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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conceptualism | Tugendhat | I 72f Veritative being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p". - VsObject Theory (>objet theory): States of affairs are taken as objects. Conceptualism: concepts are taken as objects. Immaterial - but also VsImagination. Instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no structure). TugendhatVsMiddle Ages: verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next to unum and aliquid - had Aristotle referred to the veritative existence, he could have created a semantics of assertion. >Aristotle, >Being. I 91 VsHeidegger: existence of facts instead of "all being is being of beings". I 184f Def Conceptualism/Tugendhat: the theory that predicate = concept (conceptus). The predicate stands for something, otherwise the use of the predicate would have no objective basis. >Predicates, >Reference. I 185 Nominalism: denies that we actually always imagine something when we use a predicate sensibly. We can also understand the sentence about the red castle without having a concrete imagination. >Nominalism, >Universals. ConceptualismVsNominalism: misunderstanding: the imagination does not have to be sensual. NominalismVsConceptualism: there are no "general images" - or images of something general - characterization only exists since Wittgsteins Philosophical Inveistigations. >Generality, >Ludwig Wittgenstein. I 189 VsConceptualism: object dispensable. >Conceptualism/Quine. Nominalism: 1) linguistic sign belongs to the intersubjective understanding-each-other - then intra-subjective understanding superfluous? 2) results in positive explanation for inter-subjective meaning. I 204 Conceptualism/Tugendhat: must postulate nonsensual imagination, because no sensual imagination corresponds to "every color". >Imagination, >Colour. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Object | Tugendhat | I 37f Object/Tugendhat: Definition hypokeimenon/Aristotle: object of predications. - Everything is an object: we are unable to verify this by comparing many objects. - We do not learn by abstraction what an "object" is. I 86 Analytical philosophy/Tugendhat: Vsimagination: the main target of the Analytic Philosophy is the assumption of ideas. >Imagination, >Mental states, >Mental objects, >Mentalism. I 88 E.g. not: Who do you imagine under "Peter"? - but who do you mean by "Peter"?Objects/Tugendhat: we do not imagine them, we mean them. >Meaning (Intending). I 102 For that we need singular term instead of pictures. >Singular terms, >Pictures. I 131 Object/Tugendhat: instead of this offensive term we can also speak of "content", but too unclear. >Content. I 141 TugendhatVsHusserl: fails at the question of how predicates are to understand - because of his object-orientated approach. False: the sentence would correspond to a situation. >Edmund Husserl. I 246 Object theory/Tugendhat: Facts are conceived as objects. Object: using a sentence as a display or presentation of facts. >Sentences. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Possible Worlds | Goodman | II IX (Preface Putnam) There are no "possible but not actual" worlds. GoodmanVsFormalism: no formalism for the sake of formalism. >Formalism. GoodmanVsImagination: imagination is independent from our theorizing "ontological basement". >Imagination. II 78 We have become accustomed to see the real world as one of many possible. This needs to be corrected: all possible worlds are within the real. --- Putnam III 144 Versions/Goodman: it is not about different descriptions of "identical facts". Versions are unequal possible worlds and only incompatible versions must refer to different possible worlds - not different languages, so that tables sometimes as aggregates of time segments of molecules ... etc., but we decide to produce a corresponding world, e.g. "Big Dipper" was not created, but made a constellation. PutnamsVsGoodman: this is a too daring extrapolation: that there was nothing what we have not created. III 147 PutnamVsGoodman: "Big Dipper" is not analytical: if a star perishes, we would further speak of the Big Dipper - but "star" has properties that cannot be accounted for by specifying a list - we cannot get to know this, by finding out what belongs to the Big Dipper. Big Dipper: which stars are included, is rather answered by the linguist. PutnamVsGoodman: the term "constellation" is in the middle. The constellation remains when all the stars are light bulbs. PutnamVsGoodman: easy answer: we have not created the star Sirius ourselves. We have not made it a star and we have brought about the term star, and this term applies to Sirius. Our term of bachelor applies to "Joseph Ullian", without, however, that our language practice made him a bachelor. We create the concepts, but we do not cause them to be true. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Terminology | Tugendhat | I 72f Veritative Being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p". - VsObject theory - VsConzeptualism (terms for objects) - immaterial - but also VsImagination - instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no-structure) - TugendhatVsTradition (Middle Ages): verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next unum and aliquid - would Aristotle have referred to the veritative being, he could have formed a semantics of assertion. I 91 VsHeidegger: Being of facts instead of "all being is being of any beings". I 162f Object theory/TugendhatVs: states of affairs regarded as objects - VsWittgenstein/VsTractatus: state of affairs as a combination of object, fact as existence of state of affairs - Wittgenstein, late: (self-criticism), "complex is not equal to fact". I 217 Object Theory simply ignored the communicative function of language. I 337 Singular Term/TugendhatVsObject theory: cannot make that "standing for" understandable. Not even his own basic notion, that of the object. I 338 Frege: singular terms are dependent expressions. I 246 Hysteron-proton/Tugendhat: the later earlier - fallacy of interchanging the implication relation - here: also a state of affairs can only be identified by phrases. I 266 Definition expulsion game/Tugendhat: that the rule of use which is explained, is to be understood as a verification rule - (pro). >use/Tugendhat, > truth conditions/Tugendhat, >Meaning/Tugendhat. I 276 The rules of the expulsion game are verification rules. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
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