c) 53/4 "Everything different"/Skepticism/Stroud: it could be that everything is different than we imagine it to be - Quine: that would be a distinction without differentiation: since the observation sentences are holophrastically conditioned for stimuli, the relationships to the evidence remain unchanged - Preserve the structure and you will preserve everything. ((s) Then yesterday everything was already different.) I (e) 94 Causal theory of meaning/VsDescartes: in basic cases, words act necessarily from the kinds of objects causing them. Then there is no room for Cartesian doubt. I (e) 95 DavidsonVsSkepticism: cannot be formulated because the senses do not play a role in the explanation of believing, meaning (to mean) and knowledge - as far as the content of the causal relations between the propositional attitudes and the world is independent. Of course, senses play a causal role in knowledge and language learning. >Language acquisition, >Cognition. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Skepticism | Descartes | Stroud I 4 Descartes/Skepticism/Knowledge/Stroud: Descartes wants to establish principles, a general method for the investigation of our knowledge. >Principles, >Knowledge. 1) Meditation: in the end, Descartes finds that there is no reason to believe anything about the world around him. Stroud I 16 Senses/Knowledge/Descartes: E.g. if he knows that he is sitting at the fireplace, he thinks that he knows it due to his senses. >Perception, >Sensory impressions. But he also knows that it is compatible with the fact that he is only dreaming. VsDescartes: If we allow a dreaming person to know something (e.g. mathematics, mathematical truths), does this not show that Descartes is wrong with his skepticism? VsVs: This is not shown with that. Stroud I 37 Descartes/Stroud: From the beginning, his skepticism was directed against everyday knowledge. >Certainty. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Skepticism | Kant | Stroud I 128 Skepticism/Kant: it remains a scandal of philosophy that the existence of things outside of us must be accepted solely on the basis of belief. KantVsDescartes: the relation between philosophical question and everyday knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. - ((s) But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct.) Stroud I 136 KantVsSkepticism: two stages: 1. prove external things (Moore has solved) - 2. show the general possibility of such evidence. Cf. >Moore's hands. Stroud I 138 Stroud: Problem: we do not have a specific text (sentence) with which Kant would formulate his realism and could prove it to Moore. Stroud I 142 Everyday knowledge is unproblematic, complete and does not have to be proved. Cf. >Certainty. Stroud I 140 Skepticism/KantVsSkepticism: the skepticism can never reach a conclusion because of the premises accepted by himself. Stroud I 147 KantVsDescartes: he does not go far enough and relies too heavily on "testimonies" - (documents, evidence). More important: the conditions of possibility. Davidson: Kant: no study of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects we assume around us. >Thing in itself/Kant. Solution/Kant: "Copernican revolution": idealism of all appearances. - "We only have direct consciousness of what belongs to us. Our perception depends on our capacity. Wrong: that our experience would be in accordance with the things, but vice versa. Stroud I 149 Things of the outer world/objects/world/reality/Kant/Stroud: all our perception, whether internal or external, and all "external objects of perception ... we have to regard them as representations of what we can be immediately conscious . - ((s) so the thing is the representation of our consciousness -> transcendental idealism - founds the a priori character of our knowledge of space and time (geometry). >Space/Kant, >Time/Kant, >Geometry/Kant. Therefore things cannot exist independently of our thoughts and experiences. Stroud I 163 StroudVsKant: that we need to be aware of our experiences is the return of the "epistemic priority" (from Descartes). |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Skepticism | Nagel | I 19 Subjectivism/Skepticism: says that there is no ability of such universal applicability and validity within us tp verify and substantiate our judgments. I 22ff Skepticism/Relativism: Reason cannot be criticized without using reason at any other point to formulate this criticism. >Reason, >Circular reasoning. I 31 Skepticism: a skepticism generated by reasoning can not be total. >Justification. I 31 ff Skepticism: in order to criticize it, one should not understand it as a widely applicable trivial empty phrase, but as something concrete, in order to turn the tables. This allows the conflict betw the inner content of the thoughts and the relativizing external view to be openly recognized. >Perspective, >Propositional content, >Thoughts, >Content. Subjectivism aims at a phenomenological reduction of thought to get out of them. This cannot succeed. Attempts to relativize the objectivity of a conceptual scheme fail for the same reason. E.g. I cannot say "I believe that p, but this is merely a psychological fact that affects me. As for the truth, I do not settle". I 89 NagelVsDescartes: demon: the idea of confused thoughts also contains the disentangled ones. I 92 NagelVsSkepticism: may not use arguments at all - a false calculation cannot be made right by saying that a demon had confused it. I 94 Logical skepticism/NagelVsSkepticism/Nagel: we can never reach a point where there are two possibilities that are compatible with all evidence. I cannot imagine that I am in a similar realization situation where 2 + 2 = 5, but my brain would be confused, because I could not imagine that 2 + 2 = 5. The logical skeptic offers no level of reason. - There is no point that allows reviewing the logic without presupposing it. - Not everything can be revised. - Something has to be maintained in order to check that the revision is justified. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Skepticism | Rorty | Rorty VI 225 PragmatismVsSkepticism: (raw version): "We do not need to respond to skepticism at all; it makes no difference whether we respond to it or not". (WilliamsVs). >Pragmatism. Horwich I 447 Skepticism/Peirce/Rorty/Leeds: PeirceVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: both have a common error, "correspondence" a relation between pieces of thoughts and pieces of the world that must be ontologically homogeneous. Ontological homogeneity: e.g. only relations between representations, not between representations and objects. >Skepticism/Berkeley). Peirce: this homogeneity does not need to exist. PlantingaVsPeirce: it does if the objects can only exist, for example, by showing their structure. RortyVsPlantinga: this confuses a criterion with a causal explanation. RortyVsPeirce: "ideal" unclear. >Criteria, >Causal explanation. I 448 Solution/James: "true of" is not an analyzable relation. - Therefore correspondence is dropped. >Correspondence, >Skepticism/James. Solution/Dewey: It’s just an attempt to interpose language as an intermediary instance, which would make the problem appear interesting. Rorty I 129 Skepticism/Tradition/RortyVsDescartes: not whether others are in pain is interesting - skepticism would never have become interesting, if the concept of "naturally given" had not arisen. >Skepticism/Descartes. VI 223ff Skepticism: main representative: Stroud. Stroud: speaks of a serious ongoing problem. >Skepticism/Stroud. Michael WilliamsVsStroud: the problem arises only from absurd totality demand: that everything must be explained together. >Skepticism/Michael Williams. Rorty: statements only make sense in a situation. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Skepticism | Stroud | I 13 Descartes: I cannot distinguish alertness from dream. Stroud: 1. the possibility that he dreams is really a threat to his knowledge of the world. 2. But he does not need to know whether he is dreaming to know something about the world. No knowledge: if one dreams E.g. that the shutters rattle and the dream caused it, one does not know that it rattles - (false causation, defies identity of the event). >Causal theory of knowledge, >Causation. I 17 Alone the possibility of deception is sufficient. >Deceptions. I 18 StroudVsDescartes: we can know sometimes that we are not dreaming - knowing that we do not dream is the condition for knowledge. I 37 Intersubjectivity: it also is affected by Descartes' skepticism. >Intersubjectivity, cf. >Solipsism. I 77 Platitudes/skepticism/Stroud: natural strategy VsSkepticism: e.g. The objective world was there before us. - E.g. I believe that a mountain in Africa is more than 5000m high. - That is completely independent of my knowledge. - Then it is not about assertibility conditions or truth conditions. >Reality, >Assertibility conditions, >Assertibility, >Truth conditions, >Empiricism. Otherwise: if you believe that we now know more about physics than 200 years ago, a reference to community and knowledge is implied - now truth condition and assertibility condition but still objectivity. >Objectivity. Aeroplane-example: whether the manual is correct or not, is an objective fact that can be seen from the distanced position. Distanced position: equivalent to skepticism - and at the same time determination that inside and outside diverge. Inside: corresponds to our social practice. >inside/outside. I 87 Philosophical skepticism/Stroud: its problem is not empirical. I 110 Skepticism/Stroud: it is not sufficient to put forward a specific case - Descartes makes an assessment of all our knowledge. >Knowledge. I 270 Imaginability/Stroud: it is hard to say whether something is conceivable or not - a possibility would be to imagine it and see what happens. Vs: but that is not conclusive, since it may be that what my thoughts make possible for me, is even hidden from me. >Conceivability. I 272f Dream/skepticism/Stroud: We have not yet asked if the dream opportunity is knowable to others. - StroudVs(s): we can very well "be all in the same boat" - I can use myself instead of Descartes. Stroud: I always say: it seems possible. Imaginability: requires comprehensibility. - And the possibility is comprehensible that we all dream - and then the question is whether I am dreaming, completely independent from the fact if someone else knows. - Then it is possible that all dream and nobody knows anything - and the skepticism is not to sit in opposition, thereby that it contradicts its premises. Conclusion: dream possibility: there is ultimately one because the possibility that someone knows something must not be presupposed. Stroud pro Descartes. >Skepticism/Descartes, >René Descartes. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Substance | Berkeley | Danto I 220 Substance/BerkeleyVsDescartes/HumeVsDescartes/Danto: underlying substance is a mere superstition, as well as the belief in an underlying self. Matter/Danto: in Berkeley's time matter was postulated in order to justify changes. >Change. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Substance | Descartes | Adorno XIII 68 Substance/Descartes/Adorno: in Descartes, the thinking substance is simply determined as a substance and not as an activity. DescartesVsKant, DescartesVsSpontanity. Adorno XIII 154 Substance/Descartes/Adorno: in Descartes the term substance is defined as the, quod nulla re indiget ad existendum, which requires no other thing to exist. One could conclude that it must be with absolute necessity. Esfeld I 212 Substance/Kant: Only the whole of matter persists in all change. (Like Descartes). Matter/Descartes: "physical", "material" and "extended" are synonymous for Descartes. EsfeldVsDescartes: his position is ambiguous: a) No substance can cease to exist, so we can only allow one substance. b) On the other hand, he assumes that the parts of the physical substance itself are substances! There should be a real difference between the parts. Def Real Difference/Descartes: Difference between substances. Matter/Space/Descartes/Esfeld: Matter = Space! Identifying matter with space implies that physics can be reconstructed without being confined to material things in addition to space. Further consequence: Areas of space may have physical properties, but they cannot move. >Space, cf. >Substantivalism, >Relationism, >Change. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Thinking | Burge | Frank I 691f Thinking/externalism/Burge: what thoughts you can have depends on how you relate to your surroundings - a person does not need to explore his/her surroundings to know what his/her thoughts are. >Circumstances, >Individuation. Internalism/DescartesVsBurge: the possibility of deception is supposed to prove that we can doubt the world while knowing our thoughts authoritatively - i.e. supposedly independencies from the world. Solution: ArnauldVsDescartes: Self-identification is not sufficient to know that mental events are independent of objects. The cogito does not provide knowledge about the (indexical, external) individuation conditions. >Externalism, >Thoughts, >Objects of thought, >Self-identification. Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Thinking | Danto | I 179 KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanies thinking. >I think/Kant. It would completely miss the structure of thinking to say that the various assumptions are purely coincidentally associated in his mind. Cf. >Apperception, >Apprehension, >Thinking, >Subject, >I, Ego, Self. I 307 Pavlov: associations are only external, ideas are not necessarily comboined. >Association, >Ideas, >Representation. Consequently, there are the logical links in addition to what can be causally associated with it. >Logical connectives, >Causal relation. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Thinking | Gärdenfors | I 72 Thinking without language/DennettVsGärdenfors: in contrast, some authors argue that thinking is not possible without language: (Dennett, 1991)(1). Concepts/Dennett: Thesis: many concepts can only be formed when language is already present, such as B inflation, month, heritage. Concepts/Gärdenfors: this is certainly true, but it does not deny that most of our concepts have been developed by observation and action before they found their linguistic expression. GärdenforsVsDennett. --- I 259 Deduction/Shirky/Gärdenfors: (Shirky, 2003)(2): deductive reason is over-estimated by people who work on artificial intelligence and especially on the Semantic Web. GärdenforsVsDescartes: this over-estimation comes from Arthur Conan Doyle whose Sherlock Holmes stories have done more harm to the idea of how the human mind works than anything since Descartes. 1. Dennett (1991): Dennett, D. Consciousness explained. Boston, MA. 2. Shirky, C. (2003). The Semantic Web, syllogism, and worldview. http://www.shirky.com/writings/semantic_syllogism.html |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Thinking | Kant | Danto V 2 KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanies thinking. >cogito, >I think/Kant. --- Strawson V 61 Subject/thinking/Kant: there is a "way of thinking of an object in general" - Strawson:> Objectivity/Strawson, Objectivity/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Thoughts | Danto | I 177 Thought/Descartes: Execution of a kind of action based on an idea. Even if I were a stone, I would still be a thinking stone; ens cogitans. >RyleVsDescartes, >Thinking, >Actions, >Idea, >Mind, >States of mind. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Unconscious | Freud | Rorty V 47 Unconscious/unconscious/Rorty: two meanings: 1. Several well-articulated beliefs and desire systems (quite rational). 2. Boiling mass in articulated instinctive powers, in which freedom of contradiction is irrelevant. If Freud had limited himself to this meaning, he would have left our self-image essentially unchanged. V 47/48 Freud/Rorty: the new thing about him is that the unconscious ego is not a silent, stubborn staggering animal, but an intellectual equal to the other. If psychoanalysis had limited itself to the neuroses, it would never have attracted the attention of intellectuals. Unconscious/I/Rorty: the unconscious as a rational opponent. I can also discover that my unconscious knew better than myself. This discredits the idea of a "true" I. V 60 FreudVsPlato/FreudVsKant/FreudVsDescartes/Rorty: the unconscious, our conscience, is nothing immutable, not even a central part. All parts are equally authorized. Mechanization, process, to change ourselves. V 61 Def Conscience/Freud/Rorty: memories of idiosyncratic events. No substitute for moral reasoning. Searle I 197 Searle: In contrast to Freud's concept of the unconscious, the cognitive-scientific concept of the unconscious is not potentially conscious. >Unconscious/Searle. |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Will | Nietzsche | Danto III 136 Will/Nietzsche/Danto: If it is true that Nietzsche tries to escape the usual distinction between mental and material, then the will to power must seem contradictory. After all, "will" is an expression concerning the spiritual. (See Causality/Nietzsche, I, Ego, Self/Nietzsche, Subject/Nietzsche). Danto: That is not true. As with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche's usual connotations concerning the spiritual are combined with the concept of "will" in the metaphysical sense. The will to power is not limited to the mental. If we do not respect this, we cannot understand Nietzsche. NietzscheVsActs of Will: Nietzsche attacks the "Acts of Will", which are not only accepted by philosophers. Danto III 137 Acts of Will/Danto: behave to actions like causes to effects. Hume/Danto: Hume rejected the idea that we could have an experience that corresponds to our idea of causal nexus, just how our will becomes active through our body parts or thoughts. Hume: we have absolutely no idea how the will works. Nevertheless, Hume accepts acts of will. NietzscheVsHume: is more radial, there is simply nothing that can be proven to be linked to our actions. Danto III 138 Thinking/Certainty/Subject/NietzscheVsDescartes: Nietzsche disproves the Cartesian thought that our own mental processes are immediately transparent, that we know about our way of thinking. He disproves it by setting up a series of interlinked thoughts and letting them "freeze": When Descartes talks about his doubts about reality being at least certain that these are his own doubts, he drags a lot of tacit assumptions with him. NietzscheVsDescartes: if his argumentation boils down to an "It is thought", our belief in the concept of substance is already assumed and after that a subject is assumed.(1) Danto III 140 Will/NietzscheVsSchopenhauer/Nietzsche/Danto: The philosophers tend to talk about the will as if it were the most known thing in the world; yes, Schopenhauer suggested that the will alone was known to us.(2) DantoVsSchoepenhauer: in reality this is not the case. There is no simple, self-identifiable mental operation that would be recognized as an act of will and intuitively grasped. Nietzsche: There is no 'will': this is just a simplistic conception of the mind.(3) Danto III 141 Will/Nietzsche: Perhaps the worst of all these fallacies is the conclusion that 'wanting is enough for action'.(4) Danto III 143 Will/Nietzsche/Danto: The will does not move any more, therefore it does not explain anything - it merely accompanies processes, it can also be missing.(5) Danto: if there is no will, there is no free or unfree will.(6) Freedom of will/Nietzsche/Danto: This conclusion is hasty: the doctrine of free will does not depend at all on a psychological theory about the will as a mental phenomenon; 'free' is applied to actions, but not to the will. Nietzsche mostly puts the argument about free will on ice, the idea of free will is due to "logical emergency breeding". 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 577. 2. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 S.25. 3. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 913. 4. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 S.27. 5. F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 S. 85. 6. Vgl. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 913. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burge, T. | Descartes Vs Burge, T. | Frank I, 691f Thinking/Externalism/Burge: what thoughts we can have depends on the relationships in which we are with our surroundings; a person does not need to explore their surroundings, to know what their thoughts are (not for that reason) Internalism/DescartesVsBurge: the possibility of deception is to prove that we can doubt the world while we know our thoughts authoritatively, i.e. supposedly independence from the world. Solution: ArnauldVsDescartes: even knowledge is not sufficient to know that mental events are independent of objects. Cogito does not provide knowledge about the (indexical, external) conditions of individuation. |
