Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 16 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adverbs | Evans | II 211 Adverb/Evans: Standard adverbs: Example "breathless". Intensional adverbs: Example "good as King". Both receive the separation rule SR as valid - none involves functions of sets to subsets. Davidson: Separation rule: attribution of sets of events to adverbs and sets of n+1-tuples, of events and n-tuples of objects, to verbs. Problem: to find an appropriate separation rule for "good". II 220 Adverb/Evans: an adverb is assigned to a set of events: it really is a (single or multi-digit) predicate. E.g., "carefree": sentence adverb - "before": no sentence link. Definite Description/Evans: not a term. >Descriptions. BrandomVsEvans: a description is in fact a term. >Descriptions/Brandom. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Beliefs | McDowell | I 168 Belief/McDowellVsDavidson: He could also have said: nothing is conceivable as a reason for a belief if it is not also located in the space of reasons, such as the fact that it seems to a subject to be this and that. >Belief/Davidson. Of course it is not the same, whether something seems to me to be this and that or if I am convinced that it is so. I 192 McDowellVsPeacocke: ... that is not proof that the non-conceptual content is conceivable as the reason for a subject to be convinced of something. The subject may not even have reasons. Example: the experienced cyclist makes the right movements without the need for reasons. The description does not require reasons either. >Experience/Peacocke, >Perception/Peacocke. I 193 McDowellVsEvans, McDowellVsPeacocke: this neither justifies the assumption that judgments and beliefs are founded in experience, nor that beliefs are founded by experience "as reasons". Experience/World/McDowell: the condition of correctness is that the object is actually square. --- Rorty VI 179 McDowellVsSellars/Rorty: beliefs can also be justified by mental processes that are different from judgments. >Judment/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Concepts | McDowell | I 33f Concepts/McDowell: are used in receptivity. Concept/McDowell: something that lies beyond the reach of spontaneity of naming "a concept" and then calling the relationship "rational", is fraudulent labelling. >Spontaneity. I 59 Concept/McDowell: we must not imagine the world to be "behind the outer border of the conceptual realm". Otherwise Davidson would be right, of course, there would be nothing but purely causal effects of the world on us. But there is no such border. We can say this now without becoming idealists because of it or disregarding the independence of reality. >Myth of the given, >Reality. I 86 Concept/McDowellVsEvans: the tendency to apply a concept does not come out of the blue: When someone makes a judgment, it is wrested from him by experience. >Experience/McDowell, >Judgment/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Experience | Evans | McDowell I 73 Experience/Evans: experience is not conceptual. But it has representative content. McDowellVsEvans: experience is conceptual. Definition experience/Evans: a state of an information system is only an experience if it is the input of a thinking, conceptual and logically information system. >Information system/Evans. E.g. animals probably have a feeling for pain, but no a concept of pain. Pain/McDowell: pain is not conceptual, it is inner experience. Experience/McDowell/Evans: in both of us the experience in the Kantian sense is limited, by the connection to the spontaneity (conceptuality). Experience/Evans: although it is not conceptually in Evans (and therefore, according to Kant, it must be blind), he wants to protect it by asserting a "content". That is, an objective property of reality must be present to the subject. Namely, as an apparent view of the world. McDowellVsEvans: without concepts, that does not make any sense. Evans: on the other hand, he makes the demand that perception objects must be supported by an "accompanying theory". McDowell: that is precisely the >spontaneity. --- McDowell I 80/81 ff Experience/Evans: its richness of detail cannot be grasped with terms! For example, there are much more color shades that can be experienced than concepts which are available for these color shades. ((s) The notion of difference is sufficient when samples are present.) McDowell I 91 EvansVsDavidson: (different horn of the dilemma): experience is probably outer conceptual, but still subject to rational control by the outside world. --- Frank I 524f Experience/Evans: experience is different from self-attribution: it is not clearly true/false. I 526 Judgment: although judgments are based on experience (non-conceptual), they are not about the state of information - the "inner state" deos not become the object. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Experience | McDowell | I 34f Experience/McDowell: is passive. Nevertheless, it brings abilities into the game, which actually belong to spontaneity. >Spontaneity. I 35 Spontaneity/McDowell: we must look at the expanded spontaneity as if it were subject to a control which originates outside of our thinking. This cannot be the "given". Given/experience/McDowell: how the experience of a person represents things is outside its influence, but it depends on it itself whether it is accepted or rejected by the appearance. >Reality, >Myth of the given. I 161 Experience/Quine: not subject to natural laws. Therefore, it cannot play any role within >justification. Only raw causal link to sentences. Can only lie outside the area of the reasons. >Space of reason. I 58 Experience/McDowell: includes much more than qualities. >Quality. I 81 McDowellVsEvans: E.g. Colors: Fine-grained: we should not always assume that there must be a matching pattern. There must also be recognition in the game. >Color, >Qualia, >Recognition. Thinking: there are surely thoughts that cannot be put into words so that their contents are completely determined. I 147 Definition "inner" experience: sense sensations and emotional states. (Only applies to humans). Cf. >Sensory impressions/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Identification | Evans | Davidson I 20 Identification/demonstratives/Evans: identification is always demonstratively (ostensive definition, pointing). - Therefore the thought of a unicorn is no idea. >Unicorn example, >Non-existence, >Acquaintance, >Ideas. DavidsonVsEvans: there are no objects that are immune to misidentification (DavidsonVsDescartes). >Incorrigibility. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Judgments | Evans | McDowell I 73 Judgment/McDowellVsEvans: (...) the judgment does not introduce a new kind of content! It simply confirms the conceptual content that comes from experience! Justification/McDowell: justification does not have to consist in one derivation step from one content to another. A typical perception judgment makes a selection, from a richer content provided by the experience. McDowell I 74 Evans/McDowell: important: Evans says that experiences are states of the information system, but he does not say that the idea of experience is identical with the idea of the information system. The states of the information system with its non-conceptual content (for example, of animals) are not ipso facto states of a conscious subject. McDowell I 84 Judgment/Evans: Evans thinks that view and concept must be divided between experience and judgment. (McDowellVsEvans). |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Language | Dummett | I 11 ff Evans: Thesis: Language can be explained by modes of thinking - DummettVsEvans: vice versa! (Frege ditto). Husted IV 448 DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: Language is not an idiolect, but common language prevails. (> Two Dogmas/Dummett). 1) Frege, Wittgenstein earlier: language as a means of representation or reproduction of reality, "the meaning of a sentence is its truth condition". 2) later Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson, Searle: everyday language and speech act theory: the constitutive rules of the language are not primarily a representation of reality, but allow actions of various kinds. "the sense of an expression is its use". McDowell I 152 Language/Dummett: 1) an instrument of communication 2) carrier of meaning. None should be primary. Language/McDowellVsDummett: both are secondary. Primarily, language is a source of tradition. (McDowell per Gadamer). To acquire language means to acquire spirit. ((s) Cf. >Gadamer.) Dummett III (b) 81 Language/infinite/Dummett: each quantity of knowledge is finite, but must allow an understanding of infinitely many sentences. III (c) 145 Idiolect/DummettVs: Language is not a family of similar idiolects, but the speaker declares responsibility of the common usages - without fully dominating them. III (c) 150 The concept of idiolect is important to explain variations, but idiolect can be explained by language, not vice versa. Horwich I 461 Language/DavidsonVsDummett: is not a "veil" - it is a network of inferential relations. - Nothing beyond "human abilities" - Like a stone against which we hit ourselves - and that is stone by stone, bit by bit. ((s) > satisfaction ,not >making true.) - This applies to "this is good" and "this is red". (1) - DavidsonVsMoore/DavidsonVsDummett. 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Language | Evans | Dummett I 11 Language/Evans: Language explained by modes of thinking - DummettVsEvans: vice versa! Modes of thinking are explained by language! (Frege ditto). Language/Evans/Dummett: Gareth Evans argues that language can only be explained with the help of terms for different types of thoughts that are considered independent of their linguistic expression. In his book "Varieties of reference" Evans attempts to analyse different ways of thinking about an object independently of language, in order to then explain different linguistic means of reference with the help of these ways of thinking about the object. DummettVsEvans: therefore Evans is no longer an analytical philosopher for me. Analytical philosophy emerged as soon as the "turn to language" was complete. Earliest example Freges Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884. Example numbers: How can we be given a number if we can't have an idea of it? Frege's answer is based on his well-known contextual principle. However, this is formulated as the defining principle of an exploration of language, not as a guideline for investigating modes of thought (as Evans suggests). DummettVsEvans: If thinking about an object existed only when we think something specific in relation to that object, Frege's answer would have been that the numbers are given by the fact that we capture complete thoughts about them. Context principle: Words only have meaning in a sentence. (Frege: "meaning"). Dummett: For Frege, an epistemological question (which is based on an ontological one) is to be answered by a language-related investigation. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Proximal Theory | Davidson | I (c) 53 Proximal/Meaning Theory/Davidson: same meaning with the same stimulus patterns. >Stimuli, >Stimulus meaning. Distal: same objects - here it must be translated several times: 1. Comparison of the linguistic response to changes in the environment 2. Own sentence that the radical interpreter himself/herself would express. I (c) 53f Distal/DavidsonVsQuine: same objects and causes for speakers. DavidsonVsQuine: the proximal theory leads to classical skepticism. >Skepticism. E.g. Gavagai: both could mean the same, whereby the same circumstances make all sentences true for one and for the other one all false. >Gavagai. Proximal/Quine: evidence is primary. Distal/Davidson: truth is primary: the meaning is linked to the truth conditions. Quine/DummettVsEvans: we should not align meaning on truth conditions. DavidsonVs: too simplified, every theory must relate meaning to truth and to evidence. Evidence/Davidson: are relations between sentences. - (There are no last data, only observing sentences). VsDistal theory: problem: there are probably several candidates for the position of the common cause item. E.g. every more comprehensive segment of the universe to the birth of the speaker for the utterance of "this is red". And so it would be the cause for any other disposition of the speaker. - That would equal the meaning of all observation sentences. I (c) 58 Proximal theory: does not guarantee that our theory of the world applies at all. Difference proximal/distal: as between meaning theories which a) assigns to the evidence (proximal, stimulus pattern) or b) to the truth (distal, objects) the primary status. Quine per a) (proximal). >Truth conditions, >Circumstances. I (c) 58 QuineVsEvans/DummettVsEvans: meaning does not come from truth conditions. Instead: proximal theory: stimulus patterns (evidence) instead of objects. - This is simplistic, since every meaning theory has to relate meaning to truth and to evidence. >Evidence, >Meaning theory. I (c) 59 DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsDummett: VsProximal theory: leads to skepticism, relativization on the individual: cartesian. >Cartesianism. I (c) 59 Evidence/Davidson: must be relations between propositions. - The theory cannot support this from the outside. I (c) 61 Proximal meaning theory: similar to Descartes, Dummett, Frege: stimulus patterns instead of objects are decisive. Glüer II 53 DavidsonVs social character of meaning: idiolect is also in principle interpretable (via causal hypotheses). >Idiolect. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Sense | Dummett | II (b) 72ff Sense/Dummett: The sense is a property of a single sentence, not of the full use of language. I 122 Sense/Capture/DummettVsFrege: The thought is not presented directly to the consciousness - rather grasping the sense: set of skills. I 123 The fact that the glasses are in the other jacket cannot be content of consciousness. I 124 Such examples (glasses) lead to an opposite direction according to which language is explained by thoughts that are considered to be language-independent, and not vice versa (> DummettVsEvans). - Saussure s conception of language as a code will avoid such a declaration - VsFrege: sense of the word is not the same as a part of the thought. EvansVsCompositionality. III (a) 25 Sense/Dummett: from division of states of affairs: 1) where the statement could be misused. 2) where it could be not misused. ad 1) Statement: false - conditional: false - atomic sentence or without truth value. ad 2): statement: true, Conditional: true or without truth value, atomic sentence: true. III (a) 28 Sense/Dummett: entirely determined by one knowing when it has an designated truth value and when a non-designated - finer distinctions only needed in complex sentences with operators. >Truth value/Dummett. III (b) 74 Sense/Dummett: not only through verification method, but understanding what circumstances must be realized. >Circumstances. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Terminology | Evans | Frank I 492ff Generality Constraint/Evans: the ability to think presupposes: a) a is F, b is F, etc. but also a is F, a is G, etc. - Non-fundamental notions are not connectable with all terms: e.g. this hallucinated necktie was made in Italy. (s) Generality Constraint: regulates the basic interconnectivity of terms, empirically, not logically.) VsEvans: the generality constraint does not really show the adequacy of the terms regarding "I"-imagination. Dilemma: a) I-imagination/DescartesVsEvans: is only about bodies, b) LockeVsEvans: is only about humans, not about the person. VsEvans: he presupposes unity instead of proving it. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Thinking | Evans | Dummett I 11 Evans: Language can be explained by modes of thought. - DummettVsEvans: vice versa! Modes of thought are explained by language. (Frege ditto). Dummett I 112 "Philosophy of thought"/Evans/Peacocke: The "Philosophy of thought" does not give the language the same basic position. - It deals with the problem of what it means to have a thought, as well as with the structure of the thoughts and their components. What does it mean that a thought is about an object of this or that kind? What does it mean to capture a concept? What makes a concept a part of a thought? Dummett I 115 DummettVsEvans: it is dangerous to reverse the priority of language against the thought (danger of psychologism when thoughts are subjective and not communicable). Dummett I 131 Communication/Understanding/Belief/DummettVsEvans: Evans is in danger of making understanding dependent on the belief that the intersubjectivity is based on the belief that the words of the other mean the same. But meaning does not depend on the individual consciousness, but objectively on the use. >Use theory. Dummett I 137 Analytical philosophy/DummettVsEvans: Language has priority over thoughts. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Thinking | Peacocke | Dum I 112 "Philosophy of thoughts"/Evans/Peacocke: Evans thesis: the language has no longer the basic position, - It deals with the problem of what it means to have a thought, and with the structure of thought and its components. What does it mean that a thought is about a subject of one kind or another? What does it mean to grasp a concept? What makes a term a component of a thought? >Thoughts, >Thought objects, >Belief objects. I 115 DummettVsEvans: dangerous to reverse the priority of language over the idea (risk of psychologism, when thoughts are subjective and incommunicable). >Psychologism, >Analytic philosophy/Dummett, >Language and thinking, >Thinking without language, cf. >Animal language, >Animals. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Truth Conditions | Evans | Evans I 318 My/Intention/Names/Truth Conditions/Evans: [My] goal (...) is to restore the connections between the aspects [of name use and intention]. Causal theory seems to clarify problems of meaning and intention in case of ambiguous statements. Even a child who cannot have comprehensive intentions can still say something specific. Evans I 312 Names/EvansVsDescription theory: the strong thesis that the conditions of the description theorist are sufficient is outrageous! The strict conditions of truth are quite unacceptable. Weaker thesis: a certain descriptive identification is necessary: understanding this is important: EvansVsKripke: his examples do not show that description theory is wrong. (Although I believe this too) 1. to say something, you have to aim at someone or something. 2. to have an intention, one must be in possession of a description. Davidson I 53 Truth conditions/DavidsonVsEvans: One should not align meaning with truth conditions. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Truthconditional Semantics | Davidson | I (c) 58 QuineVsEvans/DummettVsEvans: we do not get meaning from truth conditions. - Instead: proximal theory: stimulus patterns (evidence) instead of objects. This is simplistic, since every meaning theory must relate meaning to truth and to evidence. >Truth conditions, >Circumstances, >Proximal theory, >Semantics. Glüer II 18 Meaning/meaning theory: A. truth conditional semantics (Davidson) and - B. Verification theories of meaning. (Dummett, Putnam, Habermas). - All Verification theories use the verifiability of the assumed relationship - a) strongest version: a sentence understands who knows that it is true - b) weaker: understanding bound to knowledge of the verification procedures. (Dummett, Vienna Circle) - or acceptability conditions: Putnam and Habermas - according to them someone understands a sentence, who knows how to verify or when it is accepted as true. Cf. >Strength of theories. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dummett, M. | Stalnaker Vs Dummett, M. | II 1 "Linguistic image"/terminology/Stalnaker: Dummett's thesis that language goes before thinking. StalnakerVsDummett. II 2 The linguistic image even disturbed our understanding of the language. StalnakerVsDummett: I reverse Dummett's axiom: the philosophy of language can only be achieved through a philosophy of thinking. Def language/Grice/Stalnaker: is an instrument in order to achieve certain goals. (Stalnaker ditto) Stalnaker: we should distinguish means and purposes here. Def speaking/Stalnaker: is essentially a distinguishing of possibilities. Dummett also says so because to know under what truth conditions (tr.cond.) a proposition is true is to know which possibilities it excludes. II 74 Fatalism/Dummett: (Dummett "Bringing about the past"): either I will be killed in this attack or I will not be killed. Suppose I will. Then I would be killed even if I took precautions. Therefore, the precautions will be in vain. But suppose I will not be killed even if I did not take any precautions then precautions are not necessary. logic form/Stalnaker: K: I will be killed P: I take precautions Q precautions are useless R: precautions are unnecessary. 1. K v ~K - 2. K - 3.P >K - 4. Q - 5. ~K - 6.~P >~K - 7. R 8. Q v R Stalnaker: it is not sufficient to say that a particular step is not valid and leave it at that. Fatalism/DummettVsFatalism/Dummett: any sense of conditional making the step from 2 to 3 and from 5 to 6) valid must be too weak to make the conclusion of 3 to 4 valid. Therefore the whole argument cannot be valid no matter how the conditional is analyzed. Stalnaker: that is convincing but it would only be a complete solution if it also showed that there are at all in our language different senses (senses) of the conditional justifying each of these steps. StalnakerVsDummett: this will not work because the strength of his argument is based on a confusion between two senses (senses) of the conditional. (Semantic meaning and pragmatic meaning of the conditional). a) according to the semantic and pragmatic analysis (see above) there is a sense of the conditional, after the inference from II 75 2 to 3 is reasonable and also strong enough to justify the conclusion from 3 to 4. Fatalism/StalnakerVsDummett: the fallacy is not in what Dummett believes but both sub-arguments are good arguments. Namely, in the sense that anyone who is in a position to accept the premise, while it remains open whether the antecedent of the conditional is true, would be in a position to accept the conclusion. That means that if I were in a position to accept that I would be killed even if I had not yet decided whether I take precautions it would be reasonable to conclude that provisions are useless. ((s) before I decided: that means if the premise would be without truth values (tr.val.)). Accordingly, if I were in the position to know that I will not be killed. Fatalism/Stalnaker: the problem is the final step: a conclusion which seems to be of a valid form: the Constructive dilemma: has nothing substantial to do with conditionals. Step 8 is then justified like this: A v B; C follows from A, D follows from B So: C v D. Problem: this is not a reasonable inference even if one assumes that the subarguments are reasonable. Fatalism/Stalnaker: the subarguments are reasonable but not valid. Therefore, the whole argument fails. I 174 Reference/sense/Searle/Stalnaker: if a statement has no descriptive content there may be no connection to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: ... the object must be somehow singled out. Stalnaker: so in both cases it is about skills, use, habits, practices or mental states. Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both appear to take the view that a fundamental semantics (see above which fact makes that a statement has its semantic value) cannot be given satisfactorily. StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: but the two do not say that because they do not separate the two questions. a) what is the semantics e.g. for names b) what facts cause that this is our semantics. Stalnaker: if we separate them we can no longer rule out the possibility that any language could be a spoken language by us. Then the community can also speak a Mill's language. ((s) "Direct Reference": without intermediary sense, VsFrege). ((s) "Direct Reference": is an expression of Kaplan, it is here not used by Stalnaker). I 179 Propositional knowledge/StalnakerVsEvans/StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: even if this is correct – what I do not believe – there is no reason to believe that it is impossible to know singular propositions. E.g. Suppose we concede that you cannot know of a certain individual x that it is F if you cannot identify for G ((s) a second property) x than that the G that is F. Furthermore suppose the fact that x knows of y that it is based on F and is included by the allegation that y knows that G is F. ((s) identification by specific description). That means that certain conditions are necessary and others sufficient to have knowledge of a certain kind. I 180 Content/knowledge/Stalnaker: but nothing follows from these conditions for knowledge for the content of knowledge. Mere knowledge/mere reference/mere knowing/Dummett/Stalnaker: if isolated knowledge is meant by that we can admit that it is impossible but that does not imply that knowledge of x that refers a to x is not knowledge of a particular proposition. singular proposition/StalnakerVsDummett: e.g. "a refers to x". Dummett did not show that it is not possible to know such a singular proposition (to have knowledge of it). StalnakerVsDummett: it is difficult to say what conditions must be fulfilled here but the specification of the contents of a ascription is not the same as to say what it is that this knowledge ascription is true. Solution/Stalnaker: both for the problem at the level of the philosophy of mind as well as the semantic problem. A causal theory. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Evans, G. | Davidson Vs Evans, G. | I (b) 20 ff Gareth Evans: Demonstrative identification is the only possible psychological relationship that provides "fundamental identification" (> ostensive definition). If someone thinks they are thinking a thought with singular reference, while they are actually using a name with no reference (>non-existence), no proposition is given for them to think about, and consequently there is no thought for them to think in the first place. If they use a sentence that contains a name with no reference, they express no thoughts at all. DavidsonVsEvans: Cartesian pursuit of knowledge, which is guaranteed to be immune against failures. If it is assumed that all knowledge is given by a mental connection with the object, objects must be found in respect to which errors are impossible. As objects that are necessarily what they seem to be. DavidsonVsDescartes: there simply are no such items. Not even appearances are all that which they are thought to be! Even the aspects of the sense data can not be protect against misidentification, unless they are really objects. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Evans, G. | Dummett Vs Evans, G. | Davidson I 58 In a distal theory, the meaning is directly linked to the conditions which make sentences intersubjectively true or false. Here Quine sides with Dummett (DummettVsEvans) and opposes to aligning the meanings with the truth conditions. QuineVsEvans, DummettVsEvans: meaning not from truth conditions. Dummett I 11 Language/Evans: New Current: Gareth Evans argues that language could only be explained by means of concepts for different types of thoughts that are considered regardless of their linguistic expression. I 115 In his book "Varieties of reference" Evans tries to analyze language-independently different ways of thinking about an object in order to explain various linguistic means of referencing with the help of these ways of thinking about the object. DummettVsEvans: therefore, Evans is no analytical philosopher for me anymore. The anal. ph. came about as soon as the "turn to language" was completed. Earliest Example: Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic, 1884. DummettVsEvans: If thinking about an object only existed if you think something specific with regard to this object, then Frege’s answer would have been that the numbers are only given ,because we grasp complete thoughts about them. Evans: Language explainable by modes of thinking - DummettVsEvans: vice versa! (also Frege) Language is a social phenomenon, not private property of individuals. So there is still the possibility of conceiving thoughts as objective and entirely different from inner consciousness-events without having to resort to Platonic mythology. DummettVsEvans: Therefore, it is dangerous if you want to turn around the priority of the language over the thought like Evans and others. (Risk of psychologism if thoughts are subjective and incommunicable.) I 131 The meanings cannot depend on what happens in our consciousness. They could not if these inner processes were communicable! DummettVsEvans: at risk of deriving such an unauthorized view. The meaning is objective, because it is included in the use which a competent speaker has to make of this expression. Stalnaker II 1 Def Analytische Philosophie/Dummett/DummettVsEvans/Stalnaker: Thesis: die Philosophie des Denkens kann nur über die Philosophie der Sprache erfasst werden. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Evans, G. | Grice Vs Evans, G. | EMD II XXI Evans/McDowell: normal linguistic behavior is just as unconscious. (Only deviations are noticed). Then only two factors remain: 1) X’s belief about what S means from the lips of Y about t, 2) X’s beliefs about the relevant facts in the context. GriceVsEvans/VsMcDowell: a Gricean could say that we set too much store by the unreflected behavior and postulate smoothly functioning super beings that mimic our unconscious behavior. (>Platonism). We behave in an unreflected way as if we behaved very reflected. EMD II XXII And a proper understanding of this behavior depends on us recognizing this fact. Evans/McDowellVs: this seems very attractive, but we reject it: we find the question extremely difficult and our following considerations are insufficient. The appeal lies in the special phenomenological duplicity of language that makes Wittgenstein say: Signs/"Bestowing"/Wittgenstein: every sign in itself is dead, what bestows life upon them? |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Evans, G. | McDowell Vs Evans, G. | I 73 Judgment/McDowellVsEvans: but the judgment only introduces new types of content! It simply confirms the conceptual content that originates from experience! Justification/McDowell: does not exist in a derivation of one content from another. A typical perceptual judgment makes a selection from a richer content, which is provided by experience. I 75 Experience/Evans: although it is non-conceptual (and therefore must be blind, according to Kant) he wants to protect it by claiming a "content." That is, the subject is to have an objective property of reality. Namely as an apparent view of the world. McDowellVsEvans: doesn't make sense without concepts. Evans: contrasts this with the demand: objects of perception must be supported by an "accompanying theory." McDowell: just that is spontaneity. Spontaneity/animal/McDowell: distinguishes us from animals that have no terms. I 80/81 Experience/Evans: their richness of detail cannot be captured by concepts! Ex many more shades of color perceptible than terms available. (S) maybe the term difference suffices if samples are available. McDowellVsEvans: Ex colors: fine grain: we should not assume that there is always a proof-sample. I 86 There must also be recognition involved. Thinking: certainly, there are thoughts that cannot necessarily put into words in a way that their content would thereby be completely determined. Concept/McDowellVsEvans: the tendency to apply a concept does not come out of the blue. If anyone makes a judgment, it is wrested from him by experience. I 87 Experience/judgment/McDowell: the connection between the two is that experiences provide grounds for judgments. That is, the tendency to use concepts does not mysteriously hover independently of the situation as in Evans. I 89 McDowellVsEvans: there is no reason for a disection into factors of similarity and difference. Instead, we can say that we possess something that animals possess too, namely the sensitivity of the perception of the characteristics of our surroundings. We are different from animals only in the sense that our sensitivity is incorporated into the realm of spontaneity. I 91 Sensuality/concepts/McDowellVsEvans: Sensuality is conceptual. Without this assumption one lapses into the myth of the given if one tries to look at the rational control of empirical thinking. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Evans, G. | Quine Vs Evans, G. | Davidson I 58 In a distal theory, however, the meaning is directly linked to the conditions by which the sentences are intersubjectively made true or false. Here Quine sides with Dummett (DummettVsEvans) and is opposed to aligning the meanings to the truth-conditions. QuineVsEvans, DummettVsEvans: meaning not from truth conditions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Evans, G. | Verschiedene Vs Evans, G. | Frank I 571 Background/VsEvans: Question: is the following not unnecessarily involved? 