Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Biopolitics | Agamben | Brocker I 826 Biopolitics/Agamben: Power analyses that make use of the concept of "biopolitics" focus on the concept of life - and not on the citizen, the subject, the subserviant - and thus focus on the growing current "politicization of life". Brocker I 827 Agamben now combines Foucault's shifts to biopolitics (1) with Hannah Arendt's shifts to the concept of life. (2) AgambenVsFoucault: he has failed to shift his field of activity to the policies of the great totalitarian states of the 20th century. (3) AgambenVsArendt: their analysis of totalitarian states lacks the aspect of biopolitics. Solution/Agamben: Agamben brings the two strands together in the terms "naked" and "holy" life. See Holiness/Agamben, Terminology/Agamben, Life/Agamben, Humans/Agamben. 1. Cf. Michel Foucault, Sexualität und Wahrheit, Bd. 1: Der Wille zum Wissen, Frankfurt/M. 1977. 2. Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder vom tätigen Leben, München 1960. 3. Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Torino 1995. Dt.: Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben, Frankfurt/M. 2002, p. 127. Maria Muhle, „Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Agamben I Giorgio Agamben Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben Frankfurt 2002 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Body | Agamben | Brocker I 830 Body/AgambenVsFoucault/Agamben: While Foucault had still referred to the "bodies and lusts" as a possible antipole to power, Agamben calls for greater restraint. Brocker I 831 Agamben: the body has always been a biopolitical body and thus a naked life for him. Nor is it possible to restore classical political distinctions such as that between "zōḗ" and "bíos" and thus either attribute the biopolitical naked body to the sphere of "oîkos" or to overcome it in favour of a political body.(1) >Biopolitics, >M. Foucault. 1.Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Torino 1995. Dt.: Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben, Frankfurt/M. 2002, p. 197. Maria Muhle, „Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Agamben I Giorgio Agamben Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben Frankfurt 2002 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Body | Baudrillard | Blask I 16 Sexuality/Body/BaudrillardVsFoucault: his theory of sexuality is obsolete: it does not analyze the simulacra. >Sexuality, >Simulacra, >Foucault. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Discourse | Bourdieu | Gaus I 158 Discourse/Bourdieu/Bohman: BourdieuVsFoucault: [In contrast to Foucault] Bourdieu's challenge is more epistemic, relativizing linguistic activities and practices to a background habitus, a set of dispositions inculcated in socialization. >Discourse/Foucault, >Discourse theory/Bohman. Bourdieu: the object here is to appeal to 'generative and implicit schemata' rather than explicit or consciously sanctioned rules. Practices are regular and reproducible patterns of action 'without being the product of rules and without presupposing a conscious aim or the express mastery of them' (Bourdieu, 1977(1): 55). He criticizes ideal theories for their 'linguistic communism', as blind to the forms of status and inequalities that make it possible for speakers to be authoritative and persuasive. The capacity to produce comprehensible utterances 'may be quite inadequate to produce sentences that are likely to be listened to, likely to be recognized as acceptable in all situations in which there is occasion to speak' (Bourdieu, 1991(2): 55). Normative discourse theories leave out social relations among speakers, their different social positions and their capacities to garner linguistic authority. Bourdieu thinks that because habitus is not a matter of rules, its limitations are not in principle accessible to speakers at the level of second-order Gaus I 159 communication, when speakers must offer explicit justification for their actions and practices. Both challenges see power as operating within discourse itself, not merely as an external constraint upon it. Bohman: these same sorts of constraints on discourse may also operate in the ways that deeply historically embedded inequalities such as race and gender shape discourse and restrict its reflexivity (Butler, 1993(3): 232). 1. Bourdieu, Pierre (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Bourdieu, Pierre (1991) Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Polity. 3. Butler, Judith (1993) Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex. London: Routledge. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Bourd I P. Bourdieu La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement, Paris 1979 German Edition: Die feinen Unterschiede. Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft Frankfurt/M. 1987 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Interest | Spivak | Brocker I 716 Interest/Desire/Subject/Politics/Emancipation/SpivakVsFoucault/SpivakVsDeleuze/Spivak: Foucault and Deleuze (1) equate the interest and desire of the subject with what is wrong according to Spivak (2): Both ignore the question of subject production, in which desire and interest can neither be described symmetrically nor mutually reinforced. (3) The reason for this can be found in Marx, in a distinction between two types of representation (see Representation/Marx): the political representative of the small farmers is a representative of the middle classes who is not really interested in the fate of the farmers.(4) >Representation/Spivak. 1. Michel Foucault, „Intellectuals and Power. A Conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze”, in: Donald F. Bouchard (ed.) Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault, Ithaca, N.Y. 1977, p. 207f 2. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Cary Nelson/Lawrence Grossberg (Ed.) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Urbana Ill./Chicago 1988 271-313. Dt.: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the subaltern speak? Postkolonialität und subalterne Artikulation, Wien 2008, S. 275-278. 3. Vgl. Morris 2010, 3f. 4. Vgl. Karl Marx, Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, Frankfurt/M. 2007 (zuerst 1852) Nikita Dhawan, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolSpiv I Gayatri Ch. Spivak Subaltern Studies. Deconstructing Historiography New York/Oxford 1988 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Philosophy | Habermas | Rorty III 142 HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsFoucault: their polemic against the Enlightenment turns the back on the social hopes of liberal societies. >Enlightenment, >Progress, >Liberalism, >HabermasVsAdorno, >HabermasVsFoucault. Rorty III 143 Habermas shares with the Marxists the assumption that the true meaning of a philosophical opinion exists in its political implications. >Marxism/Habermas, >RortyVsHabermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Politics | Spivak | Brocker I 716 Politics/SpivakVsFoucault/SpivakVsDeleuze/Spivak: According to Spivak, the micropolitics favored by Foucault and Deleuze, which focuses on local forms of resistance, can only be determined by ignoring macropolitical lines of conflict. The two theorists neglected the (Marxist) ideology theory, leading to a view in which the dominated are constructed as classical-humanist subjects who are aware of their social situation. ((s) According to Spivak, they are only limited. See Subject/Spivak, Emancipation/Spivak, History/Spivak). Nikita Dhawan, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolSpiv I Gayatri Ch. Spivak Subaltern Studies. Deconstructing Historiography New York/Oxford 1988 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Power | Baudrillard | Blask I 17 Power/BaudrillardVsFoucault: Power theory: its object has radically changed: no longer as in Foucault in defined areas like state and prison but everywhere. Baudrillard: Power has mutated into mere signs of itself. Foucault can only talk about the power because it has already disappeared. >Politics/Foucault, >Biopolitics/Foucault. Baudrillard thesis: Power is only there to hide that it is not there anymore. Power should be affirmed without limit, so that it ultimately turns against itself. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Reductionism | Baudrillard | Blask I 79 Reductionism/BaudrillardVsFoucault: a thinking which considers woman as the other of man's, madness as the other of reason, or the savage for the other of the civilized, is for Baudrillard reductionist, it assumes an inadmissible comparability. >Dialectic, >Comparability, >Comparisons, cf. >Dialectic/Barthes. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Relativism | Rorty | I 304 Relativism: The assertion that truth and reference are "relative to a conceptual system" sounds as if it said more. But that is not the case as long as our system of concepts simply stands for the things which we currently believe. >Convention, >Language community. II (b) 36 RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism". >HabermasVsFoucault, >Habermas, >Foucault. II (g) 152 Cultural relativism: is not relativistic as long as relativism amounts to the assertion that every moral view is as good as any other. >Cultural relativism. Rorty: our moral conception is much better than any competing view. It’s one thing to make the false assertion that there is no difference between us and the Nazis. A very different thing is to represent the correct assertion that there is no neutral common ground on which a Nazi and I can retreat to discuss. III 87 Schumpeter: "the insight that the validity of one’s own beliefs is only relative, and yet stand up for them fearlessly, distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian". Isaiah Berlin: one must not ask for more. >Isaiah Berlin, >Joseph A. Schumpeter. IV 11 Relativism/cultural relativism/RortyVsPutnam: false solution: a transcultural point of view. - That would be just another God point of view: ideal truth as limiting concept. >Relativism/Putnam, >Truth/Putnam. V 20 Cultures have