Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 34 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertibility | Brandom | Brandom I 197 VsJustified Assertibility: Assertibilty conditions do not contain the entire meaning. >Assertibility conditions. --- Rorty I ~ 325 (According to Rorty): assertible/Brandom/Rorty: in addition to the term "assertible" for the pure philosophy of language we still need "true". Especially for understanding how the language works as opposed to understanding how it spreads to the world. (Semantics/epistemology). Also naive: distinguishing the assertibility conditions of a statement as "descriptive meaning" and the consequences as "evaluative" importance, and thus abandon any need for harmony. --- Brandom II 238 Assertibility Theories/Brandom: Thesis semantics must be oriented towards pragmatics (Brandom pro). >Pragmatics. II 240 Two tasks: 1. assertive force, i.e. declaring accuracy, i.e. making a distinction between traits at all 2. saying when those traits are allowed. II 241 a) what are the reasons, evidence b) directly ask whether a statement is true - "semantic assertibility"/Sellars: assertibility under ideal conditions. II 242 BrandomVsSellars: hopeless: you cannot specify ideality; either it remains circular with recourse to the notion of truth, or trivial. (Also BrandomVsHabermas). II 243 Brandom's own approach: Thesis rule-governed language game that allows to combine propositional contents that are objective in the sense that they detach from the settings of the speaker with declarative sentences - which splits assertibility into two parts: determination and authorization (two normative statuses) - goes beyond Behth, because it allows the distinction between right and wrong use. - (> Dummett:> chess). II 254f Semantic Theories/Assertibility/Brandom: Pro: Advantage: close connection to use - Problem: Dilemma: either a) linked to attitude or b) to the object - N.B.: Same assertibility conditions, but different truth conditions - the object could be red without me being able to say it. >Truth conditions II 259 Solution: Conditional: "If the pattern is red, it is red" - Tautology: this is correct because it codifies a definition preserving inference - but not: II 260 "If I am entitled to the assertion that the pattern is red, it is red"- not definition preserving. II 261 Distinction between authorization and definition does not need the notion of truth. II 261 BrandomVsAssertibility: does not distinguish between the status of the definition/authorization without the aid of incompatibilities (negation). Distinction between sentences that share the assertibility conditions and those that share the truth condition is not possible without the notion of truth. >Truth. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Authority | Gadamer | I 283 Authority/Gadamer: The contrast between the belief in authority and the use of one's own reason, as claimed by the Enlightenment, is in itself justified. Insofar as the validity of authority takes the place of one's own judgement, authority is indeed a source of prejudice. But that it can also be a source of truth is not excluded, and the Enlightenment misjudged this when it defamed all authority. >Enlightenment. To be sure of this, one can refer to one of the greatest pioneers of the European Enlightenment: Descartes. Despite all the radicalism of his methodical thinking, Descartes, as we know, exempted the things of morality from the claim of a complete reconstruction of all truths from reason. This was the purpose of his provisional morality. >R. Descartes. I 284 In fact, not only is the defamation of all authority a prejudice established by the Enlightenment itself, but it has also led to a deformation of the concept of authority. But this is by no means the nature of authority. Certainly, authority comes first to persons. The authority of persons, however, has its final reason not in an act of submission and the abdication of reason, but in an act of recognition and knowledge - the knowledge, namely, that the other is superior to one in judgment and insight and that therefore his judgment takes precedence, i.e., has priority over one's own judgment. This is related to the fact that authority is not actually conferred, but is acquired and must be acquired if one wants to claim it. It is based on recognition and, in this respect, on an act of reason itself, which, within its limits, trusts others to have better insight. (...) directly, authority is not at all concerned with obedience, but with recognition.(1) 1. (...) The notorious phrase: "The party (or the leader) is always right" is not wrong because it claims the superiority of the leadership, but because it serves to shield the leadership from any criticism that might be true by a decision of power. True authority does not need to be authoritarian. This has been discussed many times, especially in my debate with J. Habermas. Cf. the anthology "Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik", Frankfurt 1977, edited by J. Habermas, and my Solothurn lecture "Über den Zusammenhang von Autorität und kritischer Freiheit", Schweizer Archiv für Neurologie, Neurochirurgie und Psychiatrie 133 (1983), pp. 11-16 (HabermasVsGadamer; GadamerVsHabermas. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Communication | Habermas | Rorty II 32 Language/Communication/HabermasVsDerrida: Derrida denies both the existence of an "obstinate formally structured area of communicative everyday practice" and an "autonomous field of fiction". Because he denies both, he can analyze any discourse according to the pattern of poetic language. Thus, he does not need to determine language. >J. Derrida, >Language/Habermas, >Discourse, >Discourse theory. Rorty II 33 RortyVsHabermas: Derrida is neither compelled nor willing to let "any language" be "determined" by anything. Derrida could fully agree with Habermas that "the world-developing power of interpretive language must prove itself" before metaphors become literary used and socially useful tools. RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that X is a special case of Y in order to treat X as Y. As if you could not just treat X as Y to see what happens. >Method, >Classification, >Definitions, >Definability. Habermas IV 115 Communication/Habermas: Because communicative action requires orientation to validity claims, it (...) refers from the outset to the possibility that the interaction participants distinguish more or less sharply between the influence on each other and the communication with each other. General willingness to accept can therefore arise in two different ways: a) through incentive and deterrence, b) rationally, through justified agreement motivated trust. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, >Validity claims, >Understanding. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Communication | Luhmann | Baraldi I 89 Communication/Luhmann/GLU: specific operation of social systems: 1) Communication 2) Information 3) Understanding the difference between communication and information. Communication is not the same as information, it only happens when information is understood - information is a selection between what is said and unsaid. Understanding is selection between communication and information. >Understanding/Luhmann, >Information/Luhmann. Reese-Schäfer II 47 Society/Communication/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: Special case: only society operates with communication. - There is no communication outside of society. - Therefore, it is necessary closed. - This is the only system for which this is true. - Then no observer can take an outside standpoint. >Society/Luhmann, >Observation/Luhmann. AU Cass 13 Communication/Language/Karl Bühler/Luhmann: instead of "transmission model": - unity of three components 1) Information, what it is about 2) Communication 3) Understanding Communication already existed in antiquity. LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: is the idea that this triad could be dismantled into acts. - Karl Bühler: all of them are only functions. ((s) Function/(s): Is not an act.) >Speech act theory/Luhmann. AU Cass 13 Communication/LuhmannVsHabermas: communication does not serve the creation of consensus. - If that does not work, it is simply declared the norm and claimed "it was supposed to be like that." But we should not turn an impossibility into a standard. >Communication/Habermas. SchelskyVsHabermas: Does communication stop when this goal is reached? Solution/Luhmann: communication is not an act which would have to be brought under a standard - only communicating is action. Communication is open when viewed without additions like truth. - We can also say "no". - On the other hand, we do not have the opportunity to start all over again. Without any authority it is impossible.. - "No" does not terminate communication. Communication could only be terminated by misunderstanding. Communication ensues when"yes" and "no" are not yet decided. AU Cass 12 Speech act Theory/Language/Communication/LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: Language use is not an act. - You always need understanding, so it goes on. Action: would only be a release without understanding. LuhmannVsHabermas: therefore, no theory of communicative action is possible. >Communicative action, >Communication theory. Speech: here the receiver is initially excluded. He comes only later as a disciplining moment in the theory. - And as a subject. >Language/Luhmann, >Subject/Luhmann. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Communication | Sunstein | I 17 Communication/argumentation/Habermas/SunsteinVsHabermas/Sunstein: Many have expressed the hope that the "casual power of the better argument"(1) will triumph. SunsteinVsHabermas: unfortunately, this hope is often disappointed. Information pressure and social group pressure intensify errors, cascade effects and polarisation. Larger groups often act better than smaller groups in this respect. (2) >Democracy/Sunstein. I 45 In an experiment in Colorado in the summer of 2005, liberal and conservative groups were mixed together to discuss some issues such as whether the United States should sign a climate change agreement or whether affirmative action should be accorded to disadvantaged groups.(3) The result was clear: in almost every group, the positions were more polarized after the discussions, with the respective starting positions of the groups being more strongly represented. I 72 Ideal Speech Situation/Habermas/Sunstein: in Habermas' ideal speech situation all participants try to find the truth. They do not behave strategically, but accept a norm of equality. (4) >Ideal speech situation. Sunstein: According to this viewpoint, communication does not simply involve the exchange of words and opinions, but imposes requirements and preconditions on the participants. Communication (deliberation) has (then) its own internal morality, which is supposed to overcome some harmful effects of consultations in the real world. Sunstein: maybe this will work and produce better results. (...) Unfortunately, following such preconditions does not help with the problems I have in mind. I 75 Group discussions/SunsteinVsHabermas: Group discussions suffer from four problems: 1. they reinforce the errors of their members 2. they do not bring to light the information that individuals have 3. they are victims of cascade effects in which blind people are led by blind people 4. they develop polarization tendencies that lead groups to move towards extremes. >Collective Intelligence/Sunstein. I 94 Group polarization/polarization/Sunstein: arises for several reasons. (5) 1. informational influences: if there is an initial inclination in a group, most members of the group will be moved there. 2. Some people orientate themselves on what others have publicly expressed and thus occupy a dominant position. 3. There are strong links between trust, extremism and the affirmation of others. (6) When people gain confidence they will mostly be more determined in their views. Trust is in turn strengthened by the support of others, like-minded people. I 96 Does group polarization lead to correct or incorrect results? There is no general answer here. It all depends on the tendency of the group, which existed before the start of consultations. (See also Internet). 1. See Habermas, “Between Facts and Norms: An Author’s Reflections,” 940. 2. Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, 2d ed., rev. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 7–9. 3. See Reid Hastie, David Schkade, and Cass R. Sunstein, “What Really Happened on Deliberation Day?” (University of Chicago Law School, unpublished manuscript, 2006). 4. Jürgen Habermas, “What Is Universal Pragmatics?,” in Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), 2–4, 32 (discussing preconditions for communication). 5. 54. See Brown, Group Processes, 212–22, 226–45; Baron et al., “Social Corroboration and Opinion Extremity,” 540. 6. See Baron et al., “Social Corroboration and Opinion Extremity,” 557–59 (showing that corroboration increases confidence and hence extremism). |
Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017 |
| Communication Theory | Bubner | I 198 Communication theory/BubnerVsHabermas: it is claimed that the observance of the formal conditions is guaranteed for the first time in history, 1. in truth, however, political events are to be transformed structurally according to the paradigm of a philosophical ideal. Idealization because the number of participants must be limited, and this is neither a historical coincidence nor a prejudice of undemocratic eliteism. I 199 2. The planned entry into the dialogue is characterized by the breaking of previously unquestioned unanimity, yet the controversy must take place in the primary intention of returning to the community. However, efforts to reach consensus are not yet agreed, and especially consensus brings the foundation of collective practice about. In a word: the dialogue is a means, but not the last content of politics. 3. It is not clear which are the contents of the event. >Dialogue, >Communication, >Discourse, >Discourse theory, >Politics. With the tendency to reformulate the flow of practice into a permanent dialogue, the contents that are derived from everyday political life are lost. The contents become playful as long as they are removed from the practical consequences. BubnerVsCommunication theory: shows that instead of a rationalization proposal for political processes in reality a new determination of the political is intended. The substantial content of the Aristotelianism which was made up of the commonality of action-orientated values was viewed as historically overtaken or consumed. >Good/Aristotle, >Community/Aristotle. The signum of modernism, subjectivity, does not longer allow the focus on good life, since this reflexive structure of the practice structure does not take into account the particularity of the individual. I 201 BubnerVsCommunication Theory/BubnerVsHabermas: seem to concentrate solely on the act of the conclusion of contract, which they reinterpret with linguistic means and declare it a permanent process. But they refrain from the stately state of tamed practice, which they suspect of the enforcement of governance. Instead of allowing politics through the contract, politics is an unceasing succession of contracts. Every trivial conflict takes the form of a fundamental problem. >Contracts, >Contract theory, cf. >Social contract. The institutional skepticism of communication theory reaches so deeply that the avoidance of the structural determination of political order is in principle pursued in the form of the favoring of the dialogue. Procedural rules, official channels, decisionistic decisions, separation of powers, temporary governance. The whole system of the differentiated form of organization of the political is suspended, and can always be revised in conversation. Other writers: the basic idealization has been lamented, the confusion of the modes of theoretical discussion with practice, the unhistorical neglect of the requirements of factual complexity of society, etc. Bubner: the main objection, however, is that the prerequisite of all political speeches, the commonality of the objectives, is thwarted in favor of an abstract agreement between partners, whose joint action remains as long as they are discussing in the dialogue method. >Subjectivity. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Communication Theory | Habermas | Bubner I 196 Habermas/Communication theory/Bubner: Thesis: Thinking of the functioning of the political system according to the model of dialogue. Clear formal conditions which should be transferred to the political system as a whole. 1. Equality of the partners, no relationship between the knowing and the ignorant. >Interaction, >Master/slave dicalectic. 2. This is not to take place, as in Hegel, by laboriously dealing with the relation of master and servant, but rather as a priori, without which there is no interaction at all. 2. Obligation to refrain from influencing, equal scope. 3. Authenticity postulate: obligation to truth. Since intentions are not to be examined, only the course of the dialogue itself can provide the proof. >Discourse, >Argumentation. BubnerVsHabermas: since one builds from the outset on truthfulness, it is obviously more a question of definition, which one wants to allow as a dialogue at all. >Truthfulness, >Truth. Bubner I 198 Communication theory/BubnerVsHabermas: it is claimed that the observance of the formal conditions is guaranteed for the first time in history, 1. in fact, political events are to be transformed structurally according to the paradigm of a philosophical ideal. Idealization because the number of participants must be limited, and this is neither a historical coincidence nor a prejudice of undemocratic eliteism. >Ideal speech community. Bubner I 199 2. the planned entry into the dialogue is characterized by the breaking of previously unquestioned unanimity, yet the controversy must take place in the primary intention of returning to the community. However, efforts to reach consensus are not yet consensus, and consensus is the foundation of collective practice. >Collectives/Habermas, >Practice. In a word: the dialogue is a means, but not the last content of politics. 3. It is not clear what is actually the content of the event. With the tendency to reformulate the flow of practice into a permanent dialogue, the contents that are derived from everyday political life are lost. The content becomes playful as long as they are removed from the practical consequences. BubnerVsCommunication theory: shows that instead of a rationalization proposal for political processes in reality a new determination of the political is intended. The substantial content of the Aristotelianism which was in the community of action-orientated values is seen as historically overtaken or consumed. >Values, >The Good/Aristotle. The signum of modernism, subjectivity, no longer allows the focus on good life, for this reflexive structure of the practice structure does not take into account the particularity of the individual. >Subjectivity, >Individuals. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Communicative Practice | Pettit | Brocker I 857 Communicative Practice/Community/PettitVsHabermas/Pettit: There is nothing to suggest that Pettit is giving a culture of public debate a truly constructive contribution to the generation and maintenance of public welfare orientations. In the later work, Pettit tends to envisage, as legitimate guardians of the common good, councils, expert groups or committees of inquiry, which, so to speak, are exclusively dedicated to the common good. >Democracy, >Deliberative democracy, >Welfare economics. He is convinced that they have the merit of being removed from the public opinion struggle, and he himself, provocatively and misleadingly, sees them as elements of an Brocker I 858 "depoliticization".(1) >Politics/Pettit. 1. Philip Pettit, »Depoliticizing Democracy«, in: Ratio Juris 17/1, 2004 S. 53 Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Conceptual Realism | Brandom | Martin Seel criticism Die ZEIT April 01 HabermasVsBrandom: "conceptual realism" (conceptual realism: (HusserlVs) concedes the concepts real existence. The world is designed as our cpncepts require - turns the architecture of the post-Hegelian thinking upside down - instead of confrontation with the contingent world that must prove itself in the formation of adequate terms, a mere replica takes the place of in-themselves-existing contents - BrandomVsHabermas: discards the "positivist image" of a testing of our concepts in a concept-free outer world. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Conceptual Realism | Habermas | Seel III 149 Conceptual realism/HabermasVsBrandom: Habermas' "conceptual realism" misses the constructive nature of human knowledge. >Knowledge, >R. Brandom. Instead of confrontation there is a mere replica of selfcontained contents. >Content. SeelVsBrandom: Brandom is more pragmatist than pragmatism. BrandomVsHabermas: Brandom rejects the "positivist image" of a testing of our concepts in a conceptual free outer world. >External world, >Reality, >Experience, cf. >McDowellVsBrandom. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
| Consensus | Deliberative Democracy | Gaus I 160 Consensus/Deliberative democracy/Bohman: for some proponents of deliberative democracy, a strong distinction between reasoned argumentation and mere discussion provides the basis for the claim that deliberation must be oriented to consensus (Habermas, 1996(1); Cohen, 1997(2)). Deliberation is not merely discourse or dialogue, Cohen argues, because it must be 'reasoned', that is based on 'public argument and reasoning among equal citizens' that yield the single best answer (1997(2): 74). VsHabermas/VsCohen: Critics often charge that both of these claims are exclusionary and lead to undemocratic consequences under the Gaus I 161 circumstance of background injustice and pervasive inequalities. It might seem that an orientation to consensus is not a requirement of deliberation, even if it may function as a regulative ideal. Deliberation must at least resemble argumentation to the extent that it is a matter of giving and asking for reasons. The reasons that make a decision acceptable ought to be distinguished from modes by which they are communicated. Democratic standards demanded for decisions need not apply to the medium of communication as such, and not all formal public spheres need to be ideally inclusive. This means that formal theories of communication and rationality cannot decide in advance precisely what modes and forms of communication are empirically appropriate in various settings. >Deliberative democracy/Dryzek, cf. >Argumentation/Crosswhite. Gaus I 161 Bohman: (...) disagreement is precisely what makes democratic deliberation not only necessary, but also fruitful and productive when tested through the variety of perspectives typical of a diverse and pluralistic audience. Argumentative discourse need not presuppose unanimity, or seek consensus, but rather places conflicts within a mutually constructed space of reasons. >Argumentation/Crosswhite. This fact of disagreement raises the issue of whether or not public deliberation is 'oriented to con- sensus'. Consensus is meant here to contrast with mere aggregation of preferences in voting and with bargaining or compromise. Certainly, if democracy were only voting and bargaining, it would lack the self-critical testing and responsiveness of reason giving and discourse; the problems of the tyranny of the majority and aggregation problems of social choice would undermine the effectiveness of Gaus I 162 Democracy and its claims to ligitimacy. >Consensus/Discourse theories. 