Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 39 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absolutism | Hobbes | Höffe I 228 Absolutism/Hobbes/Höffe: The reason leading to civil war in early modern times, the competing claims to absoluteness of religious confessions and political authorities, has often enough appeared since the 20th century as an exclusive claim of political confessions. Consequently, the closer form of Hobbes' philosophy of state, its absolutism, proves to be counterproductive even today. HöffeVsHobbes: For people to be able to be sure of their lives, they certainly need a state order. In contrast to Hobbes, however, human existence is threatened not only in the stateless state of anarchy, but also in the latent or acutely despotic situation of an omnipotent state power: the absolutist sovereign is not suitable for the guiding idea of the political. >Society, >State, >Freedom, >Individuals, >Tyranny, >Liberalism. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Contracts | Durkheim | Habermas IV 122 Contracts/Law/Durkheim/Habermas: for the transfer of property, inheritance is historically the norm. The competing form of acquisition or divestiture is the contract that is considered a status change. The contract adds new relationships to existing relationships. The contract is therefore a source of variations, which presupposes an earlier legal basis with a different origin. The contract is preferably the instrument with which the changes are implemented. He himself cannot form the original and fundamental foundations on which the law is based. (1) Problem: how can a contract bind the parties when the sacred basis of law has been removed? Solution/Hobbes/Weber/Habermas: the standard answer since Hobbes and up to Max Weber is that modern law is compulsory law. Habermas IV 123 DurkheimVsHobbes/DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not satisfied with that. Obedience must also have a moral core. The legal system is in fact a part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy. (See Legitimacy/Durkheim). Legitimacy/Civil Law/Durkheim/Habermas: Problem: a contract cannot contain its own bases of validity. The fact that the parties voluntarily enter into an agreement does not imply the binding nature of this agreement. The contract itself is only possible thanks to a regulation of social origin. (2) 1. E. Durkheim, Lecons de sociologie, Physique des moeurs et du droit. Paris 1969, S. 203f ; (engl. London 1957). 2. E. Durkheim, De la division du travail social, German: Über die Teilung der sozialen Arbeit, Frankfurt, 1977, S. 255. |
Durkheim I E. Durkheim The Rules of Sociological Method - French: Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, Paris 1895 German Edition: Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode Frankfurt/M. 1984 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Customs/Morality | Hegel | Brocker I 791 Sittlichkeit/HegelVsHobbes/Hegel/Honneth: (Honneth refers here to Hegel's early Jena writings.(1) Hegel develops a concept of morality that has a principally progressive thrust and therefore also points "beyond the institutional horizon" of Hegel's own present.(2) The social struggle of individuals for recognition is characterized by a distinctive dynamic; for Hegel, it proves to be an event that is open to the future and can never be finally concluded. With the motif of recognition, Hegel inscribes a principal tension in his understanding of social life, which integrates the social conflicts between individuals and groups into the historical horizon of a moral process of progress that is open to the future. >Recognition/Honneth, >Identity/Honneth. 1. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1808-1807 Frankfurt, 1986. 2. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) S.11 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I 334 Morality/Hegel/Höffe: The basic lines(1) reach their climax, the synthesis as reconciliation of abstract law and subjective morality, morality, in a will that is free both externally, qua law, and internally, qua morality. This includes social forms and institutions in which a free >self-consciousness can recognize and acknowledge itself. Because they realize a far higher degree of rationality, they have an "infinitely more solid authority and power than the being of nature" (§ 146). Polis: To his thought of morality Hegel sees correspondences in the ancient Polis, namely in its theorist Aristotle. According to him, the guiding goal of human practice, eudaimonia, happiness, is the same for the individual citizen and for the polis. Similarly, Hegel, the great Neoaristotelian of modern times, conceives the highest level of freedom, morality, as the unity of the moral concepts of individuals with the moral concepts of the "moral powers," with law, custom and religion and their concrete communities and states. HegelVsAristotle/Höffe: Over this common ground one may not overlook however the fundamental difference: With Hegel, the Aristotelian doctrine of the personal household community (oikos) is replaced by the theory of the anonymous bourgeois Höffe I 335 society, with which the newer national economy or economics is integrated into the theory of law and state. >Second Nature/Hegel. Normative elements are clearly included in the description of the process. a) Hegel begins with the "immediate by-oneself", the family shaped by love. According to a further triune section this is divided into marriage, in which an initially only external unity is transformed, by free consent, into a spiritual unity of a self-conscious love. b) According to the antithesis, marriage requires a "lasting and secure possession, a property" (§ 170), for the acquisition of which, according to Hegel, the man is primarily responsible. c) According to the synthesis, the children who guarantee the progress of humanity have the right to be nourished and educated from the common family property. Alienation: With the coming of age of the children, the possibility of new families of their own arises, in which the transition to the next step, the antithesis within morality, becomes apparent. Their essence is alienation from the family, including history and religion. It is the economic and working society, known as the "civil society", which on the one hand is necessary for the development of freedom, but on the other hand does not get rid of its problem of poverty and wealth. Welfare state: The welfare state as a corrective does not come into view here. In order for bourgeois society to "function", it needs a legal system that Hegel calls the state of necessity and understanding. 1. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Ethics | Hume | Stegmüller IV 167 Ethics/Hume: thesis: no feature can be seen in the actions themselves, which would make it possible to distinguish whether they are justified or not. >Actions. Cf. >Ethics/Harman. Stegmüller: but one can even find prescriptive passages in Hume. IV 243 Ethics/morality/Hume: thesis: 1. Facing scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive. >Life. 2. HumeVsHobbes: all humans own sympathy - would everything be available in abundance, of course, respect to other people's property would be superfluous. >Sympathy/Hume, >Sympathy.- IV 245 The key driving force is self-interest. IV 247 Ethics/morality/Hume: e.g. the two rowers: 1. Pure coordination problem. 2. No one wants to make an effort. Stabilization of cooperation: 1. only artificial virtue is assumed, 2. there is no verbal communication and 3. only rational egoism. E.g. help at the harvest: the first helps the other. Then then there is a time lag: the second does not help the other -> free riders problem -> sanctions. IV 283 Reason/morals/ethics/Hume/Stegmüller: reason can never be the motive for or against an action. >Reason/Hume, >Actions, >Reasons. Passions and preferences are logically independent of conclusions. Yet, there are practical-rational preferences. Mackie: also dispassion does not allow a clear view on things. >Ethics/Mackie. --- Stuhlmann I 64 Ethics/Hume: at its reason moral statements are always required. >Morals. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Freedom | Kant | Adorno XIII 196 Freedom/Kant/Adorno: in Kant, the domination of causality is restricted to the realm of nature, but the realm of the mind should be, as far as it is his native kingdom, as far as human beings act and realize their ideas in their actions, the realm of freedom. The innermost principle of freedom is the same reason, on the basis of which causality as a category is itself constituted. This is the unity moment within Kant's dualism. >Dualism, >Causality/Kant, >Morals/Kant. Adorno XIII 252 Freedom/Kant/Adorno: if in the Kantian philosophy of history the idea of freedom can only be mediated by the antagonism of the interests and the empirical people are called radical evil, this doctrine is directly committed to Hobbes, although Kant certainly did not really want to have something in common with Hobbes. HegelVsHobbes: the Hegelian cunning of reason, as the doctrine that the rational establishment of society asserts itself through the interests of humans, but, as it were, overgrew them, is the strictest consequence from it. Höffe I 311 Freedom/Kant/Höffe: Kant demands freedom of speech and freedom of the arts and sciences. However, he rejects the privilege of the nobility, serfdom (hereditary submission, slavery) and a despotic government as well as the Höffe I 312 colonialism and a state decreed unchanging church faith. Justification: The basis for this is the definition of the legal state, with which Kant probably for the first time brings the essence of the modern constitutional state to the concept: "The legal state is that relationship of humans among themselves, which contains the conditions under which alone everyone can participate in its law(1). >Colonialism/Kant. 1. I. Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre § 41 |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Freedom | Spinoza | Höffe I 233 Freedom/Spinoza/Höffe: [Hobbes shares with Spinoza] the view that the state is not only authorized to decide on genuinely secular matters, but also on matters of religion. >State, >Religion. SpinozaVsHobbes: 1) On the one hand, [Spinoza] seeks even more consistently a naturalistic theory of the state, free of all normative remnants, which provocatively equates law and power. 2) Liberalism/SpinozaVsHobbes: On the other hand [Spinoza] takes an uncompromisingly liberal turn. >Liberalism. [Thus] it says in the Theological and Political Tractatus(1): "The purpose of the state is in truth freedom.” >Freedom, >Trade, >Economy. 