Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identity | Field | II 114 Self-identity/Identity/Field: true identity is only self-identity. - It is not enough when the extensions of the other predicates (other than "is identical to") are up for grabs. Less than true identity: E.g. congruence: is an equivalence relation for which substitutivity applies. >Schmidentity, >Identity/Kripke. Identity/Quine: it is not easy to say which facts about us make it, that "is identical to" and "rabbit" stands for rabbits - and not "belong together" or "are of the same". >Identity/Quine. And by analogy for temporary stages. Inflationism: can in turn accept facts. - (FieldVsinflationism). >Inflationism, >Facts, >Nonfactualism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Inflation Targeting | Economic Theories | Mause I 233 Inflation Targeting/Monetary Policy/Economic Theories: in many countries there is a shift away from monetary policy strategies taking explicit interim targets into account. (VsTaylor, John Brian, VsMcCallum, Bennett). Solution: in inflation targeting, central banks orientate their monetary policy directly towards inflation trends instead. VsInflation Targeting: the central banks run the risk that their monetary policy measures may take effect too late and have a procyclical effect due to time lags. Against this background, central banks must gear their monetary policy interventions to the expected inflation potential, i.e. their strategy is based on a control of the forecast inflation rate. As soon as the assumed inflation potential deviates from the formulated inflation target, monetary policy measures are required. Problem: the credibility of monetary policy depends (...) crucially on the determination of the forecast inflation rate. Solution: a combination with a Taylor-type monetary policy rule is proposed. >Taylor Rule/Taylor. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Inflationism | Field | II 104 Inflationism: Frege/Russell/Tractatus/Ramsey: truth conditions are central to meaning and content. >Truth conditions. Vs: Deflationism: no truth conditions instead perhaps verification theory. >Deflationism. Verification conditions/Verification/Verificationism/Field: Verification conditions (perhaps via stimuli) are given without the that-sentences - i.e., without propositional content - then class of verification conditions instead of proposition. >Verification conditions. Inflationism: would say that these are no real propositions because these must include truth conditions. InflationismVsVerificationism. II 126 Inflationism/Field: proceeds from facts (unlike the deflationism) - in particular, facts about the use of a language. FieldVs: what kind of facts are these supposed to be? - Deflationism: homophony condition is sufficient to rule out the fact that we do not use a language with deviating reference - there are no more facts. ((s) homophony condition: "Snow is white" is true iff is snow is white). >Homophony. II 114 Deflationism: can assume facts. >Facts, cf. >Nonfactualism. Inflationist relation: "S has the truth conditions p". II 126 Questions about the truth conditions: become questions about which language the person speaks. >Language dependence. Inflationism: would consider that as a question of use - (because he assumes facts). II 220 Inflationism/FieldVsInflationism: increases the indeterminacy. >Indeterminacy, >Translation. II 230 Inflationism/Vagueness/FieldVsInflationism: Problem: Inflationism needs a thing that is "neither bald nor non-bald". Inflationism: explains example "weakly true" compositionally. >Compositionality. Supervaluation/Sorites/Inflationism: "candidate of an extension". >Supervaluation. Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. Then it is a borderline case without definition-operator (dft-operator): "Jones is bald in some, but not in all extensions". |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Vagueness | Field | II 227 Vagueness/revision of the logic/Field: some authors: to allow double negation, to prohibit explicit contradictions, thus also not to allow negations of the law of the excluded middle (l.e.m.). >Negation, >Double negation, >Contradictions, >Stronger/Weaker, >Excluded middle. Then old version: if Jones is a limiting case for "Jones is bald", we cannot claim either "bald" or "not-bald", so we can now. New: neither claim: E.g. "Jones is bald or not bald" nor "It is not the case that Jones is either bald or not bald." On the other hand: Field: with definite-operator (definite): "It is not the case that Jones is either definitely bald or definitely not bald". - Without law of the excluded middle: "neither bald nor not bald". II 228 Limiting case/vagueness/definite-Operator/Field: we need the definite-operator