|
| Castaneda, H.-N. | Evans Vs Castaneda, H.-N. | Frank I24 "I"/Evans: directly referential (like Castaneda), but EvansVsCastanda: no fundamental priority over other index words. That which is identified by the "I" is always an object in space and time! EvansVsDescartes: I is nothing paranormal, timeless. No "res cogitans". Thus the need of intersubjective accessibility of the object of "I" thoughts is satisfied. The I-centered space only becomes an objective world place when the subject can transfer it to a public map and can recognize it. The convertibility of the demonstratively designated speaker’s perspective demands independent space. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Clarke, Th. | Stroud Vs Clarke, Th. | I 269 Skepticism/Solution/Clarke: skepticism would be falsified, 1. If anyone wakes up. Or 2. If someone came to Earth from outside and found us asleep. Conclusion: no skepticism follows from the dream possibility, even if it is involved in the everyday knowledge of facts about the outer world. Dream: Question: Does the dream possibility presuppose knowledge about facts about the outer world? If so, could we perhaps show VsSkepticism that because it ignores this precondition, it merely thinks it has achieved generalization? We could perhaps see that his assessment of the individual case can only be generalized if it does not lead to the skeptical conclusion (s) that we know nothing at all. Stroud: I hope I have shown how complicated this is. For Clarke, this touches on the question of objectivity: Objectivity/Imaginability/ClarkeVsSkepticism//Stroud: (Clarke, LS, S 766): it is inconceivable that I could dream now if someone else did not know something about my actual environment. Because he would not know if he was dreaming. Both cannot be "in the same boat". Dream/Knowledge/Demon/Clarke: For example Descartes dream possibility makes no sense at all if we ask ourselves how the evil demon or God could know that he is not dreaming himself. Imaginability/Stroud: it is hard to say whether something is imaginable or not. One way is to imagine it and see what happens. Vs: but this is not conclusive, because it is possible that what makes my thoughts possible is hidden from me. I 271 Dream/Stroud: not only is it possible that I am dreaming now, but also that no one on Earth could ever know that I am dreaming because everyone else would not know if they were dreaming either. If I add the fact that the truth about my state is not known at all, it does not seem to influence the original possibility. I can be wrong, but who would notice that? ClarkeVsDescartes/ClarkeVsTradition: we always forgot to ask whether the dream possibility is known to others or not. StroudVsClarke: that is true, but maybe it is not essential for us to recognize the dream possibility, for us to refrain from asking if others know about it. Thesis: The possibility is just as conceivable, even if no one else could ever know anything about it. ((s) Because everyone dreams). I 272 Stroud: we could very well all be in the same boat. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Descartes, R. | Anscombe Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 69 I/Body/AnscombeVsDescartes: E.g. I’m tied up in a large water tank and can not move. I am thinking, "I will not allow this to happen to me again". So it Becomes clear did a body can not be a reference of "I", but rather a Cartesian res cogitans. Problem: The Cartesian ego does fulfill the criteria of a guaranteed reference, Fra. I 80 But it does not solve the problem of Locke: Who Guarantees That the referential object is same in different "I" thoughts? AnscombeVsDescartes: He can not even Ensure that "I" does not refer to a number of thinkers Simultaneously!. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Descartes, R. | Austin Vs Descartes, R. | Stroud I 42 AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes/Stroud: (Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, 1962, 4-5) Thesis: the source of Descartes' skeptical conclusion is obtained by uncovering a series of misunderstandings and (especially verbal) errors and fallacies. --- I 43 StroudVsAustin: Descartes goes much deeper than the example doctors in New York with its simple redefinition. It is also not about linguistic errors concerning the meaning of the terms dream and knowledge. But: Suppose that Descartes was wrong and there was no need to know that you were not dreaming to know that you know something about the world: Problem: how could we know that this is true? What would show that Descartes is misunderstood? Knowledge/VsDescartes/Stroud: if his critics are right that the term "knowledge" does not require what Descartes claims (not to dream and to know that), then A) Knowledge is not "closed under logical consequence", or B) The word "knowledge" does not penetrate all the logical consequences of what we know, or C) It does not penetrate to what we know as logical consequences (of our knowledge) or even D) To what we know, what the logical consequences of this are in turn. --- I 44 Stroud: But how are these assertions supported? --- I 47 Method/Verification/Skepticism/StroudVsAustin: Austin does not say much about these "procedures", he seems satisfied with the idea that they must exist because otherwise our language usage could not always differentiate between the terms ("here" always "words"). --- I 64 StroudVsAustin: The accusation AustinVsSkepticism (AustinVsDescartes) that the meaning of "knowledge" in everyday use would have been distorted can only be raised if it can be shown that a certain linguistic usage, a certain concept, and the relation between them was misunderstood. This would be much more than reproaching a simple "redefinition" of a single concept, namely, of knowledge. Stroud: Thesis: that's what I meant by the fact that the source of Descartes' demand reveals something deep and important. --- I 74 ... .Stroud: something similar could be applied to Austin's question: "How should we use the words "wakefulness" and "sleep" if we have unrecognized methods to say in certain situations that we are not dreaming?" StroudVsAustin: that fails because it does not take into account how and why these terms are used in these situations. (Why question). Dream/StroudVsAustin: there could be easily distinguishable characteristics for different situations and we could apply a term or its negation due to these characteristics. Stroud pro Skepticism/StroudVsAustin: N.B.: (analog to the plane-example): if there are widespread but untested methods (like the manual of the soldiers) then it could be that the distinction we make is not the distinction between situations in which S is true in those in which it is not true. Then again we have no knowledge. Correctness/Plane-Example: "He does not know it" is definitely correct. --- I 75 But this distinction was not between knowledge and non-knowledge. Because even the careful spotter can be wrong, "he knows it is an F" is wrong as long as he did not see the plane on the ground. Conclusion/skepticism/usage theory/StroudVsAustin: we cannot draw an anti-skeptical conclusion from the mere fact that we use the terms "I know ..." and "I do not know ..." as we use them. ((s) It does not follow from the language use that we know when we know something (>plane-example), because we can still have information without knowing that they are missing). --- I 76 Platitudes/StroudVsAustin/N.B.: if one would disprove skepticism by arguing that it changes the meaning of the term "knowledge" must show that the most common platitudes are false, and these appear to be obvious truths. (... + ...) Moore's hands/Stroud: so Moore's proof gains philosophical importance and power. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Descartes, R. | Berkeley Vs Descartes, R. | Danto2 I 220 Properties/Descartes: A thing cannot - as its own properties - have properties which it wins or loses. (E.g. beeswax). Instead, we should speak of a change of properties. BerkeleyVsDescartes, HumeVsDescartes: underlying substance is a mere superstition, as well as belief on an underlying self. I 228 BerkeleyVsDescartes: there is no material substance (though outer reality). |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Descartes, R. | Brandom Vs Descartes, R. | Brandom I 40 BrandomVsDescartes: failed to show what it means to grasp or understand such contents as representations. He does not explain what makes a rabbit thought to a thought, which is about rabbits or anything at all. He also does not explain what it means that someone understands a thought as a thought. I 131 BrandomVsDescartes: has burdened the tradition of representation: the privileging of knowledge and therefore the successful representation against the understanding and the intended representation. For Descartes representational intention is "as if about" intrinsic and characteristic property of thoughts. He does not explain the importance of understanding. II 13 Kant and Descartes: mind primary, secondary language - BrandomVsKant and BrandomVsDescartes. II 17 BrandomVsDescartes: expression rather than representation (Sellars ditto). II 69 Content / representation / BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer. II 213 Mind / Brandom: the conceptual ability to understand rules. KantVsDescartes: normative rather than descriptive. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Descartes, R. | Brentano Vs Descartes, R. | Chisholm I 34 Individuation/I/Self/Imagination/I/Intention/Brentano: in the self-evident mental states imagined by us, we never grasp any individualizing properties. I 35 All my properties, which I can easily grasp, are such that they can at least theoretically be exemplified immediately with different things. (BrentanoVsDescartes). |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Descartes, R. | Burge Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 699 Reliability theoryVsSkepticism/Burge: some want to block the skepticism by denying seclusion principles. BurgeVsDescartes: I think we can be sure that we are not being deceived by any deus malignus. We derive this knowledge from our perception knowledge. This is not transcendental, as some authors believe. BurgeVsDescartes: the second stage judgment (reflective) simply inherits the content of the first-stage thought. E.g. "Water is a liquid": 1) you need the ability to think the empirical thought of the first stage, and 2) to attribute it to yourself at the same time. The knowledge of the content of the thoughts does not require an upstream separate examination of the conditions, just like the knowledge of the contents of perception does not require this. Fra I 700 One simply knows the thought by thinking it. We have no criterion, no phenomenon and no empiricism. I 705 BurgeVsDescartes: it is wrong to conceive one’s own thoughts as objects and to attribute a special faculty of infallibility to oneself. Either you introduce the new entity of an ability or special objects as new entities. OckhamVs. E.g. propositions which can only be thought if they have been fully understood, or ideas whose esse is their percipi. That would be objects about which no mistakes could be made, like items that could be seen at once from all sides. I 708 BurgeVsDescartes: main error: the difference between a-priori knowledge and authoritative self blurring knowledge of the first person. One has clearly no authority to know whether one of one’s own thoughts can be individuated or to explicated in a certain way. But one does not need this authority to know that one is thinking them. E.g. I can know that I have arthritis, and know that I think that without having clear criteria for arthritis. It is a truism that you have to understand what you think well enough to think of it. But this does not mean that such an understanding brings an ability to explication or substitution with it, nor that such an understanding is immune to errors. So you can know what your own thoughts are, even if you only understand them partially. DavidsonVs: that undermines the authority of the first person. BurgeVsDavidson: that is not necessary if a distinction is made between understanding and the ability to explicate. I 709 Explication: requires a higher degree of objectification: a conceptual mastery of the conditions that are the basis of your own thoughts and a conceptual mastery of the rules that you follow. Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Descartes, R. | Carnap Vs Descartes, R. | VI 226 Ego/Carnap: is a class of elementary experiences. No bundle, because classes do not consist of their elements! CarnapVsDescartes: the existence of the ego is not a primordial fact of the given. From "cogito" does not follow "sum". Carnap: the ego does not belong to expression of the fundamental experience. But the "this experience". Thinking/RussellVsDescartes: "it thinks". (> Lichtenberg). ("Mind", p.18). Stroud I 196 KantVsDescartes/CarnapVsDescartes. Frame/Reference system/Carnap/Stroud: for Carnap there is no point of view from which one can judge a frame as adequate or inadequate. That would be an "external" question. Kant/Stroud: Kant's parallel to this is transcendental idealism: if things were independent of us, skepticism would be inevitable. Problem: the transcendental idealism should not be crossed with the verification principle. Is Carnap's own positive theory better off here? That is a question of its status. It pursues the same goal as Kant: to explain the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, but without going beyond the limits of comprehensibility. General/special/internal/external/generalization/Stroud: it would be necessary to explain how the general sceptical conclusion can be meaningless, even if the particular everyday empirical assertions are meaningful. This cannot simply be because one is general and the other particular. Descartes/Stroud: the particular is representative in its argument and can therefore be generalized. The uncertainty in the individual case is representative of all our knowledge. This is the strength of the argument. VerificationismVsGeneralization: he considers this generalization suspicious. CarnapVsSkepticism/CarnapVsDescartes: statements that make sense within a reference system cannot be applied to the reference system itself. Stroud: but this is the problem inside/outside and not a question of generality or special. StroudVsCarnap: so he has to show that movement from the inside out is impossible and not the generalization. But he needed an explanation why the traditional view of the relation between "internal" and "external" questions is wrong if he wants to avoid skepticism. ((s) Why Question). Special/VerificationismVsDescartes: Thesis: the single sentence of Descartes is meaningless from the beginning. (Because unverifiable). (StroudVsVs). I 207 StroudVsVerificationism: he must now show why this verdict does not apply to all individual (special) sentences of everyday life. Verificationism would otherwise have to assume that our whole language (everyday language) is meaningless! (Because it is not verifiable according to skeptical criteria). For example "I don't know if explanation is caused by sitting in a draught" or "The aircraft spotter doesn't know if the aircraft is an F" would be damned as senseless! If verificationism condemns certain sentences as meaningless only if they are uttered, for example, by Descartes or another skeptic, he would have to show that there is a deviant use on such occasions. Otherwise he could not even indicate what VsDescartes is supposed to have gone wrong with his utterance. ((s) utterance here = action, not sentence, which should be meaningless, neither true nor false). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Descartes, R. | Danto Vs Descartes, R. | DantoVsDescartes: the only way to realize that the senses deceive us, is via the senses. So, this type of evidence dissolves into nothing. Basically, Descartes said the following: make sure that your experience is as intense and clear as can be. I 170 Descartes: N.B. just at this moment, it could turn out that this clear and specific experience is also wrong, namely a dream. Clarity: clarifies something, but it does not prove that I perceive. I 191 VsDescartes: daß seine Argumentation zirkulär ist, war stets die Standardkritik. Erst beweise er die Existenz Gottes, dann gebrauche er die Güte Gottes, um seinen Beweis abzusichern. Descartes/Danto: aber selbst in der dunkelsten Periode des Zweifels wissen wir, was unsere Ideen bedeuten. Es ist nicht so, als ob wir unserer Sprache irgendwie mißtrauen müßten! Wir wissen, was es hieße, wären unsere Ideen wahr. Nur ob sie es sind, dass eben wissen wir nicht. Dann aber verschafft uns die Idee Gottes einen Fall, indem bloßes Verstehen schon Wissen nach sich zieht! Wir könnten nicht den Anspruch erheben, zu wissen, was Gott ist, und zugleich den Zweifel hegen, ob es Gott überhaupt gebe. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Descartes, R. | Davidson Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 629 Mental/Physical/DavidsonVsDescartes: from the nomological irreducibility follows no ontological separation of two areas. I 632 Token physicalism/Davidson: (pro) receives the authority of the first person, but he cannot guarantee that the content of thought as it is identified externalistically is conscious. Solution/DavidsonVsDescartes: this residual doubt is merely rest of the untenable Cartesian theory of consciousness as a place where the mind sees special objects. I 633 If the identity of consciousness objects were determined only through relations with objects outside of the consciousness, then it would be possible that one is not aware of the contents of consciousness. But that’s just the "myth of the subjective". I 634 DavidsonVsDescartes: Error: not considering the conditions that allow the substantial thoughts. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Descartes, R. | Duhem Vs Descartes, R. | I 17f DuhemVsDescartes: If only length width depth, but no other characters and no movements are allowed, no explanations are possible. But Descartes requires the perfection of God that his will is immutable. Consequence: the set of movements is fixed. Instead of velocity you might as well have put the square of the velocity. (Leibniz: "living force"). I 81 DuhemVsDescartes: fears the gap! ... |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Descartes, R. | Esfeld Vs Descartes, R. | I 212 Materie/Descartes: "körperlich", "materiell" und "ausgedehnt" sind bei ihm synonym. EsfeldVsDescartes: seine Position ist doppeldeutig: a) keine Substanz kann auf hören zu existieren, daher können wir nur eine Substanz zulassen. b) auf der anderen Seite nimmt er an, daß die Teile der körperlichen Substanz selbst Substanzen sind! Es soll einen realen Unterschied zwischen den Teilen geben. Def realer Unterschied/Descartes: Unterschied zwischen Substanzen. Materie/Raum/Descartes/Esfeld: Materie = Raum! Die Materie mit dem Raum zu identifizieren impliziert, daß die Physik rekonstruiert werden kann, ohne auf materielle Dinge zusätzlich zum Raum festgelegt zu sein. Weitere Konsequenz: Gebiete des Raums mögen physikalische Eigenschaften haben, aber sie können sich nicht bewegen. I 213 Raum = Materie: diese Möglichkeit der Identifikation ist das einzige, was ich von Descartes übernehme. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Descartes, R. | Evans Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 497 EvansVsDescartes/EvansVsHume/EvansVsLocke/EvansVsKant: the "I" of mental self-attribution refers neither to a Cartesian "Ego" now to a Lockean person, nor to a Humean bundle of perceptions, nor to a Kantian I, but rather to an object of flesh and blood! Consequence: the background element of self-identification must be the localization in space and time. I 517 EvansVsDescartes: strongest antidote: the fact that these ways to acquire knowledge about ourselves must be incoporated in the information component of a functional characterization of our "I" ideas. I 522 Body Awareness/Descartes: not a way to achieve knowledge about oneself, but only about something that one has. EvansVsDescartes: It’s hard to make sense from this. (s) This is not an argument. Descartes: I have to admit defeat when Descartes says that this was a way to gain knowledge about myself, but one that uses my identification! Evans: I have to admit that. I 523 EvansVsDescartes: our "I" notions are notions of bearers of physical no less than mental properties. I 562 EvansVsDescartes: the use of "I" simply bridges the gap between the mental and the physical and is not more closely connected to one aspect than to the other. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Descartes, R. | Heidegger Vs Descartes, R. | II 87 VsDescartes dictates the world its being VsDescartes: determined substance by being: ambiguity substance / substantiality VsDescartes: for him being is True-being (=certainty). |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 |
| Descartes, R. | Hume Vs Descartes, R. | Danto I 220 Properties/Descartes: a thing cannot - as its own properties - have the properties which it wins or loses (e.g. beeswax). Instead, we should speak of a change of properties. BerkeleyVsDescartes, HumeVsDescartes: underlying substance is a mere superstition, as well as the superstition of an underlying self. --- Stegmüller IV 130 Descartes: the ego cannot be doubted. HumeVsDescartes: all reassurances of Descartes contradict actual experience: If I try to capture myself, I only find very specific experiences again and again, but not a 'self' that 'has' these experiences. > Lichtenberg: instead of saying 'I think' we should better say 'it thinks', where 'it' should be used like we do when we say 'it is raining' (Wittgenstein pro). |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Descartes, R. | Husserl Vs Descartes, R. | I 18 Descartes: philosophy as a rigorous science should be initiated only by evidence. Husserl: the question of the realization of absolute necessities is different: theory of experience that works on immediate consciousness experience (Vs philosophical presuppositions). This should be clarified through an exemplary viewing of essence. I 55 HusserlVsDescartes: res cogitans cannot be separated from the body. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 |
| Descartes, R. | Kant Vs Descartes, R. | Danto I 179 KantVsDescartes: The cogito, that "I think" is not an indubitable proposition, but something that accompanies every sentence you claim. KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanied thinking. Kant I 73 Existence/cogito/Kant: feeling of existence has no concept. Nothing can be proven here. VsDescartes: "I think, therefore I am," error: to infer from the concept to the existence of a thing. Field I 80 KantVsOntological proof of God’s existence/KantVsDescartes: (KdrV, B622,3 4): You can never assert the categorical (non-conditional) existence of something. Justification: Contradictions usually originate from the fact that one or more objects are postulated, and then assumptions that are mutually inconsistent: e.g. a triangle and it being quadrilateral. But there is no contradiction to deny the existence of a triangle! For we have not made any conflicting assumptions. ((s) by only assuming a triangle.) Kant: The same applies to the notion of an "absolutely necessary being": if we deny its existence, we deny it with all its predicates, but then no contradiction can arise. Nothing can be negated with all predicates and yet leave a contradiction. (s) So there is no necessary existence. Field: it can not be contradictory to deny the existence of numbers, because they have no mysterious force to leave a contradiction if they are not there. (s) Has the triangularity a mysterious force if there is no triangle? No, but that is a predicate without a carrier and not comparable here). Stegmüller IV 362 Proof of God’s existence / Kant Descartes: Four points (CPR A 594 p): 1. "If I pick up the predicate in an identical judgment and keep the subject, the result is a contradiction." I lift both together, there is no contradiction. E.g. I cannot lift the omnipotence if God is the same as omnipotence. But if I say God is not, neither omnipotence nor any other of his predicates are given. IV 363 StegmüllerVsKant: One can ask why Kant is so sure that no negative existential proposition is self-contradictory and why therefore no existence statement of the form "there is an x" can be an analysis. 2. Kant (A 597): "You have already committed a contradiction when you brought into the concept of a thing, of which you only wanted to think its possibility,the notion of its existence". MackieVsKant: This is unfair! Kant’s argument is based on the idea that Descartes has an "an open mind" concerning the existence of God or not, hence something is read into the concept of existence. But Descartes does not pretend that he is open-minded regarding the response, he is rather completely sure regarding the existence. But then he does not postulate what needs to be proofed as proofed. 3. Kant (A 598): Analytic/Synthetic distinction: there can be no analytical statements about existence. (However, he does not justify this claim). IV 364 VsKant: Analytical judgments on existence are in arithmetic, e.g. there is a prime number between 10 to 20 Frege: All arithmetic truths are analytic. 4. Kant: The logic of existence statements reflect an incorrect grammar: the auxiliary verb "be" is ambiguous here when it is used as a means of predication and existence. (> Copula). MackieVsKant: Kant stops halfway: If to "exist" is not a predicate, then what is it? Existential quantifier: exists only since Frege. IV 365 MackieVsDescartes: That is a deadlier argument: the existential quantifier cannot be an attribute and cannot express perfection, which may possess a thing or not. E.g. therefore the Revenus resident cannot be refuted, which has no necessary perfection but only an artificial perfection. There is no distinction between natural and artificial perfection in the existential quantifier, there is now no distinction between natural and artificial perfection. Then Descartes’ argument about the distinction of natural/artificial, with God the only exception of a being no longer with natural perfection, is not valid anymore. DescartesVsFrege: his only rebuttal would be if he could prove that a "this tree" or "I" or "God exists" ((s) so (ix) Fx (iota operator, indicator statement) exists MackieVsDescartes / Stegmüller.: In any case, he has not done this. Strawson V 22 "Refutation of idealism"/ Kant Descartes: So that self-consciousness is possible, it must be at least possible to distinguish between consequences of our experiences on the one hand, and consequences of the objects of our experience which they show independently. For that, the items must be so designed that they exist in a stable framework. The necessary differences of temporal relations must be taken within the experience. We must therefore have a direct and non-deductive awareness of objects in space. "The consciousness of my own existence is at the same time the non-deductive consciousness of the existence of other things beside me." Terms / Kant: not any amount of terms is sufficient for us, there must be concepts of persistent and re-identified objects among them. V 23 StrawsonVsKant: In the analogies, he always tries to squeeze more out of the arguments than there actually is. Self-awareness/Consciousness/Kant/Strawson: The distinctions must be created in the concepts themselves, because there is no such thing as a pure perception of the reference system! V 103 KantVsDescartes: self-awareness is only possible through the perception of external objects. Substance, cause and community (or reciprocal interaction is a necessary condition for objective experience. And these concepts become only meaningful regarding external objects. Strawson: Kant relies here very little on his theories from the transcendental aesthetic as premises for its arguments in the analysis. Strawson V 140 Def Soul/Descartes/Strawson: All of us know by the mere fact of conscious awareness that he exists as a (Cartesian), thinking substance, e.g. that it is capable as an intangible, lasting, not composite individual subject of ideas and experiences as well as an existence in complete independence of a body or of matter. KantVsDescartes: Which infringes the principle of sense: there is no empirical application criteria for this claim. KantVsDescartes, KantVs rational psychology: Analysis of the origins of appearance: Mix-up of the unity of experiences and the experience of unity. V 143 KantVsDescartes: After all, it is the unity of consciousness, which we, if the semblance has us under control, take erroneously for awareness of a unified subject. V 145 Def rational psychology/(Descartes): Asserts that every person has immediate safety regarding the existence of his soul as an immaterial substance. KantVsDescartes: However,the only criteria for it would be "the same man, the same soul". Deathblow for rational psychology. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Descartes, R. | Kripke Vs Descartes, R. | I 165 Descartes: The spirit is different from the body because the spirit could exist without the body. KripkeVsDescartes: He could have derived these conclusions just as well from the premise that the body could exist without the spirit. Many philosophers accept cheerfully the Cartesian premise and deny the conclusions. A theory that states that a person is nothing next to or above their body, just like a statue is nothing next to or above the matter, would need to defend the necessary thesis that a person exists iff his/her body exists and has a certain physical organization as well. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Descartes, R. | Kuhn Vs Descartes, R. | I 207 Perception/KuhnVsDescartes: It is wrong to analyze the perception as a process of interpretation. (It became a tradition only after Descartes.) The claim that members of different groups may have different perceptions when they are confronted with the same stimuli does not mean that they actually have any perceptions! E.g. in many environments a group unable to distinguish wolves from dogs could not exist. Stimulus/sensation: Experience and knowledge of nature is built into the transition from stimulus to sensation. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 |
| Descartes, R. | Leibniz Vs Descartes, R. | Leibniz I 35 "Clear and Distinct"/"Clare et Distincte"/LeibnizVsDescartes: Unsatisfactory, because not clearly determined. Perception: either dark or clear Def clear: either confused or distinct Def distinct: either adequate or inadequate Def adequate: either symbolic or intuitive Def Absolute Knowledge [Vollkommene Erkenntnis]: if it is both adequate and intuitive at the same time Def dark: is a term that is not sufficient for recognition Def clear: is a term if it is sufficient for recognition Def confused: if insufficient indicators can be enumerated separately. ((s) can still be clear, see above). Def distinct: e.g. the coin assayers' idea of gold I 36 Def symbolic: If we do not see the whole essence of a thing all at once, and use symbols there, then knowledge is symbolic. Def intuitive: Is knowledge if it is nevertheless possible to think of different terms constituting the object at the same time (constituting as in "the object shows its terms itself"). Important argument: They are all operationalistic definitions, which is sensible if the terms cannot be dissected further. I 43 Knowledge/Thinking/LeibnizVsDescartes: He needs a true God (who is not a fraud) so that the self-confidence does not remain imprisoned in a content-free "pure thinking in itself". Leibniz: instead: reasoning by truth of fact, e.g. about the ontological status of the world. I 59 LeibnizVsDescartes: To refrain from falling into an irrational transcendental idealism, the rationality of facts must be proved. As such, Leibniz is definitely not a precursor of Kant! Construction/World/Experience/Rationality/Identity/Leibniz: The construction of Leibniz' ontology consist in two phases: 1. The possibility to deduce all meaningful, i.e. true and knowledge-contained sentences are shown by reducing them on identical sentences.(Deduction/Reduction). (Prädikative Evidenz). 2. The evidence of identity shall be proved itself as such in the world. The identity as the world's basis shall find its basis once again in the constitution of the world's being. I 78 Proof of God/LeibnizVsDescartes/Holz: Is similar to Descartes' proof of God, but modified. There is a difference between accepting God as author for the exterior or for the totality of the whole (and as such for the interior as well). I 80 Particulars/Leibniz: Depicts the effects of the interrelationship in itself and obtains the whole. Dual Inclusion: Of the particular in the whole and the whole in the particular. Problem: circular argument Solution/Descartes: Justification by God. LeibnizVsDescartes: This is not possible because metaphysics are based on a complete conjunction. Solution/Leibniz: The function of sensory perception cannot be deceived. I 99 Force/Passivity/Leibniz: Force is also the ability to adapt your own state to the changes of other substances. Sufferance [Erleiden] The original force is twofold: vis activa and vis passiva. Leibniz calls these "force points" also "metaphysical points". I 100 The original force is blocked from all sides by the individual substances which cannot unfold freely. So the derived forces are only modifications of the original force. Force/LeibnizVsDescartes: A simple expansion is not sufficient! Therefore, force needs to be added. I 101 The merely expanded mass does not carry a principle of qualitative differentiation since expansion is purely quantitative. Only then motion and change can happen. Nature needs to be explained from its own definition! I 102 Matter/LeibnizVsDescartes: Impenetrability is not sufficient! For Descartes the body was immobile. Substantial being needs a carrier. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Descartes, R. | Locke Vs Descartes, R. | I 27 Innate ideas/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: there are no innate ideas! Neither in speculative nor in practical (moral, theological) thinking, not even in the form of "maxims", i.e. immediately plausible principles. 1. Speculative principles: if they were innate, they would have to be demonstrable in people not yet spoiled by prejudices, as, for example, in children or mentally weak people, and they are not! 2. If truths were innate in the form of sentences, then these would also have to be the associated terms, even the conclusions from these sentences! Such assumptions, however, extend the range of innate concepts and sentences into the impossible. 