3) SpinozaVsHobbes: In the name of the freedom of citizens, Spinoza rejects Hobbes' treaty of submission and denies the secular sovereign the jurisdiction over religious matters. >Th. Hobbes, >Rule/Hobbes, >Order/Hobbes. Once again he advocates a restriction of public power: In a free state, everyone is free to think what one wants and can say what one thinks. In terms of institutional theory, Spinoza argues for a mutually controlling network of bodies in which as many individuals as possible should be involved. >Institutions. Höffe I 235 Because (...) theology or faith and philosophy are both clearly different and complement each other without any problems, "the freedom to philosophize", as already the extended book title of the tract (1) explains, can be admitted without impairment of faith. >Religious belief. Höffe I 236 In overcoming theological and political prejudices Spinoza pursues two goals. He wants to fend off the then life-threatening accusation of atheism, but above all he wants to defend "the freedom to philosophize" against the two then most powerful authorities, the religious community and the state. >Prejudices/Spinoza. Spinoza: (...) "not only can freedom be granted without harm to piety and peace in the State, but it cannot be abolished without at the same time abolishing peace in the State and piety"(3). Höffe: One could continue: The freedom of philosophy even allows openly professing atheism. However, there is no question that the time was not ripe for this continuation. Distinction between freedom of action and freedom of philosophy: the sovereign has the right to decide on all actions, because in obedience to reason everyone has "decided once and for all to transfer the right to exercise one’s live according to his own judgement, to the sovereign"(1). To act differently at one’s own discretion is considered nefarious; Spinoza does not provide for a right of resistance. On the other hand, one was not obliged to "judge and think in this way" (ibid.). >Obedience, >Thinking. 1. B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus, Chap. 20 2. B. Spinoza, Tractatus politicus 3. Tractatus theologico-politicus |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Hegel | Honneth | Brocker I 791 Hegel/Honneth: Hegel's Jena program (1) must be understood as a break with the social-philosophical mainstream of his time; this had been dominated in its understanding of social relations by the paradigm of the "struggle for self-preservation. (HegelVsMachiavelli, HegelVsHobbes). Honneth: In Hegel's work, on the other hand, a more complex logic of practice comes to the fore, namely that which unfolds out of the "struggle of subjects for mutual recognition of their identity". (2) The subjects are no longer concerned exclusively with scarce resources for their own survival, but with their own identity or the creation of a positive self-relationship. See Identity/Honneth. Brocker I 792 HonnethVsHegel: with his turn of consciousness philosophy (already raised in the Jena writings), he ultimately left the decisive suggestions of his concept of recognition theory unused. See Recognition/Honneth. 1. Vgl. G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1808-1807 Frankfurt, 1986. 2. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p.11 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Honn I A. Honneth Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010 Honn II Axel Honneth Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Hobbes | Buchanan | Gaus I 108 Hobbes/Buchanan/Gaus: [VsHobbes‘ contractualism]: suppose, following James Buchanan (1975)(1), one proposes the following contract: each keeps the holdings that each has in the state of nature, and agrees to call off the war of each against all. This would clearly benefit everyone, since each avoids the cost of protecting her holdings in the state of war. But it also seems unfair in the sense that it reflects the bargaining power of parties based on how well they did in the war that characterizes the state of nature. Such a bargain may be a modus vivendi - a compromise among competing interests that produces peace - but it hardly seems the basis of morality (for a defence of the Hobbesian contract as a modus vivendi see Gray, 2000)(?). Sophisticated analyses such as David Gauthier’s (1986)(3) contractualism seek to solve these problems (for general discussions, see Vallentyne, 1991)(4). >Contractualism/Gauthier. 1. Buchanan, James M. (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Gray 2000 3. Gauthier, David (1986) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon. 4. Vallentyne, Peter, ed. (1991) Contractarianism and Rational Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Hobbes | Gaus | Gaus I 109 Hobbes/justice/liberalism/Gaus: the line between a Hobbesian justification of liberal principles and what I shall call a ‘liberal theory of justice’ is fuzzy and open to challenge. The rationale for the distinction is this: utilitarian, Hobbesian and value subjectivist moralities may be employed to justify liberal arrangements, but depending on the details and assumptions, they can also justify distinctively illiberal policies. They thus require additional premises (say, the theory of the market) to ground liberal political principles. GausVsHobbes: After all, Hobbes’s own theory was distinctively illiberal. Liberalism: In contrast, what I shall call ‘liberal theories of justice’ tie the very idea of justice and moral reasoning to basic liberal principles. >Rights/Liberalism, >Rights/Mill. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Hobbes | Hegel | Brocker I Hobbes/Hegel/HegelVsHobbes/Honneth: Hegel criticizes Hobbes' individualistic approach to a society that is based on a struggle of individuals against each other and neglects the aspect of an individual's struggle for mutual recognition. Honneth: Hegel integrates the "negative, conflictual character"(1) of social coexistence in Brocker I 793 one's own perspective. At the same time, however, he turns into a critical argument against the paradigm of self-preservation (see >Hegel/Honneth). Honneth: So Hegel argues with Hobbes against Hobbes by adopting the motive of struggle, but combining it with a completely different theoretical tradition, especially with the recognition theory by Fichte.(2) See >Recognition/Honneth, >Hegel/Honneth, >Intersubjectivity/Hegel. 1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) S. 27. 2. Ebenda S. 32. Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Humans | Aristotle | Gadamer I 317 Humans/Aristotle/Gadamer: Human morality is fundamentally different from nature in that it does not simply have abilities or powers at work in it, but that the human only becomes such a being through what he or she does and how he or she behaves, Gadamer I 318 i.e. but: being so, behaves in a certain way. In this sense, Aristotle contrasts "ethos" with "physis" as an area in which there is no irregularity, but which does not know the regularity of nature, but the changeability and limited regularity of human statutes and human modes of behaviour. >Ethics/Aristotle, >Knowledge/Aristotle, >Generality/Aristotle. Höffe I 65 Man/humans/Aristotle/Höffe: In addition to the (far better known) political anthropology [Aristotle] (...) in the introductory chapter of the animal lore sketches a political zoology. This places humans in a context with those "political animals" which, like the bee, the wasp, the ant and the crane, live together and thereby achieve a collective achievement. The main passage for Aristotle's political anthropology, the second chapter of Book I of Politics, does not take back this biological definition, but explains that man is to a greater extent a political being. While animals are essentially concerned with the simple life (zên), for humans the good and successful life Höffe I 66 (eu zên) also counts. Aristotle's political anthropology thus remains in political >Eudaimonism. 1. community: the individual is not enough for himself: see policy I 2(1) 2. logos: a "biological" particularity, the singular logos nature of man(2). 3. Aristotle qualifies the person living outside the polis as "greedy for war"; he is a "wild animal"; and armed armed armed injustice is the worst. AristotleVsHobbes/Höffe: Unlike Hobbes, Aristotle sees more than just a cure for the threat of war. He considers the friendship that creates harmony to be at least as important as law and justice. 1. Politika I 2, 1252a26–1253a7 2. I 2, 1253a7–18 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Humans | Fukuyama | Brocker I 808 Human/Recognition/History/FukuyamaVsHobbes/FukuyamaVsLocke/FukuyamaVsRousseau/Fukuyama Thesis: History can ultimately be understood as progress towards the establishment of democracies, but the ultimate driving force for human beings is their own individual struggle for recognition (see Recognition/Fukuyama, Universal History/Fukuyama). The central characteristic of the human for Fukuyama is the ability to sacrifice his/her life for prestige reasons. Brocker I 809 Freedom/Fukuyama: Thesis: only those who have the will to die for prestige alone show that they have the ability to make a truly free choice, i.e. to be able to choose against their natural needs and against their instinct. In liberal democracy, where the struggle for recognition is largely realized, there are few social differences. Human development Brocker I 810 is finished. The type of human being that has emerged is the last of its kind ("Last Man"/Fukuyama). Problem: this state has new problems, e.g. boredom (Fukuyama relies on Nietzsche here). People rebel against being undifferentiated members of a universal and homogeneous state. The mutual recognition of people leads to a value relativism that leads to the dissolution of a firm attachment to tradition, authority and community-building values. Anja Jetschke, „Francis Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFuku I Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man New York 1992 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Identity | Honneth | Brocker I 791 Identity/Honneth: (Honneth refers here to Hegel's early Jena writings, See Hegel/Honneth): individuals in social interactions are always concerned with their own identity or with gaining a positive self-relationship. (2) Since this is only ever attainable through mediation by others, people are also referred to in their claims to identity to enforce them socially, in interaction, and that always also means: in conflict with others. Intersubjectivity/Identity/HegelVsHobbes/Honneth: In contrast to Hobbes, Hegel now refers this basic experience of the conflictual character of social relationships not to motives of self-preservation, but to "moral drives" (3) and above all "to the experience of a violation of moral claims". (4) >Hegel/Honneth, Recognition/Honneth. 1. Vgl. G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1808-1807 Frankfurt, 1986. 2. Vgl. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) S.11 3. Ebenda S. 12. 4. Ebenda S. 230. Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Honn I A. Honneth Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010 Honn II Axel Honneth Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Interpretation | Strauss | Gaus I 24 Interpretation/Leo Strauss/Ball: Straussians – followers of the late Leo Strauss (1899–1973) – claim that a canon of works by Plato and a handful of other authors contains the Whole Truth about politics, a truth which is eternal, unchanging, and accessible only to the fortunate few (...). Gaining access to this truth requires a special way of reading and of interpreting what one reads. >Truth, >Plato. StraussVsLiberalism: (...) Strauss saw the history of modern Western liberal political thought as a story of degeneration and enfeeblement. He and his followers contrasted the vigour of classical Greek and Roman political thought with the resigned ennui of slackminded modern liberal thinkers. >Liberalism, >VsLiberalism. Modern liberalism is a philosophy without foundations. Having eschewed any grounding in nature or natural law, modern liberalism, from Hobbes to the present, is reduced to a spineless relativism and is therefore without the normative foundations and philosophical resources to resist the winds of twentiethcentury fanaticism blowing from both right and left. >Liberalism/Hobbes, >Th. Hobbes. StraussVsHistoricism: The present being bankrupt, students of political philosophy must look to the past for guidance; they must be historians but not ‘historicists’. >Historicism. Knowledge and guidance of the sort we require are not easy to come by, however. They require that we read these ‘old books’ aright - that we decipher Gaus I 25 the real meaning of the messages encoded by authors fearful of persecution and wishing to communicate with cognoscenti through the ages (Strauss, 1952)(1). >Theory change, >Meaning change. StraussVsLocke/StraussVsHobbes: To communicate with the great thinkers of antiquity is to appreciate how far we have fallen. The rot began in the seventeenth century, with the advent of modern liberalism, and that of Hobbes and Locke especially (Strauss, 1953)(2). >Liberalism/Locke, >J. Locke. They disavowed the ancient wisdom and the older idea of natural law, favouring instead a view of politics founded on security and self-interest. The ancient ‘philosophical’ quest for the good life was transmuted into the modern ‘scientific’ search for safety, security, and the accommodation of competing interests. 1) VsStrauss: Straussian interpretations have been criticized on a number of reasons. One is that they rely on the sort of supposed ‘insider’s knowledge’ that is available only to those who have been initiated into the mysteries of Straussian interpretation (and who in turn conveniently dismiss criticisms by non-Straussian outsiders as being hopelessly ignorant and uninformed). >Knowledge, >Understanding. 2) VsStrauss: Another is that they assume, without argument or evidence, that the ‘real’ text does not correspond, point for point, to the written and publicly available ‘exoteric’ text; the real or ‘esoteric’ text remains hidden from public view, its meaning inaccessible to the uninitiated and unworthy. >Theory change, >Meaning change, >Texts, >Literature. 1. Strauss, Leo, 1952. Persecution and the Art of Writing. Glencoe, IL: Free. 2. Strauss, Leo, 1953. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ball, Terence. 2004. „History and the Interpretation of Texts“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
StraussDFr I David Friedrich Strauss Der alte und der neue Glaube Hamburg 2012 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Intersubjectivity | Hegel | Brocker I 792 Intersubjectivity/Hegel/Honneth: Honneth sees in Hegel's early Jena writings(1) an approach to a departure from the individualistic view of his contemporaries (HegelVsHobbes, see Hegel/Honneth), who started out from a struggle of individuals for scarce resources instead of accepting a social struggle for mutual recognition. >Recognition/Honneth), >Hegel/Honneth. Honneth: Hegel wanted to sharpen the theoretical view of the "intersubjectivity of public life", as was the focus of attention in ancient Greek philosophy.(3) Society/Hegel: Hegel, on the other hand, combines this neoclassical ethical and moral basic orientation with a genuinely modern understanding of society. The decisive factor here is a) Hegel's modern realism adopted from the English national economy, which regards the conditions of "market-mediated production and distribution of goods"(4) integrated by formal law as conditions; b) for Hegel, the moral conditions of a society "no longer result simply from the underlying nature of the human, but from a special kind of relationship between them."(5) >Society/Hegel. 1. Vgl. G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1808-1807 Frankfurt, 1986. 2. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) S.11 3. Ebenda S. 20, 21. 4. Ebenda S. 21 5. Ebenda S. 31 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Law | Hegel | Brocker I 798 Law/Hegel/Honneth: Honneth Thesis: Hegel shows how "a new, highly demanding form" of recognition is realized in law, in which subjects recognize themselves as persons of equal rights, "who are able to make reasonable decisions about moral norms in individual autonomy".(1) HegelVsHobbes thus criticizes: Hegel criticizes Hobbes' modern individualism. >Law/Honneth, >Recognition/Hegel, >Recognition, >Th. Hobbes. 1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) S. 177 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Law | Hobbes | Habermas IV 122 Law/Hobbes/Habermas: Question: How can a contract bind the parties if the sacred basis of the law has been removed? Solution/Hobbes/Weber/Habermas: the standard answer since Hobbes and up to Max Weber is that modern law is compulsory law. The internalization of moral corresponds to a complementary transformation of the law into an externally imposed, state-authorized power based on the state sanction apparatus. The quasi automatic enforceability of the fulfilment of legal claims Habermas IV 123 is to guarantee obedience. >Coercion, >Obedience. DurkheimVsHobbes/DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not satisfied with that. Obedience must also have a moral core. The legal system is in fact part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy. >Order, >Legitimacy. Höffe I 222 Validity/Law/Laws/Hobbes/Höffe: Because of the authorization, the Höffe I 223 authority to make decisions does not stem from " his own grace". Because of the social contract, in Hobbes' case it is also not "by the grace of God", but ultimately "by virtue of the consent of all those affected", all those with legal rights. Thus, a second level of authority, legitimacy, is added to the moment of legality. In any case, the succinct formula "validity by virtue of authority" reads fully developed: "validity by virtue of a power authorised by each person concerned", or in shorter form: "validity by virtue of freely recognised authority" or "validity by consensus". >Legal Positivism/Hobbes. In the case of theories of validity, two basic forms are often opposed to each other, the theories of power and the theories of consent or recognition. Although Hobbes is usually assigned to the power theorists because of his "validity by virtue of authority", in reality he is to be assigned to both groups of theories because of the basic recognition of the persons concerned. And because the authority is authorized over the basic recognition, his theory of law belongs additionally to a third theory group, the empowerment theories. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Law | Hume | Deleuze I 35 Law/Hume: law is not a natural principle. This is an artificial rule. Morality is integrated by a political agreement. >Principles/Hume, >Morals/Hume. HumeVsHobbes: VsSocial Contract: the social contract draws a false picture of society, only a negative one. Positive: lust is the driving force of all action. It is in my best interest to leave someone to his or her property, provided he/she does the same for me. Ownership is the essential political phenomenon. --- Rawls I 184 Def Law/observation/order/justice/Hume/Rawls: something, e.g. a social system, is fair, if an ideal impartial observer from outside would judge this from a general point of view, if he had all relevant information about the circumstances. (See Roderick Firth, "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 12, 1952; F. C. Sharp, Good and Ill Wll, Chicago, 1950, pp. 156-162; D. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1888, esp. Bk III, pt. III, sec I, esp. Pp574-584. More general discussion: C. D. Broad,"Some Reflections on Moral-Sense Theories in Ethics". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 45 (1944-45); W. K. Kneale, "Objectivity in Morals", Philosophy, vol. 25 (1950).) |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Deleuze I Gilles Deleuze Felix Guattari Qu’est-ce que la philosophie, Paris 1991 German Edition: Was ist Philosophie? Frankfurt/M. 2000 Hum I G. Deleuze David Hume , Frankfurt 1997 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Law | Weber | Habermas III 231 Law/Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization the cognitive independence of law and moral, i.e. the replacement of moral-practical insights of ethical and legal doctrines, principles, maxims and decision rules of world views in which they were initially embedded. Cosmological, religious and metaphysical worldviews are structured in such a way that the internal difference between theoretical and practical reason cannot yet come into effect. >Morality, >Ethics, >Worldviews, >Rationalization, >Rationality. Habermas III 232 The autonomisation of law and moral leads to formal law and to profane ethics of conviction and responsibility. >Ethics of conviction, >Responsibility. Of course, this autonomization is still in the making even within religious systems of interpretation. This leads to the dichotomization between a search for salvation, which is oriented towards inner salvation goods and means of salvation, and the realization of an outer, objectified world. Weber shows how ethics of conviction approaches develop from this religiousness of conviction. (1) >Religion. Habermas III 278 Law/Weber/Habermas: for the emergence of modern law, Weber must postulate a process that is assumed in parallel, even if not simultaneously by him for the rationalization of worldviews. >World View/Weber. The availability of post-traditional legal concepts is not yet identical with the enforcement of a modern legal system. Only on the basis of rational natural law can legal matters be reconstructed in basic concepts of formal law in such a way that legal institutions can be created that formally satisfy universalist principles. These must regulate private commercial transactions between the owners of goods and the complementary activities of the public administration. HabermasVsWeber: this does not show the parallelism of these two processes clearly enough. Habermas III 332 Law/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber's theoretical position of law in his theory of rationalization is ambiguous in that it simultaneously permits the institutionalization of procedural rational economic and administrative action and also seems to make the detachment of subsystems from their moral-practical foundations possible. Cf. >Natural Justice. The dialectical explanation of the conflicting developments of the development of science and religion cannot be applied to the development of law, since it appears from the outset in a secularized form. Habermas: Weber reinterprets modern law in such a way that it is separated from the evaluative value sphere. Habermas III 346 HabermasVsWeber: Weber empirically reinterprets the problem of legitimacy and decouples the political system from forms of moral-practical rationality; he also cuts the formation of political will back to processes of power acquisition and power competition. >Legitimacy, >Justification, >Ultimate justification. Law/Weber: as far as the normative agreement is based on tradition, Weber speaks of conventional community action. To the extent that this is replaced by success-oriented, purpose-oriented action, the problem arises as to how these new scopes can in turn be legitimate, i.e. normatively bindingly ordered. Rational social action takes the place of conventional community action. >Purpose