Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chomsky, N. | Strawson Vs Chomsky, N. | VI 386 Transformational grammar: two kinds of formative: 1. lexical: correspond to names and general terms whose meaning is not somehow derived syntactically: e.g. "to sing", "to love", "red", "Mary". 2. non-lexical: heterogeneous group: e.g. the formative "pret" for the past tense. There is no mechanical process to find the deep structure. VI 389 Thesis: "Unconscious mastery" or "internal representation" is not enough to explain the linguistic abilities. The rules of transformational grammar provide the basis for the determination of those grammatical relations which are decisive for the semantic interpretation of sentences though not alone determining. VI 390 Grammar not circular, because it contains a lexicon. StrawsonVsChomsky: there is no general theory of the decisive class of compounds (of grammatical categories and formatives). VI 391 There is only the list of items in the dictionary without any representation of general principles of the allocation. But we should expect just such a theory if the grammar is to satisfy the conditions of transparency. Because we define with the grammatical categories the functions and relations of the sentence elements. That is what everyone understands without having explicitly learned grammar. We combine obvious semantic and syntactic considerations. VI 392 Explanation/Chomsky: this one admits that a "descriptively adequate" grammar must not be "explanation adequate". We need a theory of linguistic universals. In addition, it must be explained how our grammar was selected from other possible grammars. It must be explained: 1. Why do we understand infinitely many new propositions? (> See also the discussion "Is Language infinite?"). 2. The connection of semantics and syntax. VI 393 StrawsonVsChomsky: comments only expressly reserved on semantic considerations. Dictionary/Chomsky: is part of the base and contains far fewer entries than our ordinary dictionary. VI 395 Transformation grammar Vs traditional grammar: it was too unsystematic, no explanation of the traditional terms "verb", "noun", "object" possible. VI 396 PhilosophyVsGrammar/Strawson: is first freed from "empirical" requirements, does initially not need to cope with the actual formal requirements He has just like the grammarian a conception of meaning elements and a conception of semantically significant combination modes of these elements, to which the vocabulary is available in a transparent relationship. With these transparent relations he can consider possible formal arrangements by whom the combining functions could be dispensed. This is reminiscent of the construction of ideal languages. VI 397 Quine: (anywhere): "Do not show more structure than necessary". Grammar/Strawson: one must always distinguish between the actual (essential, crucial) and possible grammars. E.g. the essential grammar must show what elements belong to which, all combinations must be shown and be possible to distinguish. E.g. it must be possible to show when an element describes a non-symmetric relation. But the essential grammar determines in no way how these requirements are to be fulfilled. VI 398 We can choose one of several grammars. If it fulfills the requirements, we have a complete and totally transparent grammar. (Only idealized simplified, that is the price). Vocabulary/Strawson: we need a completely elaborate vocabulary or a set of related vocabularies. 1. Ontological vocabulary e.g. space, time, thing, gen. characteristics 2. Semantic V., for types and individual (abstract) elements, proper names for things, 3. Functional V. for combination or relation types. Deictic elements. 4. Vocabulary of the formal apparatus. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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