3. Maxims: the spontaneous consent to them means that they were not known before! But innate must always be present. ChomskyVsLocke/(s): would object that grammar rules also come into consciousness first. This is about the ease of learning). Innate ideas/Curls: the assumption that thinking begins with the application of innate laws of thought or first principles that are more than mere instrumental thinking is a deception. I 45 Body/Stretch/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: stretch and body are therefore not identical! It is also not at all clear that the mind must let them be distinguished from the body. (Risked the dangerous accusation of materialism). The idea of expansion and the idea of the body are different. Expansion: does not include strength or resistance to movement (>inertia). Space: cannot be divided, otherwise surfaces would come up! VsCartesians: they have to admit that they either think of bodies as infinite in view of the infinity of space, or they have to admit that space cannot be identified with bodies. I 52 Res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: to strictly separate the world of bodies from the world of thought. Locke: mentions to consider whether there could not be extended things, thus bodies that think, something flowing matter particles. In any case, it cannot be ruled out that God in his omnipotence "matter systems" may have I 53 given or "overturned" the power of perception and thought. Contemporary theologies felt provoked by this, especially his Kontrahend Stillingfleet. LockeVsDescartes: also leads to problems with human identity (see below). I 54 Identity/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: the relationship between substance and person when the ability to think is attributed solely to an immaterial substance. For example, it would be conceivable that someone could be convinced that he was the same person as Nestor. If one now presupposes the correctness of the Cartesian thesis, I 55 it is conceivable that a contemporary human being is actually the person Nestor. But he is not the human being Nestor, precisely because the idea of the human cannot be detached from his physical form. That is abstruse for us today. (> Person/Geach). Locke relativizes the thesis by saying that it is not the nature of the substance that matters to consciousness, which is why he wants to leave this question open - he conveys the impression that he is inclined towards the materialistic point of view. II 189 Clarity/LockeVsDesacrtes: no truth criterion, but further meaning: also in the area of merely probable knowledge. II 190 Clarity/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: linked to its namability. Assumes the possibility of a unique designation. (>Language/Locke). II 195 Knowledge/Locke: according to Locke, intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible certain knowledge. VsDescartes: this does not consist in a recognition of given conceptual contents, which takes place in their perception, but constitutes itself only on the empirical basis of simple ideas in the activity of understanding. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Descartes, R. | Moore Vs Descartes, R. | Dream/MooreVsDescartes: if I do not know that I am not dreaming, then I do not know that I am getting up. StroudVsMoore: it is precisely this consequence of Descartes that leads to skepticism. I do not understand why Moore accepts them. I 121 MooreVsDescartes: but that is not a problem because it "cuts off both directions". Because when I know that I am getting up, I know that I am not dreaming. So: because I know that I am not dreaming, I know that I am getting up! StroudVsMoore: so he believes that his argument is empirical. But I do not see how that follows from this. Of course, skepticism can say the opposite (converse). ((s) If I do not know that I am not dreaming, I do not know whether to get up or dream to get up). Stroud: one argument is as good as the other. Stroud: is that justified? Example Scepticist: one does not know whether one gets up - this is analog to the argument E.g. DetectiveVsAssistent that the list is not complete. StroudVsMoore: but you cannot deduce a "draw" from it. The argument is not "cut off in both directions". He cannot say. For example "Because I know that the butler was the perpetrator, I know that the list is complete". The assistant did not check the list. StroudVsMoore/(s): Moore always refers to things on the list. StroudVsMoore: but he should show that he knows that the list cannot be incomplete. I 122 He cannot simply turn the sceptic's argument around as he does. ((s) Because he needs a distanced position (external knowledge) that skepticism takes, not by asserting something particular, but something general). N.B.: of course the detective could have been wrong and the assistant would have checked the list completely. I.e. in the detective's assertion there is nothing that implies something that would be impossible. ((s) So the position of skepticism is not to show the incompleteness of the list or a lack of authorization of the list.) Explanation: the "list" does not imply that an external point of view would be impossible.). Skepticism/Moore/Stroud: there are other places in his work where he moves towards skepticism (+) he never seems to have been satisfied with it. He even admits the "logical possibility" that if all his sensory impressions could be dream images, he would not know he was not sleeping. I 123 Solution/Moore: remembrance of something immediately previous. Skepticism/StroudVsMoore: it does not show that this logical possibility does not exist. |
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| Descartes, R. | Nagel Vs Descartes, R. | I 39 VsDescartes: a standard argument blames Descartes of circularity in his argumentation in favor of the existence of a non-deceiving God. I 88 Descartes/NagelVsDescartes/Nagel: Descartes refuses to accept this priority. He was wrong, even if only temporarily, to consider the hypothesis that an evil demon could muddle his mind. For this purpose he would have to think the following: "I cannot decide between these two possibilities: a) I believe that 2 + 3 = 5 is true, b) I only believe it, because an evil demon manipulated my mind. Therefore, the result might as well be 4." This idea is incomprehensible for two reasons: 1) because it contains the false result 4, and this "thought" has neither been given sense, nor can it acquire one by assuming that a demon had confused his thoughts. I 89 2) the judgment that there are these two exclusive alternatives is in itself an application of reason. Descartes displayed logical thinking without being disturbed by the possibility that his mind might be manipulated by a demon. Nonsense: the proposition 2 + 3 = 4 is not nonsense; it has enough sense to be false by necessity! It is not possible to think that 2 + 3 = 4, but it may be assumed for the sake of argument that it follows from certain assumptions. Descartes: God could have designed arithmetics differently, but we would not have been able to grasp that. I 90 NagelVsDesacrtes: this opinion is incomprehensible for the same reason. This implies a hierarchy in the judgments a priori which is not convincing. I 90/91 It is impossible to believe that God is responsible for the truths of arithmetic if that implies that 2 + 3 = 5 could have been wrong! That is exactly the same as if you wanted to base logic on psychology or life forms. DescartesVsSkepticism/Nagel: it remains an interesting question to know whether Descartes was right in that it is incomprehensible to abstain from faith with respect to all empirical statements about the external world. (Davidson). |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Descartes, R. | Nozick Vs Descartes, R. | II 87 I/Self/Synthesis/Nozick: let us begin with the act of reflexive self-reference. Act: what is the point, where are its limits? We could look for a pre-existing entity, the support of the act, the agent. This already includes a theory, namely that every act needs an agent (actor, player). LichtenbergVsDescartes: has not found that "he thinks", but only that "it thinks". In the "agent view" we should assume: "I'm tired" = "agent of this act is tired". Problem: what does my knowing that I am the agent consist in? (Sometimes my subsequent knowledge of a previous act). If there must be a pre-existent being for it, how am I supposed to know about it? And how am I to know that this pre-existing being is the agent of my current act? Suppose, then, there is no pre-existent entity: rather that the I is represented around the act (outlined, delineated). Then there are two possibilities: 19 an agent is postulated, then the boundaries are outlined 2) we imagine that an entity is outlined and is synthesized around the act. Reference/Self-Reference/Nozick: when we start with the act of reference: A refers to x, then we can also form the concept that A refers to A. II 93 Then we can build a concept of Gödel's self-reference, by virtue of a permanent defining feature of A, and then it is necessarily self-referring in all possible worlds. Next step: self-reference not by a permanent defining characteristic, but by a characteristic which arises in the act. Explanation: Are we not applying self-reference in the latter case to explain itself? Namely, if it is the sense? This merely points back to an earlier constant or bound variable. Indexicality: something can refer to something else by virtue of a characteristic that is given in the act, but that is not reflexive! E.g. "exactly this" is described from the outside. Therefore, there is no particular problem: how is reflexive self-reference possible? Reflexivity/Nozick: there are no particular issues with respect to reflexivity, but there are about the intelligibility of speech of acts, even of non-reflexive ones with independent agents. Nozick: I do not deny these problems, but we were willing to put them to the side, because we presumed with LichtenbergVsDescartes that "thinking is going on" and not "I think". Reflexive Self-Reference/Nozick: we have understood it as composed of simple components and not as irreducible mysterious phenomenon. But if we want to guarantee the explicability of reflexive self-reference, we must explain why these acts occur. II 94 Solution: we explain them with a pre-existing person, but it does not exist independently of the act of synthesis. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that there is an intuitive and compelling quality of the view that the self is independent of all acts. That would be a view that is discussed vehemently between Buddhists and Vedantists. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Descartes, R. | Peirce Vs Descartes, R. | Black II 197 Clarity/PeirceVsDescartes/Black: the Cartesian criterion for clarity amounts to little more than the requirement that the ideas should be known and explicitly definable (distinct). Although the latter may be useful, it is not sufficient. The entire function of thinking consists in producing habits of action. |
Peir I Ch. S. Peirce Philosophical Writings 2011 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Descartes, R. | Positivism Vs Descartes, R. | Danto2 I 181 VsDescartes: the problems, which he believed to be solved were only pseudo-problems, such as the positivists have long been claiming. |
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| Descartes, R. | Putnam Vs Descartes, R. | V 108 Definition Interactionism/Putnam: theory according to which mental events interact with physical ones. Whereby the causation direction could run both in the one and in the other direction. Descartes: the mind could affect the matter when it is very, very ethereal (pineal gland). Notorious. --- V 109 Naive version of interactionism: the mind as a kind of ghost, who lives in the bodies. Vs: but it is not clear why we should have such complicated brains, it could be a very simple control mechanism. Descartes: (refined) mind and brain are an essential unit. Somehow it should be the mind-brain unit that thinks, feels and represents a personality. That is, what we commonly call the mind, is not the mind, but the unity of the brain (body) and mind. PutnamVsDescartes: obscure: unity of two substances. Cf. >interactionism/Chalmers. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Descartes, R. | Quine Vs Descartes, R. | I 56 The truth attributions are in the same boat as the true propositions themselves. QuineVsDescartes: Even if we are in the midst of in philosophizing, we retain and use - unlike Descartes - our present beliefs until we improve them here and there because of the scientific method. Stroud I 227 Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception is simply in the departure from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, 3) Illusions only exist relative to a previously held assumption of real objects. Given Facts/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: This may be the reason to assume a non-binding given fact. (SellarsVsQuine). QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: Important Argument: then it might seem impossible to refer to the possibility of deception, because a certain knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion! Stroud: We have treated arguments of this form earlier (see above >distortion of meaning). Violation of the conditions necessary for the application of certain concepts. Quine/Stroud: he could now be answered in line with StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine will not make these mistakes. Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to the language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no way to refer to what the meaning of a particular term is. StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts" I 228 the epistemologists are "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question becomes even more complicated by Quine's explicit denial that: Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying that he leaves the question unanswered, he is right in using science to reject science. I merely say that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts. TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical error to eventually disprove doubts from the science itself so that at the end there is certainty, what then is the decisive logical point he has missed? StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science. SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic might respond with a "reductio ad absurdum" and then epistemology would no longer be part of science: "Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either a) science is true and gives us knowledge or b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the external world is knowledge. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Descartes, R. | Rorty Vs Descartes, R. | I 60 Def Mind/Rorty: 1) Reason (grasping universals) 2) (later): Mind Mens/Descartes/Rorty: clear criterion for distinguishing between the extended and the non-extended (Rorty pro: just like we can distinguish between the finite and the infinite, trivial). RortyVsDescartes: but does not help in borderline cases. I 69 Descartes: could argue with Leibniz' principle of identity: that something whose existence can be doubted cannot be identical with something whose existence cannot be doubted. (RortyVsDescartes: that's "too harshly" thought!). Descartes/Rorty: allows only three "substances": thinking, expansion, God. >Substance/Descartes. I 76 Def Existence/Independent of Body/Rorty: every definition would have to draw a line between stomach cramps and the associated feeling in the consciousness. >Existence/Descartes. I 77 Descartes/Rorty: not spatially: e.g. pain "in" amputated limbs. Descartes/Rorty: "I cannot recognize anything more easily and more evidently than my mind". Cogito/RortyVsDescartes: confusion of the cogito as proof of my existence and as exclusion of my nature. I 129 Skepticism/Tradition/RortyVsDescartes: traditional skepticism that asks if other beings, for example, are in pain is as little interesting as whether the table exists if we do not perceive it. This skepticism would never have attracted the attention of philosophers had it not been for the idea of the naturally is given and its consequence that everything was merely a "reduction", a "conclusion", a "construction". VI 27 Skepticism/RortyVsDescartes/Rorty: his doubts are so non-specific that they should simply be dismissed. >Skepticism/Descartes, more authors on >skepticism. VI 167 Mind/Dennett/Rorty: "PDP": model of parallel distributed processing. Davidson like Dennett: therefore the mind is not its own place of residence. VsDescartes. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Descartes, R. | Ryle Vs Descartes, R. | Danto I 176 Idea / Descartes: Enforcement of a kind of act on the basis of an idea. Even if I were a stone now, then I would just be a thinking stone; ens cogitans. (RyleVs). Descartes thought = action - Thinking stone possible: ens cogitans Ryle I 67ff RyleVsDescartes: the semi-metaphorical idea seems to be based on the deeper philosophical assumption that there are two different kinds of existence (wrong!). I 10 Descartes: Thesis: ~there is a polar opposition between mind and matter in a common field, which is called "space". I 11 Privileged access: the reports of a psyche about its own affairs have a certainty to them that reports about the physical world cannot have. Sensation may be mistaken or confused, consciousness and introspection are not. Flor I 258 RyleVsDescartes: myth of the mind in the machine: Descartes: dualism: 1) The body is in space and time, the mind is only in time 2) The body can be described mechanically the mind cannot. 3) The body is publicly observable, the mind is private. 4) Through introspection and evidence of their consciousness a person has has direct knowledge, (privileged access), other minds can never be accessible. 