1. a knowledge of what it means that any item is F, and 2. a knowledge of what it means that any object is a. The second would be a piece of knowledge of exactly the same kind as the first. So you may not have to assume that there are singular thoughts that somehow more closely contain the exercise of this knowledge and consequently you need not to have a notion of basic identification! EvansVsVs: a knowledge of what it means that something is F is a knowledge of how it is that any element of the objective order is F, and correspondingly for a. I.e. even if one were to drop the idea of basic identification, the overall picture of "I" thinking, "here" thinking and "this" thinking would be fundamentally similar: the role that the notion of the basic level played in this book would instead have been taken over by the notion of the objective or impersonal conception of the world, whereby the mastery of such thinking would be dependent upon an understanding of how it relates to the objectively viewed world. But it is not easy to tell exactly what that means: what it means to know exactly that any element is or is here or I am any element of the objective order! It is not clear what we want at all with this demand, if we do not assume that the subject formulates the truth of such statements Fra I 572 and can make decisions under favorable circumstances. It also seems that we could not make such an assumption at all: (Section 6.3 (not in this file): "Reference system": Reference System/Evans: such a thinking mode will not be able to reach a higher degree of impersonality. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Evans, G. | Peacocke Vs Evans, G. | I 169/170 Demonstratives/Evans: perceptually demonstrative ways of givenness are possible, because these conditions are fulfilled: in a normal perception situation, there is an information link between subject and object, and also the subject knows or is able to find out where the object is. If the subject has the general ability to know what propositions makes of the form "π = p" true for any π (where π is an identification of a public place without index words (in a non-indexical frame of reference)) if p is the notion of a place in its egocentric space. If it is also able to locate the object in its egocentric space, we can say that it has an idea of the object. Idea/Notion/Evans/Terminology/Intension/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: Evans "Idea" (notion) corresponds to my way of givenness "mode of presentation". Idea/Evans: Thesis: we can conceive the idea of an object a as consisting in its knowledge of what it is to be true for an arbitrary sentence of the form "δ = a". Peacocke: where "δ" is the area of the basic ideas of an object. Fundamental Idea/Evans: is what you have if you think of an object as the possessor of the fundamental ground of difference that it actually has. Peacocke: i.e. what distinguishes an object from all others. I.e. for material objects type and location. PeacockeVsEvans: we have already seen cases where the thinker was unable to locate the object in his egocentric space: E.g. the craters on the moon. I 171 E.g. apple in the mirror cabinet. But it still seems possible to think about it, for example, wonder where it is! It is true that it is possible to at least provide a rough direction in egocentric space, but that is hardly sufficient for the knowledge condition of Evans. In the case of the memory image, it is clearer that no localization in the current egocentric space is needed. pro Evans: there must be additional imaginable evidence, e.g. experience or tools for localization (if necessary, even space travel!). If that were not imaginable, we would have to assume that the subject was not able to think of the object in public space! pro Evans: an information link is not sufficient to think demonstratively about the object. VsEvans: but that is less than to demand that the thinker can locate the object at present. Weaker Requirement: Instead, a general ability of the subject can locate the object, if necessary, is sufficient. Evans: if you cannot locate an object, you can still think of it in the mixed demonstrative descriptive way of givenness: "that which causes my experience". But in normal cases this is a wrong description! Peacocke: it also seems to be wrong in the examples of the lunar craters, the apple in the mirror cabinet. PeacockeVsEvans: trange asymmetry: Idea/Evans: an idea a of a place in a self-centered space is an adequate idea of a place in the public space. Holistic/Evans: if an arbitrarily fundamental identification of a location is possible, it is holistic. (Varieties of reference, p. 162). Peacocke: this knowledge is grounded in a general ability to put a cognitive map of the objective spatial world over our own egocentric space. I 172 E.g. in some cases this will not be possible, for example, when you are kidnapped, or ended up in an unknown area, etc. Point: even in such cases, you can still use the demonstrative pronoun "here" (in reference to objects). I.e. the thoughts are still thoughts about public space! ((s) and the self-centered space). Idea/Demonstrative Way of Givenness/PeacockeVsEvans: so his theory does not demand any ability to give a public, non-egocentric individuation our thoughts to have thoughts about a place in the public space at all. Analogy/Peacocke: exactly analogous objections can be made in the case of demonstrative ways of givenness: E.g. Suppose a subject perceives an object of type F in the manner H. Then F is the token way of givenness. Then we can introduce: [W, Fs] for the perceptual "this F". Then there is exactly one proposition of the form "p = localization of [W, Fs] now", which is true, and the subject knows what it is for it that it is true for it. PeacockeVsEvans: why should we demand here, but not in the earlier example, that the subject also knows which p (or which in the earlier case) is mentioned in this one true proposition? This is particularly absurd in the case of the lost subject. PeacockeVsEvans: his theory allows that [W, Fs] is an adequate idea here, although the subject has no fundamental idea of the object. Peacocke: but if we insisted that it could have a fundamental idea if he had more evidence, then why is an analogous possibility not also sufficient for adequacy in terms of the egocentric space? I 173 There seem to be only two uniform positions: 1) Identification/Localization/Idea/Demonstratives/Liberal Position: sufficient for a genuine way of givenness or adequate ideas are the general ability of localization plus uniqueness of the current localization in the relevant space. 