Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aboutness | Strawson | I 185 Object/Activity /about/represent/stand for/singular term/predicate/StrawsonVsGeach: "about" can not be used to distinguish between singular term and predicate. E.g. Raleigh smokes can be regarded as a sentence on smoking. It also "stands for" specifies no singular term - Both singular term and predicate term can stand for something. VsGeach: Geach is forced to say that "smoking" stands for something because for him predicative expressions stand for properties. >Predication/Geach, >Predicate/Geach, >Singular terms, >Predicates, >Levels/order. >Properties/Geach, >Intentionality. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Criteria | Henrich | Habermas IV 158 Criteria/Identity/Conditions of Identity/Henrich/Geach/Habermas: Peter Geach argues that identity predicates can only be used meaningfully in connection with the general characterization of a class of objects. (1) HenrichVsGeach: Henrich distinguishes between identity conditions and identity criteria: "It makes no sense to say that an object appears under one description as (the same) number, under another as (different) lines. The black line on the paper, which denotes the number 8, is not this number itself (...). Definition Identity conditions/Henrich: types of objects are fundamentally different from each other. >Identity conditions. Def Identity criteria/Henrich: Identity criteria can individualize [(s)objects] in the area of an object type in different ways.(2) Person/Identification/Habermas: Persons cannot be identified under the same conditions as observable objects. In the case of persons, spatiotemporal identification is not sufficient. The additional conditions depend on it, Habermas IV 159 how the person can even be identified as a person. >Person, >Individuation, >Identification, >Particulars, >Specification, >Objects, >Subjects. 1.P. Geach, Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity, in: K. Munitz, Logic and Ontology, NY. 1973 2. D. Henrich, Identität, in: O. Marquard, K. Stierle, Identität, Poetik und Hermeneutik, Bd. VIII, München, 1979, S. 382 |
Henr I Dieter Henrich Denken und Selbstsein: Vorlesungen über Subjektivität Frankfurt/M. 2016 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Discourse | Hintikka | II 229 Thinking/Peirce/Hintikka: thesis: all thinking is dialogical in its form. Thoughts are what you say to yourself. Thinking/judgment/Geach: thesis: thinking and judgement are analog to saying. HintikkaVsGeach: his results are rather lean. Discourse/question/answer/Hintikka: thesis: we need a discourse logic that is different from logic for isolated sentences. II 230 The different levels of knowledge of the questioner and of the one who answers must be taken into account. >Questions/Hintikka, >Answers/Hintikka, cf. >Dialogical logic. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| I, Ego, Self | Evans | Frank I 24 I/EvansVsDescartes: the I is the body! - The I-centered space becomes an objective world place only when the subject can transfer it to a public map and recognize it. - The convertibility of the speaker's perspective, which has been described demonstratively, requires an independent space. --- Frank I 485f I/Evans: 1. void of criteria, 2. limited access (not everyone, not at any time) - 3. the manner of givenness is dependent on the existence: I must be in the place to say "here", but change is possible ("new meaning, old meaning "). --- I 488 I-thoughts are de re. (They need information). --- I 503 I/GeachVsDescartes: instead of "I get into a terrible mess!" I can also say: "This is really a terrible confusion" - Strawson: "There is a pain" instead of "I have pain". EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: a part of the reference is to make its audience do something. --- I 504 I/Evans: our view of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand the following without being able to justify or decide it: e.g. "I have been stilled" - "I will die". --- I 545 "Here"/"I"/Evans: "here" and "I" are equal, both are not possible without the other. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Geach | Frank I 503 I/GeachVsDescartes: instead of "I get into a terrible mess!" I can also say: "This is really a terrible confusion". Strawson: also "there is pain" instead of "I am in pain". EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: for reference, it is necessary to get one's audience into something. >Reference, >Relations, >Pain, >Situation, >Description, >Self-identification, >Gareth Evans, >R. Descartes, >Dualism. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Identity | Geach | I 218 Identity/GeachVsFrege: identity is not a relation - "Is an A" does not mean "has identity with A" - (whereby "A" is a name). VsFrege: (in Frege, basic principles of artihmetics) instead of "There are just as many Fs as Gs": "Either any given object F iff it is a G, or there is a relation that is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and Gs". But this must not be an identity. I 226 Identity/Geach: only objects can be strictly identical. - In terms, there is only analogous identity: if they are coextensive. >Coextensive. I 238 Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: Identity is relative. - If someone says "x is identical to y", this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same as y". - (Weird, that Frege did not represent this). >Identity/Quine. Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single schema. (1) l- Fa (x)(Fx u x = a) - everyday-language: whatever is true of something which is identical with an object y is true of a and vice versa. From this we derive the law of self-identity: "l-a = a". Because we take "Fx" for "x unequal a", then schema (1) gives us: (2) l- (a unequal a) Vx(y unequal a u x = a) - this,of course, gives "l-a = a" I 240 Identity/Geach: if we demand strict identity, regardless of the theory in which we move, we get into the semantic paradoxes such as Grelling's or Richard's >Grelling's paradox. Solution: relative identity on theory or language, indissibility/"indiscernibility"/Quine -> Partial identity. 1. Frege, G. (1893). Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Jena: Hermann Pohle. --- Tugendhat I 37 Identity/Dummett/Geach: "=" can only be used with reference to objects. >Equal sign. Habermas IV 158 Identity/Geach/Habermas: Peter Geach argues that identity predicates can only be used meaningfully in connection with the general characterization of a class of objects.(1) (See also Criteria/Henrich, HenrichVsGeach). E.g. Person/Identification/Habermas: Persons cannot be identified under the same conditions as observable objects. In the case of persons, spatiotemporal identification is not sufficient. Also see >Identity/Henrich. 1.P.Geach, Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity, in: K. Munitz, Logic and Ontology, NY. 1973 |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Individuation | Quine | II 23/24 Theseus' ship: this is not about the expression "the same" but the expression ship. Each general term has its own individuation principle. II 158 Individuation: in our world, moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - are for objects at random (everything can be the object) and they are crucial for predicates. >Truth values. V 84 Individuation/Object/language acquisition/Quine: in order to learn "dog" one has to learn more than the existence. We must also learn the individuating power of the term, the splitting of the reference. One must learn what is to be regared as one dog and what as another. Dog is more like water than like mom: you can see several dogs. Thing: from similarity 2nd order. >similarities/Quine). - Pointing/Problem: This is a dog - must not exclude any dog - (> General term/Quine. V 88 Individuation/Overlapping/Pointing/Quine: is no problem: dogs never overlap: each consists exactly of the points that belong to the same dog as a particular point. Dogs do not have common points - different: overlapping circular disks: here the shape needs to be redrawn while pointing at it - Quine: is only at the beginning of learning - solution: you can easily tell a is identical with b. Whether a is the same dog or the same ear depends on whether a is a dog or an ear. QuineVsGeach: thus his relativism becomes untenable but it is still identity relative in a deeper sense: Identity-standards are different. V 102 Pointing: E.g. This body is an animal: here the outline must be carefully traced, otherwise it may be that only the trunk is regarded as an animal. V 125 Individuation/General term/Quine: "Square" is an individuating word. - ((s) "Fido" is not: E.g. This is a Fido.) V 161 Individuation/Quine: its fineness depends on the number of the general terms in the language - lexical glasses - individuation takes place in the eye of the beholder. VII (h) 157 Properties/Individuation/Quine: properties are individuated as follows: two open sentences which determine the same class do not determine the same property if they are not analytically equivalent. ((s) !). >Properties/Quine. XII 64f Individuation/apparatus/translation indeterminacy/ontological relativity/Quine: words for object, identity predicate the same as, a different one, plural form, logical particles, pronouns - that’s the frame of reference (coordinate system) - Important argument: this is not consistent in translation! - Uncertainty: you can counter: In what sense of rabbit? ((s) whether part or whole). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Introduction | Strawson | I 187 Term/expression/thing/introducing/Strawson: everything what is introduced by an expression in an uterance is a thing. Term: StrawsonVsQuine: here also non-linguistical, thing. >Terms. I 188 VsGeach: does not distinguish between the various types of introduction to the speech. - One can say, a statement says something about every thing that is inserted into it, not only about the things that have been introduced in a referring manner - (also on smoking) - "is wise" is purportedly introduced, Socrates is not. >Assertion, >Predicates/Geach, >Predicates/Strawson, >Predication/Geach. I 192 But still no difference between assertive and facts-introductory mode, because the latter is also predicating. I 193 Assertive mode primary. I 194 Introduction: indicative