Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Counter-Enlightenment | Habermas | IV 222 Counter-Enlightenment/Habermas: the counter-enlightenment that began with the French Revolution gave rise to a critique of modernity that has since branched out widely. (1) Their common denominator is the belief that the loss of meaning, anomie and alienation, that the pathologies of bourgeois, post-traditional society in general, can be traced back to the rationalisation of the lifeworld itself. This backward-looking critique is at first a critique of bourgeois culture. MarxismVsEnlightenment: the Marxist criticism of bourgeois society, on the other hand, starts with the circumstances of production because it accepts the rationalization of the lifeworld, but wants to explain the deformations of the rationalized lifeworld from conditions of material reproduction. This approach requires a theory that operates on a broader basic conceptual basis than that of the "lifeworld". >Enlightenment, >Lifeworld, >Bourgeoisie, >Society, >Culture. 1. While this tradition was represented by authors such as A. Gehlen, M. Heidegger, K. Lorenz, C. Schmitt between the wars, today it continues at a comparable level only in French poststructuralism. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Enlightenment | Herder | Gadamer I 204 Enlightenment/History/Herder/Gadamer: [the Historical School bases] its claim [on Herder] that not speculative philosophy but only historical research can lead to a universal historical view: HerderVsEnlightenment: Herder's attack against the rational pride of the Enlightenment had its sharpest weapon in the exemplary nature of classical antiquity, which Winckelmann in particular had proclaimed. Winckelmann: His "History of the Art of Antiquity" was unmistakably more than a historical account. It was a critique of the present and it was a programme. But by virtue of the ambiguity inherent in all critique of the present, the proclamation of the exemplary nature of Greek art, which was intended to establish a new ideal for its own present, nevertheless represents a genuine step towards historical knowledge. ((s) WinckelmannVsEnlightenment). Herder only needed to go a little beyond the foundation laid by Winckelmann and to recognize the dialectical relationship between exemplariness and unrepeatability in all the past in order to provide the teleological historical view of the Enlightenment with a universal historical world view. Thinking historically now means that each epoch has its own right to exist, indeed its own perfection. Herder has fundamentally taken this step. GadamerVsHerder: The historical view of the world could certainly not yet be fully developed as long as classical prejudices conceded classical antiquity an exemplary special position. Not only a teleology in the style of the rationalism of the Enlightenment, but also an inverted teleology, which reserves the perfect of a past or a beginning of history, still recognises a measure beyond history. >History/Gadamer, >History/Winckelmann, >History/Historism. |
Herder I Johann Gottfried Herder Herder: Philosophical Writings Cambridge 2002 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Enlightenment | MacIntyre | Brocker I 659 Enlightenment/Moral/Ethics/MacIntyre: For MacIntyre, Enlightenment represents a failed attempt to overcome post-medieval pluralism and eclecticism with the help of universal moral based on reason.(1) >Pluralism, >Universalism, >Morality. The Enlightenment had wanted to take "incoherent fragments of a once coherent system of thought and action"(2) as a basis. Problem: there are breaks between a de-teleologization of the moral system and a simultaneous dependence on a teleological framework. >Teleology. MacIntyreVsEnlightenment: the search for a moral standpoint that pretends to be independent of social order is an illusion. Obligations, rules and laws have replaced goods, traditions and social conditions. >Duty, >Laws, >Rules. MacIntyreVsKant: in his moral writings the "thought that moral is something other than following rules Brocker I 660 got almost, if not completely out of sight".(3) >I. Kant, >Morals/Kant, >Categorical Imperative, >Principles. 1. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, Ind. 1981. Dt: Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend. Zur moralischen Krise der Gegenwart. Erweiterte Neuausgabe, Frankfurt/M. 2006 (zuerst 1987), S. 61. 2. Ibid. p. 80 3. Ibid. p. 313f. Jürgen Goldstein, „Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Enlightenment | Romanticism | Gadamer I 278 Enlightenment/Romanticism/RomanticismVsEnlightenment/Gadamer: In opposition to the Enlightenment's belief in perfection, which thinks towards the completion of liberation from and the prejudices of the past, now the early times, the mythical world, the unbroken life in a "natural society" not decomposed by consciousness, the world of Christian chivalry wins romantic magic, yes, primacy of truth.