1. Habermas, Jürgen (1996) Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Cohen, Joshua (1997) 'Deliberation and democratic legitimacy'. In J. Bohman and W. Rehg, eds, Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Consensus | Discourse Theories | Gaus I 160 Consensus/deliberative democracy/Discourse theories/Bohman: for some proponents of deliberative democracy, a strong distinction between reasoned argumentation and mere discussion provides the basis for the claim that deliberation must be oriented to consensus (Habermas, 1996(1); Cohen, 1997(2)). Deliberation is not merely discourse or dialogue, Cohen argues, because it must be 'reasoned', that is based on 'public argument and reasoning among equal citizens' that yield the single best answer (1997(2): 74). VsHabermas/VsCohen: Critics often charge that both of these claims are exclusionary and lead to undemocratic consequences under the Gaus I 161 circumstance of background injustice and pervasive inequalities. It might seem that an orientation to consensus is not a requirement of deliberation, even if it may function as a regulative ideal. Deliberation must at least resemble argumentation to the extent that it is a matter of giving and asking for reasons. The reasons that make a decision acceptable ought to be distinguished from modes by which they are communicated. Democratic standards demanded for decisions need not apply to the medium of communication as such, and not all formal public spheres need to be ideally inclusive. This means that formal theories of communication and rationality cannot decide in advance precisely what modes and forms of communication are empirically appropriate in various settings. >Deliberative democracy/Dryzek. Gaus I 162 Habermas: Habermas thinks that participants in argumentation must be guided by the ideal of a single right answer to which all agree 'for the same reasons' (1996(1): ch. 8; Bohman and Rehg, 1996)(3). VsHabermas: He may well be correct that an overly agonistic conception of public discourse would undermine the epistemic basis for claims to democratic legitimacy, that is, that democratic deliberation is legitimate and not only is a fair process, but is more likely to find the most equitable and true outcome (Estlund, 1997)(4). For all its attractions to critics of deliberation, agonistic debate is no less open to the charge of elitism (Benhabib, 1991)(5), and even less based on the sort of co-operation needed to resolve conflict mutually. >Argumentation/Crosswhite. 1. Habermas, Jürgen (1996) Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Cohen, Joshua (1997) 'Deliberation and democratic legitimacy'. In J. Bohman and W. Rehg, eds, Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 3. Bohman, James and William Rehg (1996) 'Discourse and democracy: the formal and informal bases of democratic legitimacy'. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 4 (l): 79_99. 4. Estlund, David (1997) 'Beyond fairness and deliberation: the epistemic dimension of democratic authority'. In J. Bohman and W. Rehg, eds, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 5. Benhabib, Seyla (1991) Situating the Self London: Routledge. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Deliberative Democracy | Benhabib | Gaus I 283 Deliberative democracy/Benhabib/Mottier: (...)authors such as [Iris Marion] Young and Seyla Benhabib draw on liberalist thought to develop deliberative models of democracy. Benhabib (1992)(1) builds on Habermas's and Hannah Arendt's analyses of the public sphere to emphasize the necessity of democratizing public debate and opening access to it, while at the same time criticizing these authors for paying little attention to the exclusion of women from that sphere. Although Benhabib is in favour of maintaining some division between the spheres, she takes issue with Arendt for conceptualizing this separation in overly rigid terms. BenhabibVsHabermas: She also criticizes Habermas for operating a distinction between public norms of justice and private values, thereby running the risk of reinstating the separation between the two that has been at the origin of the exclusion of women. Benhabib (1992)(1), similarly to Joan Landes (1995)(2), argues for a Habermasian model of public debate while rejecting the idea of an abstract universal public, a rejection that allows 'differences' between men's and women's experiences to be taken into account instead. 1. Benhabib, Seyla (1992) Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. New York: Routledge. 2. Landes, Joan (1995) 'The public and the private sphere: a feminist reconsideration'. In Johanna Meehan, ed., Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of Discourse. London: Routledge, 91-116. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Democracy | Sunstein | I 11 Democracy/Discussion/Committees/Communication/Deliberation/Psychology/Sunstein: it is controversial today whether discussion always leads to better decisions. (1) It can happen that group members put pressure on others, which can lead to extremism or unanimity with regard to false information. >Group behavior, >Group think, >J. Habermas, >Communication theory, >Communicative action, >Deliberative democracy. I 12 Group Thinking/Irving L. Janis/Sunstein: Jani's thesis: Groups can easily lead to uniformity and dangerous self-censorship by not correctly combining information and extending disagreement to a wider area.(2) The main problem is that groups usually do not use the knowledge that their individual members have. This became particularly clear in a 2004 Senate report on the CIA. (3) After this there was group pressure, neglect of alternatives, selective perception and suppression of criticism.(4) >Conformity/Psychological theories. Solution/Sunstein: in order to shed light on the weaknesses of communication in groups, we need to examine the consequences of two weaknesses: a) information influences that lead to non-disclosure of divergent information by group members. I 13 The pattern in these cases is: How can so many people be wrong? b) Social pressure: you do not want to spoil it with superiors. >SunsteinVsHabermas, Communication/Sunstein). 1. See Robert J. MacCoun, “Comparing Micro and Macro Rationality,” in Judgments, Decisions, and Public Policy, ed. Rajeev Gowda and Jeffrey C. Fox (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 121–26; Daniel Gigone and Reid Hastie, “Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group Judgment,” Psychological Bulletin 121 (1997): 161–62; Garold Stasser and William Titus, “Hidden Profiles: A Brief History,” Psychological Inquiry 14 (2003): 308–9. 2. Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, 2d ed., rev. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 7–9. 3. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report of the 108th Congress, U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq: Conclusions, 4–7 (full version, S. Rep. No. 108–301, 2004), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov. 4. Ibid. p. 4. |
Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017 |
| Forms of Thinking | Rorty | Examples of forms of thinking in Rorty's works I 130 The 17th century "misunderstood" the mirror of nature or the inner eye as little as Aristotle the natural movement or Newton the gravitation. One could not misunderstand them, because one invented them. >Meaning, >Definition, >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Reference. I 135 "Rightly held to be true" is not the same as "true". >Context dependence. I 139 One can hardly say, "mental" means something in reality "that could turn out to be something physical", as well as one cannot say, e.g. "criminal behavior" means in reality something like "behavior that can turn out to be innocent". >Physical/psychic. I 258 Abstract/concrete: the distinction must also be relativized to a given data base, such as the distinction of the complex and the simple. >Abstractness, >Simplicity, >Complexity. I 261 Doubling: Rorty: the action, that templates led as Lockean ideas to a doubling of the explanandum, is like the claim, the particles of the Bohr-atom would double the billiard balls whose behavior they help to explain. However, it turns out that it is fruitful to postulate small billiard balls inside the big billiard balls. ((s)Vs: problem: other forces act in the atomic nucleus.) I 273 The language of thought or any code, can have no honor status, (not even for Fodor) because a mere code is not a means to distinguish the truth from falsehood. >Language of thought, >Fodor, >Code. --- II (b) 33 RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that one must first demonstrate X as a special case of Y to treat X as Y. As if one could not simply handle X as Y, to see what happens. >Habermas. --- III 169 ff Contingency: contingencies in literary narratives are meaningful only in retrospect. >Contingency. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Interaction | Parsons | Habermas IV 319 Interaction/Parsons/Habermas: Problem: if the concept of action is connected to the concept of order in such a way that both complement each other on the same analytical level to form the concept of social interaction, the focus would no longer be on the purpose-means structure, but on language-dependent consensus building as the mechanism that coordinates the action plans of different actors. >Order/Parsons, Order/Hobbes, Order/Locke. Habermas IV 320 Solution/Parsons: the starting point remains the singular action of a single actor. Parsons thinks that elementary interaction consists of two independently introduced actions of two actors. Values define the preferences of alternatives. >Double Contingency/Parsons. Habermas IV 321 Problem: how should Parsons link the monadic concept of action with an intersubjectivist concept of order? Solution/Habermas: one could make interpretations of the actors a core component of social action. The problem would be solved by orienting oneself towards the validity claims of norms that are based on intersubjective recognition. ParsonsVsHabermas: Parsons, on the other hand, sees action-oriented decisions first and foremost as a result of private arbitrariness of individual actors. (Habermas: This is so in Parsons early middle period). >Arbitrariness. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Intersubjectivity | Putnam | III 167 PutnamVsHabermas: general consent is neither in philosophy nor anywhere else ever criterion for accuracy. --- I (h) 214 Objectivity/intersubjectivity/Carnap/Husserl: objectivity is intersubjective and publicly verifiable. PutnamVsIntersubjectivity: intersubjectivity even seems to be incapable of "inter-subjective" evidence. Cf. >Objectivity/Putnam. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Language | Habermas | Rorty II 94 Language/Habermas/Rorty: Habermas distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of confidence levels. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas Rorty II 94/95 Rorty: if we cease to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy dissolves between reason and feeling. >Authority, >Reason, >I. Kant, >Reason/Kant, >Plato. Rorty II 96 RortyVsHabermas: the idea of the "better argument" is only useful if one can find a natural, transcultural relevance relation. >Argumentation, >Ultimate justification. --- Habermas IV 41 Language/Habermas: we have to choose between a) Language as a medium of communication and b) Language as a medium for the coordination of action and socialization of individuals between them. IV 42 The formation of identities and the emergence of institutions can be imagined in such a way that the extra-linguistic context of behavioral dispositions and behavioral schemas is, so to speak, linguistically permeated, i.e. symbolically structured. >Identity/Henrich, >Institutions. IV 43 Language functions as a medium not of understanding and the transmission of cultural knowledge, but of socialisation and social integration. These processes do not sediment themselves, like communication processes, in cultural knowledge, but in the symbolic structures of self and society, in competencies and relationship patterns. >Cultural tradition/Habermas, >Background/Habermas, >Competence, >Capabilities. The signal language develops into a grammatical speech, as the medium of communication simultaneously moves away from the symbolically structured self of the interaction participants and the society condensed into normative reality. >Signal language. IV 100 Language/medium/socialization/Habermas: Speech acts are only a suitable medium of social reproduction if they can simultaneously assume the functions of tradition, social integration and socialization of individuals. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act They can only do this if the propositional, illocutionary and expressive elements are integrated into a grammatical unit in each individual speech action in such a way that the semantic content does not break down into segments but can be freely converted between the components. >Content, >Semantic content. IV 135 Religion/Holy/Language/Habermas: in the grammatical speech the propositional elements are combined with the illocutionary and expressive elements in such a way that the semantic content can fluctuate between them. Everything that can be said can also be represented as a statement. This makes it clear to oneself what a connection of religious world views to communicative action means. The background knowledge goes into the situation definitions (...). >Religion/Habermas, >Holiness/Durkheim. Since the semantic contents of sacred and profane origin fluctuate freely in the medium of language, there is a fusion of meanings: the moral-practical and expressive contents are combined with the cognitive-instrumental in the form of cultural knowledge. This is a) as cultural knowledge - b) as a basis for instrumental action. This latter makes religion a world view that demands totality. >Background/Habermas. IV 273 Language/media/control media/communication media/Habermas: the conversion from language to control media (money, power (influence, reputation)) means a decoupling of the interaction from lifeworld contexts (see Lifeworld/Habermas). Media such as money and power begin with the empirically motivated ties; they code a purpose-rational handling of calculable amounts of value and enable a generalized strategic influence on the decisions of other interaction participants, bypassing linguistic consensus-building processes. >Control media, >Communication media. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Metaphors | Habermas | Rorty III 117 Metaphor/HabermasVsRorty: considers Rorty's aestheticizing speech of metaphor, concept renewal and self-discovery as an unfortunate fascination of the idea of the "world-developing function of language", which, in contrast to the "problem-solving" function of language steps into "inner-worldly practice". >Language/Habermas, >Metaphor/Rorty, >R. Rorty, >Description/Rorty, >Explanation/Rorty. Rorty III 118 Habermas/Kuhn/Rorty: Habermas is ready to accept from Kuhn that "the languages of science and technology, law and morality, economics and politics live on the luminosity of metaphorical speeches." >Science/Th. Kuhn. >Th. Kuhn. Rorty III 119 RortyVsHabermas: Habermas is more afraid of a 'romantic upheaval' like Hitler and Mao have shown it before than of a suffocating effect that the encrusted societies can have. He is more afraid of autonomy than what Foucault called the "bio-power" of the experts. >Autonomy, >Biopolitics, >M. Foucault. Rorty III 120 Rorty VsHabermas: I am very suspicious of the idea of a "universal validity" (metaphysics). This claim is no longer credible if one is convinced of the "contingency of language". >Contingency, >Metaphysics, >Universalism, >Ultimate Justification. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Philosophy | Habermas | Rorty III 142 HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsFoucault: their polemic against the Enlightenment turns the back on the social hopes of liberal societies. >Enlightenment, >Progress, >Liberalism, >HabermasVsAdorno, >HabermasVsFoucault. Rorty III 143 Habermas shares with the Marxists the assumption that the true meaning of a philosophical opinion exists in its political implications. >Marxism/Habermas, >RortyVsHabermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Politics | Pettit | Brocker I 858 Politics/Depoliticization/Pettit: Pettit defines "depoliticization"(1) as distancing political decision-making from an emotionally charged, moralizing and clichédly prejudiced struggle of opinion in which he fears that simple and polarizing platitudes rather than public welfare-oriented considerations will prevail. Instead of, however, in a good republican tradition, branding this shift from public welfare orientation to strategic, effect-hasty incitement as a process of "de-politicization", as an alarming loss of civic political judgement, Pettit understands de-politicization exactly the other way round as a taming of the downright dreaded will of the people by a rationality examination of the arguments, which circulate and meet in the public opinion struggle exercised by experts.(2) ((s) PettitVsHabermas). ((s) "Government of Experts", "Government of Technocrats", "Technical Cabinets": see also Sartori). PettitVsRepublicanism: Pettit obviously does not share the republican punch line that "politicization" is precisely the measure for the ability to make intuitive and conscious references to the common good. John P. McCormickVsPettit: In this respect, says disrespectfully that Pettit has made a democratically forgotten, institution-centred "senatorial move" and shows the tendency to neglect the problem horizon of nurturing and sharpening the political judgement of citizens, a genuine and central concern of Republican thought.(3) RichterVsPettit: Pettit did not succeed in resolving the tension between state trust and criticism of power, between civic participation and elite trust which he is building. PettitVsRawls: see Justice/Pettit. 1. Philip Pettit, »Depoliticizing Democracy«, in: Ratio Juris 17/1, 2004 p. 53 2. Ibid. p. 63 3. John P. McCormick, »Republicanism and Democracy«, in: Andreas Niederberger/Philipp Schink (Hg.), Republican Democracy. Liberty, Law, and Politics, Edinburgh 2013, p. 108 Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Postindustrial Society | Touraine | Gaus I 271 Postindustrial Society/Touraine/West: (...) 'technocracy' extends beyond economy and state to institutions concerned with communication (media), production and transmission of knowledge (education) and creation of symbolic and cultural contents (media, entertainment industry, marketing, design, etc.). >Modernism/Touraine. By implication, the fundamental contradiction of industrial society, that between capital and labour, is being superseded by new conflicts. The fundamental opposition of programmed society is between 'those who manage the apparatus of knowledge and economic transformation, and those who are caught up in change and are trying to regain control over it' (1977(1): 156). The student activism of May 1968 in Paris was an early symptom of new patterns of conflict (1971(2): 347); anti-nuclear and environmental protesters represent subsequent waves of resistance to the new form of domination. Marxism: Evidently, although Touraine updates the Marxist theory of class conflict, he retains its binary structure. Despite the apparent plurality and diversity of new social movements, ultimately ‚[A] society is formed by two opposing movements: one which changes historicity into organization, to the point of transforming it into Older and power, and another which breaks down this order so as to rediscover the orientations and conflicts through cultural innovation and through social movements. (1981(3): 31) West: Less radical forms of political activism are relegated to lesser categories of collective action in accordance with Touraine's aim 'to extract the social movement from the admixture in which it is compounded with other types of collective behaviour' (1981(3): 24; 1985(4)). * Social movements: The genuine social movement is identified by its relation to the progressive option of resistance to technocratic domination in the crisis of programmed society. Like Habermas’s Gaus I 272 analysis in its focus on reflexive modernity and on the role of technocratic or instrumental reason, and, above all, in its commitment to the schemata of Marxian critical theory, ... TouraineVsHabermas: ...Touraine's approach dif-fers mainly in what he regards as the alternative to an increasingly technocratic society. Technocracy/Touraine: As Touraine puts it: ‚Some, like myself, think it necessary to re-introduce the concept of the subject, not in a Cartesian or religious sense, but as the effort of the individual to act as a person, to select, organize and control his individual life against all kinds of pressures. Others, like Habermas, oppose to the instrumentalist view of modernity the idea of intersubjectivity, communicative action and, in more practical terms, democracy.‘ (1991(5): 390—1) * Melucci (1985(6); 1989(7)) follows Touraine's approach but, in a spirit closer to postmodernism (...) attempts to avoid such 'totalizing' tendencies. 1. Touraine, Alain (1977) The Self-Production of Society, trans. D. Coltman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Touraine, Alain (1971) The May Movement: Revolt and Reform. New York: Random House. 3. Touraine, Alain (1981) The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Touraine, Alain (1985) 'An introduction to the study of social movements'. Social Research, 52 (4): 749-87. 5. Habermas, Jürgen (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. Il, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, trans. T. McCarthy. Cambridge: Polity 6. Melucci, A. (1985) 'The symbolic challenge of contemporary movements'. Social Research, 52 (4): 789—815. 7. Melucci, A. (1989) Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society, eds J. Keane and P. Mier. London: Hutchinson Radius. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Principles | Rorty | II 43 Principles/validity/RortyVsHabermas: the question of the "inner validity" of the principles will not arise. Especially not whether it is "universally valid". The only thing that prevents a society from taking the institutionalized humiliation of the weak for granted is a detailed description of these humiliations. Such descriptions are given by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers and painters. >Cf. >Validity/Habermas, >Validity claims/Habermas, >Society/Habermas, >Inequalities/Habermas. VI 120 Principle/rationality/background/Searle/Rorty: (with Wittgenstein): for the Western rationalist tradition there are principles that do not function as a theory (Rorty pro). Rather, they function as a background. >Backgrund/Searle, >Background/Habermas, >Rationality. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Rationality | Habermas | III 25 Rationality/Habermas: has less to do with acquisition than with the use of knowledge. Knowledge can be criticized as unreliable. III 26 This is where the ability to justify comes into play. For example, actions which the actor himself/herself considers to be hopeless cannot be justified. >Justification, >Reasons, >Contradictions, >Knowledge. III 30 Rationality/Realism/Phenomenology/Habermas: two approaches differ in the way propositional knowledge is used: a) The "realistic" position is based on the ontological premise of the world as the epitome of what is the case, in order to clarify on this basis the conditions of rational behaviour. The realist can limit himself/herself to the conditions for objectives and their realization. b) The "phenomenological" position reflects on the fact that the rational actors themselves must presuppose an objective world. >Propositional knowledge. III 31 It makes the ontological preconditions a problem and asks about the conditions under which the unity of an objective world is constituted for the members of a communication community. It must be regarded by the subjects as one and the same world in order to gain objectivity. >Lifeworld, >Rationality/Pollner. III 33 The concept of cognitive-instrumental rationality, derived from the realistic approach, can be added to the broader phenomenological concept of rationality. There are relationships between the ability of decentral perception and manipulation of things and events on the one hand and the ability of intersubjective communication on the other. (See also Cooperation/Piaget), >Cooperation. III 36 Action/Rationality/Habermas: Actors behave rationally as long as they use predicates in such a way that other members of their lifeworld would recognize their own reactions to similar situations under these descriptions. >Descriptions, >Predication, >Attribution, cf. >Score keeping. III 44 Those who use their own symbolic means of expression dogmatically behave irrationally. Cf. >Language use. IV 132 Rationality/Habermas: we can trace the conditions of rationality back to conditions for a communicatively achieved, justified consensus. Linguistic communication, which is designed for communication and does not merely serve to influence one another, fulfils the prerequisites for rational expressions or for the rationality of subjects capable of speaking and acting. The potential for rationalization (...) can be released (...) to the extent that the language fulfils functions of communication (and) coordination of action (...) and thus becomes a medium through which cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization take place. >Language/Habermas. Rorty I I 92 RortyVsHabermas: his own attempt to put communicative reason in the place of "subject-centered reason", is in itself a step towards the replacement of the "what" by a "how". >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, >RortyVsHabermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Rationality | Luhmann | I 129f Def Rationality/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: the bid to respect the functional differentiations. This is ompletely different to Habermas. LuhmannVsHabermas: overall societal rationality can finally not exist in the generalization of what all the individual functional areas see as their rationality. For this purpose, there can be no privileged place, no responsible organization, so no 'constitution'. --- AU Kass 8 Rationality/Luhmann: question: how can rationality be understood under the realistic conditions of universal deceit at all? Tradition: Thesis: action and circumstances are both natural - also the criteria for correctness. AU Kass 8 Rationality/Habermas: distinction strategic/communicative rationality. LuhmannVsHabermas: the rationality should be the same rationality on both sides. Why are we talking about rationality then? But what is the common component? - Neither Habermas nor Weber say that. >Rationality/Habermas, >Rationality/Weber. Luhmann: Today: rationality of action: preferences - antonym: side-effects. >Action/Luhmann, >Action system/Luhmann, >Action theory. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Reality | Rorty | II (b) 40 RortyVsHabermas: we linguistic historicists believe that dependency relations can only be uncovered when someone proposes concrete alternatives. There is no "humanity" that would have to be guided from an era of "distorted communication" (relative term) to a new era. - We reject the notion that people have a "Interior" that resists "external conditioning". II (e) 101 ff Description/Rorty: the nature described will always have some sort of order. Thing itself/Rorty: just nature which is not described by any human language. II (e) 106f Freud/Rorty: has no interest in a distinction between reality and appearance! It’s about new description. IV 49 World: "Non-sentences". - Rorty characterizes Davidson's thesis of the non-existence of a relationship of "truthmakers" ((s) quotation marks by Rorty) to the world as the denial of a relationship between non-sentences and sentences. ((s) Everything that is not a sentence - because sentences are about the world. Otherwise circular). VI 169 Reality/statements/Wittgenstein/Rorty: we are unable to move back and forth between our statements about electrons and the electrons themselves - not even between our attributions of beliefs and the beliefs themselves - E.g. (Wittgenstein) that would be like trying to confirm what s in the newspaper by comparing what is in another copy of the same newspaper. VI 170 Success/explanation/reality/RortyVsDennett: Success as an explanation helps us to waive "reality" - the success depends on the usefulness. >Explanation/Dennett, >Benefit, >Success. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Reason | Habermas | Rorty II 82 Reason/Habermas/Rorty: Habermas draws a sharp boundary between reason and sensation. >Sensation. Rorty II 90 Practical Reason/Habermas/Rorty: Habermas (according to Rorty) demands really heavy philosophical ammunition according to Kant's model: only transcendental presuppositions of any possible communicative practice can be sufficiently strong to fulfill the task. It needs a universally available human capability called practical reason that shows us what is an arbitrary distinction between people, and what is not. >Principles/Kant, >Practical Reason, >Person/Kant. Rorty II 91 Rorty: That cannot be Rawls' intention. No superordinate "source of authority", no independent kingdom of morality. For Rawls, practical reason is rather a procedural than a substantive question. >J. Rawls. II 92 RortyVsHabermas: his own attempt to replace "communicative reason" in the place of "subject-centric reason" is itself a step towards the replacement of the "what" by a "how". >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Relativism | Rorty | I 304 Relativism: The assertion that truth and reference are "relative to a conceptual system" sounds as if it said more. But that is not the case as long as our system of concepts simply stands for the things which we currently believe. >Convention, >Language community. II (b) 36 RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism". >HabermasVsFoucault, >Habermas, >Foucault. II (g) 152 Cultural relativism: is not relativistic as long as relativism amounts to the assertion that every moral view is as good as any other. >Cultural relativism. Rorty: our moral conception is much better than any competing view. It’s one thing to make the false assertion that there is no difference between us and the Nazis. A very different thing is to represent the correct assertion that there is no neutral common ground on which a Nazi and I can retreat to discuss. III 87 Schumpeter: "the insight that the validity of one’s own beliefs is only relative, and yet stand up for them fearlessly, distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian". Isaiah Berlin: one must not ask for more. >Isaiah Berlin, >Joseph A. Schumpeter. IV 11 Relativism/cultural relativism/RortyVsPutnam: false solution: a transcultural point of view. - That would be just another God point of view: ideal truth as limiting concept. >Relativism/Putnam, >Truth/Putnam. V 20 Cultures have no axiomatic structures. The fact that they have institutionalized norms actually says the same thing as Foucault’s thesis: that knowledge and power can never be separated. If you do not believe in certain things at a certain place at a certain time, you probably have to atone for it. >Culture, >Norms. VI 74 Relativism/Realism/PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism/Rorty: both assume that one could simultaneously be both inside and outside language. VI 77f Fascism/relativism/truth/Sartre/Rorty: E.g. tomorrow, after my death, people can decide to introduce fascism - then fascism will be the human truth. RortyVsSartre: not the truth - the truth would have been forgotten. Putnam: Truth is a third instance between the camps. RortyVsPutnam: correctness instead of truth - namely, according to our standards. According to what other standards, the ones of the fascists?. >Norms/Rorty, >Correctness. VI 79 Justification of the standards/Rorty: from our self-improvement. VI 246 Cultural relativism/Rorty: I am of the opinion that our Western culture is more than others. But this kind of relativism is not irrationalism. One does not have to be an irrationalist if one abstains from making one’s own network of beliefs as coherent and transparent as possible. >Cultural Relativism, cf. >Western Rationalism. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Sense | Luhmann | Baraldi I 170 Sense/Luhmann/GLU: sense allows the selective production of all social and psychological forms. - The form of sense is the distinction "real"/"possible". Sense is the simultaneous presentation of news and possible. - Sense determines connectivity to additional communication. ((s) Elsewhere: is the dimension that is presented in the negation.) >Communication/Luhmann, >Understanding/Luhmann, >Meaning. Material dimension: "this"/"other" - social dimension: "ego"/"old" - time dimension: past/future. --- Reese-Schäfer II 34 Sense/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: the normal form of human experience. - The experience needs to select - for this serves the sense. Experience/action: is selection by sense criteria. >Action/Luhmann, >Experience/Maturana. Reese-Schäfer II 35 Definition sense/Luhmann: the meaning that has something for an observer - Futility: only possible with characters. Reese-Schäfer II 44 Sense/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: does not need a carrier - sense carries itself by allowing its own reproduction self-referential. Reese-Schäfer II 139 Sense/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: preverbal, language foundational category. >Language/Luhmann. Sense/HabermasVsLuhmann: principle linguistical - inconceivable without intersubjective validity. LuhmannVsHabermas: studies on marriage conflicts show that these cannot be solved with everyday language, because the everyday language holds both positive and negative expressions. --- AU Cass. 10 Sense/Sociology/Luhmann: Problem: if each individual produces sense, is there then a sphere of intersubjectivity? - Solution: we have to apply the sense category on two different system categories: 1. Mental systems, awareness systems that experience meaningfully. 