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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coincidence | Kauffman | I 9 Science/coincidence/Kauffman: science has reduced us to beings who owe their existence to coincidence. KauffmanVs: this is incomplete. >Life/Kauffman, >Science, >Evolution, >Beginning. I 282 Coincidence/Kauffman: There is an inevitability of historical coincidence. The periodic table is clear, but at the level of chemistry, the space of possible molecules is larger than the number of atoms in the universe. Life is thus the product of a historical coincidence. I 286 Evolution/Life/Self-organisation/Coincidence/Necessity/Kauffman: we are not just pieced up handicrafts, not just molecular ad hoc apparatuses. KauffmanVsGould, KauffmanVsMonod, KauffmanVsJacob, KauffmanVsBricolage. >St. J. Gould, >J. Monod, >F. Jacob, >Bricolage. We are children of necessity. At home in the universe. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Evolution | Kelly | I 1765 Evolution/Kelly: "random" mutations are often not free of tendencies: Variation is determined by geometry and physics. More importantly, they are formed by inherent recurring patterns of self-organization. >Mutations, >Coincidence. I 1791 Stephen Jay Gould/Kelly: represented the thesis of the omnipresent contingency in evolution, against a directionality, e. g. towards the emergence of the human being. (1) I 1804 KellyVsGould: later investigations revealed that the Burgess slate showed less diversity of life forms than Gould assumed in Gould's thesis. In this way, the possibility of a convergent evolution becomes more visible again. Evolution/Kelly: its third mainstay is structural inevitability. For example, a poison sting used for defense purposes has been created at least twelve times in evolution. The reason for this is not a common history, but a common pattern. >Self-organization. 1. Stephen Jay Gould. (1989) Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and Nature of History. New York: W. W. Norton, p. 320. |
Kelly I Kevin Kelly What Technology Wants New York 2011 |
| Explanation | Dennett | Rorty VI 144 Explanation/Dennett/Rorty: it is sufficient to explain why there seems to be something phenomenological. This is why it seems to be the case that there is a difference between thinking that something seems to be pink, and that something really seems to be pink. I 137 Explanation/Model/Dennett: models must be neither too difficult nor oversimplified. E.g. it is not about following all the electrons in a calculator. Model/pattern/explanation/Dennett: why are we considering this model and not a different one? In order to justify that we must not only take the real into consideration but also the possible. I 335 We need to develop an idealization of degrees of possibility. Explaining evolution: > Properties: E.g. you ordered a green car and it comes on time: the question is not why this car is green, but: why is this (green) car here. ((s) consider the car as a whole, the green car would otherwise be elsewhere). > "wrong question". Just-about-stories: E.g. Lake Victoria. Unusually many species of perch. Only (conventional) explanation: Too many ponds dried out. But besides the properties of the animals you have no evidence for that. I 416 Dennett: all these stories are "too good to be true". But Gould does not adopt the Pangloss principle when he considers them to be true until the opposite is proven. Coincidence/Evidence/Dennett: e.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of coincidence. I 424 Cambrian Explosion/DennettVsGould: here again suddenness is no evidence of coincidence. I 102 Explanation/Justification/Evolution/Dennett: e.g. the advantages of sexuality cannot be taken as a reason for why they are there. The evolution cannot foresee its path. Consequence: the sexuality must have survived as a side effect (>epiphenomenon). |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Genes | Dawkins | Gould I 88ff Richard Dawkins Thesis: Genes are the relevant units of selection. >Selection. Gould II 171 Dawkins Thesis: Dawkins argues that the bodies are only temporary abodes of the genes, the real bearers of evolution. Dawkins writes as a strict Darwinist. >Darwinism. Gould II 172 Dawkins: Question: If the DNA is self-referring, why does it not create millions of copies of itself? That finally displace everything else? What is hindering it? Dawkins I 50 Gene/Dawkins: Genes live much longer than their bearers. A gene can be understood as a unity that survives a multitude of successive individual bodies. I 62 Def Gene/Dawkins: in the sense of the title this book it is more complicated than Cistron. There is no generally accepted definition for gene. I would like to use the definition of G.C. Williams: Def Gene/Williams: any piece of chromosome material that potentially survives so many generations that it can serve as a unit for selection. I 63 Inheritance/copying accuracy/Dawkins: "Longevity in the form of copies". I 64 The shorter a genetic unit, the longer it will probably live. I 71 Dawkins Thesis: Small genetic units can survive in identical form, individuals, groups and species cannot. >Species. Gene/Dawkins: Does not age! For it, the probability of dying at the age of one million years is not greater than at a hundred years. I 73 Order/Dawkins: The cards themselves survive the shuffling. Selection/Dawkins: If genes always mixed, the selection would be impossible in general. I 74 Gene/Container/DawkinsVsGould: Successful genes are good designers of survival machines. For example, creatures with long legs can flee better from predators. What are the characteristics that immediately characterize a gene as good or bad? I 75 