Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Frank, M. Pauen Vs Frank, M. Pauen I 249
I/Heidelberg School/Pauen: Dieter Henrich and Manfred Frank. It's not about the evidence that the "objects" cited by the traditional notion of I do not exist, but the fact that the traditional model itself is inadequate.
We are not entitled to a "fiction of the I"! However, it has proven indispensable in psychology.
I 250
Subjet/Object/Henrich/Frank/Pauen: both Vs this conception. And regardless of a determination with respect to dualism/monism. The assumption that self-awareness arises from the recognition of the identity of subject and object causes an insoluble problem:
This realization presupposes that the subject is already aware of the fact that it is the object of its own reflection.
The act of reflection presupposes the existence of that self-awareness which, according to the model, is supposed to be the result.
Henrich: it is indeed not necessary that it has in any way conceptual knowledge of itself or is able to give of a description of itself, but it must be able in any case to testify with certainty that it is familiar with itself in the sense of self-awareness.
To arrive at an identification with itself the subject already needs to know under which conditions it can attribute something which it encounters to itself. It can never gain this knowledge through self-relation before everything else (1970).
I 251
Subject/Object/Manfred Frank/Heidelberg School/Pauen: the arguments against the S/O model also speak against the attempt to justify self-awareness as a self-ascription of properties. But if I want to realize that it is me for whom these properties are true, I already need to have self-awareness myself.
Self-Awareness/Frank: can therefore not be explicated as relation of something to something else in general.
I 252
I.e. self-awareness cannot be explained as the knowledge of a state of affairs. Of course, the subject can acquire knowledge, and self-awareness can thus turn into self-knowledge.
Frank Thesis: there must be an upstream pre-reflexive awareness of the self.
1) This is not a form of knowledge.
2) No application of criteria.
3) "Immediate": it is not based on the relation of the subject to anything else.
I 253
VsFrank: 1) Question whether the model does not remain biased in the subject/object thinking. 2) Question whether the concept of "pre-reflexive" can ever be explained coherently.
3) Question to what extent the relation of the subject to itself should be distinguished from other common forms of knowledge.
Pre-Reflexive/Frank/Pauen: this relation of the subject with itself should exist solely in the intimacy with itself. Not content-wise. No knowledge. Thus it can be maintained even during change.
VsFrank: then we cannot speak of an "I" in the interesting sense at all.
TugenhatVsHenrich/Pauen: he recurs as explicitly as one could wish on the subject/object model. The subject is itself the object.

I 258
PauenVsTugendhat/PauenVsHenrich/PauenVsFrank/Pauen: The problem with all approaches is that a state of affairs is only a determined state of affairs when it is different from other states of affairs. The mere absence of doubt whether an object is ugly does not justify the reverse that the person simply considered it to be beautiful. If the doubt never occurs and the person falls otherwise does not make any judgments of taste, this rather suggests that they lack appropriate judgment!
A person can only attribute a state as their own if they are able to recognize foreign states.
I 262
PauenVsHeidelberger School: the "pre-reflexive self" is not a necessary condition: the necessary distinction between self and external perspective can be made without it. On the other hand there is no objection to attributing a pre-reflexive self to subjects that have the ability to self-ascription.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001