2. Communication systems that reproduce sense in that it is used in communication. Subject: lost. - The subject is not a carrier of meaning. - Sense gets formal. - Solution: extraction through the distinction between medium and form - that means, independent of a particular system. AU Cass 10 Sense/Luhmann sense could be a constant invitation to a specific shape formation, which then is always characterized by the fact that they are formed in the medium by sense. - But these forms do not represent sense as a category at all. - The word "sense" is namely not the only thing what makes sense. AU Cass 10 Sense/Luhmann: a) in the system of consciousness - E.g. references to other options: I have the key in the pocket to unlock the door later - but sense is also the location of that reference in everything we consider as an object - b) in the communication system : to information also belongs the failure area: what surprises me? - All items have only sense in the context of other options. AU Cass 10 Sense is itself a medium - also negation takes place internally. - But sense itself is not negated. - We cannot get out. - A world in which only beetles exist would be one in which no more sense is processed - but we can imagine it only meaningfully. - We imagine the rest as rest - ( "as it would be for the human"). - ((s) Cf. Th. Nagel, What is it like to be a bat?). Animal/Luhmann: it is impossible to distinguish whether there is sense for animals. We depend on the assumption of sense. >Cf. >Animal, >Animal language. No distinction of meaning such as "factual"/"temporal"/"social" are possible. AU Cass. 10 Sense/Luhmann: no sense-needing system can be completely transparent to itself. - That, what we are as a result of a long chain of operations, which structures we have, we cannot reduce this to a formula. But instead we can imagine who we are, or we can describe it. - We also encounter quickly meaningless - that means, something that does not fit into this description. >Senseless, >Meaningless. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Speech Act Theory | Luhmann | AU Cass 12 Speech act Theory/Language/Communication/LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: Language use is not an act. - You always need understanding, so it goes on. Action: would only be a release without understanding. LuhmannVsHabermas: therefore, no theory of communicative action is possible. >Communicative action, >Communication theory. Speech: here the receiver is initially excluded. He comes only later as a disciplining moment in the theory. - And as a subject. >Communication/Luhmann, >Language/Luhmann, >Subject/Luhmann. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Systems | Luhmann | Baraldi I 195 System/Environment/Luhmann/GLU/(s): System is the basic concept of system theory. Outside: is always more complex than the inside. >Outside/inside/Luhmann. System: helps to reduce complexity. No system can operate outside its borders. Each system is identified by its own operation. >Operation/Luhmann. Environment: is not surrounded by borders but by horizons. It itself is not a system. It has no own operations. But it is not passive. >Environment/Talcott Parsons. --- Reese-Schäfer II 47 System/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: autopoietic systems have no other form of environmental contact than self contact. >Autopoiesis. Take only environmental impacts by transforming them into their own frequency. - E.g. social system has no use for consciousness. --- AU Cass 3 System/closed systems/Luhmann: closed systems cannot be found in the world. - We only consider open systems: biology, social system etc. - So-called operational (closed) systems are only seemingly different. --- AU Cass 4 System/Luhmann: a system can distinguish itself from the environment. --- AU Cass 8 System/environment/complexity/Luhmann: the environment of a system is always more complex than the system. Therefore, the system cannot establish a point-to-point relationship with the environment. - Therefore complexity must be reduced or ignored . For example, call different things by the same name. >Complexity/Luhmann. --- AU Cass 8 System/Luhmann: a system has subdivisions - E.g. planning for the system. - Dor the subdividions, the system is environment itself. Loosely coupled systems are more stable. - E.g. employees can be exchanged. >Form/Luhmann. Fixed coupling is not found in nature. - In systems not everything is connected with everything! - Not like Newton. --- AU Cass 11 System/Luhmann: a system is not an object but a difference. I am in my environment. I am not in society, otherwise others would think my thoughts, etc. Individuals/Systems theory: In this way, system theory allows individualism. HabermasVsLuhmann: radical individualism is not sought. LuhmannVsHabermas: the society does not have to strive for a "human aim". - ((s) This is an aim for humans, society is not a human.) --- AU Cass 14 System/Luhmann: E.g. conflicts are systems. - Because it brings the other in a limited range of variation of responses. Conflicts have an organizing force. VsSystemtheory/VsLuhmann: critiques say, here conflicts are underexposed. LuhmannVsVs: not here. Conflict: can lead to a too strong integration. Conflicts are spreading more with a fixed coupling. >Form/Luhmann. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Texts | Habermas | Rorty III 231 Literature/Self/Appropriateness/RortyVsHabermas: for him the completely traditional image of the self with its three spheres is: the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic of central importance. >Self/Habermas. This classification leads him to regard literature as a "cause of the appropriate expression of feelings" and literary criticism as a "judgement of taste". Rorty III 232 Rorty: when we give up this division, we will not ask more questions like: "Does this book want to promote truth or beauty?" "Will it promote proper behavior or pleasure?" And instead ask, "What is the purpose of the book?" >Art, >Truth of art, >Aesthetics. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Ultimate Justification | Habermas | Rorty V 8 Foundation/final justification/RortyVsHabermas: I am distrustful of the remaining fundamentalism, striving for "universality." Habermas celebrates democracy, but he does not justify it. >Democracy, cf. >Constitution/Böckenförde. When HabermasVsFoucault raised the accusation of relativism and asked him to expose his "normative standards". >Relativism, >M. Foucault. Rorty: here I stand on the side of Foucault, who shrugs his shoulders and is silent. >Inner world/Habermas, >Language/Foucault. Rorty V 9 World/Language/RortyVsHabermas: VsClaim, that the world-developing (poetic) power of language (Heidegger, Foucault) must be subordinated to the practice of the inner world. Habermas IV 536 Ultimate Justification/Habermas: I call legal institutions legal norms which cannot be sufficiently legitimized by the positivist reference to procedures. For example, the foundations of constitutional law, the principles of criminal law and criminal procedure law. As soon as they are called into question, the reference to their legality is not sufficient. They require material justification because they belong to the legitimate orders of the lifeworld itself and, together with informal norms for action, form the background of communicative action. See Law/Habermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Understanding | Luhmann | AU Cass 12 Understanding/LuhmannVsHabermas: Understanding is already included in the communication. Otherwise, you would need the recipient as a disciplinary authority. >Understanding/Habermas, >Agreement/Habermas, >Communication/Luhmann, >Communication/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communicative action/Habermas. LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: if understanding is part of the communication, you do not need to introduce different types of speech acts (e.g. strategic, communication-oriented, etc.). >Speech act theory/Luhmann. --- AU Cass 13 Understanding/action/Communication/Luhmann: LuhmannVsAction Theory: we must always begin with understanding. The communication generates in the first place in its component "understanding" the division of information and communication that makes it understanding. Without understanding we only have behavior. Understanding includes itself. - It understands that it will be understood - it understands that it is about the condition of participation in the communication, not just about a piece of world. That sounds psychologically, but it is about the communication itself. >Communication/Luhmann, >Operation/Luhmann, >Language/Luhmann. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertibility | Brandom Vs Assertibility | I 198 VsJustified assertibility: assertibility conditions do not contain the whole meaning! Just as naïve: distinguishing the assertibility conditions of a statement as "descriptive meaning" and the consequences as "evaluative" meaning", and thus giving up any desire for harmony. II 90 Assertibility/Brandom: its representatives also treat the aspect of the conditions (circumstances) as exhaustive and neglect the consequences of the use of the terms. II 91 BrandomVs: assertions can have the same conditions but different consequences. E.g. "I’ll write a book about Hegel" - "I predict that I will write a book about Hegel": same circumstances, different consequences or determination. Meaning/Use/Dummett: if we have learned only the circumstances (conditions) for the use of a predicate, it may be that we have not seen through all connections with other terms. II 242 A philosophical analysis of the concept of truth is therefore not necessarily made by a definition of the word "true". "Semantic assertibility"/Sellars: assertibility under ideal conditions. II 262 ++ BrandomVsSellars: hopeless: you cannot specify ideality, either it remains circular with recourse to the concept of truth, or trivial. (also BrandomVsHabermas). Alternative/BrandomVsSellars: support with truth conditions. Disadvantage: we are no longer able to explain the correlation of the so defined semantic contents with linguistic expressions based on a direct alignment with the execution of moves, as does the alternative language game theory. BrandomVsAssertibility: does not distinguish between the status of the determination/authorization without the auxiliary means of incompatibilities (negation). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Derrida, J. | Habermas Vs Derrida, J. | Derrida I 95 Derrida: no distinction between everyday language and specialist languages. (DerridaVsSearle). I 196 HabermasVsDerrida: there are differences. Derrida over-generalizes poetic language. There has to be a language in which research results can be discussed and progress registered. HabermasVsDerrida: he does not wriggle out of the restrictions of the subject-philosophical paradigm. His attempt to outbid Heidegger does not escape the aporetic structure of the truth events stripped of truth validity. I 211 Subject-Philosophy/Derrida: Habermas: he does not break with her at all. He falls back on it easily in the style of the original philosophy: it would require other names than those of the sign and the re-presentation to be able think about this age: the infinite derivation of the signs who wander about and change scenes. HabermasVsDerrida: not the history of being the first and last, but an optical illusion: the labyrinthine mirror effects of ancient texts without any hope of deciphering the original script. I 213 HabermasVsDerrida: his deconstructions faithfully follow Heidegger. Involuntarily, he exposes the reverse fundamentalism of this way of thinking: the ontological difference and the being are once again outdone by the difference and put down one floor below. I 214 Derrida inherits the weaknesses of the criticism of metaphysics. Extremely general summonings of an indefinite authority. I 233 DerridaVsSearle: no distinction between ordinary and parasitic use - Searle, HabermasVsDerrida: there is a distinction: communication requires common understanding I 240 Derrida’s thesis: in everyday language there are also poetic functions and structures, therefore no difference from literary