no axiomatic structures. The fact that they have institutionalized norms actually says the same thing as Foucault’s thesis: that knowledge and power can never be separated. If you do not believe in certain things at a certain place at a certain time, you probably have to atone for it. >Culture, >Norms. VI 74 Relativism/Realism/PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism/Rorty: both assume that one could simultaneously be both inside and outside language. VI 77f Fascism/relativism/truth/Sartre/Rorty: E.g. tomorrow, after my death, people can decide to introduce fascism - then fascism will be the human truth. RortyVsSartre: not the truth - the truth would have been forgotten. Putnam: Truth is a third instance between the camps. RortyVsPutnam: correctness instead of truth - namely, according to our standards. According to what other standards, the ones of the fascists?. >Norms/Rorty, >Correctness. VI 79 Justification of the standards/Rorty: from our self-improvement. VI 246 Cultural relativism/Rorty: I am of the opinion that our Western culture is more than others. But this kind of relativism is not irrationalism. One does not have to be an irrationalist if one abstains from making one’s own network of beliefs as coherent and transparent as possible. >Cultural Relativism, cf. >Western Rationalism. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Representation | Spivak | Brocker I 716 Representation/Political Representation/Marx/Spivak: in reference to Marx' The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852), Spivak distinguishes between two forms of representation: According to Marx, the French parcel farmers do not represent a coherent class,(1) >Representation/Marx. Spivak: now distinguishes between "representation" as "speaking from" and "representation" as "speaking for".(2) SpivakVsDeleuze/SpivakVsFoucault: for these two authors, the two forms coincide. Thus the aesthetic portrait, which symbolically represents the disempowered as a coherent political subject, becomes a transparent expression of their political desires and interests. Problem: Deleuze and Foucault presuppose a coherence between interest and desire. >Interest/Spivak. 1. Vgl. Karl Marx, Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, Frankfurt/M. 2007 (zuerst 1852) 2. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Cary Nelson/Lawrence Grossberg (Ed.) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Urbana Ill./Chicago 1988 271-313. Dt.: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the subaltern speak? Postkolonialität und subalterne Artikulation, Wien 2008, S. 275-278. Nikita Dhawan, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolSpiv I Gayatri Ch. Spivak Subaltern Studies. Deconstructing Historiography New York/Oxford 1988 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Sexuality | Baudrillard | Blask I 16 Sexuality/Body/BaudrillardVsFoucault: his theory of sexuality is obsolete: it does not analyze the simulacra. >Sexuality, >Simulacra, >Foucault. Blask I 72 Abnormalities: three forms: 1. The hostage 2. The thickness 3. The Obscene 1. Hostage-taking: the only still relevant social relationship: between hostage and terrorist is ruling and being controlled. Blackmail. The principle of freedom is later based on security and ultimately on that of supersaturation. We are all hostages and blackmailers. The real problem for the terrorist is to get rid of his hostage. Blask I 73 2. Obesity: social proliferation, randomness of bodies. Against the difference between the sexes. Archaic multiplication by division and doubling. The commonality between the hostage and the obese is loss of the illusion. 3. The Obscene: not only the hostage and the obese are obscene, but almost all social phenomena: gambling, culture, sex, pornography and above all the social. Permanent commitment to transparency and obscenity. Blask I 74 Sexuality/Politics/Economics/Baudrillard: We live in a sphere of the transsexual, transeconomic, transaesthetic. >Psychological theories on sex differences. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Subjects | Spivak | Brocker I 715 Subject/SpivakVsDeleuze/SpivakVsFoucault/Spivak: Spivak criticises Foucault and Deleuze's positions as unintentional Eurocentrism(1): here one sees a complicity between Western knowledge formation and international economic interests.(2) >M. Foucault, >G. Deleuze. Subject/Foucault/Deleuze/Spivak: Although French philosophers reject the idea of a sovereign subject, since it is unable to do justice to the heterogeneity of networks of power, desire and interest, they argue that the oppressed themselves have knowledge and can speak for themselves. SpivakVs: they construct an undivided political subject while ignoring the discontinuity between desire and interest. According to Spivak, both authors also neglect the ideological construction of subjects on both sides of the colonial divide. >Colonialism, >Postcolonialism. 1. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Cary Nelson/Lawrence Grossberg (Ed.) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Urbana Ill./Chicago 1988 271-313. Dt.: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the subaltern speak? Postkolonialität und subalterne Artikulation, Wien 2008, S. 271, 274 2. Vgl. Michel Foucault, „Intellectuals and Power. A Conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze”, in: Donald F. Bouchard (ed.) Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault, Ithaca, N.Y. 1977, p. 205-217. Nikita Dhawan, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolSpiv I Gayatri Ch. Spivak Subaltern Studies. Deconstructing Historiography New York/Oxford 1988 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Ultimate Justification | Habermas | Rorty V 8 Foundation/final justification/RortyVsHabermas: I am distrustful of the remaining fundamentalism, striving for "universality." Habermas celebrates democracy, but he does not justify it. >Democracy, cf. >Constitution/Böckenförde. When HabermasVsFoucault raised the accusation of relativism and asked him to expose his "normative standards". >Relativism, >M. Foucault. Rorty: here I stand on the side of Foucault, who shrugs his shoulders and is silent. >Inner world/Habermas, >Language/Foucault. Rorty V 9 World/Language/RortyVsHabermas: VsClaim, that the world-developing (poetic) power of language (Heidegger, Foucault) must be subordinated to the practice of the inner world. Habermas IV 536 Ultimate Justification/Habermas: I call legal institutions legal norms which cannot be sufficiently legitimized by the positivist reference to procedures. For example, the foundations of constitutional law, the principles of criminal law and criminal procedure law. As soon as they are called into question, the reference to their legality is not sufficient. They require material justification because they belong to the legitimate orders of the lifeworld itself and, together with informal norms for action, form the background of communicative action. See Law/Habermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Foucault, M. | Baudrillard Vs Foucault, M. | I 17 BaudrillardVsFoucault: "Oublier Foucault" (1977). Baudrillard: teilt Foucaults Absage an freudsche und marxistische Theorien von Repression und Befreiung. BaudrillardVsFoucault: seine Theorie der Sexualität ist veraltet: analysiert nicht die Simulakra. - BaudrillardVsFoucault: Machttheorie: ihr Gegenstand hat sich radikal verändert: nicht mehr wie bei Foucault in abgesteckten Bereichen wie Staat und Gefängnis sondern überall. Baudrillard: Die Macht ist zu bloßen Zeichen ihrer selbst mutiert. - Foucault kann nur über die Macht sprechen, weil sie bereits verschwunden ist. I 79 BaudrillardVsFoucault: ein Denken, das die Frau als das Andere des Mannes, den Wahnsinn als das Andere der Vernunft, oder den wilden für das Andere des Zivilisierten hält, ist für Baudrillard Reduktionistisch, es unterstellt eine unzulässige Vergleichbarkeit! BaudrillardVsFoucault: gegen unzulässige Vergleichbarkeit: das Andere der Vernunft gibt es nicht |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 |
| Foucault, M. | Habermas Vs Foucault, M. | I 317 Will to Knowledge/Foucault: intervenes in the constitution of the scientific discourses. He determines the exception of the rules by which true is distinguished from false. (Power). HabermasVsFoucault: the so disguised origin of the concept of power from the metaphysics-critical concept of the will to truth and to knowledge also explains the systematically ambiguous use of the category "power". On the one hand, the innocence of a concept that can be used descriptively, on the other hand, a constitution-theoretical basic concept which only gives analysis its reason-critical meaning. I 318 HabermasVsFoucault: paradoxical combination of positivist attitude and critical aspirations. I 320 Foucault Thesis: Power and knowledge formations form an indissoluble unity. I 321 HabermasVsFoucault: this strong thesis can certainly not be justified with functionalist arguments alone. Form of Thought Proof: HabermasVsFoucault: he would have to prove that specific power strategies implement themselves in relevant scientific strategies of the reification of everyday language experiences, and thus preempt the sense of using theoretical statements about such constituted object areas. HabermasVsFoucault: he has not taken up this approach later, otherwise he would have noticed that objectivist approaches no longer dominated the field in the human sciences in the seventies. They compete rather with hermeneutical and critical approaches. I 322 HabermasVsFoucault: his genealogy appears in a confusing double role: on the one hand, the empirical role of an analysis of power technologies, on the one hand, a transcendental role of the same analysis of power technologies that are supposed to explain how scientific discourses are possible at all. The forced connection of the idealistic notion of transcendental synthesis with empiricist ontology is not a way out of the philosophy of the subject: the concept of power is taken from the philosophy of consciousness itself! I 323 HabermasVsFoucault: he turns the truth-dependence of power into the power-dependence of truth without further ado! Power becomes subjectless. HabermasVsFoucault: however, nobody escapes the conceptual constraints of the philosophy of the subject solely by performing inverse operations of the basic concepts. I 324 HabermasVsFoucault: his genealogy turns out to be exactly the presentistic, relativistic and normative cryptographic pseudo-science it does not want to be! It ends in hopeless subjectivism. I 325 HabermasVsFoucault: 1) involuntary presenteeism 2) unavoidable relativism of a present-oriented analysis which can only consider itself to be a context-dependent practical enterprise. 