Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Deceptions	Burge	Frank I 687 Deception/Descartes/Burge: Descartes points to a causal gap between the world and effects. Different external causes can produce the same effects. Descartes: the causes differ from what we think about them. Individualism: wants to conclude that our thoughts about the world are wrong. BurgeVsIndividualism: but we know what thoughts we have, even if they are false. I.e. we also know in counterfactual situations which thoughts we have. (Twin Earth). Anti-individualism thesis in counterfactual situations, however, we have different thoughts than in the current situation (twin earth). According to Descartes, anti-individualism must therefore be wrong. For individualism: >Internalism; cf. >Externalism. Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663	Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Individualism	Kelsen	Brocker I 139 Individualism/KelsenVsIndividualism/Kelsen: Kelsen's criticism of individualism is amazing. In "Wesen und Wert"⁽¹⁾ Kelsen assumes a transformation of the individual to the collective freedom of the individual. >Freedom/Kelsen. KelsenVsLiberalismus: in statements before the First World War he certifies that contemporary liberalism has an apolitical basic attitude, which is explained by its individualism.⁽²⁾ For Kesen, economic liberalism does not necessarily belong to democracy. >Democracy. 1. Hans Kelsen, cy»Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie«, in: Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 47, 1920/1921, 50-85 (Separatdruck: Tübingen 1920). Erweiterte Fassung: Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, Tübingen 1929 (seitenidentischer Nachdruck:Aalen 1981). 2. Hans Kelsen »Politische Weltanschauung und Erziehung«, in: Annalen für soziale Politik und Gesetzgebung 2, 1913, S. 7 Marcus Llanque, „Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Individualism	Ritchie	Gaus I 101 Individualism/Ritchie/Gaus: ‘Human beings in society,’ Mill claimed, ‘have no properties but those which are derived from, and which may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of individual men’ (1963b(1): 879; see also Bentham, 1987⁽²⁾: ch. I, s. 4). Spencer agreed: ‘the properties of the mass are dependent upon the attributes of its component parts’ (1995⁽³⁾: 1). >J. St. Mill, >J. Bentham, >H. Spencer. VsIndividualism/Gaus: In the last years of the nineteenth century this individualist view was increasingly subject to attack, especially by those who were influenced by idealist philosophy(...). RitchieVsSpencer: D. G. Ritchie, criticizing Spencer’s philosophy in 1891, explicitly rejected the idea that society is simply a ‘heap’ of individuals, insisting that it is more akin to an organism, with a complex internal life (1902⁽⁴⁾: 13). Hobhouse/Dewey: liberals such as L. T. Hobhouse and Dewey refused to adopt radically collectivist views such as those advocated by Bernard Bosanquet (2001)⁽⁵⁾, but they too rejected the radical individualism of Bentham, Mill and Spencer. >B. Bosanquet, >L.T. Hobhouse, J. Dewey. Throughout most of the first half of the twentieth century such ‘organic’ analyses of society Gaus I 102 held sway in liberal theory, even in economics (see A. F. Mummery and J. A. Hobson, 1956⁽⁶⁾: 106; J. M. Keynes, 1972⁽⁷⁾: 275). >Liberalism. 1. Mill, John Stuart (1963b) A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Ratiocinative and Inductive. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, vols VII and VIII. 2. Bentham, Jeremy (1987) Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In Utilitarianism and Other Essays, ed. Alan Ryan. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 3. Spencer, Herbert (1995) Social Statics. New York: Robert Schalkenback Foundation. 4. Ritchie, D. G. (1902) The Principles of State Interference: Four Essays on the Political Philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer, J. S. Mill, and T. H. Green. London: Allen and Unwin. 5. Bosanquet, Bernard (2001) The Philosophical Theory of the States and Related Essays, eds, Gerald F. Gaus and William Sweet. Indianapolis: St Augustine. 6. Mummery, A. F. and J. A. Hobson (1956) The Physiology of Industry. New York: Kelly and Millman. 7. Keynes, John Maynard (1972) ‘The end of laissez-faire’. In his Essays in Persuasion. London: Macmillan. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Individualism	Spencer	Gaus I 101 Individualism/Spencer/Gaus: ‘Human beings in society,’ Mill claimed, ‘have no properties but those which are derived from, and which may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of individual men’ (1963b⁽¹⁾: 879; see also Bentham, 1987⁽²⁾: ch. I, s. 4). Spencer agreed: ‘the properties of the mass are dependent upon the attributes of its component parts’ (1995⁽³⁾: 1). VsIndividualism/Gaus: In the last years of the nineteenth century this individualist view was increasingly subject to attack, especially by those who were influenced by idealist philosophy (...) D. G. Ritchie, criticizing Spencer’s philosophy in 1891, explicitly rejected the idea that society is simply a ‘heap’ of individuals, insisting that it is more akin to an organism, with a complex internal life (1902⁽²⁾: 13). >Individualism/Ritchie. 