5) The mind is seen as the sum of internal processes and states, which in turn can cause physical processes or activities and states. Flor I 259 RyleVsDescartes: Problem: the suspected link between the "mind machine" and the physical machine: the relations must be understood as either a mechanical or quasi mechanical. A third possibility is ruled out. But whichever opinion we follow: we only name the problem, but we don't solve it; because the question remains as to how it should be possible at all that the two models of explanation are mutually exclusive: on mechanical processes cannot be impacted by quasi mechanical ones and vice versa! |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Descartes, R. | Strawson Vs Descartes, R. | I 128 Strawson: we mainly talk to other people, for information. How can one ascribe to others what one ascribes to oneself? StrawsonVsDescartes: in the case of the Cartesian ego this cannot be answered and the problem at all is insoluble. (Because if you can rely solely on private experience, you can also not speak competently about your own states, let alone ascribe them to others). I 134 Person/Strawson: logically simple, primitive: Everything I said about primitivity is that it is not to be analyzed in a certain way. We must not regard this kind of entity (person) as secondary compared to two primary kinds: an individual consciousness and an individual body. StrawsonVsDescartes: his mistake is only the special case of a general mistake, namely: that the designations or apparent designations of persons do not designate the same thing or the same entity, no matter what kind of predicates are ascribed to the designated. I 135 That means: to avoid this mistake, we must not assume that "I" or "Smith" are type ambiguous. We should speak only with the predicates of type ambiguity. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Descartes, R. | Wittgenstein Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 514 I/Body/Descartes: our I-thoughts leave the possibility open that we might be nothing more but mind. I/WittgensteinVsDescartes: a) Object use: E.g. "My arm is broken", "I have a bump on my forehead", b) subject use: E.g. "I hear so and so" meaningless: to ask. "Are you sure that you are in pain?" (> Certainty). But: the statement, "I am in pain" is no more a statement about a particular person, as a groan. But the reference is clear, it refers to the speaker. Frank I 523 WittgensteinVsDescartes/oral/Evans: when someone says "I think it will rain soon, therefore I am" then I do not understand him. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 --- Wittgenstein II 226 I/WittgensteinVsDescartes: the word "I" is one of several symbols with practical use, and if it was not necessary for language practice, you could drop it. It does not take any prominent position among the other words. Unless we begin to use it as Descartes did. I have just tried to demonstrate convincingly the opposite of Descartes' emphasis on the 'I'. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Descartes, R. | Verschiedene Vs Descartes, R. | Danto I 191 VsDescartes: that its argumentation is circular has always been the standard criticism. First he proves the existence of God, then he uses the goodness of God to secure his proof. Duhem I 55 PascalVsDescartes: "arrogant confidence in the unlimited power of the metaphysical method. HuygensVsDescartes: I 56... Duhem I 160 PascalVsCartesians: There are people who explain a word through themselves: The light is produced by a luminous movement of the luminous bodies. >Moliere: virtus dormitiva. Kanitscheider I 434 NewtonVsDescartes: not "indefinite" but actual infinite space! Kanitscheider II 38 Matter/NewtonVsDescartes: not expansion, but inertial mass is the key property of matter. Lacan I 51 LacanVsDescartes: "I think where I am not, so I am where I am not thinking". Descartes I 10 PascalVsDescartes: "heart logic" instead of mind logic. Vaihinger I 196 Lamettrie/Vaihinger: similar to Arnobius, against Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas. LamettrieVsDescartes. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 |
| Descartes, R. | Mackie Vs Descartes, R. | Stegmüller IV 361 Proof for the existence of God / Descartes / Stegmüller: in my mind, I find the idea of a most perfect being. So I know with at least the same clarity and precision as I understand every mathematical proposition that such a being actually and eternally exists. For existence is perfection, which is why a being who did not exist, would be less perfect. Descartes: although we can distinguish existence and essence in all other things, it becomes apparent that the existence of God is not anymore separable from its essence than the idea of a valley from the mountain. Proof of God's existence/MackieVsDescartes: even someone who would like to be a theist must say that this is too good to be true. Incidentally, there are mountains that soar without valley from a plane. In short, Descartes includes "existing" as part of the meaning of the term "God." IV 362 Ex: Suppose there is a term "Venusian" of which is true "intelligent being that inhabits the planet Venus." Next there is "Revenusian" (terminology: real Venusian), the term of which includes its existence. The sentence "The Revenusian does not exist" would be inconsistent, so that we would have to conclude that there is at least one intelligent being on Venus. Fallacy. DescartesVs: would probably say "Revenusian" is just an artificial term. Not so with "God": all infinite perfections form a unit, none of them would be comprehensible without the others. VSVS: thereby Descartes has to add an important assumption: namely, that whoever has a notion of this term, be conscious of an objective necessity, namely of the unity of the perfections, that is included by their existence. Stegmüller: of that we have no clear and definite, but only a vague idea. ((S) conceptually it would be clear). |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Descartes, R. | Schiffer Vs Descartes, R. | I 145 Mind Body Problem/m.b.p.Schiffer: (see above 2.2) there are three: a. in terms of things, (>mind) b. in terms of state of affair tokens and event tokens (mental states of affair) c. in terms of properties. (mental). Among the entities each of these categories can have three positions 1. you can affirm the existence of mental entities as irreducibly mental. 2. you can affirm them and simultaneously hold them reducible (VsDescartes). I 146 In terms of mental properties that would mean to regard them as e.g. functional properties 3. you can deny mental entities at all. oP: is the thesis that 1 does not match any ontological category. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Descartes, R. | Hintikka Vs Descartes, R. | II 113 Cogito/Descartes/Hintikka: the cogito is not a premise whose conclusion would be the sum. Solution/Hintikka: it is an act of thought which itself proves the subject its existence. analog: a speech act also proves its existence to the subject E.g. Mark Twain says: "I exist". HintikkaVsDescartes: Problem: 1) What kind of entity is the "res" which is to be proved by that? 2) In order to answer the question of what was actually proved, we need to clarify what status the entity has. E.g. Italo Calvino: Charlemagne asks a knight, why he has the visor closed. He responds: "Sir, I do not exist". II 114 Existence/Nonexistence/Subsistence/Hintikka: in this example, the knight does not exist in a certain way, but does in another, in the one in which he can be the hero of the story. Important argument: i.e. here the speech act is no conclusive evidence of his existence. ((s) Within the fiction). Cogito/Descartes/Hintikka: it would also have been wrong, had Descartes drawn the following conclusion: "Cogito, ergo Descartes exists". ((s) I.e. use the name instead of the "I" that is implied in "sum"). analogously: E.g. if someone told me on the street: "Mark Twain exists" it would be just as little proof for the existence of Mark Twain. It would have to be Mark Twain himself who carries out the speech act. Cogito/Knowledge/Hintikka: Problem: Descartes must know additionally that the thinker in question is this entity, or this type of entity. Existence/Identity/Entity/Identification/Quine/Hintikka: Quine: "No entity without identity": i.e. Descartes needs to know something else about himself in order to be able to say that he exists. Solution/Hintikka: we must distinguish two kinds of cross-world identification (cross identification). a) perspective (subject-centered) identification: it is not subjective, however, even if it is relative to a person. II 115 It uses only one coordinate system that is defined by reference to the user. It depends, however, on objective general principles. b) public (object-centered) idenification. Knowing Who/Seeing/Visual Perception/Perspective Identification/Hintikka: Def Seeing/Hintikka: seeing an object: persons and bodies that take the same space in John’s field of perception can be identified by him. He also knows there can be different objects at different times in that place. Important argument: John does not need to know who this person is! Knowing Who/Seeing Who/Hintikka: for this we need an additional identification that is based on public (object-centered) criteria. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Descartes, R. | Cavell Vs Descartes, R. | Stroud I 258 Meaning/to mean/Knowledge/Cavell: For example "saying nothing at all" is a possibility that a philosopher does not know what he means. There is nothing to mean here. (Cavell, The Claim by Reason, Oxf. 1979, 210). CavellVsEpistemology: says surprisingly little. Assertion/Cavell/Stroud: is an action. But not every (speech) action is an assertion. Even if a well-formed sentence is produced! This also applies to questions etc. Conditions of utterance/Cavell: every type of utterance (type of speech action) has its conditions. If these conditions are not fulfilled, there is no assertion (utterance) at all. And this applies to traditional epistemology: it does not fulfill the conditions of utterance. Def "Basis"/Terminology/Cavell/Stroud: is a sentence that makes a special claim (supports). CavellVsDescartes: one should assume that his basis is the claim to want to know if he is sitting by the fireplace, with a piece of paper in his hand. N.B.: but this example is not to be understood as a case in which someone investigates a specific claim to knowledge (assertion of knowledge). I 259 CavellVsEpistemology, traditional: here there are no concrete claims of knowledge at all. For example, we are asked to imagine that sitting by the fireplace is not the same as imagining that we have claimed to know that we are sitting by the fireplace. The case of skepticism is not an assertion context. We cannot answer the question, although we have the feeling that we should answer it. But this is not about something being overlooked. One must really be able to imagine that an assertion was made, and that is not the case here. ((s) Otherwise, for example, two people would be in a divided situation and one would ask whether the other also perceives the fireplace). Cavell/Stroud: without a set claim to knowledge (knowledge assertion) the investigation would not even look similar to our everyday methods. Knowledge Claim/CavellVsDescartes: to imagine that a knowledge claim would have been made in Descartes' example, one would have to imagine a context in which the claim was made. Then one needs additional conditions for the context. N.B.: these conditions would first make the judgement possible in the particular case, and this would then again not be transferable to other cases. The (skeptical) judgment would not be representative. CavellVsSkepticism/CavellVsEpistemology: Dilemma: a) it must be a concrete statement if the procedure of the investigation is to be coherent at all, but if it is concrete, it cannot be general. b) Without the generality, it cannot be skeptical. Skepticism/Cavell/Stroud: pro Cavell: he shows a solution in the right generality. I 261 CavellVsSkepticism/Stroud: no statement that the traditional epistemologist can produce is representative of our epistemic situation towards the world in general that he aspires to. The judgment of the epistemologist or the skeptic is always particulate. It cannot be generalized. Stroud: Cavell must show that the philosopher (skeptic, epistemologist) must construe the meaning of each particular assertion wrongly in order to pretend his generalization. ( > StroudVsCavell...+...). |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Descartes, R. | Spinoza Vs Descartes, R. | Esfeld I 212 Expansion/SpinozaVsDescartes: belongs to the nature of God. SpinozaVsAtomism: (Like Descartes). |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Descartes, R. | Pauen Vs Descartes, R. | Pauen I 22 Consciousness/Pauen: instead we could ask, however, what states of consciousness have in common. Tradition: Descartes: "Non-Spatial". VsDescartes: numbers and rules are also non-spatial, but they are not states of consciousness. I 44 VsDescartes: not all physical entities are expanded. I 45 VsDescartes/Pauen: main problem: psycho-physical interaction. The epiphysis is in turn under the influence of the brain. Problem: violation of the law of energy conservation. It is not a solution to merely attribute a control function to the spirit. Nor is it a solution to exclude psycho-physical interactions from the conservation laws, because then it becomes unclear how the non-physical mind can influence. Descartes himself admits that an explanation is not even possible. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Descartes, R. | Holz Vs Descartes, R. | Leibniz I 38 Methode/Intuition/HolzVsDescartes: das Verfahren führt, wenn nicht zwischen Wesentlichem und Unwesentlichem unterschieden wird, zu einer unabsehbaren Fülle von Einzelheiten. Das ist ein Problem bei psychisch geistigen und gesellschaftlich geschichtlichen Untersuchungen. Im mathematisch naturwissenschaftlichen Zeitalter bleibt das unartikuliert. Descartes’ Begriff der Intuition ist ungenau, weil er von subjektiver Überzeugtheit ausgeht. |
Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Descartes, R. | Freud Vs Descartes, R. | Rorty V 60 FreudVsPlato/FreudVsKant/FreudVsDescartes/Rorty: the unconscious, our conscience, is nothing immutable, not even a central part. All parts are equal. Mechanization, procedures to change ourselves. |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Descartes, R. | Millikan Vs Descartes, R. | I 94 Error/falsehood/false/mistake/deception/naturalistic fallacy/Millikan: nothing can be described as faulty (broken) by considering only this single, isolated thing. Normality/Solution: It's always about how a thing "should be" ("supposed to be"). Problem: even false convictions and false sentences show do not by themselves that they are wrong. Also, meaningless sentences do not indicate themselves their meaninglessness. Rationalism/MillikanVsRationalism: must therefore be wrong in regard to intentionality. MillikanVsDescartes: Cartesian reflection alone does not even show the intentional character of our convictions and ideas. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Descartes, R. | Stegmüller Vs Descartes, R. | Stegmüller IV 370 Knowledge/Recognition Theory/Descartes/Stegmüller: Descartes was dissatisfied with the status of knowledge in his time. He wanted to strengthen it with his methodical doubt. IV 371 (i) I can without contradiction doubt the existence of my body, but not that of my consciousness as the bearer of my doubts. (ii) Cogito Principle: indisputable because of the fact that I recognize his truth clearly and unambiguously. (iii) God as a perfect being cannot deceive. Sensory illusions do not stem from God, they arise in the complicated physiological perceptual apparatus. Knowledge/Recognition Theory/VsDescartes/Stegmüller: 1. The status of the general rule remains unclear. It is at least threatened by the possibility of a deceiving God. Problem: either the rule is absolutely safe, then it is not threatened by a deus malignus, or it is not completely safe, then any thinking threatens it. 2. Cogito argument: based on the insight into the self-contradiction "I don't think now". IV 372 But that is a different clarity than that of mathematics and also that of the proof of God. From the Cogito argument the authority of clear and distinct thinking cannot be deduced! 3. From the fact that at first I can only conclude with certainty that I am a thinking being, it does not follow that my consciousness is a thinking substance and a thing different from my body. IV 373 MackieVsDescartes/Stegmüller: two points: 1. Descartes claims that perfection is a positive term, imperfection a negative one, which presupposes the former. IV 374 On the other hand, he himself admits that I cannot understand the infinity of God and that there is no independent idea of perfection in my mind. But then I can gain a positive understanding of my own imperfection, from which I in turn form the negative concept of perfection. I am in constant change and am aware of it. I could also say that the purely negative concept of freedom from all shortcomings is the only one available to me for the idea of omniscience. 2. MackieVsPlato/MackieVs ideal forms: Example: absolute straight line: such ideas could not come from the sensory perception, because no real distance is completely straight. They would then have to originate from the direct not sensual familiarity with ideal beings. However, we can very well have the idea of a curved line, which is gained from perception! Then we can also imagine that this stretch is less curved. I can then imagine a borderline case that could not be further freed from curvature. The idea of perfection can thus be explained in terms of its content entirely from the material of sensory perception and the understanding of negation. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Descartes, R. | Vollmer Vs Descartes, R. | Vollmer I 14 LockeVsDescartes: no innate ideas! Soul at birth white paper, tabula rasa, wax tablet. Sensory experiences produce ideas that were not there before. Thesis: "Nothing is in the mind what was not in the senses before". (DescartesVs). Yet this is not enough to prove that some ideas do not exist at birth. Locke needs evidence for this, but it is not enough. LeibnizVsLocke: are too weak. Locke: must make sure that the ideas are the right reflection of the world: Primary qualities: inseparable from the body, constant in all changes: For example strength, expansion, shape, movement or rest and number. (objective) Secondary qualities: is nothing in the objects themselves, but only the ability to cause different sensations in us by means of their primary qualities: For example colours, tones, tastes, also warmth (!) etc. (subjective). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Dualism | McGinn Vs Dualism | McGinnVsDualism: the problem is that he goes too far in the interpretation of data. It responds to the appearances, by declaring that the mind is virtually independent of the brain. 