Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anaphora | Kamp | Cresswell I 184 Anaphora/Kamp/Heim: Thesis: a discourse section can be interpreted as a "long sentence". HintikkaVsKamp: that is unnatural. CresswellVsHintikka: pro Kamp. It is only about a semantic ((s) non-syntactic) point of view. On the surface we have different sentences. Hintikka: Thesis: a theory like that of Kamp/Heim cannot be applied to question-answer games. CresswellVsHintikka: that does work: E.g. (14) Here is a bee in the room. (15) Will it stab me? --- I 185 On a certain level one can consider (14) and (15) as a conjunction. >File change semantics, >Prosentential theory, >Conjunction. |
Kamp I Kamp From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Attribution | Cresswell | I 129 Attribution/Variables/Constants/Possible Worlds/Stalnaker/Cresswell: Stalnaker uses a value attribution which is world-dependent. I.e. a term t can be attributed to an individual in a world and a different individual in another possible world. Variables/Stalnaker: refer to the same thing in all possible worlds. Variables/constants/Hintikka: also Hintikka treats variables and constants differently: because of his restriction of quantifiers we can talk about the same thing in different possible worlds. >Cross world identity. (Camps: LewisVsHintikka). II 159 Propositional attitudes/attribution/that-Sentence/truth Conditions/content/Cresswell: thesis: the truth conditions of sentences with propositional attitudes are determined by the content of the that-clauses - that all it is about for me. >That-clause, >That/Cresswell, >Propositional attitudes, >Propositions, >Truth conditions. II 160 More than merely the truth conditions of the complementary sentences are involved in the attribution of propositional attitudes. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Beliefs | Hintikka | Schiffer I 287 Belief/possible world/Hintikka: (1969)(1): thesis: "Ralph believes that flounders snore" is true in all possible worlds that are compatible with Ralph's belief. SchifferVsHintikka: 1) It follows that Ralph also believes everything that is logically entailed in his beliefs. ((s) >logical omniscience). 2) That he believes everything if he has some inconsistent beliefs. >Logical omniscience. 1. Jaakko Hintikka. (1969) Models for Modalities. Selected Essays.Synthese Library (SYLI, volume 23). |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Events | Hintikka | II 81 Event/Hintikka: an event cannot be moved in space time. That is, that events can only be identified if the worlds have a common history. >Identification, >Individuation, >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity. Event/cross-world identification/Hintikka: an event is relative to a propositional attitude. For this we need a better foundation of the theory. Identification/space-time/KripkeVsHintikka/QuineVsHintikka/Hintikka: both admit (for various reasons) that space-time continuity does not always have a precise meaning. SaarinenVsHintikka: the identity of individuals, which occur in several worlds, is not always well-defined for all in this possible world. Hintikka: dito: in belief contexts it may be that an individual is identified under one description, but not under another. This must also be the case, otherwise we would be, in a sense, omniscient again. Possible worlds: we must also be careful to assume a "common reason" from all possible worlds. We certainly do not share a part of space-time, but part of the facts ((s) epistemic rather than ontological). World/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/substance/Hintikka: in Wittgenstein, the world is the sum of the facts, not of the objects: to a shared space-time this would only be by additional assumptions. Cross-World Identification/Hintikka: cross-world identification seems lost when we are dealing only with a set of facts ((s) epistemic) and a common space-time is missing. II 82 Re-Identification: re-identification of physical objects is necessary to get to the cross-world identification later. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Game-theoretical Semantics | Kamp | Cresswell I 179 Game-theoretical semantics/CresswellVsHintikka: Hintikka and Kulas (1985)(1) have not made any discoveries that would not have been made by Kamp (1983)(2) and Heim (1983)(3) as well. --- I 180 Example: (1) Everyone loves someone. This is about two different ranges. Λ-categorial language: (2) ((s) Everyone is so that someone is so that the former likes the latter, without quantification. > Lambda notation/Cresswell). and (3) <<λy, < everyone, <λx, (1) Hintikka J. & Kulas J. (1985): Definite Descriptions. In: Anaphora and Definite Descriptions. Synthese Language Library (Texts and Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy), Vol. 26. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5410-6_2. (2) Kamp, H. & Rohrer, C. (1983): Tense in texts. Meaning, use and interpretation of language 250, 269. (3) Heim, I. (1983): Formal Semantics - the Essential Readings. In: P. Portner & B. H. Partee (eds.), Blackwell. pp. 249-260. |
Kamp I Kamp From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Identity Conditions | Hintikka | II 143 Uniqueness Condition/W-questions/answer/Hintikka: the condition that something is a complete and unambiguous answer to a who-question (ambiguous) is, first, that (8) must imply (7). (6) Who is the man over there? (7) I know who the man over there is. E.g. It is Sir Norman Brook. (8) I know the man there is Sir Norman Brook. Problem: the step from (8) to (7) is that of an existential generalization (EG). >Existential generalization. II 144 Problem: for that we need an additional premise. E.g. (13) (Ex) Ki (Sir Norman Brook = x). (Non-mirrored quantifier, perceptually) "I know who Norman Brook is." II 145 HintikkaVsQuine: Quine does not recognize the role that my uniqueness conditions play. Quine: Quine says that these conditions can also be transferred to belief, knowledge, etc. Quine: Hintikka wants the subject to know who or what the person or thing is. Whom or what the term designates. HintikkaVsQuine: he thinks I would only use one kind of uniqueness condition. Solution: the semantic situation shows the difference: the relation between the conditions for different propositional attitudes (belief, seeing, knowledge) is one of analogy, not of identity. Solution: the sets of compatible worlds are respectively different ones in the case of knowledge, seeing, memory, belief! II 146 Identification/belief/Quine/QuineVsHintikka: every world of belief will contain innumerable bodies and objects that are not recognizable at all, simply because the believer believes that his world contains a countless number of such objects. Identity: questions about the identity of these objects are meaningless. Problem: if you quantify in belief contexts, how should one exclude them? >Quantification. Solution: one would have to limit the range of the variables to such objects, over which the subject has a sufficiently clear idea. Problem: how should one determine how clear these ideas must be? HintikkaVsQuine: the solution is quite simple when we quantify over individuals in doxastic worlds: E.g. operator: "in a world w1, compatible with everything, Jack believes": Solution/Hintikka: we can quantify over inhabitants of such worlds by simply using a quantifier within the operator. ((s) i.e. that Jack, but not we differentiate?) Problem: it could be that we want to consider the inhabitants as our neighbors from the actual world w0 ("qua neighbors"). Hintikka: but that is a problem for itself and has nothing to do with uniqueness conditions. Problem: it rather lies in the notation of the conventional modal logic, which runs from the outside to the inside and which does not allow the evaluation process, to ever turn around so that it runs from the inside outwards. Solution/Saarinen: the solution is "retrospective" operators. Solution/Hintikka: it may be that we can trace back an individual from w1 to w0, even if it does not fulfill the uniqueness conditions. (These require that an individual is identifiable in all worlds.) HintikkaVsQuine: the latter is mistaken that the question of identity is meaningless if the uniqueness conditions are not all fulfilled. On the contrary: it has to be meaningful so that we are able to see that the conditions are not fulfilled! Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: if the uniqueness condition is not fulfilled, it means only that we cannot find an individual in every world. II 150 Truth Conditions/uniqueness conditions/Hintikka: the truth conditions of the uniqueness conditions are very different from the truth conditions for other types of the most simple sentences. World Lines/Hintikka: world lines can therefore be drawn in different ways, without tipping over the remaining semantic situation. >Truth conditions, >Possible world semantics, cf. >Situation-semantics. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Impossible World | Hintikka | II 12 Impossible World/Hintikka: I believe that we must allow the impossible world to fight the problem of another kind of omniscience, the logical omniscience. >Logical omniscience. II 63 Impossible Worlds/logical omniscience/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: the problem of omniscience does not occur here at all! E.g.: (1) A sentence of the form "a knows that p" is true in a world W iff. P is true in all a-alternatives. That is, in all worlds, which are compatible with the knowledge of a. The failure of the logical omniscience can be formulated like this: (2) There is a, p and q such that a knows that p, p implies logically q, but a does not know that q. The logical truth is then analyzed model-theoretically: (3) A sentence is logically true, iff. it is true in every logically possible world. Problem: (1) - (3) are incompatible! However, they are not yet incompatible in the form given above, but only with the additional assumption: (4) Every epistemically possible world is logically possible. II 64 Problem: now it can be that in an epistemic a-alternative W'q is wrong! Problem: according to (4), these epistemic worlds are also logically possible. However, according to the logical truth of (p > q) ((s) in this example), q must be true in any logically possible world. This results in the contradiction. Solution: different authors have responded differently: Positivism: positivism takes refuge in the noninformative (tautological) logical truth. HintikkaVs: instead: semantics of possible worlds. (4) already presupposes omniscience! It assumes that a can only eliminate seeming possibilities. This is circular. Solution: there may be possibilities that appear only possible but contain hidden contradictions. II 65 Problem: the problem here is (4) and not (2)! Solution/Hintikka: we have to allow worlds that are logically impossible, but still epistemically possible ((s) unlike the impossible worlds discussed in Stalnaker and Cresswell.) Then (1) - (3) can be true together. That is, in an epistemic world (p > q) can fail. Impossible World/Hintikka: how we can allow a possible world? Impossible World/Cresswell/Hintikka: Cresswell proposes a reinterpretation of the logical constants (model-theoretical). HintikkaVsCresswell: the real problem with omniscience is that people do not recognize all the logical consequences of their knowledge. And this takes place in classical logic. Non-standard logic: bypasses the problem. You could say it destroys the problem instead of solving it. II 65 Impossible World/logical omniscience/solution/Veikko RantalaVsHintikka: Hintikka has solved some problems of this approach. II 66 Nonclassical models: nonclassical models are for first level sentences. Impossible World/Rantala: impossible worlds are not "impossible" according to Rantala, but they differ from normal possible worlds, in the way that they are "changing worlds" by allowing new individuals. However, they differ in such a subtle way that they normally cannot be distinguished from invariant worlds (with always the same individuals). It is about: Urn Model/statistics/omniscience/Hintikka: in the urn model, variant worlds are such worlds with which moves from the urn possibly get new individuals into the game. But only so few that you may not notice it. >Possibility, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility, >Possible worlds. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Intensional Objects | Cresswell | I 115 Defensive object/Cresswell: is an object which is a different thing (or several things) in different possible worlds. >Possible worlds, >Cross word identity, cf. >Counterparts, >Counterpart theory. Hintikka: better: game theory as a solution for identity in intensional contexts - whereby the first player tries, to make the proposition true, and the second to make it false. >Game-theoretical semantics. CresswellVsHintikka: the examples should be better understood in this way that they include normal quantification, but above entities of higher order, e.g. classes of individuals. >Quantification, >Levels (Order). I 120 Intensional objects/Cresswell: a) new in every possible world b) always from the actual world. >Actualism, >Actuality. CresswellVs: instead with Russell: predicate S: "is the largest wooden building" - then disambiguate: (13) (Ey) (x) ((Sx ⇔ x = y) ). Nφy). ((s) There is only one most beautiful and that is necessary wooden) (14) N (Ey) (x) ((Sx ⇔ x = y).φy)- ((s) There is neccessarily only one most beautiful and that is wooden (14), although both are wrong only (14) fails because the uniqueness of S is not logically guaranteed.) Solution: the following is true instead of (14): (15) (E1x) (Xs. N ((E1x) Sx> (Ey)(x)((Sx ⇔ x = y) . φy)) N.B.: but the data of these variables are normal things, not intensional objects. I 122 ff Intensional objects/Cresswell: Problem. E.g. (18) It is true in the other possible world that the largest wooden building of the southern hemisphere is wooden in the other world (19) O (Ey)(x)((Sx ⇔ x = y) . Oφy) (19) is not equivalent to (20) (Ey) (x) ((Sx ⇔ x = y) .φy) - because (19) is wrong in w1 because the thing that is the largest wooden building in w2 is not wooden in w1 (20) is true, however, because the largest wooden building in any possible world is, of course, in this (s) same possible world) wooden. Intensional object: according to this view we should treat the description "The largest wooden building of the southern hemisphere" as a name - then we must consider the form of (18) as (21) OOφs. But OOφs is equivalent to φs, whatever an intensional object is attributed to s. Therefore the meaning of (18) expressed by (19) cannot be captured by (21). Complex property: "in the other world wooden". >Modal properties, >Cross world identity. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Knowledge | Kripke | II 240f Knowledge/Hintikka: "strong knowledge": has very high standards. KripkeVsHintikka: when Hintikaa is confronted with counter examples, he condemns them as popular or as "weak" versions of knowledge. KripkeVs: > Method, >Knowledge/Hintikka. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Omniscience | Hintikka | II XV Logical Omniscience/Hintikka: thesis: logical omniscience is only a supposed problem. ChomskyVsHintikka: Hintikka has given the alleged paradox as the reason for his rejection of any model-theoretical semantics for propositional attitudes. HintikkaVsChomsky: Chomsky's problem has been solved long ago. --- II 21 Omniscience/solution/Hintikka: we must allow individuals to not exist in every possible world. Otherwise, all world lines would have to be ad libitum extendable, then everyone would have to know what an individual would be in any world (in whatever disguise), namely on the basis of the form of knowledge + indirect W-question. II 23 Logical Omniscience/epistemic logic/model theory/Hintikka: problem: suppose (S1 > S2). That is, all S1 models are S2 models. Then all the epistemic alternatives in which S1 is true are those in which S2 is true. Problem: it follows that for each knowing person b and every scenario applies: (3.1) {b} KS1> {b} K S2. That is, one must also know all the logical consequences of one's knowledge. This has led some to reject model theory. Model Theory/HintikkaVsVs: model theory follows only if one cannot avoid omniscience, and one can avoid it. >Model theory. Solution: one can find a subset of logical consequences (S1 > S2) for which (3.1) applies. (i) This subset can be restricted syntactically. The number of free individual symbols together with the number of layers of quantifiers limit the number of individuals that can be considered in a set S (or in an argument). Solution: this number (parameter) should not be greater than the one in S1 or S2 at any point in the argument. Problem: there is no simple axiomatic-deductive system for this. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Quantifiers | Cresswell | I 137f Quantifiers/everyday language/Quine/Kaplan/Geach/Cresswell: not 1st order: E.g. some critics only admire each other 2nd order: (Eφ)(Exφx u (x)(φx > x is a critics) u (x)(y)((φx u x admires y) > (x ≠ y u φy))). That is not equivalent to any 1st order sentence - involves plural noun phrases (plural quantification). The following is not correct: "two Fs are G". One would have to assume that "admire" should be valid in both directions - (then x is a K u y is a K u x ≠ y ... "). Better: "admire each other" is a predicate that is applied to pairs. 139 Correct: "Smart and Armstrong are present" for "S. is a and A is a". Problem: "King and Queen are a lovable couple", then "The King is an adorable ..." analog: E.g. "similar", e.g. "lessen". Solution/Cresswell: applying predicate to quantities. I 140 .. "admires another linguist" must be a predicate which is applied to all logicians. - This shows that quantification of higher level is required. >Second order logic. Problem: this leads to the fact that the possibilities to have different ranges are restricted. I 142 Higher order quantifiers/plural quantifiers/Boolos: Thesis: these do not have to go via set theoretical entities, but can simply be interpreted as semantically primitive. ((s) basic concept). Cresswell: perhaps he is right. Hintikka: game theory. >Game-theoretical semantics. CresswellVsHintikka: only higher order entities. 2nd order quantification due to reference to quantities. I 156 Branching quantifiers/Booles/Cresswell: "for every A there is a B". (x)(Ey) (x = z ⇔ y = w) u (Ax > By) (z)(Ew) 2nd order translation: EφEψ(x)(z)((x = z ⇔ φ(x) = ψ(z)) u (Ax > Bφ(x)). Function/unique image/assignment/logical form/Cresswell: "(x = z ⇔ φ(x) = ψ (z)" says that the function is 1: 1. Generalization/Cresswell: If we replace W, C, A, B, and R by predicates that are true of all, and Lxyzw by Boolos ((x = z ⇔ y = w) u Ax> By) we have a proof of non-orderability of 1st order. >Orderability. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Scope | Cresswell | I, 179f Scope/Cresswell: E.g. everyone loves someone: a) everyone is such that someone is so that the former loves the second b) someone - someone is so that everyone is so that he, the second named, loves him, the former - game theoretical semantics/CresswellVsHintikka: has brought nothing new, what Kamp/Heim did not already have - game theory: sequence of choice. >Hans Kamp, >Irene Heim, >File change semantics, >Game-theorical semantics. II 48 Scope/description/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: sentences about propositional attitudes can always give descriptions a wide range. That is, to make them rigid. >Narrow/Wide, >Rigidity. II 126 He*/scope/Cresswell: wide scope: then it can also be interpreted as "I". Narrow scope: allows "he", "she" or "it". Gods-example/solution/Cresswell:> - speaker index. >Two omniscient Gods/Cresswell, more authors on >"Two omniscient Gods". II 126 "Now"/scope/Cresswell: analog to the case of "I". Narrow scope: here "now" becomes "then". "Here"/Cresswell: Problem: that "people coordinates" could lead to an infinite list - because of the context dependency. CresswellVs: instead I use (Cresswell, 1973a(1), pp. 110-119.) properties of utterances. II 143 Hob/Cob/Nob-Example/Geach/Cresswell: (Geach 1957(2), 628): Cresswell: needs a quantifier, which is simultaneously inside and outside the scope of the attitude-verb. - Solution/Hill/Kraut: intensional objects as surrogates for individuals and a further quantifier. >Cob/Hob/Nob-case. II 150 Names/scope/Cresswell: normally names have a wider reach than modal operators - this is the "modal objection" VsKripke. KripkeVsVs: (Kripke, 1972(3), p. 279.) 1. Cresswell, M. J. (1973). Logics and Languages. London: Methuen. 2. Geach, P. (1957). Mental Acts. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 3. Kripke S. A. (1972). Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355 |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Semantics | Kamp | Cresswell I 163 Semantics/Hans Kamp/Irene Heim/Cresswell: (Kamp 1983(1), Heim 1983(2), independent of each other): 1. Thesis: Facts about descriptions, in particular their anaphoric use, require a representation level between surface form and logical form (surface/deep structure). 2. Thesis: Sentence meaning/Kamp/Heim: the sentence meaning is no longer given by the truth conditions! Description/CresswellVsHintikka/CresswellVsKamp/CresswellVsHeim: although there is a new view in terms of descriptions (among others, by Lewis 1975)(3), we do not need a new kind of semantic theory. Λ-categorial language/Cresswell: in it we can formulate the semantic insights of Kamp/Heim. S: syntactic category: the syntactic category is either simple or complex. Simple: Syntactic category 0: sentence Syntactic category 1: name Complex syntactic category: form >Descriptions, >File change semantics, >Prosentential theory, >Deep structure. (1) Kamp, H. & Rohrer, C. (1983): Tense in texts. Meaning, use and interpretation of language 250, 269. (2) Heim, I. (1983): Formal Semantics - the Essential Readings. In: P. Portner & B. H. Partee (eds.), Blackwell. pp. 249-260. (3) Lewis, D. (1975a): Adverbs of Quantification. In: Edward L. Keenan (ed.), Formal Semantics of Natural Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–15. |
