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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intensions | Brandom | I 671 Definition intension: functions from indices to extensions. A more robust type of content that is shared by the listener in the best case. >Extensions. I 672 Functions of the kind in question are so finely individuated that it is difficult to see how the use of an expression may determine that sometimes this and sometimes another function should be associated with it. (among others, reason for QuineVsIntensions). Quine: reference instead of meaning. >Reference/Quine, >Meaning/Quine. I 674 The difficulty with such an approach is exactly the one stressed by Quine: what exactly of these practices deserves to be characterized in a way that it deals with some assertions and inferences as privileged? This can only be set for artificial languages. I 675 Intension/Extension/BrandomVsTradition: three-stage instead of two-stage approach: 1) inferential significance fundamental 2) extensional dimension in concepts of substitution-inferential definitions 3) equivalence classes of expressions that correspond to what is being spoken about. Tradition: leaves out the communication dimension. Brandom: Content not as a function, rather as practical account management. I 792 Meaning/Reference/Sense/Frege/Brandom: only in the interaction with the world that lies outside the mind the "sense" determines the "meaning"; this has nothing to do with representation intentions, but certainly with success. >Sense. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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