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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adorno | Habermas | IV 490 Adorno/Horkheimer/Rationalization/Modernism/Habermas: Horkheimer and Adorno had disclosed the theory of class consciousness. They address the problem of linking the phenomena of the rationalization of life orders and the institutionalization of purpose-rational action (see Purpose Rationality/Weber) with the reification of consciousness (see Reification/Lukács) with the criticism of instrumental reason. This is a vision of an administered, totally reified world in which purpose rationality and rule merge. The theory has the advantage of focusing on the systemically induced deformation of communicatively structured life contexts. HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsHorkheimer: the weakness of its theory lies in the fact that it attributes the erosion of the lifeworld to the magic of a purpose rationality demonized to instrumental reason. Thus the criticism of instrumental reason falls into the same error as Weber's theory, and it also loses the fruits of its approach, which is nevertheless directed towards systemic effects. (See Instrumental Reason/Habermas). IV 558 Adorno/Horkheimer/Marcuse/Society Theory/Method/Habermas: Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse stick to Freudian drive theory and reckon with the dynamics of an inner nature that reacts to social pressure but remains resistant to the power of socialisation at its core. (1) (AdornoVsFromm, HorkeimerVsFromm: See I/Fromm.) 1. This position has not changed later: vgl. TH.W. Adorno, Soziologie und Psychologie, in: Festschrift Horkheimer, Frankfurt 1955; H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, Boston, 1955, der, Verhalten der Psychoanalyse, in: ders, Kultur und Gesellschaft 2, Frankfurt 1965, S. 85ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Critical Theory | Arendt | Brocker I 363 Critical Theory/ArendtVsAdorno/ArendtVsMarcuse/ ArendtVsHorkheimer/Arendt: Arendt takes a critical perspective on modern mass society. However, she rejects the basic assumption of the Critical Theory that modern society has led to de-individualization on a large scale (cf. Horkheimer/Adorno 1944 (1); Marcuse 1967 (2)). In her view, the opposite is the case: it is only the democratic mass society that creates individualism in a constitutive way. >Individuals, >Individualism, >Democracy, >Society. 1. Horkheimer, Max/Adorno, Theodor W., Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente, Amsterdam 1944. 2. Marcuse, Herbert, Der eindimensionale Mensch. Studien zur Ideologie der fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft, Neuwied/Berlin 1967. Antonia Grunenberg, „Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Arendt I H. Arendt Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics. Civil Disobedience. On Violence. Thoughts on Politics and Revolution Boston 1972 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Horkheimer | Habermas | IV 490 Adorno/Horkheimer/Rationalization/Modernism/Habermas: Horkheimer and Adorno had disclosed the theory of class consciousness. They address the problem of linking the phenomena of the rationalization of life orders and the institutionalization of purpose-rational action (see Purpose Rationality/Weber) with the reification of consciousness (see Reification/Lukács) with the criticism of instrumental reason. This is a vision of an administered, totally reified world in which purpose rationality and rule merge. The theory has the advantage of focusing on the systemically induced deformation of communicatively structured life contexts. HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsHorkheimer: the weakness of its theory lies in the fact that it attributes the erosion of the lifeworld to the magic of a purpose rationality demonized to instrumental reason. Thus the criticism of instrumental reason falls into the same error as Weber's theory, and it also loses the fruits of its approach, which is nevertheless directed towards systemic effects. (See Instrumental Reason/Habermas). IV 558 Adorno/Horkheimer/Marcuse/Society Theory/Method/Habermas: Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse stick to Freudian drive theory and reckon with the dynamics of an inner nature that reacts to social pressure but remains resistant to the power of socialisation at its core. (1) (AdornoVsFromm, HorkeimerVsFromm: See I/Fromm.) 1. This position has not changed later: vgl. TH.W. Adorno, Soziologie und Psychologie, in: Festschrift Horkheimer, Frankfurt 1955; H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, Boston, 1955, der, Verhalten der Psychoanalyse, in: ders, Kultur und Gesellschaft 2, Frankfurt 1965, S. 85ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| I, Ego, Self | Fromm | Habermas IV 558 I/Fromm/FrommVsHorkheimer/FrommVsAdorno/Habermas: in contrast to Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, Erich Fromm takes up suggestions from ego-psychology and transfers the process of ego development into the medium of social interactions that penetrate and structure the natural substrate of instictive movements(1). >Personality Psychology, >About Personality psychology, >H. Marcuse, >Th.W. Adorno, >M. Horkheimer. 1.E. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, NY 1942, deutsch Frankfurt 1971. |
Fromm I Erich Fromm Escape from Freedom New York 1942 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Instrumental Reason | Habermas | IV 490 Instrumental Reason/Habermas: the term suggests that the rationality of recognizing and acting subjects systematically expands into a higher-order purpose rationality. >Rationality, >Procedural rationality. Thus the rationality of self-regulated systems, whose imperatives override the consciousness of their integrated members, appears in the form of a totalized purpose rationality. HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsHorkheimer: thus, the two authors confuse system and action rationality. Therefore, they cannot sufficiently differentiate between the rationalization of action orientation IV 491 in the context of a (...) lifeworld on the one hand and the expansion of the control capacities of (...) social systems on the other. >System rationality, >Lifeworld. Autonomy/Spontanity: Therefore, they can only locate spontaneity, which is not yet captured by the reifying power of system rationalization, in irrational forces - in the charismatic force of leaders or the mimetic of art and love. >Spontaneity, >Art, >Mimesis. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Myth | Gadamer | I 278 Myth/GadamerVsRomanticism/Gadamer: In truth, the precondition is the mysterious dark, in which lies a mythical collective consciousness that precedes all thinking, just as dogmatic-abstract as that of a state of perfection of completed enlightenment or that of absolute knowledge. Cf. >Enlightenment/Romanticism, >Myth/Romanticism. Primordial wisdom is only the counter-image of the "primordial dumb". All mythical consciousness has always been knowledge, and by knowing about divine powers, it goes beyond a mere trembling before power (if one should take such for the primordial stage) I 279 but also beyond a collective life banished to magical rituals (as we find it for example in the early Orient). It knows about itself, and in this knowledge it is no longer simply beside itself(1). This is connected with the fact that the contrast between genuine mythical thinking and pseudo-mythical poetic thinking is also a romantic illusion based on a prejudice of the Enlightenment: namely that poetic action, because it is a creation of the free imagination, no longer has any part in the religious obligation of the myth. 1) Horkheimer and Adorno seem to me to be quite right with their analysis of the "Dialectic of Enlightenment" (even if I can see a lack of historical reflection, if not a confusion of Homer with Johann Heinrich Voss in the application of sociological terms as in Odysseus, as already criticized by Goethe). (GadamerVsHorkheimer, GadamerVsAdorno.) |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Rationalism | Horkheimer | Seel III 102 Rationalism /Reason/Horkheimer: "objective reason" is unrelated to human will. >Objectivity. SeelVsHorkheimer: that was a mistake - today: will and wishes of humans are quite objective (beyond the moment). >Objectivity/Nagel, >Desires, >Will, >Freedom, >Society, cf. >Subjectivity. |
Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
| Rationalization | Habermas | III 22 Rationalization/Sociology/Habermas: Understanding rational action orientations becomes the point of reference for understanding all action orientations. For sociology, this means the following relationship between meta-theoretical and methodological level: a) At the metatheoretical level, it chooses basic concepts that are tailored to the increase in rationality of modern life. b) At the methodological level, the understanding of rational action orientations becomes a reference point for the understanding of all action orientations (>Theory of Meaningful Understanding). This is about internal relationships between meaning and validity. >Sociology, >Levels/order, >Levels of Description, >Theory, >Method. III 209 Rationalization/HabermasVsMarx/VsAdorno/VsHorkheimer/VsWeber/Habermas: the concept of rationality of these authors is too narrow to grasp the comprehensive social rationality they have in mind. >Rationality/Habermas, >Rationality/Adorno, >Rationality/Weber, >HabermasVsAdorno, >HabermasVsMarx, >HabermasVsWeber. The term would have to be used at the same level as the productive forces, the subsystems of functional rational action, the totalitarian bearers of instrumental reason. >Productive Forces/Habermas. That is not happening. The concept of action of these authors is not complex enough for this. >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas. In addition, basic concepts of action and system theory must not be confused: LuhmannVsMarx, LuhmannVsWeber, LuhmannVsAdorno: the rationalization of action orientations and lifeworld structures is not the same as the increase in complexity of action systems.(1) >LuhmannVsWeber. III 457 Communicative action/rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only when we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas III 459 Rationalization/Habermas: the paradox of rationalization, of which Weber spoke, can be understood abstractly in such a way that the rationalization of the world allows a kind of system integration ((s) of subsystems with non-linguistic communication media such as money and power) that competes with the integration principle of ((s) linguistic) understanding and under certain conditions has a disintegrating effect on the world of life. >Lifeworld. IV 451 Rationalization/Modernism/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber could not classify the problems of legitimacy that a positivistically undermined legal rule raises within the pattern of rationalization of modern societies, because he himself remained imprisoned by legal-positivist views. >Legitimicy/Habermas. Solution/Habermas: Thesis: (p) The emergence (...) of modern societies requires the institutional embodiment of moral and legal concepts of a post-traditional nature, but (q) capitalist modernization follows a pattern according to which cognitive-instrumental rationality penetrates beyond the realms of economy and state into other, communicatively structured areas of life and takes precedence there at the expense of moral-practical and aesthetic-practical rationality. (r) This causes disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld. IV 452 Problem: a progressively rationalised lifeworld is simultaneously decoupled and made dependent on increasingly complex, formally organised areas of action such as economics and state administration. This takes sociopathological forms of internal colonization. To the extent that critical imbalances can only be avoided at the cost of disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld (i.e. of "subjectively" experienced crises or pathologies threatening identity). IV 486 Paradoxically, rationalization releases both at the same time - the systemically induced reification and the utopian perspective from which capitalist modernization has always inherited the stigma that it dissolves traditional forms of life without saving their communicative substance. >Reification 1.N. Luhmann, Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität, Tübingen 1968. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dewey | Horkheimer Vs Dewey | Suhr I 180 HorkheimerVsDewey: VsInstrumental Reason. Horkheimer: core of pragmatism is the view that an idea, a concept or a theory is nothing but a scheme or plan for action, and therefore truth nothing but the success of an idea. VsHorkheimer: presupposes the notion of truth as correspondence. I 182 HorkheimerVsDewey: pragmatism replaced the concept of truth by probability. Truth is not tied to verification, but absolute. HorkheimerVsDewey: so is prediction (and predictability) the nature "of this kind of thinking". But: The current importance and future verification of a sentence are not the same. (Horkheimer: per change of meaning.) I 182. VsHorkheimer: equals truth to contemplation. Horkheimer has not explained why truth is supposed to be even desirable. (NietzscheVs.) I 182 Pragmatism: Vs "stationary contemplation" (James): Truth that is sought for its own. I 183 HorkheimerVsPragmatism: Both the attack on the contemplation, as well as the "praise of the craftsman" express the "triumph of the means over the purpose". (Originated in Greek class society). |
Suhr I Martin Suhr John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 |
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