(1) >Cf. Myth/Romanticism. The reversal of the precondition of the Enlightenment results in the paradoxical tendency of restoration, that is, the tendency to restore the old because it is the old, the conscious return to the unconscious, etc., and culminates in the recognition of the superior wisdom of the mythical prehistoric age. However, it is precisely through this romantic reversal of the value standard of the Enlightenment that the precondition of the Enlightenment, the abstract opposition of myth and reason, is immortalized. All criticism of the Enlightenment now takes the path of this romantic reflection of the Enlightenment. The belief in the perfectibility of reason jumps over into the belief in the perfection of the "mythical" consciousness and is reflected in a paradisiacal primeval state before the fall of thought.(2) >Science/Romanticism. 1. In a small study on Immermann's "Chiliastic Sonnets" (Kleine Schriften II, pp. 136-147; now in vol. 9 of the Ges. Werke) I have analysed an example of this process. 2. Cf. my works "Mythos und Vernunft", (Kl. Schr., IV, p. 48-53; in Vol. 8 of the Ges. Werke) and "Mythos und Wissenschaft" (in vol. 8 of the Ges. Werke) |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Nietzsche | MacIntyre | Brocker I 660 Nietzsche/Moral/Ethics/MacIntyreVsEnlightenment/MacIntyre: in Nietzsche, MacIntyre recognizes the "moral philosopher of the present". (1) He had diagnosed the failure to rationalise moral and had drawn the consequences from this state of affairs. He unmasked moral as an underlying will to power. He is the "outermost opponent of the Aristotelian tradition" (2). NietzscheVsAristotle. >F. Nietzsche, cf. >Aristotle. 1. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, Ind. 1981. Dt: Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend. Zur moralischen Krise der Gegenwart. Erweiterte Neuausgabe, Frankfurt/M. 2006 (zuerst 1987), p. 155 2. Ibid. p. 345 Jürgen Goldstein, „Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Objectivity | MacIntyre | Brocker I 656 Objectivity/Moral/Modernity/Enlightenment/Aristotele/Thomas Aquinas/MacIntyre: Following Aristotle and his renewal by Thomas Aquinas, MacIntyre attempts to reconstruct an objective ethic and to bring it into position against what he sees as the failed efforts of the Enlightenment.(1) - MacIntyreVsEnlightenment. Morals/MacIntyre, Ancient Philosophy/MacIntyre, >Enlightenment/MacIntyre. 1. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, Ind. 1981. Dt: Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend. Zur moralischen Krise der Gegenwart. Erweiterte Neuausgabe, Frankfurt/M. 2006 (zuerst 1987) p. 40. Jürgen Goldstein, „Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Prejudice | Enlightenment | Gadamer I 275 Prejudice/Enlightenment/Gadamer: There is (...) very well also a prejudice of the Enlightenment, which carries and determines its nature: This fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudices in general and thus the disempowerment of tradition. An analysis of the history of concepts shows that it is only through the Enlightenment that the concept of prejudice finds the negative accentuation to which we are accustomed. >Prejudice/Gadamer. Unfoundedness: the German word [Vorurteil] seems to have been limited by the Enlightenment and its criticism of religion to the meaning of "unfounded judgement"(1) Enlightenment: In the eyes of the Enlightenment, the lack of a statement of reasons does not leave room for other ways of validity, but means that the judgment has no substantive reason, i.e. is "unfounded". GadamerVsEnlightenment: This is a real conclusion in the spirit of rationalism. The discrediting of prejudices in general and the claim of scientific knowledge to eliminate them completely is based on it. Gadamer I 276 [The] doctrine of prejudices developed by the Enlightenment (...) [brings] the following basic division of prejudices: a distinction must be made between the prejudice of human prestige and that of haste.(2) This division has its origin in the origin of prejudices with regard to the persons who hold them. It is either the prestige of others, their authority, which leads us to make mistakes, or the haste in oneself. The fact that authority is a source of prejudice agrees with the well-known principle of the Enlightenment, as Kant put it: "Have the courage to use your own intellect. >I. Kant. 1. Leo Strauss, Die Religionskritik Spinozas, p. 163 2. Praeiudicium auctorltatls et preclpltantiae: As Christian Thomasius already said in his lectiones de praeiudiciis (1689/90) and his "Introduction of the Doctrine of Reason c. 13, SS 39/ 40. Cf. the article in Walch, Philosophisches Lexikon (1726), p. 2794ff. 3. In the beginning of his essay: »Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?