|Political Parties||Hibbs||Mause I 283
Political Parties/Hibbs: The theories of electoral budget cycles regard government parties as purely opportunistic voice maximizers without their own ideological orientation. This is, of course, an idealization. (See Economic Cycle/Tufte: Tufte thesis: Before elections taxes may be lowered, after the election possibly increased again. Hibbs: systematically examined the differences in the behaviour of left and right-wing parties with regard to economic policy. (1)
Thesis: Right-wing parties, which tend to represent higher income groups, are more afraid of high inflation than high unemployment. The opposite applies to left-wing parties.
Hibb's investigation of 12 Western industrialized countries seemed to confirm that left and right-wing governments pursued a corresponding economic policy.
VsHibbs: Problem: Hibbs assumes a stable Phillips curve, i.e. a freely selectable trade-off between unemployment and inflation, which is an idealization.
FriedmanVsHibbs: such an assumption should not be assumed for rationally proactive voters. (2)
VsFriedman: Partisanship models were developed in response to this criticism, based on rationally proactive voters. (3) Thereafter, the differences between ((s) the behaviour of) left and right-wing parties are temporary and fizzle out in the course of the election cycle.
What all models have in common is that they expect left-wing governments to pursue a much more expansionary fiscal policy. (Vs: See Political Parties/Economic Theories).
1. Douglas A. Hibbs. 1977. Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review 71 (4): 1467– 1487.
2. Milton Friedman. 1968. The role of monetary policy. American Economic Review 58( 1): S. 1– 17.
3. Alberto Alesina, Nouriel Roubini & Gerald Cohen, Political cycles and the macroeconomy. Cambridge 1997.
Dougals A. Hibbs
Political Parties and macroeconomic policy 1977
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018