Gene/Dawkins: Independent and free as they may be on their journey through the generations, they are very inhibited in the control of embryonic development. There is no one gene that is responsible for developing a single body part. I 86 Gene/Dawkins: There is a "gene for copying errors, (mutators)." It follows the selfish purpose of causing errors in other genes. Similarly, a "gene for propagation" manipulates all others for its selfish purposes. I 91 Body/cell/human/Dawkins: I prefer to imagine the body as a colony of genes, and the cell as a convenient work unit for the chemical industry of the genes. I 112 Altruism/gene/Dawkins: A "gene for altruism" controls the development of the nervous system in such a way that it is very likely to behave selflessly. >Altruism. For example, some bees pull their own larvae from the hive if they are infected. I 115 The survival of the genes can also be promoted by seemingly altruistic behavior! I 154 Gene/Dawkins: Thesis: The gene may be able to help the copies of its own in other bodies. I 155 E.g.: Albino gene in humans: We must, however, revoke our language somewhat: they do not actually "want" to survive or help other Albino genes. But if it were to move its bodies purely by chance to behave towards other albinos in a more selfless way, the consequence would be that it would be more numerous in the gene pool. For this, the gene must have two functions: 1) To produce light skin color ((s) Recognizability) 2) The tendency to altruism against other fair-skinned bodies. Such a gene with two effects could be very successful. |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Method | Darwin | Gould I 189 Darwin took the view that the fossil finds were extremely incomplete. The history of most fossil species includes two characteristics which are especially difficult to reconcile with the theory of gradual change. I 190 1) Stasis: Most species show little change in one or another direction during their presence on Earth. 2) Sudden Appearance: In all spheres of life, species do not appear on the basis of incessant changes in their predecessors, but suddenly and "fully developed". --- Mayr I 160 How-Questions/Mayr: immediate function led to the discovery of most natural laws. Why-Questions/Darwin/Mayr: historical, evolutionary, indirect. Why-questions were only scientifically legitimized by Darwin. He thus introduced the entire natural history into science. --- Dennett I 293 "Why"-Questions/Dennett: Need to be asked. Darwin showed us how to answer them. Dennett I 421 Extrapolation/DennettVsGould: the extrapolationism is not represented as foolishly "pure" as Gould assumes. It was also represented by Darwin himself, but he was eager to distinguish himself from those kinds of catastrophic theories that were in the way of the theory of evolution e.g. flood. --- Gould II 122 Method/Darwin/Gould: How can we be scientific about the past? Darwin's book on worms makes that clear. >Individual causation, >Causal explanation. Gould II 123 Darwin made above all two statements about the worms (1): 1. The impact on the design of the soil is directional. They crush the soil, which can then be better distributed by erosion. Therefore, gently undulated areas tend to be signs of worm activity. 2. They form the humus, the uppermost layer of the soil and thus form a constancy in the midst of other permanent changes. The humus layer does not become thicker and thicker because it is compressed by pressure downwards. This is about continuous change within apparent consistency: the humus always seems the same, but is constantly renewed. There's a cycle. Darwin: we don't notice how our own soil is pulled away from us under our feet. Gould II 129 Gould: What if the evidence is limited to the static object itself? If we cannot observe the process of formation, can we still find several stages of the process? Darwin's answer: we deduce the history of imperfections that capture the constraints of descent. If God had applied orchids to the purpose from the very beginning, which their complex organs now hold, he would certainly have made them much easier. 1. Charles Darwin: The formation of vegetable mould, through the action of worms, with observations on their habits. London: John Murray, 1881 |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adaptionism | Gould Vs Adaptionism | Dennett I 334 GouldVsAdaptionism: is a form of laziness: because history offers such a pretty explanation, you do not bother to look for alternatives. "Exactly-as-stories": such a good story simply cannot be wrong. In addition we have the Pangloss-Principle. Dennett I 342 GouldVsAdaptionism: there are no standards for when an adaptionist explanation of the good is too much. Dennett I 358 GouldVsAdaptionism: assumes that all paths in the aptitude landscape lead to the summit. Gould: but that does not have to be the case, maybe there are barriers. DennettVsGould: that is fair enough, but then you have to consider how to find such (secret) barriers.