Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Continuants | Simons | I 117 Continuant/Broad: a continuant has no temporal parts, only spatial parts. Contrast: event: an event has spatial and temporal parts. Continuant: e.g. human. N.B.: that is why he is able to change. ((s) Otherwise there is the question of whether he remains the same.) >Temporal identity, >Personal identity. Contrast: occurrence/Broad: an event cannot change. ((s) A human (continuant) can grow old - an event cannot grow old.) >Humans, >Events, >Persons. I 127 Continuants/SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: things that can have mass are continuants and they are used in the argument of the Relativity Theory that nothing which has a mass can be accelerated beyond the speed of light. >Four-dimensionalism, >Relativity Theory. I 173 Continuants/Locke: continuants are constant clusters of matter. They cannot lose or gain any parts (SimonsVsLocke). >J. Locke. I 175 Temporal Part/continuants/mereology/SimonsVsAll other authors: thesis: even continuants can have temporal parts, i.e. they are not mereologically constant, but mereologically variable. Simons: thesis: continuants can also have an interrupted existence. >Existence. I 176 Continuants/Simons: not all continuants have to be material things, e.g. smile, nodes, waves: they are rather disruptions of material things. I 180 Def coincidence/continuants/Simons: coincidence predicate: CTD5 a ‹ ›t b ≡ a ‹t ∧ b ‹t a For a similarity of parts in terms of the mutual inclusion see Identity/Simons. I 187 Continuant/ChisholmVsAll other authors: thesis: a continuant is mereologically constant. Mereologically variable continuants are not really primary substances, but rather logical constructions of mereologically constant continuants. Organisms are only constructions. I 305 Event/continuants/Simons: event: here, a formula like "a‹b" is complete. Continuants: we need an additional time index here: ((s) with quantification) "(∃t)[a‹t b]". I 350 Continuant/Simons: events happen to a person and are called their life (or life story). Context: not all events of a life are causally connected. Solution: genetic identity (gene-identical): i.e. all events involve a single continuant. I 351 Continuant/temporal relationship/Simons: it is not the continuant, which belongs together, but its life story. HumeVsContinuants, RussellVsContinuants: continuants bring about a reduction to events, they are mere clotheslines. Whether a continuant exists depends on whether there is a life story to it. I 353 Simons: nothing maintains their continuous existence. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Process/Flux | Simons | I 124f Flux/Heraclitus/ChisholmVsQuine: Quine needs spatial and temporal extension on the same level Chi: not every sum of flux stages is a flux process. We have to say what conditions a sum must satisfy to be a flow process. >Mereological sum. Problem: that in turn presupposes continuants: shore, observers, absolute space or an introduction of "is co-fluvial with". >Continuants. This could only be explained circularly by "is the same river as". Thus, the four-dimensionalism has not eliminated all singular or general terms that denote continuants. SimonsVsQuine: one does not bath in a flux stage but in the whole flux. Error: it is wrong trying to change the subject to leave the predicate unchanged. I125 Time-stage/flux-stages/SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: stages can be misleading: e.g. a Philip stage is not drunk, but the whole man. One does not bath in a flux stadium. A consequent description in four-dimensionalism is only achieved by higher beings. For us, this is not decidable. Terminology: process ontology equals four-dimensionalism here. Simons: this is not impossible, only the language is different. >Four-dimensionalism. I 127 SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: four-dimensionalism is a convenient representation of the Minkowski-space, but representation is not an ontological argument. >Minkowski-space. I 126 Process/Geach/Simons: a process has all its properties timeless, that means, what has different properties, are the temporal parts and not the whole process. Hence, there is no change, e.g. like the poker which is hot on one end and cold at the other. >Timelessness. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Four-Dimensionalism | Strawson Vs Four-Dimensionalism | Simons I 126 Reference/StrawsonVsFour-Dimensionalism: (1959): reference to everything is parasitic to the reference to perceptible continuants, e.g. body and people. If that is true, we cannot replace the ordinary language objects by four-dimensional ones. Simons: maybe you could quite consistently translate all of this in process-ontology, but that would be only one way for higher beings that might describe us with it. And this is not a priori to decide. Process-Ontology/Simons: all that does not show its impossibility, only its foreign nature. We must in fact not only adopt continuants, but also events that they involve, in particular changes of continuants. Terminology/(s): here: four dimensionalism = process-ontology. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Four-Dimensionalism | Chisholm Vs Four-Dimensionalism | Simons I 120 Object/Thing/Chisholm: Thesis: "mereological constance objects in the original sense: entia per se: cannot change. Objects in the derived sense: Entia per alio: are subject to flux, but only in the sense that they are successively constituted by different entia per se, which differ in their parts. Continuants/Chisholm: he does not deny them! Rather ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism (because of his ontology of temporal objects). Simons I 124 Event/occurrents/Ontology/Chisholm/Simons: Chisholm disproves three arguments for the ontology of events (occurrences): (Chisholm 1976, Appendix A) 1. Argument of spatial analogy: there is a great disanalogy between space and time: a thing cannot be in two different places at the same time, but a thing can be in the same place at two different times. ChisholmVs: this is not conclusive, a defender of temporal parts can argue against it. But then he can use this argument to argue for his thesis without circularity. 