to avoid a limiting case of the a limiting case. >dft-operator, >Terminology/Field. II 228 Def Weakly true/vagueness/truth/truth-predicate/Field: to be able to say general things about borderline cases. Not only that somebody represents a certain limiting case. >Generalization. Def paradigmatic borderline case: definitely a borderline case. Not weakly true/deflationism: e.g. "Either bald or not-bald is true". Then the Truth-predicate itself inherits the vagueness. It is not definitely true whether or not. Def Strongly true/Field: assuming, Jones is a limiting case: then neither "bald" nor its negation (strongly) plus classical logic: then the disjunction "bald or not bald" should be true even in strong interpretation. Law of the excluded middle: if we give it up: a) weakly true: then the disjunction is not true b) strongly true: then the disjunction is without truth value. Strongly true: is less vague, does not inherit the vagueness. Correctness: which interpretation is the correct one is only dependent on utility. >Correctness. Per weak truth: allows infinite conjunction and disjunction. This corresponds more to the theory of validity. - Only the weak Truth-concept is supplied by the disquotation scheme. Deflationism: deflationism additionally requires the definite-operator to declare the predicate strongly true. >Deflationism. II 230 Inflationism/Vagueness/FieldVsInflationism: Problem: the I. needs a thing that is "neither bald nor not bald". Inflationism: explains e.g. "weakly true" compositional. >Inflationism. Supervaluation/Sorites/Inflationism: "candidate of an extension". >Supervaluation. Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. - Then the limiting case without definite-operator: "Jones is bald in some extensions but not in all". II 233 Vagueness/Ontology/Field: Thesis: vgueness is a deficiency of language, not of the world. >Language dependence. II 234 Vagueness/radical non-classical logic/Field: here we do not need a definite-operator or distinction between strong/weak truth: e.g. Jones is a limiting case iff it is not the case that he is either bald or not bald. Deflationism/Field: seems to save a lot of trouble, because there is no definite-operator, one would have to understand. Vs: that deceives: the trouble is only postponed: here the logical rules for "not", etc. are much more complicated. ... + ... II 228 Weakly true:...++... |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inflationism | Field Vs Inflationism | II 220 Gavagai/Deflationism/Field: the question is whether the facts about our use of the equal sign determine that it stands for identity instead of partial identity. The normal axioms just make sure that it is an equivalence relation and also a congruence relation with respect to the other predicates of our language. FieldVsInflationism: amplifies the uncertainty. Even if partial identity was a "partial reference" of "=" in a primitive language that contains no predicate "is a unseparated part of", it is likely that the addition of this predicate would then exclude this. Thus, the vagueness of "rabbit" would also be reduced. II 221 These observations are based on an inflationist perspective. Deflationism/Field: reduces the indeterminacy. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Inflationism | Wright Vs Inflationism | I 47 Def Inflationism: a) "true" is merely a means of affirmation, expressing only attitudes towards sentences (Rorty?). Does not formulate a norm. b) The DS contains an (almost) complete explanation of the meaning of the word. ("true"). VsInflationism: Self-Contradiction: the DS must be asserted for each case. The predicate of truth is normative and coincides with "justifiably assertible" regarding its normative power. a) demands that "true" is only a means of indirect assertative assertion and therefore cannot name an independent norm as required in b). Truth/Justified Assertiveness: For example "snow is white": the decision about truth and assertiveness can diverge here! |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Inflationism | Ramsey Vs Inflationism | Horwich I XIII Truth/Tradition/Inflationism/Horwich: acknowledges Tarski's idea, but considers it insufficient. Example PragmatismVsTarski: this does not explain the usefulness of truth. Inflationism/Horwich: requires attributing truth to additional attributes: "X is true iff X has the attribute P". With this one should be able to specify what truth is. (e.g. usefulness). RamseyVsInflationism: (> Redundancy TheoryVsInflationism): (Chapter 4, AyerVsInflationism, Chapters 8 and 15, StrawsonVsInflationism Chapter 13): Truth needs no additional specification. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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