verbal form: introduces thing in a statement - substantive: has no such implication can also introduce lists of things - VsFrege: is determined that terms cannot only be introduced non-substantively - hence the paradox that "is wise" is an object, not a term - (not introduced in the assertive mode). I 196 StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence only stick together by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated. >Unsaturated. I 232ff Particular/Introduction: by identifying description - so that speakers and hearers mean the same particular. >Particulars/Strawson. I 234 Introductory description must not specify texture: E.g. the city in which I lived - but true empirical statement. I 235 For universals nothing corresponding. I 236 But no facts about the world but about the language - ((s) no truthmaker.) I 238 When universals are introduced into language, no empirical certainty of truth of sentences needed. I 239 Special case: if universal is not introduced through expression but through description, then confirmation trough empirical sentence necessary. - E.g. instead of "flu": "John's Disease". >Description, >Intension. I 239f Universal/particular/introduction: Class (1): (universal): expressions of which one (without empirical facts) cannot know what they introduce class (2) (paricular) also without empirical fact possible to know what they introduce - both are incomplete (1) presuppose implicit expressions, have factual weight (2) have no factual weight. I 241 Subject/predicate/thing/particular/universal: 3. Criterion: expressions introducing particulars can never be predicate expressions - Definition subject-expression: presents a fact by itself (complete) Predicate A: incomplete "is married to John" is not a fact by itself. I 242 E.g. "generosity is a more amiable virtue than intelligence" - "generosity" and "intelligence" do not present a covert joint fact. I 242 General/individual: the affinity between the grammatical and the categorical criterion for subject/predicate distinction explains also the traditional concatenation of the two distinctions. I 254ff Introduction/particular: so far only quasi as quantification according to an empirical condition. >Quantification. New/Strawson: other sense of introducing: introduction of a practice, to introduce particular in the 1st sense - then also E1: introduces particular, E2: classes of particulars. Then prerequisite2 V2: class of things (or universals) which can be introduced. - Where is then the asymmetry between particular and universal? I 258 Connection of the two theories: an EF1 of a particular of the relevant class, we can think in such a way that it is a fact of the v2 class v1. I 263 Both theories are independend, but connectable. I 259 Particular/Introduction: sentences in which certain types of particulars are introduced, cannot be traced back to those in which they do not occur. E.g. statements about Nations cannot be traced back in statements via people - but they have statements about people as a prerequisite2 Problem: What is at the end of the chain? >Feature-universals. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Objects (Material Things) | Strawson | I 177f Thing/Job/language/Strawson: 1. grammatical criterion: List 1: Language functions: Differences: A-expressions/B-expressions: refer/describe, designate/to state something about him, etc. I 178 List 2: Differentiation of linguistic components: singular term/predicative term, referring term/predicate term, subject/predicate, etc. I 180 List 3: Distinguishes between constituents of statements or between things: things, to which one refers/predicted thing, etc.... nothing can occur on both sides: the act of self-relating cannot be identical with the act of predicting, but some possible in both roles) list 3 presupposes distinction thing/role. I 182 List 4: (corresponds to Frege): Object/term: combines roll and thing - no object can ever be predicted. >Object/Frege, >Concept/Frege. List 3: aligns the terms of List 2 (cf. >Particularisation/Ramsey). I 185 Thing/activity/"about"/represent/singular Term/predicate/StrawsonVsGeach: "about" cannot be used to distinguish between singular term and predicate. >Predication/Geach, >Predicate/Geach, >Singular Terms, >Predicates, >Intentionality, >Levels/Order. E.g. "Raleigh smokes" can be seen as a statement about smoking - also "stands for" specifies no singular term. Both singular term and predicative term can stand for something. VsGeach: he is compelled to say that "smokes" stands for something, because predicative expressions stand for properties according to him. >Properties/Geach. Terminology/Strawson: A-expressions: are substantive B-expressions: are predicative. I 203 Thing/property/singular Term/predicate/is/Strawson: if "Socrates is ..." with a description by "is" in the sense of "is identical to" is connected. Then "Socrates is ..." can be understood as B-expression (predicate). >equal sign instead of copula. >"Is". Problem: what things should be introduced by "is a philosopher"? >Introduction/Strawson. I 207ff Thing/predicate/singular term/introducing/Strawson: the reason for the distinction between A (Noun-) and B-expressions (predicate) is distinguishing between different things: between particular and universal, not between object and term or singular term and predicate. I 210 StrawsonVsTradition: already presupposes the distinction - external reason: might the tense function be the verb - Vs: this could also be expressed with two nouns and arrow notation. Socrates (Wisdom), then arrow either above Socrates or Wisdom, depending on whether Socrates died or became stupid. >Predication, >Ascription. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Redundancy Theory | Geach | I 263 Geach per redundancy theory - "it is true that p" is hardly different from "p". >Levels/Order, >Description levels. VsGeach: see >Redundancy theory/Logic texts. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Reference | Evans | I 314ff To mean/reference/divine standpoint/Wittgenstein/Evans: for example, someone is in love with one of two identical twins - God, if he could look into his/her head, could not tell with which of them the person is in love, if the person itself does not know in a moment. ((s) Because no additional information could be found in the mental state and in the twin.)- Evans: the (description-) theory of the mind cannot explain why erroneous descriptions cannot give the impetus. I 325 Reference/Evans: Reference is also possible if the description is not fulfilled, but not designation. I 328 Reference/Names/Evans: in general, we refer to the thing that is the source of the prevailing information. I 333ff Reference/Evans: reference is defined by information sets, not by fitting. --- Frank I 22 Evans: between Frege and Perry: saves Fregean sense, but meaning = reference! I 24ff Meaning unequal Reference/Evans: e.g. "today": the meaning remains, the speaker changes. > "Fido"-Fido-Theory/Evans: equals the meaning and the reference: > I/Evans. Frank I 503 EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: one aspect of the reference is to make your audience do something. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Relativism | Quine | II 44 Theory: rewording: E.g. assuming, we swap electron and molecule - any empirical statement (with theoretical term) is rated opposite - solution: we mark the theoretical terms and assign them to the two theories: then no problem, no relativism. V 89 Relative Identity/Geach: (Geach, Reference and generality, p. 39f)(1): Identity only makes sense with regard to a general term such as "the same dog". QuineVsGeach: this certainly applies to the beginning of language learning. Identity/Showing/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in showing twice and saying, "This is the same as that". Then one could still ask. "The same what?" Example: One could have pointed once at the dog and once only at the ear. Solution: You can easily say a is identical to b. Whether a is the same dog or the same ear depends on whether a is a dog or an ear. QuineVsGeach: this makes his relativism untenable once you get used to the identity speech. Identity/Quine: but is still relative in a deeper sense. 1. Geach, Peter T., Reference and Generality, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1962) II 44 Relativity of Theories/Quine: A theory formulation merely implies its categorical observational sentences without being implied by them. Therefore, the observation conditionals implied by two theory formulations can all be identical without the formulations implying each other. II 45 Let us assume that in a situation there is no possibility of harmonisation by reinterpretation of the terms. We would probably not know that they are empirically equivalent. Because that they are, one usually gets out by the discovery of such a reinterpretation. Nevertheless, we want to assume that they are empirically equivalent. Further assumed: all categorical observations are de facto true, although this is not known either. Further conditions for the truth of one theory or the other certainly cannot be set. Question: are they both true? Quine: I say yes. But even they can be logically incompatible despite their empirical equivalence, which raises the spectre of >cultural relativism. Because each of them is obviously only true from its point of view. QuineVsCultural Relativism: The spectre can easily be dispelled: by a step that is as trivial as the interchange of "electron" and "molecule": Since the two theoretical formulations are incompatible, they have to evaluate a certain sentence in the opposite direction. Since they are nevertheless empirically equivalent, this sentence must contain terms that are not sufficiently determined by observation criteria. Then we might as well pick out one of these terms and treat it as if it were two independent words, one belonging to one theory, the other to another. II 46 We could indicate this by the notation. By consistently maintaining this spelling, we could resolve any conflict between these theories. From then on, both could be accepted as terminologically different true descriptions of one and the same world. The threat of truth relativism has been averted. XI 121 QuineVsCultural Relativism/Lauener: is contradictory in itself. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Singular Terms | Strawson | Substitutions/Strawson/(s): of singular terms: reversible of predicates: not reversible. ((s) For this asymmetry cf. >Singular terms/Brandom, >Predicates/Brandom.) I 198 Singular Term/QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsRamsey: a singular term can occur at the places of quantifiable variables, general expressions not. Singular term: is quantifiable, General Term: is not quantifiable. >Singular terms/Quine, >General terms/Quine. StrawsonVsQuine: this distinction ist not so important. I 198 Singular Term/Quine: abstract singular terms: E.g. "piety", "wisdom": names of abstract objects - no general terms. Names of concrete objects: e.g. "Earth". On the other hand general term: E.g "philosopher". >Abstraction/Quine. StrawsonVsQuine: no good explanation: we would not like to say that this would be true of many things. Solution/Quine: in reality we make the distinction between singular term and predicates. General term/Quine: the location which is taken by them, has no own status. Decisive: predicates cannot be quantified. >Quantification/Quine, >Schematic letters/Quine. I 203 "a philosopher"/Quine: no singular term. --- IV 63 QuineVs singular Term: eliminable. StrawsonVsQuine. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Sortals | Kripke | I 134 KripkeVsGeach: a sortal is certainly not a priori true of the designated object. It could turn out: e.g. Lot's guests, even if he calls them, are not people, but angels. Then why should it belong to the meaning of the name? >Sense, >Names/Kripke, >Denoting/Kripke, >Naming/Kripke, >a priori/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Universals | Kripke | I 134 KripkeVsGeach: a sortal is certainly not a priori true by the designated object. It may yet turn out that it is, e.g. Lot’s guests: even if he names them, they are not humans but angels. Then why should it belong to the meaning of the name? >Sense, >Names/Kripke, >Naming/Kripke, >Denotation/Kripke, >a priori/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Geach, P. | Black Vs Geach, P. | III 22 Rationality/Geach/Black: Thesis: ~ "although it is reasonable to ask for reasons, it is not always reasonable. E.g. it is not reasonable to ask for what reason you should ever ask for reasons. III 23 E.g. Someone who rejects the asking for reasons may not ask others why they need reasons. Otherwise the questioner shows that he is not totally independent of reasons. (Self-contradiction, contradiction). Black: thus Geach assumes that the Skepticus is a militant anti-rationalist who rejects all practice. Rationality/Hume/Black: Hume, on the other hand, goes along with that, he was just never presented with the justification. Geach/Black: with him we would have to say, "I cannot respond to the anti-rationalists at all, because his question is itself unreasonable." BlackVsGeach: that means that we ourselves must have good reasons to reject the question, and that would not affect the anti-rationalists at all. According to Geach, the responder would be just as irrational. Black: (see below) but it must not be assumed that the challenger is a militant anti-rationalist. Even a complete skeptic VsRationality can maliciously try to harass the defenders of rationality. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Geach, P. | Evans Vs Geach, P. | Klaus von Heusinger, donkey sentences and their horse feet Uni Konstanz Section Linguistics Working Paper 64; 1994 Heusinger I 5 Range/Quantifier/Conjunction/Geach/VsGeach/Heusinger: (4b) E.g. [man(x) & comes(x) & whistles(x)] VsGeach: Problem: the existential quantifier has a longer range than the "and", i.e. it is regarded as a text operator. Then compositionality is violated, because the first sentence is not independent of the second one. This has caused much criticism. EvansVsGeach: the plural shows that (4b) is still too strong and does not express the everyday language meaning: (ii) is too strong: - (ii) Some sheep are such that John owns them and Harry vaccinates them in spring. I 17 Anaphora/Variable/Labeling/Existential Quantification/E Type/E Type Pronoun/Evans/Heusinger: Thesis: Discourse anaphora not as bound variables, but as shortened (or disguised) descriptions. Representatives: Evans: semantic Cooper: pragmatic Neale: syntactic. Def E Type Pronoun/Evans/Heusinger: = specific descriptions: the pronoun denotes those objects that make the sentence true which contains the quantified antecedent ((s) antecedent of the anaphor). Anaphora/Pronoun/EvansVsGeach/Evans/Heusinger: Thesis: anaphoric pronouns must be interpreted as decriptions. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Geach, P. | Kripke Vs Geach, P. | I 133 Kripke: If I understand Geach correctly, the nominal essence should be understood in terms of a priori, not in terms of necessity. (Unlike here). Perhaps that is what Geach means with his statement that he treated "nominal", not "real" beings. "Nixon is a man" would therefore be an a priori truth. KripkeVsGeach: a sortal is certainly not true a priori of the designated object. It could yet turn out that e.g. Numerous guests are angels even if he calls them people. Why then should it belong to the meaning of the name? E.g. The wife of a scientist hears a woman’s name. (In reality, the scientist simply muttered.) She wonders if there is another woman. Why is the use of the name no case of naming? If it is not, then the reason is not the indeterminacy of reference! |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Geach, P. | Quine Vs Geach, P. | V 18 Perception/Quine: has more to do with consciousness than with the reception of stimuli. But it is also accessible to behavior criteria. It shows in the conditioning of reactions. V 18/19 Dispositions/Quine: habits resulting from conditioning. V 89 Identity/Geach: (Reference and generality, p 39f.): Only makes sense with reference to a general term like e.g. "the same dog". QuineVsGeach: this is certainly true for the beginning of language learning. Identity/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in pointing twice and saying, "This is the same as that." Then you could still ask "The same what?". E.g. you could have been pointing once to the dog and merely to the ear the next time. Solution: you can easily say that a is identical with b. Whether a is the same dog or the same ear depends on whether a is a dog or an ear. QuineVsGeach: this makes his relativism untenable once you get accustomed to the identity way of speech. Identity/Quine: in a deeper sense still relative. (see below § 30) V 129 Pronouns/Pronouns/Quine: are the archetype of variables in logic and mathematics. Everyday Language: here pronouns are an important part of relative clauses. Relative Clause/Language Learning/Quine: E.g. "I bought Fido from a man who had found him." Function: the relative clause makes it possible to separate the object of what the sentence says about it. Relative Clause: becomes a general term if the pronoun for the name of the object is out in front: E.g. "which I bought from a man who had found him" is a general term! This general term says the same thing of Fido as the original sentence. Relative Clause/GeachVsQuine: (Reference and generality, p.115 122, also "Quines syntaktische Einsichten"). Relative Pronoun/Geach: instead, conceive it as meaning "and he": e.g. "I bought Fido from a man and he had found him." ((s) paratactic analysis). Or with "when he" or "since he". V 130 Geach calls this the "Latin prose theory". Def Latin Prose Theory/Geach: Thesis: it's wrong to consider "who had found him" as a terminus or independent grammatical entity at all. Donkey Sentence/Geach's Donkey/Quine: E.g. Everyone who owns a donkey beats it; Some donkey owners do not beat them. Problem: that would turn into nonsense: Every donkey owner beats it Some donkey owners do not beat it. Solution/Geach: analysis of the relative pronoun "who" with "if he": Every person, if he has a donkey, beats it. Example (by Emmon Bach): ((s)> Brandom, Bach Peter's sentences) A boy who fooled her kissed a girl that loved him. Geach: here, you cannot consider "boy who fooled her" as a separate term, because then the floating pronoun "her" would have no reference, not even to "girl who loved him", because the floating pronoun "him" would then have no reference. Solution/Geach: A boy kissed a girl and she really loved him, but he only fooled her. Quine: pro Geach. ((s) sequence of main clauses.) V 131 Relative Clause/Bach Peter's Sentences/Donkey Sentence/Geach's Donkey/Geach/Quine: Geach focuses on the quantification (1) (Ex) (x is a man and I bought Fido of x and x had found Fido) (2) (x) (y) (if x is a man and y is a donkey and x has y, then x beats y). (3) (Ex) (Ey) (x is a man, and y is a a donkey and x has y and not (x beats y)) (4) (Ex) (Ey) (x was a boy and y was a girl and y kissed y and y really loved x, but x merely fooled y). QuineVsGeach: the description of the correct grammar is one thing, a plausible description of a child's language learning is another. It would be nice if both matched, which is to be expected according to Hall, Bloomfield and Chomsky. QuineVsGeach: before this is proven, I tend to a more dualistic view. Geach's Latin prose theory correctly describes the grammar, but not the learning process. Most examples of relative clauses correspond to the Fido example. The child is torn between analogies, V 132 which are in the end described properly by Geach. Relative Clause/Quantification/Language Learning/QuineVsGeach: a reformulation of the relative pronoun depending on circumstances in "and he" or "if", etc. is too complicated. In addition, the quantification would need to be learned before the relative clauses. Instead, the child comes to the quantification the other way round, through the relative clause. Strawson I 198 QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege: Singular terms can take the places of quantifiable variables, general expressions cannot. Singular Term: quantifiable, General Term: not quantifiable. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Geach, P. | Strawson Vs Geach, P. | I 188 Reference/statement/StrawsonVsGeach: his definition is not enough because it does not distinguish between types of the introduction because you can state depending on the context that a statement says something about every thing in which it is introduced and not only about things that are introduced in the referring way. So the terms "Socrates" and "is wise" have in common that there is no difference in the mode of introduction. Grammatical distinction between the substantive and verbal mode of introduction. But not a sufficient condition: --- I 189 "Nothing," what we would not like to classify as a subject expression, is a singularean noun. (In English even nouns) Our list-definitions also do not exclude that Frege wanted to permit expressly, namely, that an A-term may be part of a B-expression. If you can say "Socrates is" corresponds to the description of the B-expression, "wise" does not correspond to the A-expression. (Asymmetric) A-expression/Strawson: singular term, subject term, referring - B-expression: predicate, descriptive. --- I 190 We have to question according to the significance of the distinction between grammatically substantive and grammatically verbal nature of the fact introduction. E.g. The term "Socrates" is in such diverse expressions as "kill Socrates" and "Plato admired Socrates" the same. --- I 191 It is different with "wise". The expression introduces the property, to be "wise", but its function is not only in the mere introduction, or it shows the mode of introduction not only in terms of the case ending. It performs its job in a very peculiar and very important mode, namely in the assertive one. --- I 192 But perhaps I do not claim, but I give someone permission to do something. This is not a weakening of the launch mode. We can say that the primary function of the indicative verb is the function of the assertion. What is the primary mode of the fact introduction, is thus at the same time something further, namely the revealing mode of introduction. (In the following no distinction between arguing and revealing). --- I 193 We can retain the idea of the revealing mode without burdening us with further grammatical classifications. We can say that among the many modes of statements ((s) error? Does this not have to be about introduction modes?) the one that is the primary, is also the claiming mode. The symbolism of assertion is also a means to express something more comprehensive, namely the occurrence of a statement. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 |
| Geach, P. | Verschiedene Vs Geach, P. | EMD II 347 Truth Conditions/Tr.c./Geach: Condition (6) (see above, EMD II 330): (6) (Sxi)phi is a true sentence, iff there is a term t, so phi' is true when phi' is obtained from phi by replacing all free occurrences of xi with t: Geach: this actually specifies the truth conditions for an interpretation of the existence quantifier. WallaceVsGeach: criticizes that there is a difference between this requirement and that of Convention T: according to Geach a sentence without semantic vocabulary can have its truth conditions indicated by a sentence which itself contains semantic vocabulary (i.e. meta-language with semantic vocabulary), according to Tarski allegedly not. (KripkeVs: this is nowhere in Tarski!). KripkeVsWallace: this is a mistake! He believes that if phi' is such that T(phi) ↔ phi' is provable, then it contains the T-prdicate itself! But it does not! It is not necessary to assume R(a) as a primitive basic term! Or that his explanation must contain "semantic vocabulary". |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Geach, P. | Hintikka Vs Geach, P. | II 229 Thinking/Peirce/Hintikka: Thesis: all thought is dialogical in its form. Thoughts are what we say to ourselves. Thinking/Judging/Geach: Thesis: is analogous to saying. HintikkaVsGeach: his results, however, are rather meager. Discourse/Question/Answer/Hintikka: Thesis: we need a discourse logic that differs from the logic for isolated sentences. II 230 Here, the different level of knowledge of asking and answering person must be considered. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Geach, P. | Wiggins Vs Geach, P. | Simons I 213 "Relative Identity"-view of super position: a) (Representative: Geach): "Sortal Theory" of relative identity: known as "theory R": for Sortals F and G it is possible to find two objects a and b, so that a and b are both Fs and Gs, a is the same F as b, but not the same G. Nicholas Griffin: pro. WigginsVsGeach: that violates Leibniz' law. And because this applies necessarily, the theory is necessarily wrong. DoepkeVsGeach: "relative identity" is only a false name for similarity. b) Grice/George Myro: (both unpublished): VsWiggins' thesis that things that are ever different are always different. GriceVsWiggins: the assumption depends on finding properties in which the objects differ in the times when they are not superposed. Then identity is relative to time. I.e. TI a = t b ↔ (F)[Ft a ↔ Ft b] Where the quantifier runs only over properties whose instantiation does not include the instantiation of any other property at any other time. This excludes: the property, e.g. to be two years old, e.g. to be ex-president e.g. to be bride-in-spe. Simons: we can call this the relation of "temporal indistinguishability". It is characterized by a limitation of Leibniz's law. I 214 