3) arbitrary partisanship of a criticism that cannot document its normative foundations. (Foucault is circumstantial enough to admit this. I 326 HabermasVsFoucault: even the radical historicist can explain power technologies and domination practices only in comparison with each other and not every single one as a totality of itself. I 327 HabermasVsFoucault: caught up in exactly the self-reference he fought: the truth claims are not limited only to the discourses in which they occur. I 328 Even the basic assumption of his theory of power is self-referencing; it must also destroy the validity, the basis of of the research inspired by it. I 330 HabermasVsFoucault: Foucault’s concept of power does not allow such a privileged notion of counter-power (E.g. the workers). Every counter-power already awakens itself in the horizon of power. I 336 He fights against a naturalistic metaphysics, which reifies a counter-power. HabermasVsFoucault: but therefore he also has to refrain from answering the question of the normative foundations of his criticism. HabermasVsFoucault: undialectical! Leveling of ambiguous phenomena - (Foucault admits weaknesses in earlier works) |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Foucault, M. | Putnam Vs Foucault, M. | V222 PutnamVsFoucault: he investigates with his relativism never clear examples like: peace is better than war. (Similar to Swift, and for the same reason: both are satirists). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Foucault, M. | Rorty Vs Foucault, M. | Rorty III 142 HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsFoucault: their polemics against enlightenment turns the back on social hopes of liberal societies. III 143 Habermas shares with the Marxists belief that the true meaning of a philosophical opinion consists in its political implications. V 8 Foundation/Final Justification/RortyVsHabermas: I distrust the remaining fundamentalism, striving for "universality". Habermas celebrates democracy, but he does not justify it. If HabermasVsFoucault alleges relativism and challenges him to disclose its "normative standards". >Ultimate Justification. Rorty: here I stand on the side of Foucault, who shrugs and says nothing. RortyVsFoucault: distrust him when he projects his desire for private Nietzschean autonomy in the public sphere. In this mood he rejects the democratic institutions. V 20 Cultures/Rorty: have no axiomatic structures. That they have institutionalized norms, actually means the same as Foucault's thesis that knowledge and power can never be separated. If at a certain time at a certain place you do not believe in certain things, you'll probably have to pay for it. V 21 RortyVsFoucault: but these standards are not "rules of language" or "criteria of rationality". They have the look of officials and policemen. Whoever disagrees, commits the Def Cartesian fallacy/Rorty: he sees axioms where nothing but shared habits reign. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Foucault, M. | Searle Vs Foucault, M. | I 217 Cognitive theory: here it is claimed that we would have drawn the conclusion, when we look at a tree from one and then know that he has a back. SearleVsCognitive theory: on the contrary, what we do is simply this: we see a tree as a real tree. >Background/Searle. The background is not a control system. SearleVsFoucault: that was the weakness of Foucault's concept of discourse formation (Foucault 1981)(1). He believed just as Bourdieu that rules are of such phenomena, as we discuss here. Searle: the rules interpret not themselves, to function they really need a background. >Rules/Searle, >Cognition/Searle. 1.M. Foucault Archäologie des Wissens, Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Hermeneutics | Foucault Vs Hermeneutics | Habermas I 325 FoucaultVsHermeneutics: self-reference is to be eliminated, the horizon is to be explained from basic practices. For example, the prohibition of gladiator battles is not to be traced back to the humanitarian influence of Christianity, but to be explained by the dissolution of one power information by the next. I 326 HabermasVsFoucault: even the radical historian can only explain power technologies and dominance practices in comparison with one another and by no means each one as a totality from itself. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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