1 The zombie problem 2 The Haunted problem II 38 McGinnVsDualism: seperates the mind to radically from the brain. So as if the mind could go about its business without assistance of the brain machine . He s right that the brain, just as we presently understand it, can not explain the mind - he is wrong when he concludes that no brain property can do this. II 42 Mind / brain / McGinn: the spirit is manifest in a causal relation to the brain, as difficult as this may be to believe. Why should that be so, if the existence of consciousness depends on God (VsDescartes). Theism / McGinn: the theistic dualism exaggerates the gap between mind and brain. II 106 Def Hyper Dualism / McGinn: assumed in the Big Bang there were two universes, a material and a parallel, which consisted only of consciousness. II 108 - II 110 McGinnVs Hyper dualism: Where is the fatal error? In the concept of causality. The mental universe is said to contain no matter and yet events and circumstances in this universe make things happen in the other universe. Thus, it is assumed that disembodied consciousness be able to influence the course of events. This raises two major questions: 1st How can a disembodied consciousness be the cause of something? 2nd How can the physical sequence of events be disturbed by anything in the material universe, which is going on in the other universe? |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Dualism | Ryle Vs Dualism | Pauen I 82 Ryle/Pauen: it seems as if Ryle wanted to deny the existence of mental states, but this is a misunderstanding. He simply denies an autonomous mental substance. I 84 RyleVsDualism: Category Error: falsely assumes that we can speak of mental processes in the same context as of physical processes. As if mind and brain differed like Library and Lecture Hall. Therefore, it is pointless to speak of "concurrent" mental and physical events. Ryle I 226 ff Dualism/RyleVsDualism/Ryle: life is not a double series of events that take place in two different kinds of matters. It's only a chain of events of various genres whose differences are mainly in that logically different types of statements of law and law-like statements are applicable to them. I 228 We are not looking into a secret chamber. In reality, the problem is not of that kind. It is is rather about the methodological question of how we prove law-like statements about the silent demeanor of people and apply them. E.g. I find out that someone is a true master of chess by watching him. That a student is lazy by watching him for a longer while. The question is not the frame question: "How do I discover that we have a soul?", but: a whole series of special questions of the form: how do I discover that I am more selfless than you, that I do poorly in dividing, but better at solving differential equations? That you are suffering from anxiety or easily overlook certain kinds of facts? Apart from such purely dispositional questions, there is the whole range of execution and event questions of the form: how do I find out that I got the joke, but you did not? That your deed required more courage than mine? I 229 Questions of this kind are not a mystery! I 230 In short, it is part of the meaning of "he understands" that he could have done this and that and that he would have done it... and the test is a set of tasks. With a single success we would not entirely have been satisfied, but we were with twenty. (Whether a boy can divide). Wittgenstein VII 147 Philosophy/Nonsense/Logical Grammar/Tetens: the thesis that philosophy is based on a misunderstanding of the "logical grammar" of language, can neither be found in Carnap nor in the Tractatus, but in Ryle in his criticism RyleVsDualismus, VsDescartes (Ryle 1969). |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Epistemology | Cavell Vs Epistemology | Stroud I 259 Skepticism/CavellVsEpistemology, traditional: here there are no concrete claims of knowledge at all. For example, to be asked to imagine that you are sitting by the fireplace is not the same as to imagine that we have claimed to know that we are sitting by the fireplace. The case of skepticism is not an assertion context Knowledge Claim/CavellVsDescartes: to imagine that a knowledge claim would have been made in Descartes' example, one would have to imagine a context in which the claim was made. Then one needs additional conditions for the context. N.B.: these conditions would first make the judgment possible in the particular case, and this in turn would not be transferable to other cases. The (skeptical) judgement would not be representative. CavellVsSkepticism/CavellVsEpistemology: Dilemma: it has to be a) a concrete assertion, if the procedure of the investigation is to be coherent at all, but if it is concrete, it cannot be general. b) without the generality. Then it cannot be skeptical. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Evans, G. | Davidson Vs Evans, G. | I (b) 20 ff Gareth Evans: Demonstrative identification is the only possible psychological relationship that provides "fundamental identification" (> ostensive definition). If someone thinks they are thinking a thought with singular reference, while they are actually using a name with no reference (>non-existence), no proposition is given for them to think about, and consequently there is no thought for them to think in the first place. If they use a sentence that contains a name with no reference, they express no thoughts at all. DavidsonVsEvans: Cartesian pursuit of knowledge, which is guaranteed to be immune against failures. If it is assumed that all knowledge is given by a mental connection with the object, objects must be found in respect to which errors are impossible. As objects that are necessarily what they seem to be. DavidsonVsDescartes: there simply are no such items. Not even appearances are all that which they are thought to be! Even the aspects of the sense data can not be protect against misidentification, unless they are really objects. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Hume, D. | Moore Vs Hume, D. | Stroud I 104 Knowledge/Proof of Existence/Existence/Hume/Stroud: two principles: 1. Nobody knows of the existence of anything if he/she has not perceived it directly (apprehended >apprehension: disorderly) or that he/she knows that something he/she has perceived directly is a sign of the existence of that thing. 2. Nobody can know that a thing is a sign of something else, if he/she did not perceive these two things (thing and sign) Stroud I 106 directly. (> StroudVsMoore: I do not understand why he accepts that (MooreVsDescartes). I also do not understand why he overlooks the consequences of sensory data theory. MooreVsHume: the two principles are wrong: for example, I know that this pen exists, but if Hume's principles were true, I could not do that. So they, one or both, are wrong. Moore/Stroud: accepts that if you start from Hume's position, it follows that he does not know that there is a pen. StroudVsMoore: both arguments are valid. And they have a common premise. For Moore, the question of what conclusion to accept amounts to whether it is safer to know that this is a pen or safer to know that Hume's principles are true. I 107 MooreVsHume: Example pen: is even the strongest argument to prove that its principles are wrong. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Kant | Descartes Vs Kant | Stroud I 131 World/reality/Kant: the outer things we know of must have a "reality" that does not allow them to be opened up inferentially (A 371). Direct Perception/= Consciousness/Kant/Stroud: direct consciousness of things (of this kind) is then a sufficient proof of their reality! Stroud: thus we are in the everyday situation where the "external perception" (Kant) provides the immediate proof of something real in space. (A 375). DescartesVsKant: could say that Kant is not in a position to do so. Stroud: it is not about which of the two gives the correct description of the situation. KantVsDescartes: his description cannot be correct. But he does not simply give a competing alternative. Rather, he defines conditions for access to knowledge. >Knowledge/Kant. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Kant | Stroud Vs Kant | I 145 Def Reality/Real/(Kant: "whatever is connected with a perception according to empirical laws is real". (A 376)). I 146 StroudVsKant: but he does not go into detail how we can distinguish reality from appearance in individual cases where the question might arise. I 159 Skepticism/transcendental/StroudVsKant: does he really refute skepticism with his transcendental philosophy? Is it a better answer than others? 1. We can only understand his answer if we understand and accept his transcendental approach. We must then also accept his idealism. I 160 Understanding/Stroud: we should do best when we observe people and their behavior (>Behaviorism). But that would be an empirical study. It would be about language, language behaviour and language acquisition. StroudVsKant: we understand his argument only if we understand his concept of a priori knowledge. And this investigation presupposes that we accept transcendental idealism. That seems circular! (Circle): to understand idealism again, we must understand the particular nature of the investigation that makes idealism transcendental. I 161 2. StroudVsKant: (this would even be Kantian reasons VsKant): according to Kant, thoughts are only possible if they are applied to what categories can be applied to. But this is only possible within the framework of possible experiences. The concepts must be able to have an empirical application. ((s) So they must be learned in empiricism). StroudVsKant: then how is it possible that we can have (transcendental) thoughts at all that are not determined by empirical conditions? a) empirically: For example, if expressions such as "directly perceive" and "independently of us" are given in everyday empirical use, then we see ((s) according to Kant!) that the sentence "We perceive independent things directly" is true. Empirically understood this simply means: e.g. without mirrors or screens. b) transcendental: other language use: here the sentence "we perceive independent things directly" does not express truth. ((s) Beware, Stroud does not say that he is wrong according to Kant). StroudVsKant: with the transcendental meaning we thus move away from everyday language. KantVsStroud: would reply that this use must be understandable for us, otherwise knowledge about the world would not be possible. I 162 StroudVsKant: this leads to two problems: 1. Suppose we accepted Kant's transcendentalism: Question: why would the rejection of idealism at the transcendental level be more attractive than accepting it at the empirical level? Why does Kant reject empirical idealism? ((s) "Condition"/empirical/(s): a condition cannot be understood empirically. But their fulfilment > Fact. But one cannot see that a fact is supposed to fulfil something.) Solution: making a corresponding sentence true. (But this sentence must be expressed first). StroudVsKant: if the argument is that our knowledge would otherwise be limited to the things we know are dependent on us, why should we then seek "refuge" in the view that our knowledge is limited to things we have recognized as (transcendently spoken) dependent on us? Skepticism/StroudVsKant: is so painful precisely because it does not allow knowledge of independent things. Why should Kant's solution be less painful just because it is transcendental? Empirical Idealism/KantVsStroud: cannot be true. 2. Question about the strength of the guarantee that Kant's transcendentalism exists: This corresponds to the question why Kant rejects transcendental realism. KantVsTranscendental Realism: would not be a correct explanation of our knowledge because - if it were true - we could never directly perceive things independent of ourselves and therefore could never be certain of their existence. Transcendental realism thus opens the way for empirical idealism by perceiving external things as something separate from the senses. Problem: we can then be aware of our representations, but we do not know if something existing corresponds to them! StroudVsKant: he rejects these attitudes for the only reason for which transcendental explanations can be rejected at all: that they provide no explanation, how is it possible that we know something? StroudVsKant: why does he think that empirical idealism paves the way for transcendental realism? Probably because he believes that the only things we can directly perceive are the things that depend on us. And he does not assume this as an empirical thesis, but only as a transcendental one. The sentence "everything we perceive is dependent on us" is true when understood transcendently. Kant/Stroud: probably he assumes this because he does not understand how perception is possible without the perception of a "representation" or something "in us". StroudVsKant: this is how the thesis of the "epistemic priority" appears here again: I 164 shifted from the empirical to the transcendental level. Perception/Kant/Stroud: he can only accept direct perception of independent things empirically spoken because he does not accept them transcendently spoken. StroudVsKant: important: that this is the only point he rejects. Kant: if we treat external things as things in themselves, it is impossible to understand how we can arrive at knowledge. StroudVsKant: Suppose Kant were right that transcendental realism leaves our knowledge of external things unexplained. Question: why is that alone sufficient to make our theory wrong, transcendentally speaking? Couldn't it simply be transcendentally true that things cannot be known? Kant/Stroud: would say no, as he understands "transcendental" as following: transcendental knowledge is part of the explanation of our knowledge. Direct Perception/Kant: is only possible of dependent things (representations etc.). Transcendental Realism/Kant/Stroud: would then have to say that there are also independent things. Namely, those that correspond to these representations. But then we would be forced to conclude that all our representations (sensory experiences) would be inadequate to establish the reality of these things. (A 369). The outer things would then be separate from the things we are aware of. StroudVsKant: the only problem of transcendental realism is that it prevents our explanation of "how knowledge is possible". I 165 Problem: then there is no independent way to determine his truth or falsehood. The only test of his acceptability is whether he makes an explanation possible. Transcendental Aesthetics/Transcendental Idealism/Kant/Stroud: Transcendental idealism is integrated into transcendental aesthetics: (A 378), independent of these consequences. StroudVsKant: but it is not bound differently than transcendental or a priori as an a priori condition of an investigation of the conditions of possibility of knowledge. And this is the only way how a transcendental theory can be founded at all: that it is the only possible explanation of our synthetically a priori possible knowledge in geometry and arithmetic. Skepticism/StroudVsKant: so there is no independent possibility to justify a transcendental theory. ((s) than that it is the only explanation for something else). Then one has to ask whether skepticism has been refuted at all. I 166 Skepticism/StroudVsKant: there are at least two ways in which an explanation of our knowledge of the outer world can fail: If skepticism were true; Kant claims to have at least empirically refuted this, but only by putting in place a transcendental version of the same description. Understanding/StroudVsKant: if we understand transcendentalism (transcendental use of our words) at all, this use is not satisfactory. It still represents knowledge as limited to what I understand to be dependent on me. I am once again a prisoner of my subjectivity. Transcendental Idealism/StroudVsKant: is ultimately difficult to distinguish from skepticism. I.e. not that it is the same as empirical idealism, but that it is unsatisfactory as an explanation, namely on the empirical level! I 167 Transcendental Idealism/KantVsStroud/KantVsDescartes: Kant would say: "I won't lose anything if I accept it". My knowledge is not limited to the things that are empirically dependent or are only empirically subjective. I am theoretically able to deliver the best physics, chemistry and other sciences. I am in a better position than Descartes. StroudVsKant: but then, according to Kant, all our scientific knowledge is still subjective or dependent on our human sensitivity. I 168 Knowledge/Explanation/StroudVsKant: but we could also do without an explanation in another way: not because skepticism was true (and thus nothing could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be conclusively posed! (>Carnap, see below). Kant/Stroud: N.B.: pleads in a way for a limited ("deflationary") view that corresponds to this critique. ((s) deflationary here: not aimed at the most comprehensive framework, see below). KantVsDescartes: if its question could be asked coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate. StroudVsKant: but he does not explain what Descartes was concerned about. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Locke Vs Leibniz, G.W. | II 190 Clarity/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: is linked to its namability for him. Assumes the possibility of a unique designation. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Stegmüller Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Stegmüller IV 388 Contingency/Leibniz: every thing is contingent, which is why it would not be so if another thing were different. All things are causally connected. The world is the totality of these things, which is why the world as a whole is also contingent! World/Leibniz: it may well be that the series of causes is unlimited. Leibniz does not necessarily assume a temporal beginning! Sufficient Reason/Leibniz: must then lie outside the world! It must be something else than the world! IV 389 He must be a necessary being. VsLeibniz: 1. How do we know that everything needs a sufficient reason? 