2) Strict position: this is neither sufficient for genuine ways of givenness nor for adequate ideas. PeacockeVs: this can hardly be represented as a unified theory: it means that, if you are lost, you cannot think about the objects that you see around you. That would also mean to preclude a priori that you as a kidnapped person can ask the question "Which city is this?". Demonstratives/Peacocke: Thesis: I represent the uniformly liberal position Demonstratives/Evans: Thesis: is liberal in terms of public space and strictly in terms of egocentric space! ad 1): does not deny the importance of fundamental ideas. If a subject is neither able to locate an object in the public nor in egocentric space ((s) E.g. he wakes up from anesthesia and hears a monaural sound), then it must still believe that this object has a fundamental identification. Otherwise it would have to assume that there is no object there. Anscombe: E.g. a subject sees two matchboxes through two holes which (are manipulated) so arranged that it sees only one box, then the subject does not know what it means for the sentence "this matchbox is F" to be true. The uniformly liberal view allows the subject to use demonstratives which depend on mental images, even if it has no idea where in the public space and when it has encountered the object. EvansVs: representatives of this position will say that the knowledge of the subject is at least partial, I 174 because this idea causally results from an encounter with the object. But that makes their position worse instead of better: for it completely twists the grammar and logic of the concept of knowing what it is for the subject that p is true. Ability/PeacockeVsEvans: but a capability can also consist in the experience of finding out the right causal chains in a given environment: the same goes for the localization of an object point seen in the mirror in egocentric space. PeacockeVsEvans: his distinction seems unreal: it may be simultaneously true that someone has a relation R to the object due to causal relations, and be true that the possibility of being in this relation R is a question of the abilities of the subject. E.g. (Evans) to recognize the ball: Peacocke: this is not a sensory motor skill, but rather the ability to draw certain conclusions, which however require an earlier encounter. This also applies to e.g. the cognitive map, which is placed over the egocentric space: PeacockeVsEvans: in both cases it does not follow that the presented object, remembered or perceived, is thought of explicitly in causal terms: the way of givenness is truly demonstrative. First Person/PeacockeVsEvans: the second major objection concerns thoughts of the first person: the different examples of immunity to misidentification, which contain the first person, roughly break down into two groups: a) here, immunity seems absolute: E.g. "I am in pain". I 175 b) Here, the immunity seems to depend on presuppositions about the world: if these assumptions are wrong, they open the possibility of picking out something wrong without stopping to use the word "I". These include: E.g. "I was on the ocean liner": memory image. E.g. "I sit at the desk": visual, kinesthetic, tactile perceptions. The distinction between a) and b) may be made by the constitutive role: "The person with these conscious states." Infallibility/Tradition/Evans: (absolutely immune judgments): the judgment to be a judgment of a specific content can be constituted by the fact that this judgement responds to this state. Peacocke pro. PeacockeVsEvans: Problem: can this infallibility be connected to the rest of Evans' theory? Because: I/Evans: Thesis: the reference of "I" may fail! Peacocke: how is that compatible with the absolute immunity of "I am in pain"? Conditionalisation: does not help: E.g. "if I exist, I am in pain" that cannot fulfill the purpose: the existence of the idea still needs the reference of "I". Similarly: E.g. "If my use of "I" refers, I am in pain": because "my use" must be explained in terms of the first person. Question: Can we use memory demonstratives which refer to previous use of first-person ways of givenness? E.g. "If those earlier uses of "I" speak, I am in pain." (Point: not "my uses"). PeacockeVs: that does not help: Descartes' evil demon could have suggested you the memories of someone else. (>Shoemaker: q-memories.) I 176 Constitutive Role/Brains in the Vat/BIV/EvansVsPeacocke: the constitutive role of [self] would not explain why the brains in the vat would be able to speak in a demonstrative way about their own experiences: Mental States/Evans: differ from all other states and objects in that they refer demonstratively to their owners. Pain is identified as an element of the objective order. Then someone can have no adequate idea of these mental states if he does not know to which person they happen. Peacocke: we can even concede thoughts about its pain to the brain in a vat, provided that it can give a fundamental identification of the person who has the pain. Peacocke: No, the nerves must be wired correctly. I.e. this is not true for the brains in the vat. So we can stick to the liberal point of view and at the constitutive role and the idea of a person. Also to the fact that the mental states are individuated on the person who has them. Individuation/Mental States/PeacockeVsEvans: not through localization (like with material objects), but through the person. I 177 E.g. Split-Brain Patient/Peacocke: here we can speak of different, but qualitatively equivalent experiences. From this could follow two centers of consciousness in a single brain. But: after the surgery we should not say that one of the two was the original and the other one was added later. E.g. olfactory sensation of the left and right nostril separate. Then there are actually separate causes for both experiences. ((s), but the same source.) Peacocke: it does not follow that in normal brains two consciousnesses work in harmony. Here, the sense of smell is caused by simultaneous input through both nostrils and is thus overdetermined. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Frege, G. | Evans Vs Frege, G. | Frank I 485 I/Here/Now/This/Index Words/Evans: are closely related. One and the same explanation pattern applies with three properties: 1) Criteria-free identification: in a certain sense there is even no identification at all! But this can be understood a a "broader sense of identification". Problem: possible misunderstanding: identification criterion of singular term is the Fregean sense. A "criteria-less sense" would then appear as a conceptual contradiction. Solution/Evans: Fregean sense: should be understood as the particular way to think of an object designated by an expression. 2) Limited Accessibility: "I" is not accessible to anyone at any time. Fra I 486 You have to be at the place in question in order to truthfully say "here". The behavior of "I", "this", etc. corresponds to this. I/Thoughts/Understanding/EvansVsFrege: it’s probably impossible for me to "grasp" other people’s "I" thoughts, but that does not mean it is impossible to understand them! Communication/Evans: It is not absolutely necessary to think the thoughts of others in exactly the same form as they do themselves in order to understand them. Limited Accessibility/VsEvans: Question: Is it not possible to have "here" thoughts, no matter where you are? EvansVsVs: misunderstanding: Fregean thoughts are carriers of un-relativized, absolute truth values. Thus it is impossible that one and the same idea is sometimes true and sometimes wrong. It is therefore wrong to speak of a way of givenness expressed by "here" (s) "Here" is not an intention, "here" no intention Kaplan: "I": "rigid intension") Evans: There are as many kinds of the givenness of "here" as there are places. Difference: type/token. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Geach, P. | Heim Vs Geach, P. | Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse Uni Konstanz Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Arbeitspapier 64; 1994 Heusinger I 13 E-Typ-Analyse/Eselssätze/Existenzquantifikation/EQu/Evans/Heusinger: ist eine direkte Reaktion auf Geachs Analyse. These Diskursanaphora nicht als gebundene Variablen sondern als bestimmte Kennzeichnung. HeimVsEvans/HeimvsE-Typ-Analyse: (Heim 1982, Kamp 1981) Problem: Die Einzigkeitsbedingung ist zu stark. Heusinger: Evans Theorie hat aber in letzter Zeit wieder erneut Zulauf bekommen. |
Heim I Irene Heim The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases London 1988 Heim I I. Heim Semantics in Generative Grammar Oxford 1997 |
| McDowell, J. | Schiffer Vs McDowell, J. | I 204 SchifferVsDavidson/SchifferVsMcDowell/SchifferVsEvans: thesis: a translation theory is possible for the Radical Interpretation (RI). compositionality/Schiffer: problem: If Davidson is right, and we first need a theory of meaning for our own language for the RI, then our language must have a compositional semantics. (…+…) |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Peacocke, Chr. | McDowell Vs Peacocke, Chr. | I 192 Concept/experience/Peacocke: prerequisite for the subject to have a concept of a square is the non-conceptual content (the experience). I 193 This property (the concept) has also a condition of accuracy, which relates to the world. McDowellVsPeacocke: that's no proof that the non-conceptual content is eligible as the reason for a subject to be convinced of something. Perhaps the subject does not even have reasons! Ex an experienced cyclists makes the right movements without the need for reasons. A description also does not require reasons. McDowellVsEvans, McDowellVsPeacocke: that qualifies neither to assume that judgments and beliefs are founded in experience, nor, that beliefs are founded on experiences "as reasons." I 194 McDowellVsPeacocke: flatulently abstruse conceptual apparatus: "protopropositional content", "experiential content", etc. McDowellVsPeacocke: he has to dissolve the alliance between reason and language, which has existed since Plato. (One word for both: "Logos") He has to dissolve the tie between the reasons for a subject to think how it thinks and the reasons it can give (articulable reasons). (Absurd). I 195 Experience/world/McDowellVsPeacocke: Ex Square: reason: "because of what it looks like." This is quite ok and just one reason for a conviction and not merely a "part of a reason ..." Ostension/concept/McDowell: Ex "It looks like ..." - need not be any less conceptual than that for which there is a reason. We can only get the rational relationship under control if we understand it conceptually, even if according to our theory (Evans) the content would be non-conceptual. Circle/Peacocke/McDowell: why does Peacocke believe, that in experience there must be bridges between the conceptual and what is outside? He thinks he has to avoid a circle. To explain the prperty of an obersvational concept we can not perceive the contents as conceptual fromthe very beginning (according to Peacocke). Ex colors: then, not only the term "red" is presupposed but, even worse, the "concept of the property of "Red."" Circle/McDowellVsPeacocke: that only shifts the problem. Why should we assume that we would always be able to explain what it means to have a concept? Ex neurophysiological conditions would not refer to what someone thinks if they think that something is red. (This is exactly what Peacocke wants). Circle/McDowell: the explanation of observational concepts must always be located outside the space of concepts. (also Wittgenstein). But not "lateral perspective." |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Psychologism | Dummett Vs Psychologism | I 115 Language is a social phenomenon, not private property of individuals. So there is the possibility of conceiving thoughts as objective and entirely different of inner consciousness-events without having to resort to Platonic mythology. DummettVsEvans: Therefore, it is dangerous if you - like Evans and others - to reverse the priority of language against the idea. (Danger of psychologism if thoughts are subjective and incommunicable). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Shoemaker, S. | Evans Vs Shoemaker, S. | Frank I 540 Memory/Evans: There is also memory activity on a non-conceptual level: that of the information system (perception state). E.g. It seems that something was the case in this or that way. These are no freely floating images whose reference to the past is read into them by the subject. I 542 ShoemakerVsEvans: the impression that memory-based judgments about oneself are free of identification is based on a linguistic triviality: we would not say of a person whose information comes from someone else "he remembers". EvansVsShoemaker: but it is not true that the freedom of identification is a mere illusion: EvansVsStrawson: rather, he exposes himself to the accusation. Fra I 543 Of taking advantage of the linguistic phenomenon, when he tries to prove the freedom of identification in question looking at the extraordinary utterance "I remember clearly that this memory took place, but did it take place in me?". Memory/Shoemaker: Memory-based judgments depend on identification and are therefore not immune to misidentification: E.g. we can imagine that the apparent memories of a person were in reality causally derived from other people (false memory). E.g. complete duplicate of a person (clone). (s) too absurd to be a convincing example. Fra I 544 Shoemaker: "Quasi Memory": "Q memory". E.g. if there are such false memories, then it seems to make sense to say "someone stood before a burning tree, but was it me?" EvansVsShoemaker: even if this is possible, it does not follow that normal judgments must be based on an identification! It’s not about distinction: "someone stood ... I was the one". Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
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| Radical Interpretat. | Schiffer, St. | I 204 SchifferVsDavidson / SchifferVsMcDowell / SchifferVsEvans / SchifferVs EMD: for RI a theory of translation is possible. |
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