texts, therefore equal analysability. HabermasVsDerrida: he is insensitive to the tension-filled polarity between the poetic-world-opening and the prosaic-innerworldly language function. I 241 HabermasVsDerrida: for him, the language-mediated processes in the world are embedded in an all prejudicing, world-forming context. Derrida is blind to the fact that everyday communicative practice enables learning processes in the world thanks to the idealizations built into communicative action, against which the world-disclosing power of interpretive language has to prove itself. Experience and judgment are formed only in the light of criticizable validity claims! Derrida neglects the negation potential of communication-oriented action. He lets the problem-solving capacity disappear behind the world-generating capacity of language. (Similarly Rorty) I 243 HabermasVsDerrida: through the over-generalization of the poetic language function he has no view of the complex relationships of a normal linguistic everyday practice anymore. Rorty II 27 HabermasVsDerrida, HabermasVsHeidegger/Rorty: "subject philosophy": misguided metaphysical attempt to combine the public and the private. Error: thinking that reflection and introspection could achieve what can be actually only be effected by expanding the discussion frame and the participants. II 30 Speaking/Writing/RortyVsDerrida: his complex argument ultimately amounts to a strengthening of the written word at the expense of the spoken. II 32 Language/Communication/HabermasVsDerrida: Derrida denies both the existence of a "peculiarly structured domain of everyday communicative practice" and an "autonomous domain of fiction". Since he denies both, he can analyze any discourse on the model of poetic language. Thus, he does not need to determine language. II 33 RortyVsHabermas: Derrida is neither obliged nor willing to let "language in general" be "determined" by anything. Derrida could agree fully with Habermas in that "the world-disclosing power of interpretive language must prove itself" before metaphors are literarily absorbed and become socially useful tools. RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that X must be demonstrated as a special case of Y first in order to treat X as Y. As if you could not simply treat X as Y, to see what happens! Deconstruction/Rorty: language is something that can be effective, out of control or stab itself in the back, etc., under its own power. II 35 RortyVsDeconstruktion: nothing suggests that language can do all of this other than an attempt to make Derrida a huge man with a huge topic. The result of such reading is not the grasping of contents, but the placement of texts in contexts, the interweaving of parts of various books. The result is a blurring of genre boundaries. That does not mean that genera "are not real". The interweaving of threads is something else than the assumption that philosophy has "proven" that colors really "are indeterminate and ambiguous." Habermas/Rorty: asks why Heidegger and Derrida still nor advocate those "strong" concepts of theory, truth and system, which have been a thing of the past for more than 150 years. II 36 Justice/Rawls Thesis: the "just thing" has priority over the "good thing". Rawls/Rorty: democratic societies do not have to deal with the question of "human nature" or "subject". Such issues are privatized here. Foundation/Rorty Thesis: there is no Archimedean point from which you can criticize everything else. No resting point outside. RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism". Habermas: "the validity of transcendental spaces and times claimed for propositions and norms "erases space and time"." HabermasVsDerrida: excludes interaction. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Foucault, M. | Rorty Vs Foucault, M. | Rorty III 142 HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsFoucault: their polemics against enlightenment turns the back on social hopes of liberal societies. III 143 Habermas shares with the Marxists belief that the true meaning of a philosophical opinion consists in its political implications. V 8 Foundation/Final Justification/RortyVsHabermas: I distrust the remaining fundamentalism, striving for "universality". Habermas celebrates democracy, but he does not justify it. If HabermasVsFoucault alleges relativism and challenges him to disclose its "normative standards". >Ultimate Justification. Rorty: here I stand on the side of Foucault, who shrugs and says nothing. RortyVsFoucault: distrust him when he projects his desire for private Nietzschean autonomy in the public sphere. In this mood he rejects the democratic institutions. V 20 Cultures/Rorty: have no axiomatic structures. That they have institutionalized norms, actually means the same as Foucault's thesis that knowledge and power can never be separated. If at a certain time at a certain place you do not believe in certain things, you'll probably have to pay for it. V 21 RortyVsFoucault: but these standards are not "rules of language" or "criteria of rationality". They have the look of officials and policemen. Whoever disagrees, commits the Def Cartesian fallacy/Rorty: he sees axioms where nothing but shared habits reign. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 |
| Habermas, J. | Brandom Vs Habermas, J. | Seel III 149 HabermasVsBrandom: "turns the architecture of the post-Hegelian thinking upside down". His "conceptual realism" misses the constructive nature of human insight. The place of confrontation is taken by a mere replica of in-themselves-existing contents BrandomVsHabermas: Brandom refutes the "positivist image" of a testing of our concepts in a concept-free outer world. |
Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
| Habermas, J. | Bubner Vs Habermas, J. | I 196 BubnerVsHabermas: but since one builds on truthfulness from the outset, it is obviously more a question of definition what one wants to allow as dialogue at all. Communication Theory/BubnerVsHabermas: it is claimed that this is the first time in history that compliance with formal conditions has been guaranteed, I 198 1. in truth, however, political events are to be structurally transformed according to the paradigm of a philosophical ideal. Idealization, because the number of participants must remain limited, and that is neither a historical coincidence nor a prejudice of undemocratic elitism. I 199 2. If the planned entry into dialogue is characterized by the breaking up of previously unquestioned unanimity, the controversy must take place with the primary intention of returning to common ground. But efforts to find consensus are not yet consensus, and only consensus creates commonality of collective practice. In a word: dialogue is a means, but not the last content of politics. 3. It is not clear what the content of the event is actually about. With the tendency to reformulate the flow of practice into a permanent dialogue, the contents that come from everyday political life are lost. The contents become playful as long as they are removed from the practical consequences. - I 201 The prerequisite of all political speech, the commonality of the objectives, is crossed out in favour of an abstract agreement between partners whose joint action remains unaffected as long as they discuss the dialogue method. Other AuthorsVs: the underlying idealization has been lamented, the confusion of modes of theoretical discussion with practice, the unhistorical neglect of the requirements of factual complexity of society, etc. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Habermas, J. | Derrida Vs Habermas, J. | I 32 VsHabermas: he fails to recognize that Derrida no longer interprets the language in the light of the theory of signs. He does not understand writing as signs. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 |
| Habermas, J. | Luhmann Vs Habermas, J. | Reese-Schäfer II 109 Ethics/Habermas: Cognitive ethics, with the dimension right/wrong. LuhmannVs. Reese-Schäfer II 112 LuhmannVsHabermas: "political moralist" (in Luhmann's eyes sharp criticism.) Ethics should rather ask whether morality can be regarded as good without circumstance. It should not pursue morality itself, but perform translation in both directions. Reese-Schäfer II 140 LuhmannVsHabermas: studies on marital conflicts show that these conflicts cannot be solved colloquially, because the colloquial language provides positive and negative expressions. There is no law that communication leads to consensus. One should therefore understand and analyse discussions themselves as systems. Discussions in particular offer little chance of bringing in one's own subjectivity. The language symbols like God, reform, justice, love, truth, democracy etc. are moralized in the discussions. This limits the possibility of connecting. This means that those who use counterarguments must defend themselves. Reese-Schäfer II 141 LuhmannVsHabermas: there is no logical hierarchy of reasons. Therefore there is no hope for an end to the discussion. At some point it just stops. There must be social, not logical or semantic rules for its termination. Cass 8 VsHabermas: Problem: the term should actually be the same on both sides, because why do we speak of rationality when both are rationality? What is the common component? HabermasVsLuhmann: in Luhmann only the system has rationality but the system is not everything! LuhmannVsHabermas: but that applies also to Habermas' "communication rationality", because if one communicated, there are also still things, over which one did not communicate yet and humans, with whom one did not communicate yet and the conditions change faster than the readiness to communicate again. So the realm of the afterlife plays a role in every model. But the system rationality is better equipped to deal with it. For Habermas, by the way, this afterlife is not the lifeworld. Cass 11 System/Society/Individual/Luhmann: the system is not an object, but a difference (S/U). For example, for the body the consciousness operations belong to the environment! ((s) No border crossing). Luhmann: that is not so frightening at all: for example, I myself feel more comfortable in the "environment" of my society than I would feel "in the society", where others think my thoughts or cause my chemical reactions. LuhmannVsHabermas: systems theory therefore allows us to think of a radical individualism that would not be possible if we were to adopt the humanist standpoint of the human as part of society. HabermasVsLuhmann: radical individualism is not aspired to at all. Society/LuhmannVsHabermas: it would be a mistake to claim that society must run towards a "human goal"! LuhmannVsHabermas: Understanding is already contained in communication - otherwise one needs the receiver, a disciplining instance. If one leaves understanding in communication, one gets a theory relieved of norms and rationality demands. Cass 13 Communication: Tradition like Habermas: Searching for consensus. Luhmann: what do you do when the consensus is reached, then there is no more communication? Habermas: there are enough conflicts. Luhmann: what is then the demand for consensus supposed to do? Then we turn an impossibility into a norm! The result of communication must already be open! Why do we have the "No" in the language? |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Habermas, J. | Rorty Vs Habermas, J. | Brendel I 133 Justification/Rorty/Brendel: Thesis: truth is not its goal. That would suppose a false separation of truth and justification. There is also not the one scientific method that leads to the truth. Epistemic justification: can have many goals. Brendel I 134 Correspondence/RortyVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty/Brendel: therefore there is no correspondence