2. Can there be a necessary being that has a sufficient reason in itself? If the second question is answered negatively, the totality has no sufficient reason! KantVsLeibniz: the cosmological proof is implicitly based on the (refuted) ontological proof. (See KantVsDescartes). IV 390 Existence/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: the view that the concept of existence is completely absorbed in the existence quantifier is controversial! Existence/Contingency/StegmüllerVsLeibniz: we could understand necessary existence as negation of contingency. Problem: 1. the premise that the world as a whole is contingent (it would not exist if something else had been different) would have to be dropped: even if every part of the world is contingent, there is nothing to suggest that the world as a whole would not exist unless (sic?) something else was or would have been different. The conclusion from the contingency of each part to the contingency of the whole is inadmissible. Alternative 2: Contingency: something is contingent even if it could not exist. IV 392 This must be combined with the above remark that it would not be logically impossible that the claimed necessary being could not exist either. But this is incomprehensible. Sufficient Reason/VsLeibniz: (ad (i)): how do we know that everything must have a sufficient reason? So far nobody has been able to show a necessity a priori for this. That would not have any plausibility either: 1. It is true that we are always looking for symmetries, but there is no guarantee that we will always find them. 2. We are always within our world, extrapolations are not allowed! Even if now everything within the world had a sufficient reason, we would have no right to conclude on a sufficient reason outside the world. Common argument: things must be comprehensible through and through. MackieVs: that is not true at all! IV 393 We have no reason to believe that the universe is oriented toward our intellectual needs. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Stroud Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 183 Internal/external/Carnap/StroudVsQuine: in Carnap's distinction there must be something else. The fact that it can be answered as an internal question but not as an (identical) external one shows that the two must not be confused. Language/Carnap/Stroud: therefore Carnap distinguishes different "languages" or "systems". These answer only internal questions. Expressiveness: that a "philosophical" (external) question is then meaningless is not only due to the terminology. I 184 The terminology is always meaningful. For example, within mathematics, "There are numbers" makes sense. I 223 Knowledge/Skepticism/Quine: if all knowledge is put to the test at the same time, no part of it can be invoked. ((s) > Example "Everything he said is true"). Empiricism/knowledge/solution/Quine: this is the reason why knowledge must be justified on the basis of sensory experience. Psychology/knowledge/explanation/justification/Quine: a surrender of epistemology to psychology leads to circularity. ((s) Because psychology itself goes beyond the mere detection of stimuli). StroudVsQuine/StroudVsNaturalised Epistemology: is also a surrender of epistemology to psychology. And thus just as circulatory! Epistemology/Stroud: can it be that the traditional epistemology has been refuted, but not Quine's naturalized epistemology itself? Is the solution the relation between the two? Quine: sometimes suggests that the two points of view (NaturalizedVsTraditional Epistemology) differ: the "doctrinal" question should be put aside as false hope. Consciousness/knowledge/tradition/knowledge theory/justification/Stroud: the traditional epistemology insists on the isolation of certain objects of consciousness in order to identify undoubted information. Consciousness/QuineVsTradition: we can bypass the question of consciousness and simply try to explain, I 224 how our rich output arises from the events that occur on our sensory surface (nerve endings). N.B.: this can be approached scientifically. Then one can distinguish two types of events in the observable physical world, and that is the scientific goal. StroudVsQuine: it looks like Quine just changed the subject. Skepticism then still threatens. And Quine does not want that. "Liberated epistemology" (roots of reference, 3): is not the same as empirical psychology, it is rather an "enlightened persistence" (enlightened) of the traditional epistemic problem. Empiricism/knowledge/justification/reason/circle/Quine: (see above) Tradition: our knowledge cannot be empirically justified, otherwise it is circular. QuineVsTradition: this fear of circularity is unnecessary logical shyness. "Enlightenment/"liberated" epistemology/Quine: the insight into the fact that skepticism arises from science itself. And to fight it, we are entitled to bring in scientific knowledge. QuineVsTradition: did not recognize the strength of its position at all. I 225 Knowledge/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: Traditional epistemology has not recognized that the challenge of knowledge originated from knowledge itself. Thesis: the doubts about its reliability have always been scientific doubts. Consciousness/Quine: the confusion was based on the concentration on consciousness. Introspection/Tradition: thought that facts about our "lean" input would be brought to light through introspection. QuineVsIntrospection: the reasons for finding the input lean come from science. I 227 Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception simply consists in deviating from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, RR 3) Illusions exist only relative to a previously accepted assumption of real bodies. Given/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: this may be the reason to assume a non-binding given. (SellarsVsQuine). QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: N.B.: then it might seem impossible to invoke the possibility of deception because some knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion! Stroud: we have dealt with arguments of this form before (see above >Distortion of meaning). Violation of the necessary conditions for the use of certain terms. Quine/Stroud: it could now be answered analogously to StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine does not make these errors. Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no possibility to invoke what lies within the meaning of a particular term. StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts" I 228 the epistemologist is "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question is made even more difficult by Quine's explicit denial that: Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying he leaves the question unanswered, he is right to use science to reject science. I am simply saying that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts. TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical mistake to refute doubts from science itself, so that in the end there is certainty, then what is the crucial logical point that he has missed? StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science. SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic could answer with a "reductio ad absurdum", and then epistemology would no longer be part of science: "Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either a) Science is true and gives us knowledge, or b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the outer world is knowledge. I 230 Moore/Stroud: Moore should not be slandered either. According to Kant and Carnap, what he says is completely legitimate. Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: N.B.: the results of an independent scientific study would be in the same boat as e.g. Moore's hands. They would be "scientific" versions of Moore's argument with the common sense. Philosophy/Science/Quine: both merge continuously. Stroud: Descartes and other traditional philosophers could agree with that. StroudVsQuine: Problem: then maybe we have no scientific knowledge at all. We have no more reason to believe in it than we do not believe in it. No scientific investigation could provide clarity here. I 231 Nor would any challenge be conceivable "from the inside". So skepticism would follow. I 233 Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: but whether it is correct or not is not something that will be decided by future experience or experiments! If the epistemological question is correctly asked - as Quine asks it - then we already know how future experience will be! We will always be confronted with the question of the surplus of our rich output over lean input. Certainly, if we are confronted today with an experience that undermines our belief, skepticism will be justified today. But: N.B.: the same was already justified in 1630! I 234 Naturalism/StroudVsQuine: will not be enough if skepticism argues with the reductio ad absurdum. We just have to rebuild the ship on the high seas. The traditional epistemologist can saw (identify!) the piece out of the ship that represents the lean input. I 240 Knowledge/StroudVsQuine: even if I blamed the "meager" input for accepting a "projection," that would not be an explanation of his knowledge or true belief. I 245 Knowledge/knowledge theory/explanation/projection/StroudVsQuine: assuming that I assume with Quine that all my beliefs are just "overflowing output from lean input" (i.e. projection), that doesn't mean that I cannot think I have true beliefs, in the sense that there's nothing to stop my beliefs from being true. Problem: even if they were all true, I would not be in a position to explain, or even understand, how a knowledge theory should explain and understand them. I cannot explain how my true belief contributes to knowledge. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Representation | Brandom Vs Representation | I40 VsRepresentations: here the mind is treated as an unexplained explainer. (Descartes). I125 BrandomVsRepresentation: very problematic: if it is understood as a term, it should make the grammatical difference between singular terms and sentences understandable through reference to the ontological difference between objects and facts. But it does not follow that it is possible to introduce the category of facts as what is in the same sense represented by and that-sentences. I 126 an ontological category of facts cannot be made understandable primarily and regardless of explaining the declarative sentences. Representation is not expression! I 132 Rebecca West: VsRepresentation: "Mind as a mirror of nature": we do not need an image of the world, "one copy of these damn things is enough." I 292 Belief: can be ambiguous: one can be convinced of something wrong. The distinction often refers to the objectivity of representations (BrandomVsRepresentationalism, instead social practice as a guarantee of objectivity.) I 404 BrandomVsRepresentationalism: four aspects: 1) in addition to "true", representations need "refers to" and "means". (Later Frege) I 405 2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts. 3) the "of" in de-re attributions. The concept of intentional relatedness: something is true of Kant, but not of Hegel. 4) concept of objective representational accuracy of judgment and reasoning. Can be justified by direct observation, inferential determinations or reference to certificates. I 412 BrandomVsRepresentation: instead expressive role. I 690 Brandom pro representationalism: contains the indisputable insight: whatever has a propositional content, necessarily has a representational side. The objection only applies to treating the representation as fundamental. II 69 Content/Representation/BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer. Rorty VI 181 BrandomVsRepresentation/Rorty: instead: "making real inferential connections between claims". If we have succeeded in using a logical and semantic vocabulary, we do not additionally need to explain how they got their "psychic powers". Representation/McDowellVsBrandom: representation cannot be reconstructed from the concept of inference. "Inferentialistic" explanations of the concepts do not work. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Skepticism | Austin Vs Skepticism | Stroud I 48 Dream/AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes: it is about the strong thesis of Descartes that we cannot know if we are not dreaming. Without them, skepticism would be disarmed. Austin major thesis Method/everyday language/AustinVsDescartes: Can it be shown ((s) > manifestation) that Descartes violates the normal standards or conditions for knowledge with his strong thesis? Stroud: we have already seen it that it seems like this. (In terms of our everyday life and science). --- I 49 For example, no one asks whether the other is not dreaming when he points to a goldfinch, or e.g. in court, if the witness does not dream. But even in very important cases the dream possibility is not allowed in the discussion as a relevant alternative. --- I 50 Knowledge/Austin: is only questioned in special cases. --- I 51 Only then certain alternatives are relevant. Austin: typical e.g. external psychological. And again, there are (more or less) established procedures. Error/Deception/Austin: Thesis: "You cannot always deceive all people". Austin/Stroud: his demand for specific reasons for doubt related to e.g. suspected deception are not the same as the above requirement that there must always be a "special basis" for the question, e.g. "is it really a goldfinch?". E.g. Goldfinch: this is all about the question of whether there are certain reasons to assume something else. This can also be the case, for example, when we quote authorities. Reliability/everyday language/Austin: it is fundamental for our speech that we are entitled to trust others, unless there is a concrete reason against it. Knowledge/Stroud: excludes error or mistake. Austin: dito: "If you know something, you cannot be wrong": this is perfectly fine. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Skepticism | Kant Vs Skepticism | Stroud I 129 Skepticism/knowledge/KantVsDescartes: The relation between the philosophical question and our everyday or scientific knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. ((s) (see below): But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct). Descartes/Stroud: for him the skepticism is inevitable! Kant: would agree. That is why he developed another concept. "Scandal"/Kant: that a theory has never been developed in the history of philosophy that avoids skepticism. Knowledge/theory/Kant/Stroud: there are conditions to be met by any theory of knowledge: the theory must not be deny that there are external things. Suppose there were no external world, then Descartes’ skepticism would loose its sting! Then there would be no limit to my knowledge that I know nothing about the things except me, because there would be nothing after all. I 130 Def problematic idealism/Kant/Stroud: Thesis: that the world which is independent from us is unknowable. Or that the world is dubious or not reliable as other things that we know. That makes everything problematic. (B 274) KantVsIdealism: misinterprets our actual situation in the world. Knowledge/Kant/Stroud: whoever reads the proof, must know at the end that the example is a goldfinch or actually three typographical errors. Stroud: these are not really high standards. It seems that every access to knowledge needs to meet this standard. Problem: virtually no philosophical theory satisfies this condition! KantVsDescartes: (end of the 1. Meditation) does not meet this condition. KantVsSkepticism: therefore, any inferential approach must be avoided to avoid it. World/reality/Kant: the external things which we know need to have a "reality"((s) a particular property?) which does not allow to be inferred . (A 371). ((s) Kant here similar to Hume: direct perception of things)). immediate perception/= Awareness/Kant/Stroud: there is then a sufficient proof of the things’ (of this kind)reality! ((s)> proof of existence). (A 371). Stroud: so that we are in a daily situation where the (Kant), "external perception [provides] ... the direct evidence of something real in space". (A 375). DescartesVsKant: could say that Kant is actually not capable. Stroud: But this is not a matter which one of both gives the correct description of the situation. KantVsDescartes: its description cannot be correct. But he is not just giving a competing alternative. He rather gives conditions for the access to knowledge. I 132 At least such theories must take account of the traditional skepticism. E.g. if Descartes was right, we could not know anything about the outside world. That is the reason why Kant does not allow to infer knowledge of external things. Otherwise, skepticism is inevitable. Stroud: So it requires precisely the kind of knowledge that Moore gives! I 140 Def "Epistemic Priority"/terminology/Stroud: you could call Descartes’ thesis that sensory experience, perception, representations (which Descartes calls Ideas’) are epistemically placed before the perceived objects. I 141 Stroud: that means that epistemically subordinated things cannot be known without epistemically antecedent things being known. And not the other way around. That means that the latter are less knowable, so the outer world is less knowable than our sensory experiences. KantVsDescartes/KantVsEpistemic priority: this view needs to be rejected since it cannot explain how knowledge is actually possible! Perception/KantVsDescartes: we perceive things directly, without conclusion. Stroud: we understand Kant only when we understand Descartes. Realism/KantVsSkepticism/KantVsDescartes: these considerations which involve him are those which lead to the epistemic priority (priority of sensations (or "ideas") before the objects). I 142 We need to understand this in order to understand Kant’s version of realism. (VsMoores simple realism). That means the realism which explains how it is possible that we know something of the world? (Conditions of the possibility of knowledge). I 146 Knowledge/KantVsSkeptizismus/Stroud: when external perception (experience) is the condition for inner experience, and when external experience is immediate then we can know (in general) that there is an external reality which corresponds to our sensory experiences (sensations). I 147 Then there may be deception in individual cases, but no general skeptical questioning. KantVsSkeptizismus/KantVsDescartes: cannot be extended to all, it can only appear in individual cases. Perception/KantVsDescartes: N.B. if one could assume the skepticism at any rate, one would have to assume that our perception has come about not directly but indirectly, inferentially (via conclusion). KantVsDescartes: this does not go far enough and relies too heavily on the "testimonies" of our everyday expressions. I 148 Descartes should have examined the conditions that actually make experience possible. KantVsSkepticism: even the "inner experience" of Descartes are possible only if he firstly has outer experiences. Therefore, the skeptical conclusion violates the conditions of experience in general. Descartes position itself is impossible: no examination of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects, which we believe exist around us. Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: Kant accepts at least the conditional force ((s)e.g. the premises) of the traditional skepticism. KantVsDescates: But he rejects the skeptical conclusion: they contradict every adequate philosophical theory of knowledge. Solution/Kant: what we know touches the phenomena. KantVsSkepticism/Stroud: The antecedent of the skeptical conclusion can only be true if the consequent is false. Knowledge/world/KantVsMoore/Stroud: Thus, he has a different understanding of the relationship between philosophical study of knowledge and the knowledge in daily life. I 159 Science/reality/everyday/knowledge/KantVsDescartes/Stroud: our everyday and scientific knowledge is invulnerable to skepticism. KantVsMoore: But there is no conclusion of our perceptions of knowledge about unrelated things. I 168 Knowledge/explanation/StroudVsKant: But we could not need an explanation: not because skepticism were true (and therefore there would be nothing that could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be provided conclusively! (> Skepticism/Carnap). Kant/Stroud: Important argument: advocates in a manner for a limited ("deflationary") perspective, which corresponds to this criticism. ((s) "deflationary": here: not directed at the most comprehensive framework). KantVsDescartes: when his question could be provided coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate. StroudVsKant: this does then not explain what Descartes was concerned about. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Spinoza, B. | Strawson Vs Spinoza, B. | Rorty I 28 Wittgenstein/Strawson/Rorty: thesis: there is nothing but the human body, VsDescartes: Vs splitting in res cogitans and res extensa. Aspect/VsSpinoza: "Two aspects". That is okay as long as you do not ask: "Are organisms something physical?" |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Tradition | Externalism Vs Tradition | Frank I 676 Geist/Tradition/Descartes: eine Bühne auf der "Erscheinungen, Sinnesdaten und Qualia vorbeiziehen". Was da erscheint, sind nicht die gewöhnlichen Objekte, sondern ihre angeblichen Vertreter. Und das Herz soll diese Vertreter lieben. DavidsonVs: Problem: 1. wie ist es dann möglich, sich einen Weg nach außen zu bahnen? 2. wie kann sich das Selbst in diesem Bild unterbringen? Denn es scheint auf der einen Seite alles zu umfassen, Theater, Bühne, Schauspieler und Publikum, auf der anderen Seite wird das, was gewusst und registriert wird, allein vom Publikum gewusst und registriert. Problem der Lokalisierung: sind die Objekte im Geist, oder werden sie von ihm betrachtet? Davidson: diese Objekte interessieren mich hier nicht, sondern ihre urteilsartigen Vettern: Propositionen, partikulare Vorkommnisse von Propositionen, Repräsentationen oder Fragmente des "Mentalesischen": der Geist "faßt" sie nicht, er ist auch nicht "mit ihnen bekannt" oder "hat sie vor Augen". I 676/677 ExternalismusVsTradition/ExternalismusVsDescartes: korrigiert dieses Bild: wenn externe Faktoren beteiligt sind, dann muss all das, was bestimmen hilft, um was für ein Objekt es sich handelt, gleicherweise vom Geist erfaßt werden, wenn der Geist wissen soll, in welchem Zustand er ist. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Various Authors | Kanitscheider Vs Various Authors | Kanitscheider I 433 Infinity/Material Existence/Physics: some models require physical infinity: the hyperbolic world of general relativity theory (AR), the steady astate theory (SST). Infinity/Mathematics/Physics: Gauss: is skeptical about actual infinite quantities. LucretiusVsArchimedes: is infinity mere possibility of an object to traverse new space-time points? (remains a discussion until today). Bolzano: the objective existence of infinite sets cannot fail due to the impossibility of imagining every single object. I 434 NewtonVsDescartes: not "indefinite" but actual infinite space! KantVsNewton: the infinite is unimaginable! NewtonVsKant: not imaginable, but conceptually comprehensible! Riemann: Differentiation infinite/unlimited (new!). Solution for the problem of the "beyond space". Three-ball (S³) conceptually analytically easy to handle. I 435 Sets/infinity: here the sentence: "The whole is larger than the parts" is no longer applicable. (But extensional determination is also not necessary, intensional is enough). Space: Question: Can an open infinite space contain more than Aleph 0 objects of finite size? Solution: "densest packing" of spatially convex cells: this set cannot be larger than countable. Thus no a priori obstacle that the number of galaxies in an unlimited Riemann space of non-ending volume is the smallest transfinite cardinal number. II 102 Measurement/Consciousness/Observer/Quantum Mechanics/QM: Psychological Interpretation: Fritz London and Edmund Bauer, 1939 >New Age Movement. II 103 Thesis: the observer constitutes the new physical objectivity through his consciousness, namely the rotation of the vector in the Hilbert space. 1. KanitscheiderVsBauer: Problem: then there is no definite single state of matter without the intervention of a psyche. 2. KanitscheiderVsBauer: on the one hand consciousness is included in the quantum-mechanical laws, on the other hand it should possess special properties within the observer, namely those which transfer the combined system of object, apparatus and observer without external impulse from the hybrid superposition state into the single state in which the partial elements are decoupled. 3. KanitscheiderVsBauer: strange that the Schrödinger equation, the most fundamental law of quantum mechanics, should not be applicable to consciousness. 4. KanitscheiderVsBauer: also doubt whether the consciousness can really be in the superposition of different completely equal soul states. (Bauer had adopted his thesis from Erich Becher's interactionalistic body soul dualism II 104). I 423 Space Curvature/Empirical Measurement/Schwarzschild/Kanitscheider: Schwarzschild: Distortion of the triangle formed by the Earth's orbit parallax. Although the curvature factors are not known, one can conclude that if the space is hyperbolic (K < 0), the parallax of very distant stars must be positive. I 424 If you now observe stars with a vanishing parallax, the measurement accuracy provides an upper limit for the value of negative curvature. If the space is spherical - the parallax must be negative. Schwarzschild: in the hyperbolic case, the radius of curvature should be at least 64 light years, in the elliptical at least 1600 light-years. KanitscheiderVsSchwarzschild: such theory-independent experiments are today rightly regarded as hopeless. I 296 Time Travels/Kanitscheider: VsTime Machine/VsWells: H.G. Wells makes the mistake that he lets the traveler ascend and descend the world line of the earth on the same earthly space point. Exactly this leads to the conceptual impossibility of forward and backward movement in time. Time Travel/General Relativity Theory/Kanitscheider: this changes when matter comes into play. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Positivism | Pro | Bezzel Wittgenstein (where?) HabermasVsWittgenstein: Wttg. positivist. WittgensteinVsDescartes: "Game of doubt already presupposes certainty. WittgensteinVs: behaviorism, metaphysics, ostensive definition, "second-order language," progressive thinking of natural science, (western philosophy) |
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| Skepticism | Versus | Bezzel Wittgenstein (where?) WittgensteinVsDescartes: "Game of doubt already presupposes certainty. WittgensteinVs: behaviorism, metaphysics, ostensive definition, "second-order language," progressive thinking of natural science, (western philosophy) |
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| Positivism | Versus | Bezzel Wittgenstein : HabermasVsWittgenstein: W. Positivist. WittgensteinVsDescartes: "Spiel des Zweifels setzt schon Gewißheit voraus. WittgensteinVs: Behaviorismus, Metaphysik, hinweisende Erklärung, "Sprache zweiter Ordnung", Fortschrittsdenken der Naturwissenschaft,(westlich) |
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| eliminat. Materialism | Pro | Frank I 578 Rorty per eliminative materialism: is linked to Feyerabend - RortyVsKant, RortyVsDescartes Fra I 584 Foucault: man disappears, Rorty: the mental disappears). Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Inferentialism | Versus | Vollmer I 17 Descartes: knowledge purely inferential possible - LockeVsDescartes: Thesis: "there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses" - Locke: tabula rasa mind LockeVsInnate Ideas - LeibnizVsLocke: LeibnizVsTabula Rasa - the mind already brings some characteristics with (Aristotle ditto) - I 24 Kant: everyone already brings with finished structures. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Inferentialism | Pro | Vollmer I 17 Descartes: knowledge purely inferential possible - LockeVsDescartes: Thesis: "there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses" - Locke: tabula rasa mind LockeVsInnate Ideas - LeibnizVsLocke: VsTabula rasa - the mind already brings some characteristics with (Aristotle ditto) - I 24 Kant: everyone already brings with him finished structures. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vs Skepticism | Austin, J.L. | Stroud I 42 AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes/Stroud: (Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, 1962, 4-5) one arrives at the source of Descartes' skeptical conclusion by uncovering a series of misunderstandings and (especially verbal) errors and fallacies. I 44 Knowledge/Philosophy/Everyday/Austin/Stroud: (Austin Other Minds, (Phil.Papers 1961,45) These typical philosophical investigations are carried out from our normal (everyday) practice. I 45 Austin Thesis: "enough is enough": i.e. not everything has to be said. It is not always necessary to prove that this goldfinch is not a stuffed bird. (OM 52). I 48 Dream/AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes: it is about Descartes' strong thesis that we cannot know if we are not dreaming. Without it, skepticism would be disarmed. Austin's nuclear thesis Method/Everyday Language/AustinVsDescartes: can it be shown ((s) >Manifestation) that Descartes with his strong thesis violates the normal standards or conditions for knowledge? I 51 Misconception/Deception/Austin: thesis "you cannot always deceive all people". I 64 StroudVsAustin: the accusation of AustinVsSkepticism (AustinVsDescartes) that the meaning of "Knowledge" has been distorted in everyday use can only be raised if it can be shown that a certain usage of language, a certain concept and the relation between them has been misinterpreted. Stroud: that is what I meant by the fact that the source of Descartes' demand reveals something deep and important. I 76 Stroud: this leads us to the depth and importance of skepticism. It is about much more than deciding if you know something about the world around you, it is about our practice (actions) and reflection of our knowledge (self-knowledge). Can we take a distant position here? I 82 Skepticism/Source/Stroud: Thesis: The source of the philosophical problem of the outside world lies somewhere in our notion of an objective world or our desire to understand our relation to the world. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Skepticism | Cavell, St. | Stroud I 257 Def "Basis"/Terminology/Cavell/Stroud: is a sentence that makes a special claim. Basis/Terminology/CavellVs: Thesis: In the case of Descartes, the basis is not completely natural. This is the key to diagnosis. CavellVsSkepticism: Thesis: "The skeptic does not do what he thinks he is doing". This does not mean, however, that he distorts the meanings of the terms used. (see AustinVsMoore above). I 258 N.B.: the point here is that the way of saying something is essential to what is meant (Conceptual Role, 208) I 258 Use Theory/Cavell: The thesis is based on individual situations. I 258f Skepticism/CavellVsSkepticism: the skeptic does not do what he believes he is doing. He says nothing! - Then he cannot mean anything either. - Traditional epistemology: it says surprisingly little - it claims no knowledge! Def Basis/Cavell: a sentence that produces a special claim. CavellVsDescartes: did not make a claim either. - Difference: to imagine sitting by the fireplace, and to imagine claiming to know this. So the solution method cannot even look similar to our everyday methods. - Assertion: requires context that is not generally transferable. The sceptical judgement would not be representative. I 261 The judgement of the epistemologist or skeptic is always particular. I 261 StroudVsCavell: I can see that I have made a condition that is not met. Then this calls my knowledge into question, without me having previously put this forward in a claim to knowledge ("basis"). Nevertheless: like Cavell: StroudVsEpistemology: needs each time a concrete knowledge claim, which makes a general answer impossible. I 263 Stroud pro Cavell: I think he is right, thesis: that the traditional epistemologist needs conditions of expression for every concrete case, which make a generalization impossible. StroudVsCavell: I just want to show that you don't have to show that no assertion has been made. |
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| Innate | Descartes, R. | Vollmer I 14 LockeVsDescartes: no innate ideas! The soul is at birth white paper, tabula rasa, wax tablet. Sensory experiences produce ideas that were not there before. Thesis: "Nothing is in the mind what was not in the senses before". (DescartesVs). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Space | Descartes, R. | Kanitscheider II 38 Matter/Space/Descartes: new: absolutistic conception of space of a special kind: geometry is not imposed on space from outside by objects, but possesses the geometric structure inwardly - NewtonVsDescartes: not expansion, but inertial mass is the key property of matter - Newton: thesis: space is absolute and independent of matter. II 39 Einstein: there is no "field-empty" space. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Skepticism | Descartes, R. | Stroud I 11 Descartes: Thesis: the senses do not show us with certainty whether the situation in which we believe we find ourselves actually exists. This shows that we cannot know anything at all about the outside world. Descartes: Thesis: I cannot distinguish alertness from dream. I 18 Descartes/Dream/Skepticism/Stroud: Thesis: two steps of Descartes' considerations are correct. Nevertheless: StroudVsDescartes: Thesis: We may sometimes know that we are not dreaming. I 19 StroudVsDescartes: Thesis: one can also know something about the world when one dreams (see below). I 24 Weaker Thesis/StroudVsDescartes: the undeniable truth is merely that when one dreams that one then lacks knowledge. ((s) so this is a weaker thesis). Skepticism/Stroud: The thesis is only reached with the stronger thesis! I 111 Skepticism/Descartes/Stroud/VsMoore: Descartes arrives at his thesis by assessing all our knowledge. Source: were the senses in Descartes. I 140 "All Different"/Skepticism/Descartes/Stroud: achieves his skeptical conclusion from the thesis that our perception could be exactly as it is, even if there were no external things at all. Gap/Stroud: for Descartes there is a gap between appearance and reality. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Personal Identity | Locke, J. | I 53 Identity/Human/Person/Personal Identity/Locke: (27.Chapter II. Book of the essay: "On Identity and Diversity"). Thesis: There is a difference between any mass of matter and a structured matter that makes life possible. As far as this basis is concerned, there is no difference between plants, animals and humans. Another conception of mental identity anchors it only in the immaterial soul (Descartes) and abstracts it completely from body and form. This position can be reconciled with the idea of transmigration, for which Locke obviously did not have much sympathy. I 54 Identity/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: the relationship between substance and person when the ability to think is attributed solely to an immaterial substance. For example, it would be conceivable that someone could be convinced that he was the same person as Nestor. If one now presupposes the correctness of the Cartesian thesis, I 55 it is conceivable that a contemporary man is indeed the person Nestor. But he was not Nestor, precisely because the idea of man could not be detached from his physical form. That is abstruse for us today. (>Geach). Locke relativizes the thesis by saying that the nature of the substance is not important for consciousness, which is why he wants to leave this question open - he gives the impression that he is inclined towards the materialistic point of view. |
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| Mind | Rorty, R. | I 28 Wittgenstein / Strawson / Rorty thesis: there is nothing but the human body, VsDescartes: Vs splitting into res cogitans and res extensa. Aspect / VsSpinoza "two aspects". That s okay as long as you do not ask: "Are organisms something physical?" |
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| Philosophy | Ryle, G. | Tetens Wittgenstein VII 147 Philosophy / nonsense / logical grammar / Tetens: the thesis that philosophy comes from a misunderstanding of the "logical grammar" of the language, is to be found neither Carnap nor in the Tractatus, but at Ryle in his criticism Vs dualism, VsDescartes (Ryle 1969) . |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Self-consciousness | Sellars, W. | Fra I 264 Consciousness / SellarsVsSartre / SellarsVsDescartes: the thesis of self-transparency of consciousness is the "myth of the given". |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| absolute Space | Newton, I. | Kanitscheider II 38 Materie/Raum/Descartes: neu: absolutistische Raumauffassung besonderer Art: Die Geometrie wird dem Raum nicht von außen durch Objekte aufgeprägt, sondern besitzt die geometrische Struktur innerlich - NewtonVsDescartes: nicht Ausdehnung, sondern träge Masse ist die Schlüsseleigenschaft der Materie. Newton: These: Raum ist absolut, von Materie unabhängig. II 39 Einstein: es gibt keinen "feld-leeren" Raum. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Self-consciousness | Sartre, J.P. | Fra I 264 Bewusstsein/SellarsVsSartre/SellarsVsDescartes: die These von der Selbstdurchsichtigkeit und Selbst-Erschlossenheit des Bewusstseins ist der "Mythos des Gegebenen". |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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