1. Mill, John Stuart (1963b) A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Ratiocinative and Inductive. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, vols VII and VIII. 2. Bentham, Jeremy (1987) Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In Utilitarianism and Other Essays, ed. Alan Ryan. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 3. Spencer, Herbert (1995) Social Statics. New York: Robert Schalkenback Foundation. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Spencer I Herbert Spencer The Man versus the State Indianapolis 2009 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Self-Determination	Political Philosophy	Gaus I 259 Self-determination/Political Philosophy/Kukathas: in the nineteenth century, nationalism was allied with Gaus I 260 liberalism as the principle of nationality was invoked as a principle of freedom - and against alien rule. >Nationalism, >Liberalism. Mazzini: the liberalism of Mazzini, for example, advocated the unification of Italy as a national republic from which French, Austrian and Papal power was expelled. Mill: John Stuart Mill saw a common nationality as a prerequisite for (liberal) representative government. >J. St. Mill. Liberalism/non-liberalism: in this light, national self-determination might seem unproblematic, as an ideal both liberals and non-liberals alike might readily accept: liberals because they favour self-determination, and non- liberals because they favour national community. Yet matters are not so straightforward. In the first instance, what is always, and inescapably, controversial is the issue of who is the 'self' that is entitled to self-determination. Even if people within a boundary are entitled to govern themselves, how is the boundary to be drawn: who is to be included and who is to be excluded (Barry, 1991⁽¹⁾; 2001⁽²⁾: 137)? Culture/group membership: theorists such as Raz and Margalit (1990)(3) look to resolve the problem by tying group membership to culture, suggesting that 'encompassing groups' have a number of characteristics that give them a unity which enables them to mount claims to self-hood and therefore self-determination. Central to such groups is a common culture, but no less impor- tant is the fact that people within them recognize each other as members and regard their membership as important for their own self-identification. It is also important to recognize, however, that the right of self-determination can be enjoyed only by a group that is a majority in a territory (1990⁽³⁾: 441). VsIndividualism: what Raz and Margalit reject, as an undesirable illusion, is the individualist principle of consent: 'It is undesirable since the more important human groupings need to be based on shared history, and on criteria of nonvoluntaristic (or at least not wholly contractarian) membership to have the value they have' (1990⁽³⁾: 456). Consent/KukathasVsRaz/KukathasVsMargalit: yet it is difficult to see how consent can fail to play a significant role in any account of self- determination if self-determination is to mean some- thing more than the determination of the lives of some by the will of others. And many other theories of self-determination give a substantial role to consent as central to any account of political legitimacy. >Consent. Beran: among the most sustained defences of the importance of consent is that offered in the writings of Harry Beran, particularly in his defence of the right of secession s central to the legitimacy of the liberal state (Beran, 1984⁽⁴⁾; 1987⁽⁵⁾; but see also Green, 1988(6); and Simmons, 2001(7)) (...). >Political Secession. 1. Barry, Brian (1991) 'Self-government revisited'. Democracy and Power. Oxford: Clarendon, 156-86. 2. Barry, Brian (2001) Cultuæ and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Oxford: Polity. 3.Raz and Margalit 1990 4. Beran, Harry (1984) 'A liberal theory of secession'. Political Studies, 32:21-31. 5. Beran, Harry (1987) The Consent Theory of Political Obligation. London: Croom Helm. 6. Green, Leslie (1988) The Authority of the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 7. Simmons, A. John (2001) Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author Vs Author	Entry	Reference
Individualism	Burge Vs Individualism	Stalnaker II 169 Externalism/Anti-Individualism/Burge/Stalnaker: (Burge 1979) further developed Putnam's approach: 1) not only meaning and other semantic properties, but also intentional psychological properties are dependent on external conditions. Wishes, fears, intentions, hopes, etc. 2) Social Conditions - facts about language use in a community - are external conditions that determine mental states. 3) The dependence on external conditions is a penetrating phenomenon, not limited to few terms and expressions, not only to de-re attitudes or names, natural kind concepts and index words, but also attitudes de dicto and all kinds of expressions. Def Individualism/Burge: Thesis: that intentional mental states are intrinsic properties of the individuals that have them. BurgeVsIndividualism.	Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003