« |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Prejudice | Gadamer | I 273 Prejudice/Understanding/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: It's not the case that if you listen to someone or start to read someting, you don't have to forget all the pre-opinions about the content and all of your own opinions. Therefore, a hermeneutically trained awareness of the otherness of the text must be receptive from the outset. But such receptiveness requires I 274 neither factual nor even self-elimination, but includes the detached appropriation of one's own prejudices and preconceptions. It is important to be aware of one's own bias so that the test presents itself in its otherness and thus has the opportunity to play off its factual truth against one's own pre-opinion. >Understanding/Gadamer, >Hermeneutic Circle/Heidegger. Only [the] recognition of the essential prejudice of all understanding sharpens the hermeneutical problem to its real peak. I 275 GadamerVsHistorism: Measured by this insight, it becomes clear that historism, despite all criticism of rationalism and natural law thinking, is on the ground of the modern Enlightenment and shares its prejudices which were not seen through. For there is very well also a prejudice of the Enlightenment that carries and determines its essence: This fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudices in general and thus the disempowerment of tradition. An analysis of the history of concepts shows that it is only through the Enlightenment that the concept of prejudice finds the negative accentuation to which we are accustomed. Prejudice in itself means a judgement that is made before the final examination of all factually determinant moments. In case law, a prejudice meant a preliminary legal decision before the actual final judgment was made. For the party in the lawsuit, however, the issuing of such a prejudice against that person meant an impairment of his or her chances. So préjudice as well as praeiudicium simply means impairment, disadvantage, damage. But this negativity is only a consecutive one. It is precisely the positive validity, the prejudicial value of the preliminary decision - as well as that of any precedent - on which the negative consequence is based. Unfoundedness (German: "Unbegründetheit"): The German word seems to have been limited by the Enlightenment and its criticism of religion to the meaning of "unfounded judgment"(1). Enlightenment: In the eyes of the Enlightenment, the lack of a statement of reasons does not leave room for other ways of validity, but means that the judgment has no substantive reason, i.e. is "unfounded". GadamerVsEnlightenment: This is a genuine conclusion in the spirit of rationalism. The discrediting of prejudices in general and the claim of scientific knowledge to eliminate them completely is based on it. >Rationalism. 1. Vgl. Leo Strauss, Die Religionskritik Spinozas, S. 163 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Various Authors | Rorty Vs Various Authors | V 84 Englightenment/Rorty: religion, myth and tradition can be brought into contrast to an ahistorical Something that is common to all men. GadamerVsEnlightenment/HeideggerVsEnlightenment/Rorty: man himself is historical through and through. >Enlightenment. IV 143 RortyVsSearle/RortyVsCuller: (like Derrida): both consider textbook distinctions to be terribly important. We should return to the ironic skepticism of the Phenomenology of Spirit. III 180 RortyVsMann, Thomas: "Dr. Faustus" only frilly generality. VI 364 "Significance"/"Meaning"/Stag/Terminology/Rorty: differentiation by E. D. Hirsch: Def Significance/Hirsch: position of a text in a different context. Def "Meaning"/Hirsch: what is in line with the intentions of the author at the time of writing the text. RortyVsHirsch But nothing depends on that. Rorty: It's always about putting a statement into a context! We can go about it as anachronistically as we want as long as we are aware of it. Truth/Interpretation/Rorty: the determination of the truth depends on that one puts this statement into the context of the allegations that we would be prepared to establish ourselves. Truth and meaning cannot be determined independently. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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