(>Theory). Dennett I 367 GouldVsAdaptionism: instead: " |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Gould, St. J. | Dawkins Vs Gould, St. J. | I 74 Gene/Container/DawkinsVsGould: successful genes are good designers of survival machines. For example, creatures with long legs can flee better from robbers. What are the characteristics that immediately characterize a gene as good or bad? I 75 DawkinsVsGould: I can see the difference that Gould finds, but the DNA does have a special position in the theory of selfish genes. There are also differences in the genes: e.g. genes that give bees yellow and black stripes are increasing in frequency, because they warn other animals. Genes that give tigers yellow and black streaks increase in frequency, although (or you might say: because) they are not effective in the brains of other animals. I 434 Body/Dawkins: is not a replicator, but a vehicle. (I 400): The genes work towards forcing organisms of successive generations to pass them on. Replicator/Behavior/Dawkins: the replicators do not behave, they do not perceive the world! (DawkinsVsGould). They do not catch prey and do not run away from predators. They construct vehicles that do these things. |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Gould, St. J. | Dennett Vs Gould, St. J. | I 371 Arch Spandrels/DennettVsGould: Gould: Thesis: the spandrels are so refined that the whole cathedral stands for their sake. GouldVs "pervasive adaptation" DennettVsGould: not so clever and not so often. I 388 Dennett: false juxtaposition of adaptionism with architectural necessity. Minimum surface limits expensive mosaic stones. Exaptation/Gould: thumb of the panda not really a thumb, but it does a good job! " Exaptation/Dennett: according to orthodox Darwinism any adjustment is some form of exaptation. This is trivial, because no function is preserved forever. Strand: GouldVsGradualism: "punctuated equilibrium". Jumps possible Long periods of stability, periods of abrupt changes. But no theory of macromutation. Broken Balance/DennettVsGould: Figure I 392: it depends on how the diagram is drawn: with sloping or horizontal branches (standing and jumping). DennettVsGould: it is known that changes can only be evaluated retrospectively in evolution. Nothing that happens during the sideways movement distinguishes an anagenetical from a kladogenetical process. I 405 DennettVsGould: but the fact that a currently existing group will be the founder of a new species, cannot be important for the intensity of a development. I 409 DennettVsGould: Gould would certainly not regard such a local imperceptible (but fast) transition from mouse to elephant (a few throusand years) as a violation of gradualism, but then he has no evidence in the form of fossil finds for his counter-position to gradualism. I 423 Has Neo-Darwinism ever claimed that evolution is proceeding at a constant speed? DennettVsGould: actually presumes (wrongly) that the majority of the contest of evolution was a lottery! His only clue: he cannot imagine why some of the amazingly bizarre creatures (Burgess) should be better designed than others. I 424 Chance/Evidence/Dennett: E.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of the randomness. I 426 Cambrian explosion/DennettVsGould: Equally, the suddenness here is no evidence for the randomness. Evolution/DennettVsGould: he is quite right: the paths are continuous, unbroken lineages (to us), but they are not lines of global progress. So what? There are local improvements. Münch III 379 Adaptionism/Dennett: the more complex the condition, the less likely appears a rational reason. But the truth of a non-adaptionist story does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories. We should accept Pangloss’ assumption.(1) 1. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Gould, St. J. | Pinker Vs Gould, St. J. | I 212 Evolution/PinkerVsGould: many alleged misconstructions in nature turn out to be old wives' tales. (Gould, "pieced together partial solutions"). Selection/Gould: can barely influence basic body plans. (e.g. vessel, nervous system of vertebrates has been unchanged for several hundred million years) I 214 PinkerVsGould: Selection should not be played against phylogenetic constraints. As hindering the dichotomy between innate and learned behavior. Pointless Questions/Pointless/Pinker: E.g. "Why does a creature have this or that organ?" Only makes sense if a comparison follows. Feathers/Wings/Pinker: that they first developed the feathers for thermal insulation is a widespread rumor. "They cannot fly with half a wing." PinkerVs: but there are not few birds that can fly a little: chicken, animals that let themselves fall from trees, etc. I 373 Exaptation/PinkerVsGould: I agree with Gould when it comes to the development itself: E.g. jawbone to ossicles). But: question: who or what performs the development or the functional takeover? Why were the earlier structures appropriate to take on new functions? |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Gould, St. J. | Verschiedene Vs Gould, St. J. | Dennett I 383 Helena CroninVsGould: flaw: he asks, how exclusive the selection as a driver of change is. Do you have to look at all the properties of living organisms as adaptations? Cronin: the selection may be the only thing that really brings forth adjustments, without that it must therefore have caused all properties. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Various Authors | Kauffman Vs Various Authors | Dennett I 311 Monod / Francois Jacob: Thesis: nature is a "crafter" (> bricolage). Opportunism, acomplete lack of direction and coincidence prevail. (KauffmanVs). Kauffman: also a blind crafter finds the forced moves. I Kauffman 286 Life / Self Organisation / Kauffman: we are not just pieced together, not merely molecular ad hoc devices. KauffmanVsGould, VsMonod, VsJacob, VsBricolage. We are children of necessity. At home in the universe. Kauffman I 277 Gradualism/KauffmanVsGradualism/Kauffman: funktioniert bei zwei Modellen nicht: 1. maximal verdichtete Rechnerprogramme. Da diese völlig regellos sind, (keine Redundanz) ist die Fehlertoleranz gleich null. Jede Änderung wird das Ergebnis randomisieren. 2. NK-Landschaften: wenn sich die Zahl der Kopplungen K = N 1 annähert, gibt es immer weniger Regelmäßigkeit. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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