rationality, >Conventions, >Community. Habermas III 347 Only the procedure of coming into being justifies the assumption that a normative agreement is rationally motivated. Only within normatively defined limits may legal entities act rationally without regard to conventions. HabermasVsWeber: Weber fluctuates here between discursive agreement and arbitrary statute. Habermas III 351 Modern civil private law/Weber/Habermas: is characterised by three formal features: positivity, legalism and formality. Def positivity/Habermas: positively set law is not generated by interpretation of recognized and sacred traditions, it rather expresses the will of a sovereign Habermas III 352 legislator, which uses legal organisational means to regulate social offences conventionally. Def Legalism/Habermas: legal entities are not subject to any moral motives other than general legal obedience. It protects their private inclinations within sanctioned boundaries. Not only bad convictions, but also actions that deviate from the norm are sanctioned, assuming accountability. Def Formality/Law/Habermas: Modern law defines areas of legitimate arbitrariness of private individuals. The arbitrary freedom of legal entities in a morally neutralized area of private actions with legal consequences is assumed. Private law transactions can therefore be regulated negatively by restricting authorisations that are recognised in principle (instead of a positive regulation of concrete obligations and material bids). Anything that is not prohibited by law is permitted in this area. Habermas: the system functionality corresponding to these characteristics results from legal structures in which procedural rational action can become general. It does not explain how these legal structures themselves are possible. Habermas III 353 Rather, the form of modern law is explained by the post-traditional structures of consciousness it embodies. HabermasVsWeber: Weber would have to understand the modern legal system as an order of life, which is assigned to the moral-practical way of life. But Weber's attempt to view the rationalization of law exclusively from the point of view of rationality of purpose contradicts this. Habermas: only at a post-conventional level does the idea of the fundamental critiqueability and need for justification of legal norms emerge. Habermas III 354 Modern Law/Weber/Habermas: separates morality and legality. This requires practical justification. The moral-free sphere of law refers to a moral based on principles. The achievement of making something positive is to shift justification problems, i.e. to relieve the technical handling of the law of justification problems, but not to eliminate these justification problems. This justification, which has become structurally necessary, is expressed in the catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the civil constitutions alongside the principle of popular sovereignty. Habermas III 357 Modern Law/Weber: For Weber, modern law in the positivist sense is to be understood as the law that is set by decision and completely detached from rational agreement, from concepts of justification, no matter how formal they may be. ((s) > Carl Schmitt's Decisionism/Weber). WeberVsNatural justice: Thesis: There can be no purely formal natural justice. Being-Should/Weber: The supposed to be valid is considered to be identical with that which in fact exists everywhere on average; the 'norms' obtained by logical processing of concepts of legal or ethical, belong in the same sense as the 'natural laws' to those generally binding rules which 'God himself cannot change' and against which a legal system must not attempt to rebel. (2) >Natural Justice. Habermas III 358 HabermasVsWeber: Weber confuses the formal characteristics of a post-traditional level of justification with particular material values. Nor does he sufficiently distinguish between structural and content-related aspects in rational natural justice and can therefore equate "nature" and "reason" with value contents, from which modern law, in the strict sense, is detached as an instrument for asserting any values and interests. >Foundation/Weber. Habermas III 362 Procedural legitimacy/procedural rationality/law/HabermasVsWeber: as soon as the rationalization of law is reinterpreted as a question of the procedural rational organization of procedural rational management and administration, questions of the institutional embodiment of moral-practical rationality cannot only be pushed aside, but downright turned into its opposite: These now appear as a source of irrationality, at least of "motives that weaken the formal rationalism of law".(3) Habermas: Weber confuses the recourse to the establishment of legal rule with a reference to particular values. Habermas IV 122 Law/Weber/Habermas: Question: How can a contract bind the parties if the sacred basis of the law has been removed? Solution/Hobbes/Weber/Habermas: the standard answer since Hobbes and up to Max Weber is that modern law is compulsory law. The internalization of moral corresponds to a complementary transformation of the law into an externally imposed, state-authorized power based on the state sanction apparatus. The quasi automatic enforceability of the fulfilment of legal claims Habermas IV 123 is to guarantee obedience. >Obedience. DurkheimVsHobbes/DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not satisfied with that. Obedience must also have a moral core. The legal system is in fact part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy. >E. Durkheim. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I. 1963, p. 541. 2.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Ed. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 638 3.Ibid p. 654 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Legal Positivism | Hobbes | Höffe I 221 Legal Positivism/Hobbes/Höffe: [Hobbes is regarded as the] ancestor of modern legal and at the same time state positivism, i.e. an opponent of that legal thinking which, under titles such as "divine law", "natural law" and "law of reason", clearly limits the arbitrariness of legislators and rulers. The imperative or command theory of law is regarded as proof. >Natural justice. Höffe: [Hobbes is concerned with something else]: HobbesVs "collective reason": Hobbes strongly objects to this trust, at length in his posthumous dialogue on English law. English law: This consists of an individual case law (precedent law), which is called common law in the sense of common law because, after the Norman invasion (1066), it is based on the verdicts of royal judges and asserts itself against regional peculiarities. Höffe I 222 Imperative Theory/Command Theory/HobbesVsTradition: Hobbes contrasts this with the theory of imperatives in the most extensive chapter of the first two parts of the Leviathan, in chapter 26. Its concise basic thesis, known from the Roman poet Juvenal (Satires 6., 223), belongs to the basic knowledge of the humanistically educated. It says: Not a truth makes a law but an authority, ("sed auctoritas, non veritas, facit legem": chap. 26). Forerunner: The command character alluded to therein has long been advocated in legal theory. Laws/Seneca: Seneca, for example, in his Moral Letters to Lucilius, writes that a law commands that it does not argue or discuss ("llexl iubeat, non disputet", Letter No. 94). VsHobbes: At first sight the character of the command is plausible, especially Hobbes' criticism of the assumption that the law is a piece of advice ("counsel"). On closer examination, however, concerns do emerge. For example, orders consist of concrete requests, whereas a law regulates a multitude of concrete cases. One can, however, set aside the command moment and concentrate on Hobbes' formula "not the truth, but authority". It does not contain any positivist theory of law, but emphasizes three minimal conditions in ingenious conciseness: 1) First, legal provisions are not theoretical objects waiting to be discovered; they are rather produced by man ("facit"). 2) Secondly, the truth that Hobbes rejects as a ground for validity is an insight that is not in itself a ground for validity. Hobbes here rejects a legal moralism which considers mere insight into injustice to be a sufficient argument for declaring the relevant law invalid. 3) The third condition, Hobbes' own thesis "validity by virtue of authority", is based on a multidimensional concept. "Authority" means an "author", i.e. originator and will, who has the power to enforce his will. In contrast to organized crime, power is not violentia, pure violence, but potestas, an authorized violence. Thanks to authorization, a legal system becomes legal: the decision once it has come into force remains part of the existing law as long as no new decision has been made. >Authority/Hobbes, >Validity/Hobbes. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Locke | Höffe | Höffe I 241 Locke/Höffe: (...) John Locke (1632-1704) [founded] British empiricism. >Empiricism. LockeVsDescartes/LockeVsHobbes: In epistemology he develops a counterpoint to Descartes' rationalism and in political philosophy an alternative to Hobbes' absolutism. >Th. Hobbes, >R. Descartes, >Absolutism, >Rationalism. However, because of his epistemological empiricism and his political and economic liberalism, additionally because of his demand for a child-oriented education and finally because of his plea for a certain religious tolerance, he rises quickly to European fame, and rightly so. More than any other thinker, he shaped the philosophical, political and economic world view of the bourgeois age. To this day he is valued as a classic of epistemology, political philosophy and, not least, pedagogy. Höffe I 242 In early writings such as the Tracts on Government (1660/61), Locke did not yet represent liberal political views. For example, he advocates state supervision of religious services. Biography: Although he is a champion of liberal ideas, he also earns money from the slave trade. >Liberalism, >Slavery. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Master-Slave Dialectic | Hegel | Höffe I 329 Governance/Slavery/Phenomenology/Hegel/Höffe: preliminary considerations: In competition with his peers, the human does not first depend on self-assertion, but already on the constitution of a self. Hegel expands the often merely social, legal, or state theoretical debate on three further topics: a) the confrontation of humans with themselves, b) the confrontation with nature and c) the three dimensions belonging to the concept of work. HegelVsHobbes: Hegel overcomes the reduction of the human driving forces to three conflict-causing passions and the resulting war of all against all. Th. Hobbes. Hegel neither denies the competition nor its possibly deadly violent character, nor does he deny that there are fortunately Höffe I 330 opposing forces, three passions of peace and the reason serving them. But in fighting off the violent competition (...) he discovers a far more fundamental task and ultimate achievement: people are not initially finished subjects, but must develop the necessary self-concsiousness in a dynamic process. In the complex course (...) of a veritable "fight for recognition", three dimensions interlock: - the personal confrontation of the individual with him- or herself, - the social with his or her peers and the - economic with nature. Self-consciousness: Self-consciousness appears at first as a simple striving for self-preservation, but encounters the competing striving of another (...) and, since one self-preservation contradicts the other, leads to a "fight to the death". Struggle: Whoever now clings to survival within the framework of this struggle, and consequently shuns death, submits to the one who dares to live. He becomes a servant, the other a master. Reason/Master: Here, according to Hegel, the master represents the level of consciousness of the mind. Sensuality/Slave: the slave, because he considers physical survival to be the most important thing, the level of sensuality. Dialectic: But since the slave, forced by the master to work, in this very work, instead of directly enjoying nature, he is inhibited in his own lust. The master, on the other hand, who lets the other work, finds himself in the role of the merely enjoying, consuming individual. The slave, precisely because he must inhibit his desire, frees himself from the merely naturally existing. Thus the initial order of precedence is reversed: The servant proves himself superior to the master, whereby he rises to the actual master, while the previously superior, the master, stands there as a slave. Self-consciousness: The core of this struggle for recognition consists in a "self-knowledge in the other". a) personal: One recognizes oneself first and only in a second person. b) apersonal: Self-knowledge does not come about through social recognition alone. It also requires an examination of the pre- and extra-personal world through work, i.e. economic action.(1) >Dialectic/Hegel, >History/Hegel, >World History/Hegel, >Progress/Hegel, >Self-Consciousness. 1. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Morality | Hegel | Brocker I 791 Morality/Sittlichkeit/HegelVsHobbes/Hegel/Honneth: (Honneth refers here to Hegel's early Jena writings (1)): Hegel develops a concept of morality, which in principle has a progressive thrust and therefore also points "beyond the institutional horizon" of Hegel's own presence.(2) The social struggle of individuals for recognition has a distinct dynamic; in Hegel it proves to be an event open to the future that can never be finished. With the motif of recognition, Hegel inscribes a fundamental tension in his understanding of social life that integrates the social conflicts between individuals and groups into the historical horizon of a moral progress process that is open to the future. >Recognition/Honneth, >Identity/Honneth. 1. Vgl. G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1808-1807 Frankfurt, 1986. 2. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) S.11 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Morals | Fukuyama | Brocker I 809 Moral/Fukuyama: Who can make decisions in principle independently of basic human needs (see Humans/Fukuyama), makes moral decisions and distinguishes himself/herself as a human being. Whoever makes moral decisions signals that he/she is prepared to risk his life for it. The clash of two moral people is therefore very likely to end in the fight for submission until death. FukuyamaVsLocke/FukuyamaVsHobbes: the beginning and the core of a liberal society is not the mutual recognition of the right to life and property, but the mutual recognition of the dignity of the other. ((s) See Recognition/Honneth). Anja Jetschke, „Francis Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFuku I Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man New York 1992 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Natural State | Locke | Höffe I 249 Natural State/Locks/Höffe: (...) Locke [understands] the natural state not as a thought experiment, but historically (...): early political units like Rome and Venice and every other "peaceful beginning of governments has been laid by the agreement of the people"(1). Reason: Locke, however, does not merely cite historical evidence, but rather invokes in argumentative ambiguity Höffe I 250 again and again a second instance, reason, which is "obviously on our side" (ibid.). Natural state: The state of nature consists in a "state of peace, goodwill, mutual assistance and preservation"(2). Unlike the older treaty theorists, Locke can define the state of nature so positively, almost idyllically, because he already places it under a law of nature, the moral law of nature. >Reason/Locke. Origin: By this Locke understands, as in the early experiments on the law of nature, an overly positive, absolutely binding practical norm of divine origin. Duties: According to its content, it is a duty that, according to Locke, is recognizable by both reason and revelation: the prohibition of harm. Hobbes: In Hobbes' natural state everyone has "a right to everything, even to the body of another" (3) which shows prevailing lawlessness. LockeVsHobbes: Locke, on the other hand, derives from the prohibition of damage the legal claim to the inviolability of the three basic goods: life, freedom and >property. With these thoughts he undoubtedly anticipates the basic conditions of the modern constitutional and legal state. Divine origin: With the reference to a divine origin, that is, an authority without any reason, he does not, however, like Hobbes (...), get involved in a deeper reasoning. Freedom: Because of the natural law mentioned, people live in the state of nature in "perfect freedom". Every human being is as an absolute lord of his or her own person and possessions:(4), equal to the gods and subject to no one. Nevertheless, he or she is subject to a restriction: only within the limits of natural law may the person direct his or her actions in such a way (principle of freedom) and dispose of his or her property (principle of possession/property) and his or her person (principle of life and limb) in the way that seems best to him or her. >War/Locke, >Social Contract/Locke. Höffe I 251 Pre-contractual state: Among the obligations that prevail in Locke's pre-contractual natural state is the right, in the absence of a public authority, to punish the violation of the relevant divine and natural commandments itself. Locke sees the only way out of leaving the natural state in the establishment of a political or civil society(5). It consists in a "political body", i.e. a state-like community that receives its legitimation by the free consent of its members, rational beings, i.e. by a social contract. >Social Contract/Locke. Höffe I 252 In Locke's case, the state of nature is not characterized by a latent war, as with previous treaty theorists, but by a twofold legal uncertainty: People do not always have enough power to enforce their rights, and if they do have the power, they run the risk of taking too much. 1. Locke, Second treatise of Government, 1689/90, § 104 2. Ibid. § 19 3. Hobbes, Leviathan I 14 4. Second treatise of Government, 1689/90, §123 5. Ibid., Chap. VII |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Natural State | Rousseau | Höffe I 271 Natural State/State of Nature/Rousseau/Höffe: For Hobbes, the founder, the state of nature is a thought experiment that sketches a coexistence of already reasonable people who, however, lack law and state. RousseauVsHobbes: In Rousseau's view of the history of development(1) it becomes a primordial, "animal state". Human/Speech/Rousseau: Humans who live in this state, the animal humans, have neither language nor reason or a consciousness of death. They know neither ambition nor contempt or a need for revenge; moreover, they live without any lasting relationship. In this "true state of nature", a primordial state which, historically, is even further back than Locke's state of nature, humans have two things in common with the other living beings. Self-love: It is determined by a thoroughly positive self-love (amour de soi), which, in contrast to the antisocial self-love (amour-propre) of the civilized human being, amounts to an emotional self-sufficiency. Moreover, the human possesses a sense of existence Höffe I 272 (sentiment de l'existence). Freedom: Above all, the human is characterized by a natural freedom, an independence from his fellow men, which also includes an indifference towards them. The natural state qua primordial state does not recognise privileges that some people enjoy to the detriment of others; there are neither privileges nor discrimination. The two basic evils that destroy this ideal state are private property and the state (which protects it), "civil society". In French it says "société civile", not "société bourgoise". Rousseau's bourgeois society here, as with other authors of modern times, is not an economic bourgeois society in contrast to a civic society, but the community with the power of coercion, the state, itself. >Social Contract/Rousseau. Höffe I 274 RousseauVsHobbes/RousseauVsSpinoza: Unlike Hobbes and Spinoza, but in agreement with Locke, the natural state for Rousseau is not a state of war. The natural state loses its central meaning. >Natural state/Hobbes, >Natural State/Locke, >Constitution/Spinoza, >Contract theory/Spinoza, >Democracy/Spinoza, >Freedom/Spinoza, >Natural Justice/Spinoza, >Politics/Spinoza, >State/Spinoza, 1. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755 |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Order | Hobbes | Habermas IV 314 Order/Hobbes/Habermas: as later Utilitarianism, so Hobbes also proceeds from isolated subjects endowed with the capacity for pupose-rational action. Rational skills should serve passions that dictate the purposes of action. The pursuit of one's own interests leads to a struggle for security and scarce goods. If one only considers the natural equipment of interested and purpose-oriented individuals, social relationships cannot take the form of peaceful competition. Habermas IV 315 The actions of other individuals can only be understood as a means or condition for the realization of their own purposes. Therefore, all artificial regulations are governed by the natural maxim that everyone seeks to exert influence on everyone and to gain generalised influence, i.e. power. See >Order/Parsons. Solution/Hobbes: a contract of power with the unconditional subjugation of everyone to the absolute power of one. However, this presupposes a situation in which the subjects acting in a rational manner are already prepared to fulfil the conditions necessary for the conclusion of a contract.(1) ParsonsVsHobbes. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 93f. Höffe I 228 Order/State/Society/Hobbes/Höffe: Hobbes formulates the characteristic challenge of his epoch as a generally valid basic problem: "Why at all and in what form do we need an institutional political order, why a state with powers of coercion? Since the answer also comes from general principles, from real principles, especially from the idea of the state of nature, both Hobbes' question and his proposed solution transcend the historical context, i.e., once again, the British Civil War and the early bourgeois market society. ((as) But, because of problems: see >Absolutism/Hobbes.) Cf. >State/Hobbes, >Governance/Hobbes. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Order | Locke | Arndt II 198 Name/names/classes/order/Locke: subsumptions under names (general term) are only achievements of our minds - the mind is caused by the similarity to make abstract general ideas. >Idea/Locke, >Mind/Locke, >Similarity/Locke. Habermas IV 316 Order/Locke/LockeVsHobbes/Parsons/Habermas: Locke makes use of practical reason, which prohibits the rational pursuit of one's own interests obeying exclusively imperatives of purpose rationality. >Procedural rationality. Solution/Locke: even the natural state is conceived from the point of view of the intersubjective validity of a natural right to the purpose-rational representation of one's own interests. Rational action/Locke: the right to behave rationally in this sense is thus limited for everyone, since everyone else is entitled to it from the outset.(1) 1. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 96. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Loc II H.W. Arndt "Locke" In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Order | Parsons | Habermas IV 306 Order/Parsons/Talcott ParsonsVsHobbes/Habermas: the question of how social order is possible cannot be solved under empirical conditions. (The Hobbesian problem). Problem: rationalistic and empirical concepts of action cannot grasp the autonomy of action any more than materialistic and idealistic concepts of order can grasp the legitimacy of a context of action based on interests. Solution/Parsons: Parsons develops a voluntaristic concept of action and a normativistic concept of order. Habermas IV 310 Order/Parsons: cannot be stabilized by interests alone. Thesis: Orders that are deprived of their normative force lead to anomic states.(1) Habermas IV 315 The Hobbesian Problemsee Order/Hobbes. If one starts from the concept of purpose-rational action, the actions of others are possible means for one's own purposes. Then it follows from the postulate of rationality that everyone should try to rule over each other. Then power becomes the central concept of the analysis of order. A purely utilitarian society would then be chaotic and unstable. (2) Solution/Hobbes: a contract of power with the unconditional subjugation of everyone to the absolute power of one. However, this presupposes a situation in which the subjects acting in a purposive-rational manner are already prepared to fulfil the conditions necessary for the conclusion of a contract. (3) ParsonsVsHobbes: A. The model of purpose-rational action cannot explain how actors can make an agreement that is reasonable, Habermas IV 316 i.e. so that the interests of all are taken into account. Solution/Parsons: The concept of purposive rationality must be extended. This leads to a distinction between technical and practical concepts of rationality. >Order/Locke. Conclusion: commitments must be based on a normative consensus, Habermas IV 317 which alone cannot result from rational considerations. B. Parson's thesis: (like Weber and Durkheim): Hobbes' artificial coercive order cannot be made permanent and is therefore not suitable as a model for an explanation of how social order is possible. Habermas IV 318 Problem: there is a lack of standardization and value orientation. Parsons/Habermas: Parsons constructs a symmetrical relationship between two contrary but equally wrong positions: 1) Sociological materialism reduces norms to externally imposed regulations and ignores the fact that the institutionalisation of expectations of behaviour is based on the orientation of the actor and binds it normatively and not merely de facto. Habermas IV 319 Sociological idealism underestimates the coercion that emanates from the non-normative components of the action situation, from the material substrate of the lifeworld in general. >Idealism, >Materialism. Solution/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons develops an institutional concept that follows the New Kantian model of value realization, i.e. Weber's concept of an order integrating values and interests.(3) >Institutions. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 404. 2. Ibid. p. 93f 3. Ibid. p. 732. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Proper Names | Mill | Wolf I 43 ff Names/Mill: what is more appropriate: to conceive the name as something for an object or for an idea of the object? MillVsHobbes: "Perception" is too metaphysical. Wolf I 43 Definition Name/Hobbes: "an arbitrarily chosen word, which serves as a characteristic to awaken in our mind a thought which resembles a thought which one had before, and which, expressed to others, serves them as a sign of a thought which the speaker had earlier in his mind." Names/Hobbes: names are not signs of things themselves. One only thinks of the stone. Wolf I 44 MillVsHobbes: the word sun names the name of the sun and not our idea of the sun. ((s) The idea or imagination could change). Mill: because the names not only share our ideas, but also teach the listener about our belief and this is a belief about the thing itself and not about the idea! E.g. "The sun is the cause of daylight". This is not to say that the idea of the sun produces the idea of daylight. Names/Mill: different types: some words are only parts of names: E.g. from, to, often, truly, as well as pronouns like myself, to him, "John's", even adjectives. These words express nothing which can be affirmed or denied. Exception: e.g. "'heavy' is an adjective": here "heavy" is a complete name. Name of this sound sequence. >mention / >use. Wolf I 47 Names/Mill: through their mediation we are able to state general sentences. They, themselves, can also be divided into >general terms (e.g. "human") and >singular terms (e.g. Maria). (> Zink). "John" can only be affirmed by a single person (at least in the same sense). Wolf I 49 Name/concrete/abstract/Mill: e.g. "white" is at the same time the name of an object and of many objects (concrete). "Whiteness" is the name of an attribute. "Age": is the name of an attribute. (abstract, generalization). Originates from Locke and Condillac. Wolf I 50 "Attribute" is itself the common name of many attributes. Name/abstract/singular term/Mill: however, if an attribute does not allow degree differences or type differences, it is not a general term but a singular term: E.g. visibility, tangibility, equality, rectangularity, milk white. No multiplicity of attributes, but a specific attribute. Wolf I 51 Names/Mill: names always include some attribute in themselves, but they are not the name of this attribute! The attribute itself has its own, abstract name (singular term), for example, "The whiteness". Wolf I 53 Names/Mill: names are not co-denotating, not connotative: they denote the individuals without any attributes.I 54 E.g. originally, Dartmouth may be located at the mouth of the Dart, but John is not named like this because it was part of the meaning that the father might have had the same name. In addition, the mouth of the river may have shifted without changing the name of the city. Proper names adhere to the things themselves (labels) and do not fall away if attributes of the object fall away. Although only God may have the appropriate attributes, it is still a common name and does not belong here anywa Wolf I 55 Co-denotating names/Mill: these names are identifications: e.g. "the only son of Johann Müller". Also identifies attributes. Wolf I 56 So whenever names have any meaning, the meaning is in what they co-denotate and not in what they denotate (the bearer). Non-denotating (normal) names have no meaning. Wolf I 57 Names/Mill: names do not give the listener any knowledge of the subject. If perhaps he had already learned something about Cologne before, it was not through the word Cologne. Wolf I 58 By knowing of how many objects the name can be, which it all denotates, we learn nothing, but only when we learn what it may co-denotate (attributes). On the same thing, we may also employ different names whose meaning is not the same. MillVsFrege: Therefore the bearer (of the name) is not the meaning. Wolf I 59 Co-denotating names/Mill: here there is an uncertainty. Wolf I 61 Solution: to give a fixed co-denotation for concrete names with occurring predicates. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Proper Names | Prior | I 119 ff Names/Hobbes: names are names of our ideas. >Th. Hobbes, >Ideas. MillVsHobbes: names convey to the others, what we think of someone (something), not only about our idea The idea of fire does not cause the heat, even though I must have terms to think. >Proper names/Mill, cf. >Connotation. I 158ff Name/existence/Prior: Vs the thesis, "Name is all what intends to identify a real object": Problem: indirect speech: E.g. The spokesperson believes Holmes exist, but the listener does not: then the speaker is in a position to identify Holmes the listener is not but then the listener cannot tell what the speaker has said (absurd). >Thought objects, >Belief objects, >Identification, >Individuation. I 168 Names/KennyVsRussell: there is a hideen description in "B exists". >Hidden descriptions. PriorVsKenny: when names must name something then no name can be used in indirect speech with a known non-existence. >Naming, >Non-existence, >Indirect speech. I 168ff Theory/PriorVsKenny: cannot set up his own theory. - Kenny Thesis: names must intend reference - then the theorist himself cannot even intend to use the name if he talks in his example sentences of non-existent persons. >A. Kenny. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Social Contract | Hegel | Höffe I 333 Social Contract/Hegel/Höffe: Within the considerations of the contract, Hegel rejects the modern patterns of state legitimation, such as the theory of the social contract advocated by Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke and Rousseau, and also by Kant. >Social contract/Hobbes, >Social contract/Locke, >Social contract/Rousseau. HegelVsSpinoza/HegelVsHobbes/HegelVsLocke/HegelVsRousseau/HegelVsKant: For whether one accepts a contract of all with all or a contract "of all with the prince or the government" - the state is subjected to the arbitrariness of the individual(1). In truth, everyone has always lived in a state that has the rank of an end in Höfe I 334 itself. >State/Hegel, >Society/Hegel. VsHegel/Höffe: Contract theorists such as Kant would not contradict the character of an end in itself, but would probably emphasize the legitimizing and critical task of the social contract. Social Contract/Kant: As an "original contract" and as a "mere idea of reason" he submits the "touchstone of legality of every public law": The legislator may (...) give his laws only in such a way "as they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people."(2) 1. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820, § 75 2. Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis. 1793, II. Folgerung |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Social Contract | Hobbes | Höffe I 214 Social Contract/Leviathan/Hobbes/Höffe: [Leviathan's title copperplate] is an image of the state or sovereign being the representative of all citizens: The citizens authorize the sovereign to act on their behalf. On the other hand, the citizens are completely absorbed in the almighty state. Neither do they have an existence outside the state, nor can they claim any rights against the sovereign, except the right to protection: the sovereign has to ensure their survival. The community is represented in the body of the king: the king is the people. HöffeVsHobbes: The title character would be modern if it could also be seen as the reversal of the fact that the people are the king, with the citizens taking possession of the king, i.e. the governance. What speaks against this is that only the body below the head, not the head itself, is made up of little people. >Governance/Hobbes. Hobbes I 227 Because the contract is a legal transaction to which each party must freely agree, but which is bound by its consent, the pattern of argumentation takes the form of a contract, or more precisely the form of the contract that creates a political society, which is called the "social contract" and the associated theory "(social) contract theory", recently also called contractualism. Forerunner: Hobbes did not invent the idea of contracts. A precursor is the covenant that the God of Israel makes with his people. In modern times, the idea of a covenant can already be found in John Althusius (1557-1638). But only Hobbes, with the help of the thought experiment "natural state" and legitimatory individualism, worked out the motive into a veritable theory. >Contract theory, >Authority, >Contractualism. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Social Contract | Rousseau | Höffe I 273 Social Contract/Rousseau/Höffe: In contrast to his contract-theoretical predecessors Hobbes, Spinoza and Locke, references to the Old and New Testament no longer play a role. The confessional wars are long over, but censorship still prevails. State: The counter-model that [Rousseau] has devised for the alienated societies is the bourgeois Höffe I 274 order in the sense of a state, for which he does not develop a natural history, but only examines its justification(1). Individualism: In doing so, he follows the legitimatory individualism of his predecessors in contract theory. The final basis for the justification of a community that is nevertheless entitled to coercive powers lies with the individual concerned: Each individual must freely consent. Natural state: RousseauVsHobbes/RousseauVsSpinoza: In contrast to Hobbes and Spinoza, but in agreement with Locke, the natural state for Rousseau is not a state of war. The natural state loses its central meaning. >State/Rousseau, >Human/Rousseau. Höffe I 275 Because [the] basic treaty is concluded unanimously, Rousseau can, despite his first state theory thesis that every human being is born free and as master of him- or herself (>Freedom/Rousseau), put forward the fourth thesis of the legitimacy (>Justification/Rousseau) of a community with the power of coercion. Because of the unanimity, the social contract may even be considered "the freest act in the world"(2). >Freedom/Rousseau. Höffe I 277 Justification: Under Rousseau's own principle of self-preservation, the social contract is only worthy of approval if it guarantees (not only physically understood) self-preservation, at least not endangers it. >Justification/Rousseau. 1. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762 Wilson I 24 Social Contract/Rousseau/Wilson, E. O.: Rousseau had issued the slogan "Freedom, Equality, Fraternity" in his social contract. E. O. WilsonVsRousseau: at the same time he had conceived the fatal abstraction of "collective will" in order to achieve these goals. This collective will, he wrote, forms itself into a "moral law which is objectively justified", since it is the only interest of the "rational will of free individuals" to serve the welfare of society and each of its members. This social contract should create "equal conditions for all". "Each one of us places together his or her person and all of his or her strength under the supreme direction of the common will, and we accept each member as an inseparable part of the whole." Wilson: Those who did not want to give in to this collective will were regarded as dissenters and had to face the "necessary violence" exercised by the assembly. >General Will. |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 WilsonEO I E. O. Wilson Consilience. The Unity of Knowledge, New York 1998 German Edition: Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge New York 1998 |
| Society | Fukuyama | Brocker I 809 Society/FukuyamaVsLocke/FukuyamaVsHobbes/Fukuyama: the beginning and the core of a liberal society is not the mutual recognition of the right to life and property, but the mutual recognition of the dignity of the other. >Recognition/Honneth. State/Fukuyama: From a historical perspective, the liberal state is the form of state that best balances these competing claims because it is based on the principle of recognition. This liberal state is to be thought of as a universal state in which all people are recognized, and it is to be thought of as a homogenous state in which social differences are largely levelled. The possibility of a universal historical process ("end of history") ends with its extensive implementation. End of History/Fukuyama, Universal History/Fukuyama, Humans/Fukuyama, Recognition/Fukuyama. Brocker I 810 Problem: the liberal-democratic system must meet two conflicting requirements: a) It must achieve mutual recognition of the equivalence of all (universalism) b) It sees itself confronted with the permanent striving of the people Brocker I 811 who want to be better than the other. Anja Jetschke, „Francis Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFuku I Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man New York 1992 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Spinoza | Adorno | XIII 89 Spinoza/Adorno: Spinoza is the extreme opposite to an idealistic thought which does not antithetically oppose thinking and being, but reflects this antithesis once more in itself. >Idealism, >B. Spinoza. Order/Spinoza/Adorno: Spinoza has the one - as Kant would have said - dogmatic presupposition that everything follows from a principle. He himself did not derive this presupposition further, but referred it to the axioms and definitions. He could then simply formulate the identity theorem so that the order of ideas and the order of things would be the same. >Reality/Spinoza. XIII 246 Spinoza/SpinozaVsHobbes/Adorno: Spinoza's unfinished late work, the "political treatise"(1), was a direct response to Hobbes's anti-rationalist and thus anti-systematic impulse. >Rationalism. Hobbes/Adorno: Spinoza is nevertheless one of the great system-forming constructive philosophers of this time. >Th. Hobbes. 1. B. Spinoza. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670). |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| State (Polity) | Hobbes | Höffe I 209 State/justification/legitimation/Hobbes/Höffe: Hobbes justifies the domination character of the state with the Höffe I 210 thought of the social contract: that a rule can only be legitimized by each person concerned. In his political thinking he seeks to fulfil the civilisational-political hope of the epoch, the state as guarantor of inner peace. As the inner form of the state, he believes he should justify absolute sovereignty. Problem: A state power that is not committed to either the separation of powers or fundamental rights cannot convince either argumentatively or politically. >Legitimacy, >Social contract, >Law, >Governance. VsHobbes: Consequently, Hobbes provokes sharp criticism from his contemporaries. Courtyards I 212 Philosopher’s Rule: The philosopher Hobbes does not want to rule himself. But he does expect the ruler to adopt his political views. Problem: [The] politically highly ambitious project turns out (...) to be a grandiose failure. Hobbes' first political writing, the initial reasons, predictably fuel the war. For instead of being a philosophy Höffe I 213 above the parties, it sides with the crown and against the opposing parliament. In addition, Hobbes defends the Anglican state church against both the Catholics and the Protestants who oppose a state church. [Responsible for the failure] is (...) a 'biased' diagnosis that does not see the causes of the civil war in the violation of ancestral rights. [Hobbes] goes to Paris, where he spends eleven years in exile from November 1640. >Social Contract/Hobbes, >Governance/Hobbes. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| State (Polity) | Kant | Höffe I 311 State/Kant/Höffe: According to (...) Hobbes one seeks peace out of fear of death and the desire for happiness. KantVsHobbes: In Kant's strict rationale, these pragmatic motives have no space. The salvation of the state lies not in happiness but in the rational community of external freedom. Not because no more blood flows and peace therefore being charitable, is demanded by reason, but because under this condition alone the right dictated by reason becomes real. >Contract Theory/Kant, >Legislation/Kant, >Natural State/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| State (Polity) | Locke | Mause I 36 State/Locke: For Locke, the purpose of the state is the protection of property. This theoretically presupposes that Locke, unlike Hobbes, already has property rights in their natural state and the latter is not per se a state of war, so that the state established by contract is preferable to the state of nature and legitimate only if the property in it is better protected than before; and this also means in particular that it must be protected from interference by the state itself under all circumstances. Höffe I 248 State/Liberalism/Locke/Höffe: Like Hobbes, Locke establishes the state from the consent of free people, from a social contract. However, he attaches importance to more than just securing peace. He also attaches importance to the separation of powers and, above all, to the three basic goods mentioned above: "life, liberty and property". In the sense of a concretising expansion, health also appears occasionally. LockeVsHobbes/LockeVsAbsolutism: Without the additional tasks of securing peace, explains Locke against Hobbes' absolutism, one would "consider people so foolish that they try to prevent what martens or Höffe I 249 foxes could do, but are happy, indeed consider it safe to be devoured by lions" (§ 93)(1). Governance/Locke: Because of its superior rank, Locke's basic goods ("life, liberty and property") could be considered basic and human rights. It is true that in the natural state everyone is entitled to them, but they are not secured there. Locke emphasizes again and again that the necessary violence for the state community that is necessary for this is ceded to a strong majority, but not to distributive and collective ones. Consequently, it is not excluded what contradicts the idea of a veritable basic and human right: that the majority of a minority restricts the rights and, as in Locke's letter of tolerance, refuses tolerance to Catholics and atheists. See >Tolerataion/Locke. Höffe I 251 Pre-contractual state: Among the obligations that prevail in Locke's pre-contractual natural state is the right, in the absence of a public authority, to punish the violation of the relevant divine and natural commandments itself. Locke sees the only way out of leaving the natural state in the establishment of a political or civil society(2). It consists in a "political body", i.e. a state-like community that receives its legitimation by the free consent of its members, rational beings, i.e. by a social contract. >Natural State/Locke, >Social Contract/Locke. 1. J. Locke, Second treatise of Government, 1689/90 2. Ibid. Chap. VII |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hobbes, Th. | Hume Vs Hobbes, Th. | Deleuze I 33 Social Contract/HumeVsHobbes: the social contract gives an abstract and false image of society, i.e. that there is only negative limitation and only a forced relationship to limit self-interest. Instead: a positive system of artfully contrived events. The human is inventive. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Deleuze I Gilles Deleuze Felix Guattari Qu’est-ce que la philosophie, Paris 1991 German Edition: Was ist Philosophie? Frankfurt/M. 2000 Hum I G. Deleuze David Hume , Frankfurt 1997 |
