Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dualism | Chalmers | I 125 Dualism/Consciousness/Chalmers: we have seen that materialism failed because of the lack of logical supervenience of conscious experience on physical facts. >Supervenience, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Consciousness, >Materialism. This is followed by a dualism, but not a Cartesian dualism, which assumes a "mind in the machine", which performs extra causal work. Instead, for us, a kind of property duelism follows. > Property dualism/Chalmers, cf. >R. Descartes. I 134 Dualism/Chalmers: you could avoid the dualism by referring to a zombie world that is physically identical to ours as being described as false. >Zombies/Chalmers. I 135 This world would at the same time be identical and different. We could make the physical properties rigid with the operator "dthat", e.g. dthat (plays the role of ...). >"dthat", >Rigidity, >Operators, >Properties. N.B.: then the zombie world would not have some features that our world has. N.B.: then consciousness could metaphysically supervene on other properties. That would be an interesting argument. >Metaphysical possibility, >Metaphysics. ChalmersVsVs: 1. this is speculative. 2. (more direct): it is based on an incorrect semantics of physical concepts. I 136 For example, an electron with unrecognized properties would still be called an electron, but not an electron with the properties of a proton. >Change in meaning, >Change in theory. Metaphysics/Chalmers: semantics is not so decisive here, but the metaphysical question remains. I 154 Dualism/Definition Proto-phanomenal property/Chalmers: involves as the only one not experiencing itself, but several simultaneously existing could have this. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal. Cf. >Emergence, >Emergence/Chalmers, >Causality, >Phenomena, >Experience, >Knowing how. To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded. >Causation. I 155 Dualism/Chalmers: if we were to take such a position, we would represent an essential dualism. >Essentialism. ChalmersVsDualism: one can also understand this position non-dualist, albeit not as a materialistic monism. It then provides a network of intrinsic properties that "realizes" the extrinsic physical properties. >Monism, >Extrinsic, >Intrinsic, cf. >Exemplification. The laws are still the physical ones. In extreme form, when all intrinsic properties are phenomenal, we are dealing with a variant of idealism, but according to Berkeley's type. >G. Berkeley, >Idealism. It would most likely correspond to a version of Russel's neutral monism: I 155 Monism/Russell/Chalmers: neutral monism: the fundamental properties of the world are neither physical nor phenomenal, but the physical and the phenomenal are both built up from this fundamental. The phenomenal is formed from the intrinsic natures, the physical from the extrinsic. I 156 Dualism/Definition Interactionistic Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process. >Experience. ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism. >Epiphenomenalism. Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)(1) I 157 ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to cause any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter examples: VsInteractionistic Dualism/VsInteractionism/Chalmers: 1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random. 2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently. ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain if the wave function collapses. ChalmersVsInteractionistic Dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant. I 158 ChalmersVsEccles: if there are psychons, then they can manage with purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties. VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties. ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus this adheres to the causal unity of the physical. ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: even if one were assuming psychones, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychones. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychones without being able to prove them. I 162 Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is non-physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role. >Causal role, >Causality, >Causation. I 162 Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: so I characterize my own view: Thesis: Consciousness supervenes naturally on the physical, without supervening logically or "metaphysically". >Supervenience. I argue that materialism is wrong and that the realm of physical is causally completed. I 171 Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: my position is already implicitly shared by many who still call themselves "materialists". All I have done is to make the ontological implications of the naturalistic view explicit - that consciousness "emerges" from the physical. We do not have to give up much, what is important for our scientific world. Cf. >Emergence, >Emergence/Chalmers. 1. Eccles, J.C. (1986) Do Mental Events Cause Neural Events Analogously to the Probability Fields of Quantum Mechanics? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 227, 411-428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1986.0031 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Interactionism | Chalmers | I 156 Dualism/Definition Interactionist Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process. ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism. >Dualism, cf. >Property dualism, >Epiphenomenalism. Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)(1) I 157 ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to effect any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter arguments: VsInteractionist dualism/Interactionism/Chalmers: 1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random. >Quantum mechanics. 2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently. ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain when the wave function collapses. >Wave function. ChalmersVsInteractionist dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant: I 158 ChalmersVsEccles: if there are his psychons, then they can do without purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties. >Phenomena, >Experience. VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties. ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of the behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus it adheres to the causal unity of the physical. ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: Even if one were to assume psychons, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychons. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychons without being able to prove them. >Zombies. I 162 Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is not physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role. >Causal closure, >Consciousness/Chalmers, cf. >Materialism. 1. Eccles, J.C. (1986) Do Mental Events Cause Neural Events Analogously to the Probability Fields of Quantum Mechanics? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 227, 411-428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1986.0031 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Metaphors | Searle | II 189 Metaphor/Searle: there is no algorithm to decide whether one is present. It is about non-representational mental skills and similarity between extensions is often not critical. --- IV 98 Metaphor/Searle: why do some metaphors work and others do not? E.g. Sally is a block of ice, but not a prime number. Solution: a block of ice is not insensitive. There must be clear rules - metaphorical meaning is always an utterance condition. SearleVsAll other authors: the literal meaning is not sure. IV 103 Truth conditions are clear. IV 107 Metaphor is not a comparison - this is absurd: "with which block of ice do you compare him?" Similarity: is nevertheless important for understanding. Solution: it is only about Sally. IV 111 VsInteraction theory: there is no interaction between the ice block and Sally: you can use someone else. Meaning (like Davidson): in the metaphor no meaning changes its expression. >Metaphor/Davidson. IV 113 Negation: the negation is metaphorical as well. >Negation. IV 122 Metaphor/Searle: VsComparison Theory: there is indeed no resemblance asserted: e.g. "father of the country" - instead: you have to get behind the principles: what are the relevant similarities? Similarity itself is an empty predicate. IV 134 The basic principle is that only possible values of the metaphorically used expression can be the actual values that determine the possible properties of the object - metaphor needs no convention (irony neither). >Comparison, >Convention, >Similarity. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dualism | Pauen Vs Dualism | Pauen I 56 VsDualismus: it appears to explain the consistency of experiences and the free will better indeed, but it still remains absolutely unclear how consciousness was able accomplish this integration feat. What non-physical regularities govern it? The dualist does not have any concrete research subject! If this integration takes place completely unconsciously, it is not an activity of the consciousness! MonismVsDualism: has a research object in contrast whose mode of operation is known in principle and which can be checked for evidence of integration feats. I 57 VsDualism: merely shifts the problem of free will by autonomous mind. The autonomous mind can hardly have created itself. Therefore, it is also dependent on the properties and characteristics that go back to the act of creation, or were acquired after this act. I 58 VsDualism: is it not at least superior in the question of the origin of consciousness? Again, only shift of the problem: the dualist cannot rely on theories of neuronal processes here, but has to rely on something beyond that. However, it is absolutely unclear where it should start here. The assumption that immaterial substance possessed the ability to produce consciousness is as mysterious as the assumption that material processes possessed it. Nor can you define the mind as a "capacity to create consciousness". That would be as circular as reducing playing chess to the "ability to play chess". MonismVsDualism: has a concrete object of study here, even though it is pondering the same question. I 59 VsInteractionalistic Dualism: if it assumes an interaction, it violates the principle of the causal closure and the principle of physical determination. E.g. brick: the flight cannot rely on consistently physically described events, after all, the reaction would depend on an act of will. The principle of physical determination is also violated: the act of will had no equivalent in physically describable events, after all, it is supposed to be independent of neuronal activity. I 60 Property Dualism: ignores these problems and represents consciousness as an autonomous property that is simultaneously a new kind of physical properties. For this, one would have to encounter events that cannot be explained by neural processes. This would force us to enhance the natural sciences methodically. MonismVsDualism: contrary to the principle of ontological austerity. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Popper, K. | Vollmer Vs Popper, K. | II 84 VsInteractionism/VsEccles: where does the interaction take place? Eccles: in the "liaison areas" VollmerVsEccles: this is of course only a shift: where are the "liaison areas" located? How does the interaction come about? Eccles/Popper: (monism) Thesis: the self-confident mind is active in reading from the multitude of active centers at the highest level of brain activity...directing its attention to these centers and integrating its selection so that even the most fleeting experiences are brought together into one unit. The self-confident mind also works by changing the spatiotemporal pattern of neuronal processes ...the searchlight offers an analogy. A scanning device, a probe... II 85 VollmerVsEccles/VollmerVsPopper: nothing is gained by vague analogies. Nor does he make any suggestion as to how his hypotheses should be tested. What he thinks is new is the independent activity of the mind, the search for uniform interpretation. But that is exactly what we want to explain! This is reminiscent of the e.g. explanation of the telegraph principle: "It's like a dachshund: if you pinch at the back, it barks at the front". "And what about wireless telegraphy?" "Just like that, but without the dachshund." I 74 Evolutionary Epistemology/EE/Vollmer: does not describe the evolution of knowledge (like Popper) but our abilities. I 75 VollmerVsPopper: his theory of world 3 and his body soul dualism are not compatible with the evolutionary epistemology. I 278 LewontinVsPopper: a theory that does not make forecasts can be testable, and thus empirical! VollmerVsPopper: it could be shown that selection theory makes verifiable predictions! Popper has long since withdrawn his criticism of the theory of evolution! |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| |||