SimonsVsGrice: if we call this similarity "identity", then any other kind of similarity is possible, like for example "surface identity" of a body with its surface. Indistinguishability/Time/Simons: will turn out to be important below (in constitution). System CT/Simons: (see above) with him, we have already rejected "temporal identity". Ad (3): dichrone view of super position: Thesis: superposed objects do not have to exist at the same time. For example, the gold forms into a ring. When the ring is melted, it is replaced by the gold. I.e. they exist at different times. For example, a person does not coincide with its body, it transforms into its body (the corpse). (Only if "body" is understood as "corpse", as is often, but not always the case). Dichrone view: Thesis: there is no substrate that survives the change. Change/Diachronic View: Thesis: is always a replacement of one object by another. SimonsVsDiachronic View: does not explain why so many properties are transferred from the original to the later object. Solution: an (assumed) substrate would explain this. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Strawson Vs Quine, W.V.O. | NS I 149 Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: pro descriptive metaphysicsVsRevisionist metaphysics. Definition descriptive metaphysics/Strawson: detects which ontology suggests our every day doing and speaking. Definition revisionists Metaphysics/StrawsonVsQuine: a physicalist ontology. This stands in contrast to the everyday's way of thinking. StrawsonVsQuine: for Strawson it is just about the everyday language, not about the ontology of any language. Ontology/language/Strawson: Thesis: pro-thing-property-ontology. This is necessarily the most elementary. Because of the similarity to the subject-predicate form. --- NS I 150 Space/Time/Strawson: are tools to differentiate different cases. Transcendental/Kant: are arguments that relate to the conditions of possibility. Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: his arguments are transcendental. --- Strawson I 198 QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege: singular expressions (singular term) can occur at the points of quantifiable variables, general expressions cannot. Singular Term: can be quantified, general term: not quantifiable. StrawsonVsQuine: on closer inspection, these differences of approach seem far less significant. Quine strongly distinguishes between types of non-linguistic objects on one side and the distinction between singular and general terms, on the other side. (Word/object). In Quine "piety" and "wisdom" are singular expressions, namely names of abstract objects like the nouns "Socrates" and "earth" are the names of concrete objects. Abstract Singular Term/Quine: E.g. "piety" (Universal). The distinction between singular and general term is more important for Quine from the logical point of view. The singular term gives the impression, and to name only one object, while the general term does not claimed at all, to name something, although it "may be true of many things." StrawsonVsQuine: this is an unsatisfactory way of explaining that the word "philosopher" should be a general and not a singular term. We would not like to say that this expression is true of many things or people. --- Strawson I 252 Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: regardless of their captivating simplicity of this analysis, I believe that it will be unacceptable by the form in which it is created. The language terms, in which the analysis is drawn up, presuppose the existence of subject expressions of linguistic singular terms. Other consequence: we are invited, to see the expressions that replace the "Fs" and "Gs" in the quantified sentences as ordinary predicate expressions. That is allright. --- I 253 Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: but again these forms have only their place in normal language because singular terms, subject expressions occupy the place they have there. Circularity: because we cannot simultaneously regard Fs and Gs as predicate expressions and accept that they all resolve subject expressions totally in the form of quantified sentences. Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: the argument is based on the linguistic forms that require in turn the use of these expressions. StrawsonVsGadamer/StrawsonVsQuine: one could argue against that this is too narrow, one must proceed inventively. In the case one would have to say what a teaching really should say, which is, taken literally, unacceptable. --- Strawson IV 69 StrawsonVsQuine: Suppose we want to manage without quantification over properties. Does it follow that the belief in objects would be justified, but not the belief in properties? --- IV 70 Strawson: we can accept a different kind of existence. A secondary, although a usual sense of existence, which applies to properties and relations. --- IV 71 Vs: E.g. a) "There is at least one property that has no machine, namely perfect efficiency". b) "no machine is completely efficient." In a) I quantify, in b) I do not. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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