2. Argument of change (change): for example, how can Philip be drunk once and sober once? For him, both are contradictory together. ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism/Solution: instead of saying a time stage of Philip is (timelessly) drunk, we simply say in everyday language: he was drunk last night and is now sober. Either we use grammatical times as in everyday language, or we relativize our predicates to the time ((s) "have-at-t", "be-at-t"). 3. Argument of the river (not "flux-argument"): Example River/QuineVsHeraclitus: Quine uses the temporal extension of the river on the same level as the spatial extension. ChisholmVsQuine: not every sum of river stages is a river process. I 125 Solution/Chisholm: we have to say what conditions a sum has to meet to be a river process. ChisholmVsQuine: Problem: this again requires continuants: (river banks, human observers) or a theory of absolute space or the introduction of a technical term ((s) predicate) "is cofluvial with"). Problem: this can only be understood in terms of "is the same flux as". So circular. VsFour-Dimensionalism/VsProcess-Ontology: he did not succeed in eliminating all singular or general terms that denote continuants. Process-Ontology/Four-Dimensionalism/SimonsVsProcess-Ontology: all representatives except Whitehead speak with a "split tongue" when it comes to concrete examples. Continuants/Quine: says he can "reconstruct them four-dimensionally". "Describe them as new". Reconstruction/Redescription/SimonsVsQuine: when something is rewritten, it gets a new description. Reconstruction is strictly speaking a discarding. So continuants must then disappear from our ontology and something else must take their place. Problem: thus, it is misleading to speak of river stages or cat stages. E.g. not one Philip stage is drunk, but the whole person is. For example, one does not bathe in one river stage, but in the whole river. Error: it cannot be right to change the subject and leave the predicate unchanged, and think you still have a true sentence! Similarly: Four-Dimensionalism/Cartwright: (1975,p. 167) "four dimensional objects have different careers". SimonsVsCartwright: only continuants like generals or opera singers have careers. Four-dimensional objects have no career, they are at best a career. Problem: if continuants are to disappear from ontology, then there is nothing that can be a career. That is talking with a "split tongue": you cannot enjoy the advantages of the old entities if you abolish them. Four-Dimensionalism needs a whole new way of speaking (unfamiliar, contrary to everyday language). Whitehead/Simons: is the only one who can do this and it is literally obscure. I 126 Process-Ontology/Simons: all this does not show their impossibility, only their alien nature. We must not only adopt continuants, but also events that involve them, especially changes of continuants. SimonsVsProcess-Ontology/SimonsVsVsFour-Dimensionalism: that the space-time requires the task of continuants is not so sure and rather depends on the circumstances. Certainly, Minkowski diagrams simply represent time as another (equal) dimension. I 127 Argument/Simons: it is not a conclusive argument to derive an ontology from a convenient representation. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Presentism | Lewis Vs Presentism | Schwarz I 19 Past/Future/LewisVsPresentism: it is common sense that the last moon landing was in 1972 and that certain species are long extinct. Presentism: but also refers to common sense and claims that these things are no longer real. To be past means to no longer exist. There will also be future species only when they are there. There is only what exists now (give/exist/"there is"). LewisVsPresentism: "there is": Lewis does not claim that "dinosaurs exist now". But they do exist (although not today). They only exist in the past. But the presentist also accepts this. Then what is the point of contention? Schwarz I 20 Solution: has to do with the area of quantification. Quantification/Area/Schwarz: unlimited quantifiers are rare and are part of metaphysics. Example "there is no God" refers to the whole universe. Example: "There is no beer": refers to the refrigerator. Existence/Lewis/Schwarz: so there are different "ways of existence". Numbers exist in a different way than tables. Existence/Presentism: his statements about what exists are absolutely unlimited. Four-dimensionalism/Existence: statements about what exist ignore from his point of view past and future. When we say that there are no dinosaurs ((s) then we (wrongly) extend the present into the past.) Schwarz: through the present tense we indicate that we are not talking about absolutely everything, but only about the present. Quantification/Schwarz: can also be neutral in the present. But it doesn't depend on grammar. Schwarz I 21 Solution: make true: what makes the sentences true, e.g. that Socrates drank the cup of hemlock? Four-dimensionalism truthmakers: the events in the past part of reality. Presentism: does not believe in past parts of reality. But then the truthmaker must be a characteristic of the present! VsPresentism: Problem: the present is logically not dependent on the past. It is possible that the world was only created five minutes ago. Reality/Presentism: (some representatives) one does not grasp reality by just determining what things are present. That Socrates existed is not true because there are certain things now, but because they existed then. Statements about what has existed and will exist express basic facts that cannot be reduced to statements about what is. Then the sentence operators "it was a case that," and "it will be the case" are primitive and unanalytic. (Prior, 1969(1)). Properties/LewisVsPrior/LewisVsPresentism: Vs these primitive operators: All truths must be based on what kind of things with what qualities there are. The two operators above would not be sufficient. Example "Socrates is still admired today" ((s) This does not distinguish the present from the past as desired here. Example "There were several English kings named Charles": Problem: there was no time when there were several. Then, among other things, plural past quantifiers must also be accepted. Four dimensionalism/Lewis: Solution: Temporal operators simply move the range of quantifieres. Example "...1642" is like "...in Australia". Then: with "there were several English kings named Charles" we quantify about a larger part of the past, perhaps about all past things together. Presentism: (some representatives) try to acquire it without sharing the metaphysics: Reference to "Socrates" or "1642" is then somehow abstract and of a completely different kind than that to concrete things (Bigelow 1996). Perhaps past times are linguistic fictions, sentences and their inhabitants contained in them (descriptions). Then, for example, "cup of hemlock" would not require that there is someone of flesh and blood who does anything. (!) It is enough if a fiction tells about it ((s) >Fiction/Field). Schwarz I 22 Other solution/presentism: such sentences about past things as set-theoretical constructions of present things: the Socrates of the year 399 is then a set of now existing qualities, among them also the characteristic to drink the hemlock cup. VsPresentism: not all things that ever existed can be described in our language or constructed from current events. Besides, there are many fictions that have nothing to do with them. What distinguishes the "real" from the "false"? Four dimensionalism: "Surrogate V" ("Replacement V"): interprets other times and their inhabitants as metaphysically fundamental entities. Example "Socrates" refers to an irreducible entity ("being") that is somehow linked to the qualities we assume from Socrates. (LewisVs) Problem: the link must not be that the entity has these properties! Because that would be the true four dimensionalism. LewisVs "ersatz world": no theory of substitute Socrats can be developed where these are really "abstract". PresentismVsFour-dimensionalism: sweeps essential aspects of reality under the carpet: what will become of the flow of time, the change of things and the peculiarity of the present? The four-dimensional block universe never changes. His time dimension "does not flow". E.g. then I can't be happy that the visit to the dentist is over, because it is still just as real. Four-dimensionalismVsPresentism: e.g. visit to the dentist: I am glad that it is no longer there, not that it has been erased from reality. Just as I'm glad the attack didn't happen here, but elsewhere. 1. Arthur N. Prior [1969]: Past, Present and Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Chisholm Vs Quine, W.V.O. | III 86 Analytic/Synthetic/Chisholm: many authors maintain that the distinction is untenable. III 87 1. for that one would have to speak of necessity 2. from the behavior of people it is not evident that their language is such that it is necessarily true: if a certain expression applies to something, then it applies also another way of saying the same thing. 3. The behavior does also not show the need that two expressions must apply to the same thing. ChisholmVsQuine/Chisholm: That together, if it were true, would be insufficient to show that the distinction is untenable. An additional premise would have to contain a philosophical generalization on the conditions for such a distinction. Generalization/Chisholm: how would it be defended: we see that in connection with the question of the criterion (see below) and skepticism (see below) - ChisholmVsQuine: none of the possible generalizations was ever defended. Therefore, it is not true that the distinction analytic/synthetic was proved untenable. Simons I 124 Event/occurrents/Ontology/Chisholm/Simons: Chisholm disproves three arguments for the ontology of events (occurrences): (Chisholm 1976, Appendix A) 1. Argument of spatial analogy: there is a great disanalogy between space and time: a thing cannot be in two different places at the same time, but a thing can be in the same place at two different times. ChisholmVs: this is not conclusive, a defender of temporal parts can argue against it. But then he can use this argument to argue for his thesis without circularity. 2. Argument of change: for example, how can Philip be drunk once and sober once? For him, both are contradictory together. ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism/Solution: instead of saying a time stage of Philip is (timelessly) drunk, we simply say in everyday language: he was drunk last night and is now sober. Either we use grammatical times like in everyday language or we relativize our predicates to the time ((s) "have-at-t", "be-at-t".) 3. Argument of the river (not "flux-argument"): Example River/QuineVsHeraclitus: Quine uses the temporal extension of the river on the same level as the spatial extension. ChisholmVsQuine: not every sum of river stages is a river process. I 125 Solution/Chisholm: we have to say what conditions a sum has to meet to be a river process. ChisholmVsQuine: Problem: this again requires continuants: (river banks, human observers) or a theory of absolute space or the introduction of a technical term ((s) predicate) "is cofluvial with"). Problem: this can only be understood in terms of "is the same flux as". So circular. VsFour-Dimensionalism/VsProcess-Ontology: he did not succeed in eliminating all singular or general terms that denote continuants. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Change | Chisholm, R. | Simons I 120 Object/Thing/Item/Chisholm: Thesis: "Mereological constancy" objects in the original sense: entia per se: cannot change. Objects in the derived sense: Entia per alio: are subject to flux, but only in the sense that they are successively constituted by different entia per se, which differ in their parts. Continuants/Chisholm: he does not deny them! Rather ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism. (with his ontology of temporal objects). Simons I 191 Flux/Change/Chisholm: Thesis: the apparent fact that continuants change parts is explained by the fact that different successive "stand-ins" (indented) parts in turn have other (permanent!) parts. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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