Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Foster, J.A. | Davidson Vs Foster, J.A. | II 35 DavidsonVsFoster: my mistake was not assuming that any theory that gives the correct truth conditions could serve as an interpretation. My mistake was, however, (like Foster says) to overlook that someone could have a sufficiently clear theory without knowing that it is there! It was easy for me to overlook this, because I departed from the one who constructed the theory himself. FosterVsDavidson: Question: whether Davidson made clear enough what a competent translator must know. FosterVsDavidson: Davidson’s theory is in ruins because in order to secure the translation II 38 an intensional expression like "determines" (or "asserts") must be used. DavidsonVsFoster: But I’ve never tried that! My attempt at finding access to language and meaning, makes significant use of concepts such as belief and intention, but I do not think that these concepts can be reduced to something behavioristic or scientific. I avoid substantial use of unexplained linguistic concepts. Saying that an interpreter necessarily must know a so-called intensional concept does not ruin my theory. (Beliefs and intentions are also intensional). DavidsonVsFoster: has not exactly distinguished two problems: 1) whether the paratactical analysis can be applied here at all. (Marginal). 2) whether the radical interpretation is threatened if the relevant concept "determines" obscures an unanalysed linguistic concept. Davidson: I propose paratactic semantics for "determines", unless it can be shown that it is not working. Reference/DavidsonVsFoster: it cannot be sufficient to maintain the same reference, because then all true propositions would assert the same fact. II 40 DavidsonVsFoster: ...this is not a "notational variant", notation has nothing to do with it. Both accept the same notation, the possible-world semanticist and I. We differ in the semantic analysis. Reference/Translation/Token reflexive/Davidson: the fact that the reference is changed in translation often occurs in token-reflexive sentences (so-called by Reichenbach). (E.g. snow ... snow, this ... this). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Foster, J.A. | Hintikka Vs Foster, J.A. | EMD II 15 FostersVsDavidson: a truth theory is no longer truly interpreting for all languages if that what the elements designate exceeds that which is relevant to the truth. These languages include at least all extensional languages for which L is typical. VsFoster: there are at least 4 ways to attack this view: 1) HintikkaVsFoster: (correspondingly): Foster reads more meaning into an extensional language that its simple syntax allows. In such a language, the meaning of the elements does not exceed their truth-relevant designation function. The additional conditions cited by Foster ("the earth moves and...") are more of an extensional fragment of a richer, non-extensional language. 2) VsFoster: no natural language could ever be purely extensional, a language needs propositional attitudes, and these are attributed non-extensionally. 3) VsFoster: (weaker): even if there may be a purely extensional languages, all known natural languages are non-extensional. I.e. Foster’s conclusions have little relevance. 4) VsFoster: if the method of truth theory sufficed for a certain type of non-extensional language, we can easily adapt it to an extensional language by constructing the theory only for a hypothetical non-extensional language of which this language would be a fragment. Common denominator of this criticisms VsVsDavidson: that the peculiarity of the language with which Davidson’s theory is tested was not grasped. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intensionality | Pro | EMD II 151 LoarVsDavidson, LoarVsFoster: semantic analysis is non-formal, non-extensional, but intensional. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 |
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