Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anti-Realism | Rorty | Horwich I 462 Anti-Realism/Dummett/RortyVsDummett: rather refers to values - realism rather to chairs. >Values, >Objcets, cf. >Realism. Rorty I 305 Anti-Realism/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam does not understand antique and our modern theories as two roughly correct descriptions of a fixed set, but he does not believe that our theory is better in relation to the same entities. But if our theory is just our theory, then we might as well ask the Neanderthals instead. >Pragmatism, >Truth. PutnamVsAnti-Realism: the problem is that for antirealism truth only makes sense as a subordinate concept to theories. But extension is indissolubly linked to truth: x belongs to the extension of a predicate F precisely when " x is an F" is true. ((s) Anti-realism is understood differently here than with Dummett). Problem: changing extension is senseless. - justified assertibility can change. PutnamVs equating truth with justified assertibility. >Extension, >Anti-Realism/Dummett. VI 406 Per distinction realism/anti-realism: Dummett, Nagel (vsGadamer, VsDavidson) Vs distinction realism/anti-realism: Rorty, Davidson. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Authority | Gadamer | I 283 Authority/Gadamer: The contrast between the belief in authority and the use of one's own reason, as claimed by the Enlightenment, is in itself justified. Insofar as the validity of authority takes the place of one's own judgement, authority is indeed a source of prejudice. But that it can also be a source of truth is not excluded, and the Enlightenment misjudged this when it defamed all authority. >Enlightenment. To be sure of this, one can refer to one of the greatest pioneers of the European Enlightenment: Descartes. Despite all the radicalism of his methodical thinking, Descartes, as we know, exempted the things of morality from the claim of a complete reconstruction of all truths from reason. This was the purpose of his provisional morality. >R. Descartes. I 284 In fact, not only is the defamation of all authority a prejudice established by the Enlightenment itself, but it has also led to a deformation of the concept of authority. But this is by no means the nature of authority. Certainly, authority comes first to persons. The authority of persons, however, has its final reason not in an act of submission and the abdication of reason, but in an act of recognition and knowledge - the knowledge, namely, that the other is superior to one in judgment and insight and that therefore his judgment takes precedence, i.e., has priority over one's own judgment. This is related to the fact that authority is not actually conferred, but is acquired and must be acquired if one wants to claim it. It is based on recognition and, in this respect, on an act of reason itself, which, within its limits, trusts others to have better insight. (...) directly, authority is not at all concerned with obedience, but with recognition.(1) 1. (...) The notorious phrase: "The party (or the leader) is always right" is not wrong because it claims the superiority of the leadership, but because it serves to shield the leadership from any criticism that might be true by a decision of power. True authority does not need to be authoritarian. This has been discussed many times, especially in my debate with J. Habermas. Cf. the anthology "Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik", Frankfurt 1977, edited by J. Habermas, and my Solothurn lecture "Über den Zusammenhang von Autorität und kritischer Freiheit", Schweizer Archiv für Neurologie, Neurochirurgie und Psychiatrie 133 (1983), pp. 11-16 (HabermasVsGadamer; GadamerVsHabermas. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Hermeneutics | Habermas | III 175 Hermeneutics/Sociology/Habermas: if the social scientist has to participate at least virtually in the interactions he/she wants to understand, and this means that he/she must implicitly comment on the claims of validity involved in the interactions, then he/she will not be able to apply his/her own terms to the conceptuality found in the context in any other way than the lay in their everyday communicative practice. >Understanding, >Practice, >Theory, >Method, >Validity claims. III 176 The same structures that facilitate communication also provide for the possibilities of a reflexive self-control of the communication process. See also Understanding/Sociology/Schütz. III 194 Hermeneutics/Habermas: the methodological yield of philosophical hermeneutics: - That the interpreter can clarify the meaning of a symbolic utterance only as a virtual participant in the communication process of those directly involved; - That the performative attitude binds him/her to the pre-conception of the hermeneutic initial situation; - But that this commitment does not have to affect the validity of his interpretation. - because he or she can make use of the rational internal structure of communication-oriented action and use the assessment competence of a responsible communication participant reflexively in order to - systematically relate the author's and his/her contemporaries' lifeworld to their own. - and to reconstruct the meaning of the interpreter's position as at least implicitly assessed content of a criticizable statement. III 195 HabermasVsGadamer: this basic insight endangers Gadamer, because behind his preferred model of the humanities' preoccupation with canonized texts hides the actually problematic case of the dogmatic interpretation of sacred writings. >Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >H.-G. Gadamer. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Knowledge | Gadamer | Gadamer I 371 Knowledge/Gadamer: Knowledge always means (...) to go to the opposite at the same time. This is its superiority over partiality through the opinion that it understands to conceive of possibilities as possibilities. Knowledge is dialectical by nature. Knowledge can only have those who have questions, but questions encompass in themselves the opposites of yes and no, of the so and the other. >questions. Only because knowledge is dialectical in this comprehensive sense, there can be one that explicitly makes the contradiction of yes and no its object. The seemingly all too specific question whether the same science is possible from the opposite, therefore, contains the reason for the possibility of dialectics in general. >Dialectics/Aristoteles. Gadamer I 372 How can ignorance and questioning come about in the first place? (...) [It can] only come about in the way that an idea comes to mind. There is no methodical path to the thought (...) that is the solution. Idea: Every idea has the structure of the question. The idea of the question, however, is already the dive into the levelled breadth of the widespread opinion. >Doxa/Plato. We also say of the question that it arises, that it poses itself - much rather than that we rise or ask it. Habermas III 193 Knowledge/Gadamer/HabermasVsGadamer/Habermas: Gadamer remains attached to the experience of the philologist who deals with classical texts. III 194 For him, the knowledge embodied in the text is fundamentally superior to the interpreter's knowledge. Habermas: This contrasts with the experience of the anthropologist, who learns that the interpreter does not always take the position of an inferior in comparison to a tradition. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gadamer, G. | Derrida Vs Gadamer, G. | I 49 DerridaVsGadamer: responds to allergically to the metaphorical use of words such as "voice" (of being). In reality he does nothing else than Heidegger wanted with his program of destruction of metaphysics. I 50 DerridaVsGadamer: the Other remains in a radical sense the Other. The goal is not understanding in terms of a fusion of horizons, but the working out the differences, which are not re-combined in one unit. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 |
| Gadamer, G. | Habermas Vs Gadamer, G. | Rorty II 127 Gadamer/Rorty: helps us to wipe out both the concept of "inner nature" and the concept of "identifying description" Gadamer/Rorty: helps us to replace metaphors of depth with metaphors of width, the more descriptions are available, the better. II 129 VsGadamer/Rorty: many times he was blamed of having invented a language-bound variety of idealism. V 24 HabermasVsGadamer/Rorty: relativism and potential repressiveness. VI 415/416 RortyVsKrüger/Rorty: his propagating of the "scientific and technological world" has lead authors such as C.P. Snow, Habermas and Popper to think that Heidegger and Gadamer were on the wrong political side, (representing the more "literary culture") and were enemies of human freedom. (HabermasVsGadamer, PopperVsHeidegger, SnowVsLiterature). |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Gadamer, G. | Wittgenstein Vs Gadamer, G. | I 21ff Signs/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by notes (explanations). Notes are sentences which contain the primitive signs. So they can only be understood if the meaning of these signs has been detected (VsHermeneutic Circle/WittgensteinVsGadamer), 4.12 "To be able to represent the logical form, we would have to position us with the sentence outside the logic, that is, outside the world." --- I 22 Wittgenstein: the meaningful sentence comprises both the punctuation, as well as its "projective relation to the world". (3.12) The projection method is "the thinking of the sentence meaning". (3.11) |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Gadamer, G. | Verschiedene Vs Gadamer, G. | I 50 LacanVsHermeneutics: Nothing behind it. A. Wellmer Die Sprache ist das Licht der Welt - Nachruf auf G. Gadamer, Die ZEIT März 2002 BenjaminVsGadamer: the "conversation that we are" is a discourse permeated by power relations and conflicts of interest, medium is not only a continuation of the tradition, but also an impending corruption of its best potentials. (>Adorno: "saving criticism"). WellmerVsGadamer: suspiciously military: "Engaging in the context of tradition". As a representative of an unbroken bourgeois educational elite, he had no sense for the corruptibility of the Enlightenment, except as a critic of modern scientism. |
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| Quine, W.V.O. | Strawson Vs Quine, W.V.O. | NS I 149 Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: pro descriptive metaphysicsVsRevisionist metaphysics. Definition descriptive metaphysics/Strawson: detects which ontology suggests our every day doing and speaking. Definition revisionists Metaphysics/StrawsonVsQuine: a physicalist ontology. This stands in contrast to the everyday's way of thinking. StrawsonVsQuine: for Strawson it is just about the everyday language, not about the ontology of any language. Ontology/language/Strawson: Thesis: pro-thing-property-ontology. This is necessarily the most elementary. Because of the similarity to the subject-predicate form. --- NS I 150 Space/Time/Strawson: are tools to differentiate different cases. Transcendental/Kant: are arguments that relate to the conditions of possibility. Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: his arguments are transcendental. --- Strawson I 198 QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege: singular expressions (singular term) can occur at the points of quantifiable variables, general expressions cannot. Singular Term: can be quantified, general term: not quantifiable. StrawsonVsQuine: on closer inspection, these differences of approach seem far less significant. Quine strongly distinguishes between types of non-linguistic objects on one side and the distinction between singular and general terms, on the other side. (Word/object). In Quine "piety" and "wisdom" are singular expressions, namely names of abstract objects like the nouns "Socrates" and "earth" are the names of concrete objects. Abstract Singular Term/Quine: E.g. "piety" (Universal). The distinction between singular and general term is more important for Quine from the logical point of view. The singular term gives the impression, and to name only one object, while the general term does not claimed at all, to name something, although it "may be true of many things." StrawsonVsQuine: this is an unsatisfactory way of explaining that the word "philosopher" should be a general and not a singular term. We would not like to say that this expression is true of many things or people. --- Strawson I 252 Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: regardless of their captivating simplicity of this analysis, I believe that it will be unacceptable by the form in which it is created. The language terms, in which the analysis is drawn up, presuppose the existence of subject expressions of linguistic singular terms. Other consequence: we are invited, to see the expressions that replace the "Fs" and "Gs" in the quantified sentences as ordinary predicate expressions. That is allright. --- I 253 Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: but again these forms have only their place in normal language because singular terms, subject expressions occupy the place they have there. Circularity: because we cannot simultaneously regard Fs and Gs as predicate expressions and accept that they all resolve subject expressions totally in the form of quantified sentences. Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: the argument is based on the linguistic forms that require in turn the use of these expressions. StrawsonVsGadamer/StrawsonVsQuine: one could argue against that this is too narrow, one must proceed inventively. In the case one would have to say what a teaching really should say, which is, taken literally, unacceptable. --- Strawson IV 69 StrawsonVsQuine: Suppose we want to manage without quantification over properties. Does it follow that the belief in objects would be justified, but not the belief in properties? --- IV 70 Strawson: we can accept a different kind of existence. A secondary, although a usual sense of existence, which applies to properties and relations. --- IV 71 Vs: E.g. a) "There is at least one property that has no machine, namely perfect efficiency". b) "no machine is completely efficient." In a) I quantify, in b) I do not. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kant | Seel III 142 Aesthetic Perception/Kant: "state of a free play of cognitive faculties". KU/Schlegel: "floating on the wings of the poetic reflection in the middle" Ruth Sonderegger: Thesis: to interpret this floating as a game of back and forth. a) "Reading together" the meanings b) "Reading apart" anarchic interactions of forms and materials. III 143 SondereggerVsGadamer/SondereggerVsDerrida: both do not do justice to the peculiar "KU experience" (Seel pro). |
Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| History | Gadamer, G. | Graeser I 86 Geschichte/Gadamer: These gehört nicht uns sondern wir ihr. Graeser. damit fusioniert er beschreibende und normative Züge. Sicher ist es eine Sache zu sagen, daß a) unsere Auffassungen geschichtlich bestimmt sind, eine andere Sache ist es zu behaupten, b) daß wir nur da verstehen, wo wir in ein Überlieferungsgeschehen einrücken. Gadamer: These "Alles Verstehen ist Auslegung". Text/Verstehen/Gadamer: These Suche nach dem Sinn nicht auf das abstellen, was der Autor sagt oder meint, sondern was der Text sagt! GraeserVsGadamer: Gadamer stilisiert den Text als Gesprächspartner, zur Quasiï·"Person. Er überträgt Eigenschaften auf ihn, die er als Text nicht hat und auch nicht haben kann. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Hermeneutics | Gadamer, G. | Graeser I 87 Hermeneutik/HabermasVsGadamer: (Der Universalitätsanpsruch der H.): Gadamers These, dass Verstehen und Verständigung Vollzugsformen menschlichen Lebens seien und allen speziellen philosophischen und wissenschaftlichen Betätigungen vorauslägen, ist deswegen problematisch, weil es auch verzerrte Verständigungssituationen gibt oder auch einfach unverständliche Lebensäußerungen. Unterordnung des Patienten unter den Analytiker.... damit wird Gadamers These von der Anerkennung von Autorität als Basis von Verstehen gerade auch hier bestätigt! Rorty I 388 Hermeneutik/Gadamer/Rorty: These Hermeneutik ist keine Methodenlehre. Def wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein: eigenes Bewußtsein von Vergangenem, das uns verändert. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Understanding | Gadamer, G. | Graeser I 166 Gadamer: Thesis: "Being that can be understood is language". DavidsonVsGadamer / Graeser: utterances are understood and these phrases have become objects. In Gadamer historical reconstructions and intellectual links stand in the place of systematics. Truth and Method: "How is understanding possible?". Rorty II 125 Gadamer’s thesis: only linguistic can be understood. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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