| Hobbes, Th. | Locke Vs Hobbes, Th. | I 82 Law of Nature/Locke: it follows from the law of nature that the individual may not destroy itself or other creatures (unless a higher purpose allows this) and that everyone must preserve not only oneself but also the rest of humanity, i.e. life, freedom, health and goods of fellow human beings. If the law of nature is respected by all, then the State of nature: is a "state of peace, goodwill, mutual help and preservation" (LockeVsHobbes: no civil war!) There are also lawbreakers in the state of nature. The decision is left to the injured party. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Hobbes, Th. | Luhmann Vs Hobbes, Th. | AU Kass.14 Double contingency / System / Luhmann: what is now first, the double contingency or the system? The theory of the social contract has been read so often and has also been criticized accordingly, by starting from a chaotic state of nature in which all are evil. LuhmannVsHobbes: no one ever has found the natural wild state of Hobbes, even if there may have been less civilized precursors. Double contingency: the appropriate question is not a before / after problem but "whenever" it problematizes the social order, one encounters the question, how do I deal with double contingency. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Hobbes, Th. | Mill Vs Hobbes, Th. | II 43 ff Def Name/Hobbes: "an arbitrarily chosen word, which serves as a feature to evoke in our mind a thought which is like a thought that we had previously, and that, expressed towards others, is a sign of a thought, the speaker had in mind earlier. " Name/Mill: what is more reasonable: regarde the name as an object or as an idea of the subject matter? MillVsHobbes: idea too metaphysical. II 44 MillVsHobbes: the word sun denotes the name of the sun and not our idea of the sun. ((S) The idea or concept could change). Mill: For, the names not only convey our ideas, but instruct the listener also about our faith and this is a belief about the matter itself, not about the idea! Ex "The sun is the cause of daylight." This does not mean that the idea of the sun brings about the idea of daylight. Name/Mill: different kinds: some words are only part of the name: Ex from, to, often, truly, also pronouns like me, him, "Johanns", even adjectives. These words express nothing that can be affirmed or negated. Exception: Ex '' 'heavy' is an adjective": here "heavy" is a full name. Name of this sound sequence. ((s) >mention / >use.) Prior I 119 Name/Hobbes: are names of our ideas (imaginations) and not of the imagined objects. Name/MillVsHobbes: (as Reid): names are not only there to make the listener think what we think, but also to inform them about what we think. Therefore: if I use a name to express a belief, this is a belief about the thing itself and not my image (idea) of the thing. Proposition/Mill: are not assertions of ideas (imaginations) but relate to the things themselves. Ex to believe that gold is a yellow metal, although I need to have the notions of gold and yellow, my belief refers to the things themselves. Just as I cannot dig the concept of soil with the term of the spade. I 120 The idea of fire does not causes the idea of heat. Even if I can not have my thoughts without concepts or ideas (ideas). As Reid: nevertheless we can make concepts and ideas into objects of thought in particular situations. Judgment/Johnson: (as Mill): correlates two objects of thought, but not the thoughts themselves. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Hobbes, Th. | Rorty Vs Hobbes, Th. | II (f) 125 Nominalism/Rorty: NominalismVsMetaphysics. > Quine still connects him with that. Language/World/Order/RortyVsHobbes/RortyVsQuine: that leads to contradiction if they think that by words for the smallest particles of matter nature will be dissected in a manner that is not possible with other words! A consistent nominalism must emphasize that the forecast success of such a vocabulary has no importance for the "ontological rank". |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Hobbes, Th. | Cavell Vs Hobbes, Th. | Cavell I 246/247 DescartesVsHobbes: his argument does not get off the ground, since, for example, the walk tends to be taken only as the activity itself, thinking (consciousness) on the other hand soon as the activity (actio) soon as the ability (facultas), soon as the thing in which the ability is contained. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Hume, D. | Frege Vs Hume, D. | I 67 Number/Hobbes: presupposes in mathematics among themselves equal units, from which it is constituted. Number/Hume/Frege: the constituent parts of quantity and number he considers quite similar. Number/FregeVsHobbes/FregeVsHume: just as one might view individuals as completely different! If one disregards the features by which things differ, it does not get as Lipschitz says: "the concept of the number of things considered", but Frege: a general term under that these things fall. I 94 Number/Equality/Equality of Numbers/Numerical Equality/Frege: we have to explain the meaning of the sentence "The number (sic) which is belongs to the concept F is the same as that which belongs to the concept G" in such a way that the expression: "The number (sic) which belongs to the concept F" does not occur. (Otherwise, circular). Number Equality/Hume/Solution: assigning each unit of a number to a unit of another number. ((s)> unique representation). I 95 FregeVsHume: this will result in logical difficulties which we may not pass by: Equality/Quantity/FregeVsHume/Frege: equality also occurs independent of numbers (sic), so that you might think it was already established before the quantity, and that from the concept of quantity (sic) and that of equality it would have to result when two quantities are equal, without need for a definition. FregeVs: That would explain equality only for each individual case! (By always making an equation). |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Hume, D. | Verschiedene Vs Hume, D. | Hacking I 68 Causality/W.C.BroadVsHume: VsRegularity: For example we can see that the siren of Manchester howls every day at the same time, whereupon the workers of Leeds let the work rest for one hour. But no causation. Hacking I 70 CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are characteristics of the procedures with which we establish theories. (>Putnam). Hume I 131 Def Atomism/Hume/Deleuze: is the thesis that relations are external to conceptions. (KantVs). VsHume: Critics accuse him of having "atomized" the given. Theory/DeleuzeVsVs: with this one believes to have pilloried a whole system. As if it were a quirk of Hume. What a philosopher says is presented as if it were done or wanted by him. I 132 What do you think you can explain? A theory must be understood from its conceptual basis. A philosophical theory is an unfolded question. Question and critique of the question are one. I 133 It is not about knowing whether things are one way or the other, but whether the question is a good question or not. Apron I 238 Lawlikeness/lawlike/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness or graduality of the broad term). Problem: not all laws unlimited in space-time are legal in the narrower sense. Universal, but not physically necessary: Example: "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometre". Universality: is therefore not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for lawfulness. For example, the universal statement "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if it is replaced by its contraposition: For example "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965, 341). Strong Hume-Thesis/Hume/Schurz: Universality is a sufficient condition for lawlikeness. SchurzVs: that is wrong. Weak Hume-Thesis/Schurz: Universality is a necessary condition for lawfulness. ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than the claim that it is necessary.) BhaskarVsWeak Hume-Thesis. BhaskarVsHume. Solution/Carnap/Hempel: Def Maxwell Condition/lawlikeness: Natural laws or nomological predicates must not contain an analytical reference to certain individuals or spacetime points. This is much stronger than the universality condition. (stronger/weaker). Example "All emeralds are grue": is universal in space-time, but does not meet the Maxwell condition. ((s) Because observed emeralds are concrete individuals?). I 239 Natural Law/Law of Nature/Armstrong: are relations of implication between universals. Hence no reference to individuals. (1983) Maxwell condition/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): it represents a physical principle of symmetry: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained. Symmetry Principles/Principle/Principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience! Maxwell Condition/Schurz: is too weak for lawlikeness: Example "No lump of gold..." also this universal statement fulfills them. Stegmüller IV 243 StegmüllerVsHume: usually proceeds unsystematically and mixes contingent properties of the world with random properties of humans. Ethics/Morality/Hume: 1. In view of scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive. 2. HumeVsHobbes: all people have sympathy. If, of course, everything were available in abundance, respect for the property of others would be superfluous: IV 244 People would voluntarily satisfy the needs in the mutual interest according to their urgency. Moral/Ethics/Shaftesbury/ShaftesburyVsHume: wants to build all morality on human sympathy, altruism and charity. (>Positions). HumeVsShaftesbury: illusionary ideal. Ethics/Moral/Hume: 3. Human insight and willpower are limited, therefore sanctions are necessary. 4. Advantageous move: intelligence enables people to calculate long-term interests. IV 245 The decisive driving force is self-interest. It is pointless to ask whether the human is "good by nature" or "bad by nature". It is about the distinction between wisdom and foolishness. 5. The human is vulnerable. 6. Humans are approximately the same. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ethics | Hume, D. | Stegmüller IV 243 Ethics/Moral/Hume: Thesis 1. In view of scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive. 2. HumeVsHobbes: all people have sympathy. If, of course, everything were available in abundance, respect for the property of others would be superfluous: IV 244 People would voluntarily satisfy the needs in the mutual interest according to their urgency. IV 244 Ethics/Morality/Hume: Thesis 3. human insight and willpower are limited, therefore sanctions are necessary. 4. Advantageous move: intelligence enables people to calculate long-term interests. IV 245 The decisive driving force is self-interest. It is pointless to ask whether the human is "good by nature" or "bad by nature". It is about the distinction between wisdom and foolishness. 5. Humans are vulnerable. 6. Humans are approximately the same. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 |
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