between statements and independent reality. Truth/RortyVsPutnam: is not idealized rational acceptability either. Reality/PutnamVsRorty: there is a consciousness independent reality. Truth/Peirce/Rorty/Brendel: Both: Thesis: there are no in principle unknowable truths. Reality/PeirceVsRorty: there is a reality that is independent of consciousness. Truth/Peirce/Brendel: obtained by the consensus of an ideal research community. Convergence/Peirce/Brendel: Thesis: there is a convergence of research. The corresponding true conviction expresses actually existing states of affairs. (Habermas ditto). Convergence/RortyVsPeirce: does not exist and therefore no universally valid convictions of an ideal research community. Brendel I 135 RortyVsHabermas: ditto. Communication/RortyVsHabermas/Rorty/Brendel: is not a pursuit of universally valid statements. Thesis: there is no difference in principle between a cooperative search for truth and the pursuit of group interests. Rorty II (b) 50 RortyVsHabermas: sounds as if he took over the metaphysical position, as if all the alternative candidates for belief and desire already exist and the only thing that must be ensured is that they can be freely discussed. Ahistorical universalist "transcendentalism". II (b) 29 French Philosophy/HabermasVsFrench: "the vexatious game of these duplications: a symptom of exhaustion." RortyVsHabermas: Rather signs of vitality. I read Heidegger and Nietzsche as good private philosophers, Habermas reads them as poor public ones. He treats them as if they targeted what he calls "universal validity." II (b) 43 Principle/Validity/Application/RortyVsHabermas: the question of the "internal validity" of the principles is not relevant. Especially not if it these are "universally valid". The only thing that keeps a society from having considering the institutionalized humiliation of the weak as norma, of course, is a detailed description of these humiliations. Such descriptions are given by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers and painters. II (d) 94 Habermas/Rorty distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of degrees of confidence. II (d) 94/95 Rorty: if we stop to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy between reason and emotion dissolves. II (d) 96 RortyVsHabermas: the idea of the "better argument" only makes sense if you can find a natural, transcultural relevance relationship. III 113 Foucault/Rorty: Society denies the space for self-creation and private projects. (VsHabermas). III 119 RortyVsHabermas: Habermas is more afraid of a "romantic revolution" like Hitler and Mao have brought about than of the stifling effect that encrusted societies may have. He is more afraid of autonomy than what Foucault calls the "biopower" of experts. >Biopower. III 120 RortyVsHabermas: I am very suspicious of the idea of 'universal validity' (metaphysics). This claim is no longer credible if we are convinced of the "contingency of language". III 231 Self/Literature/Appropriateness/RortyVsHabermas: for him the very traditional image of the self with its three spheres, the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic, is of central importance. This classification means that he sees literature as a "matter for the appropriate expression of feelings" and literary criticism as a "matter of taste". III 232 Rorty: if we give up this classification, we will no longer ask questions like "Does this book promote truth or beauty?" "Does it promote proper behavior or pleasure?" and instead we will ask: "What is the purpose the book?" V 9 World/Language/RortyVsHabermas: Vsdemand that the world-disclosing (poetic) power of language (Heidegger, Foucault) should be subordinated to the inner-worldly practice. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Habermas, J. | Tugendhat Vs Habermas, J. | II 16 TugendhatVsHabermas/Apel: "good" or the entire ethics cannot be justified linguistically. Only voluntarily. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Habermas, J. | Verschiedene Vs Habermas, J. | Rorty II 172 LyotardVsHabermas/Rorty: he only knows a beautiful, but no sublime policy. RortyVsLyotard: he is wrong. Politics is about compromises. These can be beautiful, but not sublime. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Luhmann, N. | Habermas Vs Luhmann, N. | I 426 Luhmann stands less in the tradition of Comte to Parsons than in the problem history from Kant to Husserl. He inherits the basic concepts and problems of the philosophy of consciousness. HabermasVsLuhmann: He undertakes a change of perspective which makes the self-criticism of a modernity crumbling with itself obsolete. The system theory of society applied to itself cannot help responding affirmatively to the increasing complexity of modern societies. I 430 HabermasVsLuhmann: thought movements from metaphysics to metabiology! Departs from the "as such" of organic life, a basic phenomenon of self-assertion of self-referential systems facing an over-complex environment. I 431 Undefraudable: the difference to the environment. Self-preservation replaces reason. Reason/HabermasVsLuhmann: thus he also replaced the criticism of reason with system rationality: the ensemble of enabling conditions for system preservation. Reason shrinks to complexity reduction. It is not outbid like in the communicative reason. Reason once again becomes the superstructure of life. Meaning/System Theory: the functionalist concept of meaning dissolves the relationship between meaning and validity. (As in Foucault: when it comes to truth (and validity as such) we are only interested in the effects of the considering-as-true). I 434 HabermasVsLuhmann: no central perspective, no criticism of reason, no position anymore. HabermasVsLuhmann: but we lack a social subsystem for perceiving environmental interdependences. That cannot exist with functional differentiation, because that would mean that the society occurred again in society itself. I 435 Intersubjectivity/Luhmann: language-generated intersubjectivity is not available for Luhmann. Instead, inclusion model of the parts in the whole. He considers this figure of thought to be "humanist". And he distances himself from that! I 437 HabermasVsLuhmann: Contradiction: Social Systems: previously, persons or "consciousness carriers" have to be postulated which are capable of judgment before all participation in social systems. On the other hand, both system types (psycho/social) cannot stand on different steps of the ladder if they are to be distinguished as equally emergent achievements of sense processing against organic systems. So Luhmann speaks of co-evolution. I 438 HabermasVsLuhmann: suffers from the lack of appropriate basic concepts of linguistic theory: sense must be neutral with regard to consciousness and communication. - Language/HabermasVsLuhmann: a subordinate status is assigned to the linguistic expression against the phenomenologically introduced concept of sense. Language only serves the purpose of the symbolic generalization of previous sense events. I 441 LuhmannVsHumanism: "cardinal sin" amalgamation of social and material dimension. Luhmann II 136 Living Environment/Luhmann: Luhmann does not know a living environment! (HabermasVs). Thus, person, culture and society are no longer cramped. HabermasVsLuhmann: "unacknowledged commitment of the theory to rule-compliant issues", "the apology of the status quo for the sake of its preservation", and "uncritical submission of the theory of society under the constraints of the reproduction of society." "High form of a technocratic consciousness." II 141 HabermasVsLuhmann: contradiction: that systems have a kind of relief function, while at the same time, the environment of social systems is a more complex world. Lu II 137 - HabermasVsLuhmann: Vs Functionalization of the Concept of Truth. Even the system theory itself can make no special claim to the validity of its statements. It’s only one way of acting among others. Theory is action. This, in turn, can only be said if you ultimately assume a theoretical point of view outside of the practice. II 165 System Theory/HabermasVsLuhmann: its claim to universality encounters a limit at that point at which it would have to be more than mere observation, namely a scientifically based recommendation for action. AU Cass.12 HabermasVsLuh: (in correspondence): Luhmann did not consider linguistics! LuhmannVsHabermas: that is indeed the case! I do not use the terminology. E.g. the normative binding of actors. It would have to be re-introduced in some other way, but not in communication. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Peirce, Ch.S. | Brandom Vs Peirce, Ch.S. | Rorty VI 193 Truth/BrandomVsPutnam/BrandomVsPeirce/BrandomVsHabermas: Brandom is not committed to defining "true" epistemically. So not what "is considered true (or under ideal conditions) by all the members of the community or the experts". Rather, there is no bird's eye view at all. |
Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Sellars, W. | Brandom Vs Sellars, W. | I 322 BrandomVsSellars: Two problems: 1) Sellars assumes that the reporter has to justify his assertions. This implies that general facts of the form to "X is a reliable symptom of Y" are known. I 323 But invoking something contains an implicit assertion of reliability (to avoid regress?) 2) Error: construe the authority of non-inferential reports as the act of invoking a piece of evidence. (Regress: On what is the authority of the evidence based, etc.). The authority of inferential reports is rather sui generis. "Semantic assertibility"/Sellars: assertibility under ideal conditions. II 242 BrandomVsSellars: hopeless: you cannot specify ideality, either it remains circular with recourse to the concept of truth, or trivial. (also BrandomVsHabermas). Alternative/BrandomVsSellars: support with truth conditions. Disadvantage: we are no longer able to explain the correlation of so understood semantic contents with linguistic expressions based on a direct alignment with the execution of moves, as the alternative language game theory does. |
Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Speech Act Theory | Luhmann Vs Speech Act Theory | AU Kass 12 LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory, LuhmannVsSearle, LuhmannVsHabermas: Vs Theory of Communicative Action: Question: whether one shoots understanding into the unity of communication or not. If you have a concept of communication, i.e. only the communication, i.e. only what I am doing here now, then you leave understanding out of it. Then one must take corrective measures in theory: the actor, if he/she acts reasonably, is guided by the conditions of understanding. The actor does not say something that he/she knows cannot be understood. That would mean, however, that the recipient is initially excluded from the speech act (Luhmann: speech act) or the communication. And it is only as a disciplining moment that it is returned to theory. And as a subject! LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: if understanding is part of communication, you do not need to introduce different types of speech acts (e.g. strategic, communication-oriented, etc.) |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Various Authors | Habermas Vs Various Authors | Die ZEIT 5/02 Genetic Engineering/Hubert MarklVsHabermas: "human dignity" is a historical construct. The self-understanding of the human must change. HabermasVsMarkl: I do not like the "must". Cultural life forms are certainly constructions, but they do not change arbitrarily, but are imaginative, more or less productive responses to the challenge of problems that require solutions. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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