Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intention Based Semantics | Schiffer Vs Intention Based Semantics | I 258 SchifferVsIntention-based semantics/SchifferVsIBS: much worse: from normal speakers too much knowledge is required. For example, that he knows the function that maps sentences to propositions. Solution/Lewis: (Lewis 1975): Actual speech ratio / population / Lewis (Lewis 1975): L is a language in G only if it's common knowledge in G that members of G "never attempt to express a proposition of L, which is not true in L "(p 167). Then Lewis would respond to the above objections: I 259 Lewis: the normal human being does not need a term of L to expect that his fellows are truthful. He just needs proper expectations about how they should behave. He expects them to act in accordance with a regularity of truthfulness. But we would - and not he - describe this as regularity. He might have an internally represented grammar, and being able to have the potentially infinite number of expectations, but this is not critical. (p. 180f). Schiffer: Problem: it is not entirely clear how this is to avert the above objection: to know that a fellow human being will never say a false sentence, a member of the population must know the function. And in addition he needs a manner of givenness (givenness, "concept"). And that is too much for the knowledge that can be attributed to normal people. Lewis: seems to want to attribute the following knowledge: For all s, p, if L(s) = p, then it is common knowledge, in G, that members of G would not express s, if p is not true. Schiffer: I do not know whether that's adequate for Lewis, it does not help the IBS: the idea is to redraft IBS definitions in a way so that all references to L are outside of that-propositions. ((s) so that the speaker does not affect the language itself.). Pointe: then the individual speakers must know only sentences and individual propositions. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Expression Meaning | Schiffer, St. | I XVIII Expression - Meaning / SchifferVsIBS / Intention-based Semantics/SchifferVsIntention-based Semantics: not only needs compositionality and theory of relations, but also implies that: Understanding / IBS: is an inferential process (Conclusions) SchifferVs: this is dubious. This in turn requires propositional knowledge that we do not have. |
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