Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exterior/interior | Stroud | I 206 General/Special/skepticism/verificationism/generalization/interior/exterior/Stroud: With Descartes the special is representative and can therefore be generalized. >René Descartes. VerificationismVsGeneralization: Verificationism considers eneralization as suspicious: one should not apply statements of the system to the system itself. >Verificationism, >Self-reference, >Cirular reasoning. StroudVsCarnap: the problem interior/exterior is not the same as that of the general and special. StroudVsCarnap: the sentence that Descartes does not know whether he is sitting by the fire is not meaningless, only in connection to the skeptical presumption that it is not verifiable. >Senseless, >Verification. Problem: the verificationism could come easily in the situation to have to assume that then all of our everyday language would be useless. >Everyday language. I 211 Naturalized epistemology/QuineVsCarnap/Stroud: denies the need for an external position - so that the interior/exterior-problem is avoided. >Naturalized epistemology. I 214 QuineVsKant: no a priori "knowledge". >a priori, >a priori/Quine, >outside/inside/Carnap, >exterior/interior/Carnap. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Generality | Stroud | I 206 General/Special/skepticism/verificationism/generalization/interior/exterior/Stroud: With Descartes the special is representative and can therefore be generalized. >René Descartes. VerificationismVsGeneralization: Verificationism considers eneralization as suspicious: one should not apply statements of the system to the system itself. >Verificationism, >Self-reference, >Cirular reasoning. StroudVsCarnap: the problem interior/exterior is not the same as that of the general and special. StroudVsCarnap: the sentence that Descartes does not know whether he is sitting by the fire is not meaningless, only in connection to the skeptical presumption that it is not verifiable. >Senseless, >Verification. Problem: the verificationism could come easily in the situation to have to assume that then all of our everyday language would be useless. >Everyday language. I 264 Public/knowledge/Stroud: there are indeed general statements about knowledge: e.g. that someone knows something about Sicily of the 4th century. - E.g. that no one knows the causes of cancer. VsMoore: that he does not achieve a general statement about knowledge, but is not due to a lack of generality. >G.E. Moore. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Descartes, R. | Carnap Vs Descartes, R. | VI 226 Ego/Carnap: is a class of elementary experiences. No bundle, because classes do not consist of their elements! CarnapVsDescartes: the existence of the ego is not a primordial fact of the given. From "cogito" does not follow "sum". Carnap: the ego does not belong to expression of the fundamental experience. But the "this experience". Thinking/RussellVsDescartes: "it thinks". (> Lichtenberg). ("Mind", p.18). Stroud I 196 KantVsDescartes/CarnapVsDescartes. Frame/Reference system/Carnap/Stroud: for Carnap there is no point of view from which one can judge a frame as adequate or inadequate. That would be an "external" question. Kant/Stroud: Kant's parallel to this is transcendental idealism: if things were independent of us, skepticism would be inevitable. Problem: the transcendental idealism should not be crossed with the verification principle. Is Carnap's own positive theory better off here? That is a question of its status. It pursues the same goal as Kant: to explain the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, but without going beyond the limits of comprehensibility. General/special/internal/external/generalization/Stroud: it would be necessary to explain how the general sceptical conclusion can be meaningless, even if the particular everyday empirical assertions are meaningful. This cannot simply be because one is general and the other particular. Descartes/Stroud: the particular is representative in its argument and can therefore be generalized. The uncertainty in the individual case is representative of all our knowledge. This is the strength of the argument. VerificationismVsGeneralization: he considers this generalization suspicious. CarnapVsSkepticism/CarnapVsDescartes: statements that make sense within a reference system cannot be applied to the reference system itself. Stroud: but this is the problem inside/outside and not a question of generality or special. StroudVsCarnap: so he has to show that movement from the inside out is impossible and not the generalization. But he needed an explanation why the traditional view of the relation between "internal" and "external" questions is wrong if he wants to avoid skepticism. ((s) Why Question). Special/VerificationismVsDescartes: Thesis: the single sentence of Descartes is meaningless from the beginning. (Because unverifiable). (StroudVsVs). I 207 StroudVsVerificationism: he must now show why this verdict does not apply to all individual (special) sentences of everyday life. Verificationism would otherwise have to assume that our whole language (everyday language) is meaningless! (Because it is not verifiable according to skeptical criteria). For example "I don't know if explanation is caused by sitting in a draught" or "The aircraft spotter doesn't know if the aircraft is an F" would be damned as senseless! If verificationism condemns certain sentences as meaningless only if they are uttered, for example, by Descartes or another skeptic, he would have to show that there is a deviant use on such occasions. Otherwise he could not even indicate what VsDescartes is supposed to have gone wrong with his utterance. ((s) utterance here = action, not sentence, which should be meaningless, neither true nor false). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
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