Kamp I Kamp From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Situation Semantics | Cresswell | I 63 Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry: possible worlds (poss.w.) are too big to explain what the speaker of a sentence knows. Possible World: complete possible situations. >Situations, >Possible worlds, >Facts. CresswellVsBarwise: Situations need only be partial in the sense that they are small possible worlds. >Barwise/Perry. I 69 CresswellVsBarweise/Perry: disjunction: their construction requires that situations are considered as possible worlds: E.g. I am at home or at the university: as a proposition incomplete, because both made true. The situation can only be one of the two. Making true/truthmaker: the total (disjunction) does not have to be made true by an alternative, because it can also be made true by another alternative. >Truthmakers. I 72 Situations seem incomplete. (E.g. Does the dog bark loudly or quietly?) - But they are not as incomplete as propositions. >Propositions. I 71 Problem: Total situation: The machine is working (shows red or green). - still contradiction: is the situation described by a or by b? If the signal was neither showing red nor green, the incompleteness would be too radical. >Descriptions, >Incompleteness. I 73 Incomplete/situation/Barwise/Perry: E.g. naked infinitives with "see". Joe saw Fred coming in and Sally was smoking or not smoking. >Naked infinitive. Cresswell: so everything possible; but then they are possible worlds. Everything that can be a possible world is a possible world. Possible worlds do not have to be large, they can be as small as situations at Barwise/Perry. Different: Aspect/Hintikka: (= incompleteness of possible world): all facts about who slept during the lecture. >Aspects. CresswellVsHintikka: we do not want lists, these are metaphysical here. Solution/Cresswell. "Everything that interests us in the situation". ((s) So lists after all.) Thus the truth of the propositions can be determined. I 74 Definition essentially incomplete/Cresswell: a situation is essentially incomplete when it only needs to be part of an accumulation of situations (disjunction). CresswellVsBarwise: but this does not work with naked infinitives with "see": E.g. of "Ralph saw Ortcutt or Hortcutt hide the letter". - at "Ralph saw... or saw... ". (This is not a that-sentence!) >That-clause. This is not possible if seeing should be a relation between subject and situation. - ((s) Then only one of the two.) >Seeing. I 77 Situation Semantics/CresswellVs: knows only one kind of entities (situations). - instead: possible world semantics: three types: 1. possible world, single and complete (assessed with regard to truth) 2. Propositions: classes of possible worlds, are in logical relations and are the meanings of sentences in a context 3. Individuals (individuals) among them events. >Possible world semantics. Situations/Cresswell: can be considered as one of each of these kind of entities. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Space Time | Hintikka | II 81 Space Time/identification/KripkeVsHintikka/QuineVsHintikka/Hintikka: Kripke and Quine argue (for different reasons) that space time continuity does not always have a precise meaning. >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity, >Centered worlds, >Identification, >World lines. SaarinenVsHintikka: the identity of individuals, which occur in several worlds, is not always well-defined for all these possible worlds. Hintikka: ditto: it may be in belief contexts that an individual is identified under a description, but not under another description. This must also be the case, otherwise we would be omniscient again. Possible Worlds: we must also be careful to adopt a "common reason" from all possible worlds. We certainly do not share a part of the space time, but part of the facts. World/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/substance/Hintikka: in Wittgenstein, the world is the sum of the facts, not of the objects: for a shared space time this would only be by additional assumptions. Cross-world identification/Hintikka: the cross-world identification seems lost when we are dealing only with a lot of facts ((s) epistemically) and a common space time is missing. II 82 Re-identification: re-identification of physical objects is necessary first to get to the cross-world identification later. II 90 Possible worlds/Hintikka: the expression possible world presupposes that a space time is shared. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Chomsky, N. | Hintikka Vs Chomsky, N. | II XV Logical Omniscience/Hintikka: Thesis: is only an alleged problem. ChomskyVsHintikka: he has quoted the alleged paradox as a reason for his rejection of any model-theoretical semantics for propositional attitudes. HintikkaVsChomsky: his problem has already been solved long ago. (Essay 5) |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Compositionality | Schiffer Vs Compositionality | I 220 SchifferVsCompositionality: my rejection is based all the time on the rejection of the theory of relations for belief. Here it is difficult to speculate about what kind of conditional sentences for "believes" would require a meaning theory that would not be a truth-theoretic semantics. How could such m.th. look like at all?. E.g. Conceptual Role Semantics: (Schiffer Vs: see section 4.3). Bsp Game Theoretical Semantics/game theory/Hintikka/Schiffer: (Hintikka 1982): this is not an alternative to the conventional theory. PeacockeVsHintikka: (1978) has shown that game theoretical rules provide corresponding truth-theoretical or model theoretical axioms. I XV SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural languages do not have any compositional meaning theories (m.th.). I 137 Paul and Elmer/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. if John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is false: I 138 Either that or the alleged quantification through belief objects is not what it appears to be the Quine eye. I 144 SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification. SchifferVsCompositionality: we can now conclude that no natural language has a compositional truth-theoretic semantics (comp.tr.th.Sem.). Otherwise the theory of relations would be correct. In addition, it also has no compositional m.th. because then it has to be a compositional semantics. Understanding/SchifferVsFrege: So compositional semantics are not required to explain speech understanding! I 182 SchifferVsCompositional Semantics: it is false, even regardless of the falsity of the theory of relations of belief. ((s) Compositional Semantics/(s): does not consider the truth conditions but speaks only of the contributions of the meaning of words for the meaning of the proposition.) Schiffer. 1. t is not plausible that languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics unless it follows from the stronger assertion that they have compositional truth theories, which themselves are truth-theoretic. (> stronger/weaker; >Strength of Theories). I 192 SchifferVsCompositionality/public language/Mentalese/Schiffer: if I'm right, that no public language has a compositional semantics, I have to find a mistake in (U). It is not my goal to show that speech comprehension does not imply that the natural languages have compositional semantics, the explanation of our understanding would be an empirical task. I rather want to give a counter-E.g. VsCompositionality. E.g. (1) Harvey understands an indefinite number of new propositions of a language E1, which itself contains infinitely many propositions. (2) an explanation of his capabilities does not require compositional semantics. E1: is not a fully-developed natural language. I 193 Harvey: is in this considered possible world an information-processing machine that thinks in machine language: "M": Belief/conviction: Harvey has it if it is in a certain computational relation to an embodied (tokened) proposition of M. ((s) Mentalese: so there is still an internal relation to one's own thought language). B: is a box in Harveys head in which a proposition of M (tokened) exists exactly then when a token from the proposition occurs in B. (Assuming, Harvey has only a finite number of convictions). Belief: for each there is exactly one proposition in Mentalese whose occurrence in B realizes it. µ: is a formula in M so that Harvey believes that snow is white. Realisation/"meaning"/Schiffer: as propositions of M (machine language, Mentalese) realize belief, they also have ipso facto semantic or representational properties. Then it is fair to say that μ "means" that snow is white. And also, that a component of μ references as inner counterpart of the word to snow in the public language. I 195 Speech comprehension/Understanding/Schiffer: without compositionality: E.g. (Continuation: E1: spoken language (without ambiguity and indices) M: Mentalese for Harvey conceptual role: to explain the transition from (1) to (2). (and any others that correspond to it). Propositions in internal code: (or representations thereof: (3) Nemrac derettu "sum"-"sno"-"iz"-"pör-pol" ((s) English backward, [phonetic language], metalanguage (ML) and object language (OL) mixed) (4) Nemrac dias taht emons wons si elprup ((s) English backward, but explicit language, ML) and (5) Nemrac ecnarettu si eurt ffi emos wons si elprup ((s) ML and OL! "true" and "iff" in machine language, but without everyday linguistic meaning or "eurt" does not have to mean "true"! Conceptual role instead of meaning). I 196 Conceptual Role/c.r./SchifferVsCompositionality: we hereby show that "dias taht" and "eurt" can have conceptual roles that a) do not require any compositional semantics, b) explain the transition from one occurrence of (3) in Harveys B-Box to an occurence of (4) and (5) We do not need to specify the full meaning role! I simply assume that (4) and (5) have a role ("whichever"), which by virtue of their formula in Harvey triggers this belief. And none of this makes a compositional semantics necessary: Justification: E.g. you could just have a mapping relation for propositions between two different languages, with which a person who does not understand the other language, knows when a proposition of the other language is true. (…+…) I 200, 202f, 208. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Cresswell, M.J. | Hintikka Vs Cresswell, M.J. | Cresswell I 158 Game-Theoretical Semantics/GTS/Game Theory/Hintikka/Terminology/Cresswell: is actually not important for my purposes. I 159 HintikkaVsCresswell: Vs use of higher order entities. ((s) instead of 2nd order logic and instead branching quantifiers in order to re-establish compositionality). (Hintikka 1983, 281-285). CresswellVsHintikka/CresswellVsGame-Theoretical Semantics: 1) quantifies over higher-order entities itself, namely strategies! In particular, in the truth conditions for sentences like (28), despite Hintikka’s assertion that branched quantifiers would only mention individuals. (p 282). CresswellVsHintikka: 2) Def Truth/Game-Theoretical Semantics/Hintikka: consists in the existence of a winning strategy. If we formalize (x)(Ey)Fxy as Ef(x)Fxf(x), we are not involved in a move! Move/Game Theory/Hintikka/Cresswell: consists of a single specific choice of nature of x and then a specific choice by me. Sentence Meaning/CresswellVsHintikka: Important argument: then a single game can define the sentence meaning, and not represent how the speaker deals with it or represents its meaning. Hintikka II 63 Logical Omniscience/Semantics of Possible Worlds/Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: the problem does not occur here! E.g. (1) A sentence of the form "a knows that p" is true in a possible world W iff. p is true in all a-alternatives. I.e. in all possible worlds that are compatible with the knowledge of a. logical omniscience: its failure can be formulated as follows: (2) There is a, p and q so that a knows that p, p logically implies q, but a does not know that q. logical truth: is then model-theoretically analyzed: (3) A sentence is logically true, iff it is true in every logically possible world. Problem: (1) - (3) are incompatible! However, they are not incompatible yet in the above given shape, but only with the additional assumption: (4) Every epistemically possible world is logically possible. II 64 Problem: now it may be that in an epistemic a-alternative W’q is false! Problem: according to (4), these epistemic worlds are also logically possible. Following the logical truth of (p>q) ((s) in this example) q must be true in any logically possible world. This creates the contradiction. Solution: different authors have different responds: Positivism: takes refuge in the non-informative of (tautological) logical truth. HintikkaVs: instead: possible world semantics. (4): already presumes omniscience! It assumes that a can already eliminate only apparent options. This is circular. Solution: There may be possibilities that only appear to be possible, but contain hidden contradictions. II 65 Problem: the problem here is therefore (4) and not (2)! Solution/Hintikka: we must allow possible worlds which are logically impossible, but nevertheless epistemically possible ((s) other than the impossible worlds that are being discussed in Stalnaker and Cresswell. Then (1)-(3) can be true together, i.e. can in an epistemic possible world (p > q) can fail. Impossible World/Hintikka: Problem: how we can allow it. Impossible World/Cresswell/Hintikka: suggests a reinterpretation of the logical constants (model-theorically). HintikkaVsCresswell: the real problem with omniscience is that people do not recognize all the logical consequences of their knowledge and that takes place in classical logic. Non-standard logic: goes past the problem. One could say that it destroys the problem instead of solving it. |
Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Frege, G. | Hintikka Vs Frege, G. | Cresswell I 148 Compositionality/Cresswell: It has long been known that it fails on the surface structure. (Cresswell 1973 p 77). HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: H. says that it is simply wrong. In saying that, he ignores the deep structure. And indeed you can regard the difference of the two readings of (39) (Everybody loves somebody) in the context of the game theory as changing the order in the choice of individuals. Then you could say that the only linguistic object is the surface structure. CresswellVsHintikka: but when it comes to that, his observations are not new. Compositionality/Cresswell: fails if we say that the two readings depend on the order in which we first process "and" then "or", or vice versa. Nevertheless, the Frege principle (= compositionality) is in turn applicable to (44) or (45). It is treated like this in Montague. (see below Annex IV: Game-theoretical semantics). I 149 HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: fails even with higher order quantification. CresswellVsHintikka: this is a mistake: firstly, no compositionality is effective in the 1st order translation of sentences like (29). But authors who use higher-order entities (Montague and Cresswell) do not see themselves as deniers of the Frege principle. Hintikka seems to acknowledge that. (1982 p 231). I 161. "is"/Frege/Russell: ambiguous in everyday language. HintikkaVsFrege/KulasVsFrege: (1983): not true! Cresswell: ditto, just that "normal semantics" is not obliged to Frege-Russell anyway. Hintikka II 45 (A) Knowledge/Knowledge Objects/Frege/Hintikka: His concern was what objects we have to assume in order to understand the logical behavior of the language, when it comes to knowledge. Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege’s knowledge objects are the Fregean senses, reified, >intensional objects). Hintikka: For me, it is primarily about the individuals of which we speak in epistemic contexts; only secondarily, I wonder if we may call them "knowledge objects". Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: we can oppose the possible worlds semantics to his approach. (Hintikka pro possible worlds semantics). II 46 Idea: application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives). Possible World/Hintikka: the term is misleading, because too global. Def Scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knower. We can also call them knowledge worlds. Set of All Possible Worlds/Hintikka: we can call it illegitimate. (FN 5). Knowledge Object/Hintikka: can be objects, people, artifacts, etc. Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege presumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for some kind of entities. They can be taken as Fregean knowledge objects. Identity/Substitutability/SI/Terminology/Frege/Hintikka: SI is the thesis of the substitutability of identity ((s) only applies with limitation in intensional (opaque) contexts). II 47 E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star From this it cannot be concluded that Ramses knew that the morning star = the evening star (although MS = ES). II 48 Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguish two types of context: Direct Context/Frege/Hintikka: extensional, transparent Indirect Context/Frege/Hintikka: intensional, opaque. E.g. contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "ext", "opaque", etc. not from Frege). Frege/Hintikka: according to his own image: (4) expression >sense >reference. ((s) I.e. according to Frege the intension determines the extension.) Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here, the picture is modified: (5) Expression (>) sense (> reference) Def Systematic Ambiguity/Frege/Hintikka: all our expressions are systematically ambiguous, i.e. they refer to different things, depending on whether they are direct (transparent, extensional) contexts or indirect ones (intensional, opaque). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: Fregean senses in Frege are separate entities in order to be able to work at all as references in intensional contexts. E.g. in order to be able to restore the inference in the example above (morning star/evening start) we do not need the identity of morning star and evening star, but the. identity of the Fregean sense of "morning star" and "evening star". II 49 Important argument: but Frege himself does not reinterpret the identity in the expression morning star = evening star in this way. He cannot express this fact, because there identity occurs in an extensional context and later in an intensional context. Identity/Frege/Hintikka: therefore we cannot say that Frege reinterprets our normal concept of identity. Problem: It is not even clear whether Frege can express the identity of the senses with an explicit sentence. For in his own formal language (in "Begriffsschrift"(1) and "Grundgesetze"(2)) there is no sentence that could do this. He says that himself in: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung": we can only refer to the meanings of our expressions by prefixing the prefix "the meaning of". But he never uses this himself. (B) Knowledge Objects/Possible World Approach/HintikkaVsFrege: Idea: knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that forces us to consider certain possibilities. These we call possible worlds. new: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) in addition to the references, but we look at the same references in different possible worlds. Morning Star/Evening Star/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: Solution: "morning star" and "evening star" now single out the same object, namely the planet in the real world. II 50 (C) Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: there is no systematic ambiguity here, i.e. the expressions mean the same thing intensionally as extensionally. E.g. Knowing what John knows means knowing those possible worlds which are compatible with his belief, and knowing which are not. II 51 Extra premise: for that it must be sure that an expression singles out the same individual in different possible worlds. Context: what the relevant possible worlds are depends on the context. E.g. Ramses: here, the case is clear, On the other hand: E.g. Herzl knew Loris is a great poet Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal. II 53 Meaning Function/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: the difference in my approach to that of Frege is that I consider problems locally, while Frege considers them globally. Fregean Sense/(= way of givenness) Hintikka: must be considered as defined for all possible worlds. On the other hand: Hintikka: if Fregean sense is construed as meaning function, it must be regarded as only defined for the relevant alternatives in my approach. Frege: precisely uses the concept of identity of senses implicitly. And as meaning function, identity is only given if the mathematical function works for all relevant arguments. Totality/Hintikka: this concept of totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful. Solution/Hintikka: it is precisely the possible worlds semantics that helps dispense with the totality of all possible worlds. ((s) And to consider only the relevant alternatives defined by the context). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: was virtually constructed as an object (attitude object propositional object, thought object, belief object). This is because they were assumed as entities in the real world (actual world), however abstract. II 54 Meaning Function/M. F./HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses, meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere. Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses". Knowledge Object/Thought Object/Frege/Hintikka: Frege, unlike E.g. Quine, has never considered the problem. Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: entitles us to move from a sentence S(b) with a singular term "b" to the existential statement (Ex) S(x). This fails in intensional (epistemic) contexts. Transition from "any" to "some". E.g. epistemic context: (10) (premise) George IV knew that (w = w) (11) (tentative conclusion) (Ex) George IV knew that (w = x) II 55 Problem: the transition from (10) to (11) fails, because (11) has the strength of (12) (12) George IV knew who w is. EG/Fail/Solution/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumed that in intensional (opaque) contexts we are dealing with ideas of references. HintikkaVsFrege: Problem: then (11) would follow from (10) in any case ((s) and that’s just what is not desired). Because you’d have to assume that there is definitely some kind of sense under which George IV imagines an individual w. Problem: "w" singles out different individuals in different possible worlds. II 56 Possible Worlds Semantics/Solution/Hintikka: E.g. Suppose. (13) George knows that S(w) to (14) (Ex) George knows that S(x) where S(w) does not contain expressions that create opaque contexts. Then we need an additional condition. (15) (Ex) in all relevant possible worlds (w = x). This is, however, not a well-formed expression in our notation. We have to say what the relevant possible worlds are. Def Relevant Possible Worlds/Hintikka: are all those that are compatible with the knowledge of George. Thus, (15) is equivalent to (16) (Ex) George knows that (w = x). This is the additional premise. I.e. George knows who w is. (Knowing that, knowing who, knowing what). Knowing What/Logical Form/Hintikka/(s): corresponds to "knows that (x = y)" ((s) >single class, single quantity). E.g. knowing that "so and so has done it" does not help to know who it was, unless you know who so and so is. ((s) i.e. however, that you know y!) Solution/Hintikka/(s): the set of possible worlds compatible with the knowledge) II 57 Meaning Function/M. F./Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: in order to be a solution here, the meaning function (see above) needs to be a constant function, i.e. it must single out the same individuals in all possible worlds. Frege/Identity/Opaque Context/Hintikka: Frege had to deal with the failure of the SI (substitutability in case of identity) ((s) i.e. the individuals might have a different name), not with the failure of the Existential Generalization (EG). ((s) I.e. the individuals might not exist). Hintikka: therefore, we need several additional premises. Possible Worlds Semantics: SI: here, for substitutability in case of identity, we only need on the assumption that the references of two different concepts in any possible world can be compared. Existential Generalization: here we have to compare the reference of one and the same concept in all possible worlds. Frege/Hintikka: now it seems that Frege could still be defended yet in a different way: namely, that we now quantify on world-lines (as entities). ((s) that would accomodate Frege’s Platonism). II 58 World Lines/Hintikka: are therefore somehow "real"! So are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"?. HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world bound individuals and world lines as individuals. World Lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that the world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". Using world lines does not mean reifying them. Solution/Hintikka: we need world-lines, because without them it would not even make sense to ask at all, whether a resident of a possible world is the same one as that of another possible world. ((s) cross world identity). II 59 World Line/Hintikka: we use it instead of Frege’s "way of givenness". HintikkaVsFrege: his error was to reify the "ways of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual world. Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, in this context we need not ask "about what we quantify". II 109 Frege Principle/FP/Compositionality/Hintikka: if we proceed from the outside inwards, we can allow a violation of Frege’s principle. (I.e. the semantic roles of the constituents in the interior are context dependent). II 110 HintikkaVsFrege/HintikkaVsCompositionality: Thesis: meaning entities should not be created step by step from simpler ones in tandem with syntactic rules. They should instead be understood, at least in some cases, as rules of semantic analysis. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 2. Gottlob Frege [1893–1903]: Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Jena: Hermann Pohle Wittgenstein I 71 Def Existence/Wittgenstein: predicate of higher order and is articulated only by the existence quantifier. (Frege ditto). I 72 Hintikka: many philosophers believe that this was only a technical implementation of the earlier idea that existence is not a predicate. HintikkaVsFrege: the inexpressibility of individual existence in Frege is one of the weakest points, however. You can even get by without the Fregean condition on a purely logical level. HintikkaVsFrege: contradiction in Frege: violates the principle of expressing existence solely through the quantifier, because the thesis of inexpressibility means that through any authorized individual constant existential assumptions are introduced in the logical language. |
Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Heim, Irene | Cresswell Vs Heim, Irene | I 163 Semantics/Hans Kamp/Irene Heim/Cresswell: (Kamp 1983 Home 1983, independent): 1) Thesis: facts about descriptions, in particular their anaphoric use, require a level of representation between surface form and logical form (surface/deep structure). 2. thesis: Sentence meaning/Kamp/Heim: is no longer given by the truth-conditions. Description/CresswellVsHintikka/CresswellVsKamp/CresswellVsHeim: although there is a new point of view in terms of descriptions, (including by Lewis 1975), we do not need a new kind of semantic theory. -categorical language/ Cresswell: in it, we can formulate the semantic insights of Kamp/Heim. So. I 82 s: syntactic category: either simple or complex. simple: syntactic category 0: Sentence syntactic category 1: Name complex syntactic category: form (t, s1, ... sn). |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Hintikka, J. | Kripke Vs Hintikka, J. | Hintikka I 84 KripkeVsHintikka: Problem: the solutions of these differential equations do not need to be analytic functions or functions allowing an explicit definition of the objects. Hintikka: It seems that Kripke presupposes, however, that you always have to be able to define the relations embodied by the world lines. HintikkaVsKripke: that is too strict. World line: we do allow instead that they are implicitly defined by the solutions of the differential equations. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Hintikka, J. | Lewis Vs Hintikka, J. | V 275 Seeing/Visual Experience/Hintikka: Content of the visual experience: Set of alternative possibilities. LewisVsHintikka: We must modify this in order to satisfy the self-ascription: Visual alternatives are not possible worlds, but possible individuals in worlds. The subject believes that it belongs to a set of alternative individuals. Identification/Hintikka: cross-identification through perception. IV 42 Essentialism/Lewis: current discussion: the perfect conformity between the >counterpart (c.p.) and its original (Hintikka). LewisVsHintikka: I simply call this >similarity. Cf. >essentialism. This is exactly the c.p.r. we need in order to look at Kripke's example of Hitler who could have led an honest life. >Counterpart relation: Not only its vagueness can be handled differently in varied contexts, we can also pit different counterpart relations against each other. It is better to accept numerous relations than numerous entities! E.g. relations which either ascertain comparative or absolute similarities. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Hintikka, J. | Quine Vs Hintikka, J. | I 73 Possibilia/Hintikka: Thesis: talk about human experience makes the assumption of possibilia necessary. (Unrealized possibilities). HintikkaVsQuine. Intentionality/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Husserl the essence of human thought is in relation with unrealized possibilities. Possibilia/Hintikka: we need them to deal with logically incompatible entities of the same logical type. Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: is the corresponding model theory. I 137 QuineVsModal Logic: Problem of cross-world identification. Cross-World Identificatin/Cross-Identification/Quine/(s): Problem of identity conditions. If no identity conditions (IC) are given, the question is pointless whether an individual is "the same as" one in a different possible world. HintikkaVsQuine: my modified approach goes beyond the scope of Quine's criticism. Worldlines/Hintikka: are fixed by us, not by God. Nevertheless, they are not arbitrary. Their boundaries are given by the continuity of time and space, memory, location, etc. I 138 It may even be that our presuppositions prove to be incorrect. Therefore, there can be no set of world lines that comprise all possible worlds we need in alethic modal logic. Modal Logic/Quantification/Quine/Hintikka: a realistic interpretation of quantified alethic ML is impossible. But for reasons more profound than Quine assumed. Cross-World Identification/HintikkaVsQuine: is not intrinsically impossible. Quine/Hintikka: has even accepted this lately, with limitations. Solution/Hintikka: Cross-world identification as re-identification. I 139 Propositional Attitude/Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: we will focus here on the problem of propositional attitudes. I 140 Quantification in Epistemic Contexts/Belief Contexts/Intensional/Hintikka: Ex (1) Albert knows who wrote Coningsby (2) (Ex) K Albert (x wrote Coningsby) Notation: (Ex) perspective (perceptual) identification (acquaintance) in the book: not reflected E). Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: e.g. (2) can only then be inferred from (3) K Albert (Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby) i.e. (3) * Albert knows that Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby. ... Only then can be concluded when we have an additional premise: (4) (Ex) K Albert (Beaconsfield = x) i.e. (5) Albert knows who Beaconsfield is. Quine per Hintikka: this solution is better than a criterion for rigid designators (rigidity, QuineVsKripke). Everyday Language: it's of course simply very natural to speak in a way that you say you know who or what something is. HintikkaVsQuine: he praises me for the wrong reasons. He turns things upside down. Although he does not commit the mistake I criticize, he forgives it. I 141 Formal Language/Logic/Canonical Notation/HintikkaVsQuine: we should view logical language as our native language and not set so much store by the translation into everyday language. It is only about semantic clarity anyway. I 145 HintikkaVsQuine: does not understand the role my uniqueness conditions play: Quine: says you can also transfer these conditions to belief, knowledge, etc. Quine: Hintikka requires that the subject know who or what the person or thing is. Who or what the term designates. HintikkaVsQuine: he thinks I only use some type of uniqueness condition. Solution: the semantic situation shows the difference: the relation between the conditions for different propositional attitudes (beliefs, see, know) is one of analogy, not of identity. Solution: the sets of compatible possible worlds in the case of knowing, seeing, memory, belief are different ones every time. I 146 Identification/Belief/Quine/QuineVsHintikka: any belief world (possible worlds) will include countless bodies and objects that are not individually recognizable, simply because the believer believes his world contains countless such objects. Identity: questions about the identity of these objects are pointless. Problem: if you quantify in belief contexts, how can you exclude them? Solution: the scope of variables to those objects about which the subject has a sufficiently clear idea, would have to be limited. Problem: how do you determine how clear these ideas must be? HintikkaVsQuine: the solution is quite simple if we quantify about individuals in doxastic possible worlds: Ex Operator: "in a world w1, compatible with everything Jack believes": Solution/Hintikka: we can quantify about the inhabitants of such worlds, by simply using a quantifier inside the operator. ((s) i.e. Jack, but not we, distinguish). Problem: it could be that we might want to consider the people as our neighbors from the real world w0. ("qua neighbors"). Hintikka: but that is a problem in itself and has nothing to do with uniqueness conditions. Problem: is more due to the notation of conventional modal logic which does not allow that us to turn around the evaluation process which runs from outside to inside so that it extends from the inside out. Solution/Saarinen: "retrospective" operators (see above) Solution/Hintikka: it may still be that we can track an individual back from w1 to w0, even if it does not meet the uniqueness conditions like (16) - (127). (They require an individual to be identifiable in all the possible worlds). HintikkaVsQuine: he is wrong in that the question of identity is pointless if not all the uniqueness conditions are met. On the contrary, it has to make sense for us to ever able to determine that the conditions are not met! Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: if it is not met, it only means that we cannot find an individual ((s) or its counterpart) in any possible world. Uniqueness Condition/QuineVsHintikka: Quine's most serious objection is that these conditions are always indicated (indexical) i.e. that they are context-dependent. I.e. only in a particular situation it is about whether an individual is the same. I 147 Knowing-Who/Knowing-What/Context/Quine: E.g. "Who is he?" only makes sense in a given situation. HintikkaVsQuine: of course he is right that the truth conditions vary with the situation, but that does not destroy the uniqueness conditions for epistemic logic. HintikkaVsQuine: he only misunderstands the role these conditions play. Truth Value/Hintikka: the truth value of sentences of the form (18) (Ex) K(b = x) and equally of (19) (Ex) K(b = x) become independent of the truth value of other types of simplest sentences! Question/Answer/T Question/Hintikka: we get a new class of atomic sentences! Solution: distinction between identification through acquaintance/description. I 148 World Lines/Identification/Cross-World Identity/Hintikka: Thesis the world lines have to be drawn before the conditions are ever applied. Drawing the world lines is never part of the application of the uniqueness conditions. ((s) otherwise circular). Truth Conditions/Atomic/Atomic Sentence/Hintikka: for my theory, the interplay of specific atomic and non-atomic sentences is essential: it shows how e.g. the truth value of sentences of the form "knows + -one-question-word" sentences depends on the truth value of sentences of the form (18) - (19). HintikkaVsQuine: his criticism is similar to one that would criticize traditional truth value tables, because some of the sentences that are used to put them together are also blurred. Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: is not affected by this criticism. All it claims is that once the world lines are drawn, the rest of the semantics remains as it was. I 160 Def Knowledge/Hintikka: what is true in all knowledge possible worlds (knowledge worlds) of a subject. And, conversely, what is true in all knowledge possible worlds of a person is their knowledge. Important argument: the world lines can be drawn differently, however, while the evaluations (the non-logical constants) remain the same. The variation of the world lines can then be "seen" in the variation of the semantic power of the phrase n of the form know + indirect question. I 161 Quine has used such variation to the reject the possible world semantics of sentences with "knowing-that". HintikkaVsQuine: for him it was actually about the structural (not the referential) system. And this remained untouched. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Hintikka, J. | Russell Vs Hintikka, J. | Hintikka I 179 RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this lies merely in a further error by Russell: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed. Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced this to objects of acquaintance. But Russell believed that it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that apparently denote objects, which are not those of acquaintance. N.B.: with this, his quantifiers do not enter an ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do so. Variable/Russell/Hintikka: with Russell only notational patterns. Ontological commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment, which languages of 1st order bring with them. Being/ontology/Quine: "Being means, being a value of a bound variable." HintikkaVsRussell: that, he did not recognize. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Hintikka, J. | Verschiedene Vs Hintikka, J. | Cresswell II 40 T-Predicate/Cresswell: Thesis: We should identify the semantic truth predicate with the truth predicate for indirect speech: because of the existence of sentences of the following kind: (18) Jeremy believed that the proposition expressed by Miriam and that which Mary implied was equivalently true. Problem: here we are definitely dealing with paradoxes and have to deal with them. Solution/Hintikka: has developed an epistemic logic that deals with it. But it only applies in a community of logically omniscient people. Richmond ThomasonVsHintikka: Such a community cannot exist if knowledge is conceived that way. Logical Omniscience/Cresswell: then in any case only "that0" is needed. Prior I 84 Preface Paradox/Prior: (similar to Moore's Paradox). Variants: a) Preface b) simply book as a whole The author says in the book that p and he says in the book that q and that r etc.. and in the preface that either not p, or not q or not r etc... and that is inconsistent. The whole set cannot be true together. This can also be formulated as a paradox of belief. Rationality/Belief/Hintikka: "Rationality of belief" should avoid the preface paradox. MakinsonVsHintikka: it can be very rational to represent contradictory beliefs at the same time. I 85 This may be about probability: it may be rational to believe that two things are more likely than their non-existence, but their combination is less likely than their non-existence. VsHintikka: rationality should not be equated with consistency! |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Hintikka, J. | Peacocke Vs Hintikka, J. | I 189 Possible Worlds/Acquaintance/Identification/Hintikka/Peacocke: then we must interpret Hintikka so that he assumes that only demonstrative methods are indispensable for the ability to distinguish between possible worlds. I 189/190 PeacockeVsHintikka: E.g., it is quite natural that someone who sees a table in front of him also has a "descriptive" condition for the identification between possible worlds (cross-world identity). Whether one is in the right relations in the real world to be familiar with a thing (acquaintance), is one question, the conditions of cross-world identity is quite another! This can be extended to the semantics of propositional attitudes in terms of possible worlds. It can be seen as a sufficient condition to quantify into belief contexts (!) that there is something in every possible world that is compatible with the belief of the subject that is in a certain relation to him, without asserting that the things that are in relation to him in another possible world are in any sense identical! Then it is only necessary, but not sufficient for the subject to believe something that this belief must remain true with respect to any possible world compatible with this belief. But this is something that every theory of possible worlds must assume in relation to propositional attitudes. Especially if these propositional attitudes cannot be formulated in terms of the subject. Possible World/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: R. is unable to explain the cases where we quantify into belief contexts (!) where (according to Hintikka) the quantifier goes beyond "public descriptively identified" particulars. Hintikka: compares this with a "roman à clef". Peacocke: it is not clear that (if) this could not be explained by Russell as cases of general thoughts so that the person with such and such properties is so and so. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Hintikka, J. | Foster Vs Hintikka, J. | I 16 FosterVsHintikka: if we accept that an extensional language by our means can provide all the provisions of a natural language, its objection loses plausibility. It is absurd to assume that the erroneous interpretations do not come to an end. For if extensionality as such does not limit descriptive resources, it does not limit the kind of empirical evidence that is relevant to interpretation. |
Foster I John A. Foster "Meaning and Truth Theory" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Hintikka, J. | Rantala Vs Hintikka, J. | Hintikka I 65 Oberflächen-Modell/surface model//Hintikka: (Lit, frühere Veröffentlichungen von Hintikka): zur Lösung des Problems der logischen Allwissenheit. Lösung/Veikko RantalaVsHintikka: hat einige Probleme dieses Ansatzes gelöst. I 66 Nichtklassische Modelle: für Sätze 1. Stufe. Unmögliche Welt/UnMöWe/Rantala: sind bei ihm nicht „unmöglich“ sondern sie unterscheiden sich von den normalen möglichen Welten (Möwe), dass sie „sich verändernde MöWe“ sind (changing worlds) indem sie neue Individuen zulassen. Allerdings auf eine so subtile Weise, dass sie normalerweise nicht von invarianten MöWe (/mit immer denselben Individuen) nicht zu unterscheiden sind. Dabei geht es um: Urnenmodell/Statistik/Allwissenheit/Hintikka: wobei die varianten MöWe solche sind, bei denen bei Zügen aus der Urne möglicherweise neue Individuen im Spiel sind. Aber so wenige, dass man es möglicherweise nicht merkt. epistemisch möglich/Hintikka: entspricht dann einem Urnenmodell, mit neuen Individuen, d.h. sie ist oberflächlich möglich, aber in Wirklichkeit (nicht sofort erkennbar) logisch unmöglich. Problem: das wirft die Frage auf, was an einer MöWe beobachtbar ist. Lösung/Hintikka: die verschiedenen möglichen Komplexe von Erfahrung die man haben kann, wenn man höchstens d Individuen beobachtet, werden durch die verschiedenen Konstituenten der Tiefe d repräsentiert. I 67 Das ist das intuitive Gegenstück zur deduktiven Rolle von Konstituenten: Konstituenten: ihre deduktive Rolle ist die der logisch stärksten Propositionen der Tiefe d. Tiefe/(s): bemisst sich nach der Zahl der vorkommenden unabhängigen Individuen. Konstituente/Hintikka: C0(d) (der Tiefe d) ist eine endliche Menge endlicher Bäume. Knoten: jeder Baum hat ein eindeutig bestimmtes kleinstes Elemente (Knoten) (der Länge d) Baum: ihm entspricht jetzt eine Höhe d (statt der Länge der Konstituente). Knoten: eine Folge von Knoten eine Folge von Individuen. Individuum: die Folgen werden durch die Zweige de Baums beschrieben. Baum: die Segmente oberhalb der Knoten repräsentieren die verschiedenen Entwicklungen, die aus dem Modell abgeleitet werden können. Modell: kann hier ein variantes oder ein invariantes Modell sein. ((s) s.u. es geht hier bei dem Problem der logischen Allwissenheit immer um die invarianten Modelle). |
Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Hintikka, J. | Saarinen Vs Hintikka, J. | Hintikka I 80 Querwelteinidentität/Querwelteinidentifikation/Hintikka: normalerweise halten wir einen großen Teil der Welt fixiert, wenn wir zwei Individuen identifizieren. Vergleichbarkeit/Hintikka/(s): so werden Alternativen vergleichbar. Um Alternativen zu verschiedenen Teilen vergleichbar zu machen, dehnen wir sie aus. Die Erweiterungen sollten einen Teil gemeinsam haben. Im Extremfall teilen sie ihre Geschichte. identisch: sind zwei Objekte (Individuen) wenn ihre Geschichte zusammenfällt. Das führ dazu, dass Querwelteinidentifikation teilweise reduziert wird auf Re-Identifikation. D.h. es wird zu dem Problem. Wie die Raumzeit zu einer gemeinsamen Grundlage zurückverfolgt werden kann. Vorteil: wir müssen nicht jede einzelne mögliche Welt (Möwe) berücksichtigen. I 81 Querwelteinidentifikation/Querwelteinidentität/Locke/Kripke/Hintikka: These: Verursachung spielt eine wichtige Rolle. Ereignis/Hintikka: kann nicht in der Raumzeit bewegt werden. D.h. dass sie nur identifiziert werden können, wenn die MöWe eine gemeinsame Geschichte haben. Ereignis/Querwelteinidentifikation/Hintikka: ist relativ zu einer prop Einst. Dazu brauchen wir noch eine bessere Fundierung der Theorie. Identifikation/Raumzeit/KripkeVsHIntikka/QuineVsHintikka/Hintikka: beide wenden (aus verschiedenen Gründen) ein, dass raumzeitliche Kontinuität nicht immer einen präzisen Sinn hat. SaarinenVsHintikka: die Identität von Individuen, die in mehreren Möwe auftreten, ist auch dann nicht immer für alle diese Möwe wohldefiniert. Hintikka: dito: in Glaubenskontexten kann es sein, dass ein Individuum unter einer Beschreibung identifiziert wird, nicht aber unter einer anderen. Das muss auch so sein, denn sonst wären wir wieder gewissermaßen allwissend. MöWe: wir müssen auch vorsichtig sein, einen „gemeinsamen Grund“ von allen Möwe anzunehmen. Wir teilen sicher keinen Teil der Raumzeit, sondern einen Teil der Tatsachen. ((s) epistemisch statt ontologisch). Welt/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Substanz/Hintikka: bei Wittgenstein ist die Welt die Summe der Tatsachen, nicht der Gegenstände: zu einer geteilten Raumzeit würde das nur durch zusätzliche Annahmen. Querwelteinidentität/Hintikka: scheint verloren, wenn wir es nur mit einer Menge von Tatsachen ((s) epistemisch) zu tun haben und uns eine gemeinsame Raumzeit fehlt. I 82 Re-Identifikation: von physikalischen Objekten ist zunächst nötig, um danach zur Querwelteinidentifikation zu gelangen. |
Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Hintikka Vs Kripke, S. A. | II XIII Possible Worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: the term is misleading. (Began in the late 50s). Kripke Semantics/HintikkaVsKripke: is not a viable model for the theory of logical rules (logical necessity and logical possibility). (Essay 1). Problem: the correct logic cannot be axiomatized. Solution: interpreting Kripke semantics as non-standard semantics, II XIV in the sense of Henkin’s non-standard interpretation of higher-level logic, while the correct semantics for logical modalities would be analogous to a standard interpretation. Possible Worlds/HintikkaVsQuine: we do not have to give them up entirely, but there will probably never be a complete theory. My theory is related to Kant. I call them "epistemology of logic". II XVI Cross World Identity/Hintikka: Quine: considers it a hopeless problem HintikkaVsKripke: he underestimates the problem and considers it as guaranteed. He cheats. World Line/Cross World Identity/Hintikka: 1) We need to allow that some objects in certain possible worlds do not only exist, but that their existence is unthinkable there! I.e. world lines can cease to exist - what is more: it may be that they are not defined in certain possible worlds. Problem: in the usual knowledge logic (logic of belief) this is not permitted. 2) world lines can be drawn in two ways: a) object-centered b) agent-centered. (Essay 8). Analogy: this can be related to Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by description. (Essay 11) II 2 Kripke Semantics/Modal Logic/Logical Possibility/Logical Necessity/HintikkaVsKripke/HintikkaVsKripke Semantics: Problem: if we interpreted the operators N, P so that they express logical modalities, they are inadequate: for logical possibility and necessity we need more than an arbitrary selection of possible worlds. We need truth in every logically possible world. But Kripke semantics does not require all such logically possible worlds to be included in the set of alternatives. ((s) I.e. there may be logically possible worlds that are not considered). (see below logical possibility forms the broadest category of options). Problem: Kripke semantics is therefore inadequate for logical modalities. Modal Logic/Hintikka: the historically earliest purpose for which it was developed was precisely dealing with logical modalities. This was the purpose for which the Lewis systems were developed. HintikkaVsKripke: does not only have a skeleton in the closet, but said skeleton haunts the entire house. Equivalence Relation/Hintikka: if R is required to be reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive, it does not provide the solution: it still does not guarantee that all logically possible worlds are contained in the set. It can (possibly together with with connectedness) only guarantee that w0 has a maximum number of sets as its alternatives that are, so to speak, already in SF. II 3 KripkeVsVs/Hintikka: It could be argued that this does not yet show that Kripke semantics is wrong. It just needs to be reinforced. E.g. Nino Cocchiarella: Cocchiarella: additional condition: all models (in the usual 1st order sense) with the same domain of individuals do (w0) must occur among the alternative possible worlds to w0. ((s) No new individuals may be added or removed with regard to the original possible world w0). Hintikka: technically it is of course possible. "Old": (= Kripke semantics): non-standard semantics. new: F must include all models that have the same individuals domain do(w0) of well-defined individuals as w0. Individual/Individuals/Modal/Hintikka: an individual must be well-defined, but it does not have to exist! ((s) I.e. it can be expressed then that it is missing, E.g. the hero has no sister in a possible world). Domain of Individuals: for each possible world is then a subset of the domain D. II 4 HintikkaVs: Problem: this is unrealistically interpretative: this flexible approach namely allows non-well-shaped individuals. Then there is no point in asking whether this individual exists or not. Fusion/Fission: a flexible semantics must also allow fission and fusion between one possible world and the another. Def Well-Defined/Individual/Hintikka: an individual is well-defined, if it can be singled out by name at a node of the world line. World Line: can link non-existent incarnations of individuals, as long as they are well-defined for all possible worlds in which a node of the world line can be located. Truth Conditions: are then simple: (Ex) p(x) is true iff there is an individual there, E.g. named z, so that p(z) is true in w. Modal Semantics/Hintikka. About a so defined (new) semantics a lot can be said: Kripke Semantics/Hintikka: corresponds to a non-standard semantics, while the "new" semantics (with a fixed domain of individuals) corresponds to a standard semantics. (For higher-order logic). Standard Semantics/higher level: we get this by demanding that the higher level quantifiers go over all extensionally possible entities of the appropriate logical type (higher than individuals) like quantifiers in the standard semantics for modal logic should go over all extensionally possible worlds. This is a parallelism that is even stronger than an analogy: Decision problem: for 2nd order logic this is reduced to the 1st order standard modal logic. Standard: does the same job in the latter sense as in the former sense. Quantified 1st Order Standard Modal Logic/Hintikka: all of this leads to this logic being very strong, comparable in strength with 2nd order logic. It follows that it is not axiomatizable. (see above HintikkaVsKripke). The stronger a logic, the less manageable it is. II 12 Kripke/Hintikka: has avoided epistemic logic and the logic of propositional attitudes and focuses on pure modalities. Therefore, it is strange that he uses non-standard logic. But somehow it seems to be clear to him that this is not possible for logical modalities. Metaphysical Possibility/Kripke/HintikkaVsKripke: has never explained what these mystical possibilities actually are. II 13 Worse: he has not shown that they are so restrictive that he can use his extremely liberal non-standard semantics. II 77 Object/Thing/Object/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke Thesis: the existence of permanent (endurant) objects must simply be provided as a basic concept. HintikkaVsKripke: this requirement is not well founded. Maybe you have to presuppose the criteria of identification and identity only for traditional logic and logical semantics. But that also does not mean that the problem of identification was not an enduring problem for the philosophers. II 84 KIripkeVsHintikka: Problem: the solutions of these differential equations need not be analytic functions or features that allow an explicit definition of the objects. Hintikka: it seems that Kripke presupposes, however, that you always have to be able to define the relations embodied by the world lines. HintikkaVsKripke: that is too strict. World Line: we allow instead that they are implicitly defined by the solutions of the differential equations. II 86 HintikkaVsKripke: our model makes it possible that we do not necessarily have to presuppose objects as guaranteed like Kripke. ((s) it may be that a curve is not closed in a time section). II 116 Cross World identity/Rigidity/HintikkaVsKripke: it’s more about the way of identification (public/perspective, see above) than about rigidity or non-rigidity. The manner of identification decides what counts as one and the same individual. HitikkaVsKripke: his concept of rigidity is silently based on Russell’s concept of the logical proper name. But there is no outstanding class of rigid designation expressions. Proper Names/Names/HintikkaVsKripke: are not always rigid. E.g. it may be that I do not know to whom the name N.N. refers. Then I have different epistemic alternatives with different references. Therefore, it makes sense to ask "Who is N.N.?". Public/Perspective/Identification/Russell/Kripke/Hintikka: Russell: focuses on the perspective II 117 Kripke: on public identification. II 195 Identity/Individuals/Hintikka: it is much less clear how the identity for certain individuals can fail in the transition to another possible world. I.e. world lines can branch (fission). Separation/KripkeVsFission/SI/Hintikka: Kripke excludes fission, because for him the (SI) applies. A fission, according to him, would violate the transitivity of identity. After a fission, the individuals would by no means be identical, even if it should be after the transitivity. Therefore, for Kripke the (SI) is inviolable. HintikkaVsKripke: that is circular: Transitivity of Identity/Hintikka: can mean two things: a) transitivity within a possible world. b) between possible worlds. The plausibility of transitivity is part of the former, not the latter. To require transitivity of identity between possible worlds simply means to exclude fission. This is what is circular about Kripke’s argument. II 196 Possible World/Individuals Domain/HintikkaVsKripke: it should not be required that the individuals remain the same when changing from possible world to possible world. Talk about possible worlds is empty if there are no possible experiences that might distinguish them. ((s) is that not possible with a constant domain? Also properties could be partly (not completely) exchanged). Possible World/Hintikka: should best be determined as the associated possible totalities of experience. And then fission cannot be ruled out. II 209 Re-Identification/Hintikka: also with this problem situation semantics and possible worlds semantics are sitting in the same boat. Situation semantics: rather obscures the problem. In overlapping situations, E.g. it assumes that the overlapping part remains the same. Re-Identification/Quine/Hintikka: deems it hopeless, because it is impossible to explain how it works. Re-Identification/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke ditto, but that’s why we should simply postulate it, at least for physical objects. HintikkaVsQuine/HintikkaVsKripke: that is either too pessimistic or too optimistic. But mistaking the problem would mean to neglect one of the greatest philosophical problems. |
Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Russell, B. | Hintikka Vs Russell, B. | II 165 On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for genuine constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of substitutivity of identity (SI) in intensional contexts. Informative Identity/Frege: the fact that identity can even sometimes be informative is connected to this. EG/Existential Generalization/Russell: it, too, may fail in in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms). HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather circumvents the problems of denoting terms. E.g. The bald king of France/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France. HintikkaVsRussell: But there are also other problems. (see below for ambiguity of cross world identificaiton). Description/Russell/Hintikka: Def Primary Description: the substitutivity of identity applies to them (SI) Def secondary description: for them, substitutivity of identity (SI) fails. II 166 Existential Generalization/Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley. Description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "the author of Waverley": (ix)A(x) primarily: the description has the following power: (2) (Ex)[A(x) & (y) A(y) > y = x) & ~ George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. ((s) notation: quantifier here always normal existential quantifier, mirrored E). I.e. the quantifier has the maximum range in the primary identification. The second reading is more likely, however: Secondary: (3) ~George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x & (Scott = x)]. ((s) narrow range): Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is also a third option for the range of a quantifier ((s) >"medium range"/Kripke). (4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. II 166 Existential Generalization/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not see that there was a reason for the failure of the existential generalization, which is not caused by the non-existence of the object. E.g. (5) George IV knew that the author of Waverley is the author of Waverley. a) trivial interpretation: I 167 (6) George IV knew that (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x)) everyday language translation: he knew that one and only one person wrote Waverley. I 166 b) non-trivial interpretation: (7) (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x))). ((s) no quantifier after "knew that everyday language translation: George knew of the only person who actually wrote Waverley, that they did. Because knowledge implies truth, (7) is equivalent to (8) (Ex) George IV knew that (Ez)(A(z) & (y)(A(y) > y = z) & x = z). this is equivalent to. (9) (Ex) George IV knew that (the author of Waverley = x) Here, the description has secondary (narrow) range. Everyday language translation: George knew who the author of Waverley is. I 167 Knowledge/Who/What/Where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze structures of the form knows + W-sentence. General: (10) a knows, who (Ex x) is so that A(x) becomes (11) (Ex) a knows that A(x). Hintikka: this is only possible if we modify Russell’s approach: Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be attributed to non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed by Russell’s Theory of Descriptions (ThoD). Problem: for every person, there are a lot of people whose names they know and of whose existence they know, but of who they do not know who they are. II 168 E.g. Charles Dodgson was for Queen Victoria someone of whom she had heard, but whom she did not know. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10), the following applies. (12) ~(Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x) But that’s trivially false, even according to Russell. Because the following is certainly true: (13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson) Existential Generalization/EG: then yields (14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x) So exactly the negation of (12) contradiction. II 168 Descriptions/Hintikka: are not involved here. Therefore, Russell’s description theory cannot help here, either. E.g. we can also assume that Victoria knew of the existence of Dodgson. Empty Terms/Empty Names: are therefore not the problem, either. Ontology/Hintikka: so our problem gets an ontological aspect. Existential Generalization/EG/Being/Quine/Ontology/Hintikka: the question of whether existential generalization may be applied on a singular term "b", E.g. in a context "F(b)", is the same as whether b may be value of a bound variable. Existential Generalization/Hintikka: does not fail here because of non-existence. II 169 We are dealing with the following problems here: Manifestation used by a) no SI Frege, Russell b) no EG (i) due to non-existence Russell (ii) because of ambiguity Hintikka Ambiguity/Solution/Hintikka: possible worlds semantics. E.g. (12) - (14) the problem is not that Dodgson did not exist in the actual world or not in one of Victoria’s worlds of knowledge, but that the name Dodgson singles out different individuals in different possible worlds. Hence (14) does not follow from (13). II 170 Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Clarity/Russell/Hintikka: Which way would have been open to Russell?. Knowing-Who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself very often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge, who did something with the existence of another individual, which is known to have done... + ... II 173 Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: Important argument: an ingenious feature of Russell’s theory of denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers that denote! Theory of Denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") includes the reduction of descriptions to objects of acquaintance. II 174 Hintikka: this relation is amazing, it also seems to be circular to allow only objects of acquaintance. Solution: We need to see what successfully denoting expressions (phrases) actually denote: they precisely denote objects of acquaintance. Ambiguity/Clarity/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization. Existential Generalization/Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: his own example shows that only objects of acquaintance are allowed: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is in fact a primary incident i.e. his example (2). "Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "if" instead of "did not know". (secondary?). Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed like this: that George wanted to know of the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott. II 175 That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (in the distance) and had asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell select an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not usually deal with beings of flesh and blood whose identity is known to us, instead of only with objects of perception?. Knowing Who/Knowing What/Perception Object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely with perception objects it seems as if the kind of clarity that we need for a knowing-who, is not just given. Identifcation/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in my approach Dodgson is a bona fide individual iff. he is one and the same individual in all worlds of knowledge of Victoria. I.e. identifiable iff. (15) (E.g.) in all relevant possible worlds it is true that (Dodgson = x). Problem: What are the relevant possible worlds?. II 178 Quantifier/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell systematically confuses two types of quantifiers. (a) of acquaintance, b) of description). Problem: Russell has not realized that the difference cannot be defined solely in terms of the actual world!. Solution/Hintikka: we need a relativization to sets of possible worlds that change with the different propositional attitudes. II 179 RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this merely lies in a further error of Russell’s: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed. Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced to objects of acquaintance. Russell believed, however, it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that seemingly denote objects that are not such of acquaintance. Important argument: in that his quantifiers do not enter any ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do that. Variable/Russell/Hintikka: are only notational patterns in Russell. Ontological Commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment that 1st order languages bring with them. Being/Ontology/Quine: "Being means being value of a bound variable". HintikkaVsRussell: he has realized that. II 180 Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate merely seemingly denoting descriptions one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go over individuals that are identified by way of description. ((s) Object of the >Description). Otherwise, the real Bismarck would not be a permissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain species. Problem: then these quantifiers may not be constituents of propositions, because their value ranges do not only consist of objects of acquaintance. Therefore, Russell’s mistake was twofold. Quantifier/Variable/Russell/Hintikka, 1905, he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions. Def Pseudo Variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable. Acquaintance/Russell: values of the variable should only be objects of acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell). Quantifiers/HintikkaVsRussell: now we can see why Russell did not differentiate between different quantifiers (acquaintance/description): For him quantifiers were only notational patterns, and for them the range of possible interpretations need not be determined, therefore it makes no difference if the rage changes!. Quantification/Russell: for him, it was implicitly objectional (referential), and in any event not substitutional. Peacocke I 190 Possible Worlds/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: R. is unable to explain the cases in which we quantify in belief contexts (!) where (according to Hintikka) the quantifier over "publicly descriptively identified" particulars is sufficient. Hintikka: compares with a "roman à clef". Peacocke: it is not clear that (whether) this could not be explained by Russell as cases of general ideas, so that the person with such and such characteristics is so and so. Universals/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: we are familiar with universals and they are constituents of our thoughts. HintikkaVsRussell: this is a desperate remedy to save the principle of acquaintance. PeacockeVsRussell: his arguments are also very weak. Russell: E.g. we cannot understand the transitivity of "before" if we are not acquainted with "before", and even less what it means that one thing is before another. While the judgment depends on a consciousness of a complex, whose analysis we do not understand if we do not understand the terms used. I 191 PeacockeVsRussell: what kind of relationship should exist between subject and universal?. Solution: the reformulated PB: Here we can see to which conditions a term is subject, similar to the principle of sensitivity in relational givenness. I 192 HintikkaVsRussell: ("On denoting what?", 1981, p.167 ff): the elimination of objects with which the subject is not familiar from the singular term position is not sufficient for the irreducibility of acquaintance that Russell had in mind. Quantification/Hintikka: the quantifiers will still reach over objects with which the subject is not familiar. But such quantifiers cannot be constituents of propositions, if that is to be compatible with the PB. Because they would certainly occur through their value range Occur and these do not consist of particulars with which one is familiar. |
Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cross World Identity | Pro | Cresswell I 129 Variables / constants / Hintikka: he also handles variables and constants in different ways: by its restriction of quantifiers we can talk about the same thing in different worlds ((s)> cross-world identity) - LewisVsHintikka). |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| He* | Castaneda, H.N. | Cresswell II 182 Er*/Castaneda: (!Quasi-Indikator-): These ist unanalysierbar, bzw. in einigen Vorkommnissen auf andere Vorkommnisse zu reduzieren, in anderen nicht. Er will das in Hintikkas System der epistemischen Logik eingliedern. (Hintikka 1962). CastanedaVsHintikka: sein eigener Umgang mit de se ist inadäquat. Fra I 184 These die Verwendungen von "er" sind logisch von den (A)-(F) Verwendungen des Pronomens der dritten Person verschieden. - + Fra I 399/400 "ich"/"er"/Quasi-Indikator/Castaneda: These "er*" lässt sich auf keine Verwendung von "er" reduzieren! (>Beschränkung, >Irreduzibilität, >Reduktion). PerryVs: bei fast allen Fï·"Verwendungen gibt es eine implizite Beschränkung, aber diese Tatsache zwingt uns nicht, auf die Behauptung zu verzichten, daß "er*" nicht mehr als eine Verwendung von "er" ist. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Belief | Hintikka, J. | Schiffer I 287 Belief/Possible World/Hintikka: (1969): Thesis "Ralph believes that flounders snore" is true in all possible worlds that are compatible with Ralph's beliefs. SchifferVsHintikka: 1. It follows that Ralph also believes everything that is entailed logically in his belief. ((s) > logical omniscience). 2. That he believes everything if he has any inconsistent beliefs. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Intension | Hintikka, J. | Cresswell I 115 Def intensional object / Cresswell: is an object that is a different thing (things) in various worlds - Hintikka: better game theory as a solution for identity in intensional contexts - the first player tries to make the sentence true and the second to make it wrong - CresswellVsHIntikka: the example sentences should better be understood that they involve normal quantification, but about entities of higher order, example classes of individuals. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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