Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Interpretation Wittgenstein Hintikka I 249
Interpretation/Symbol/WittgensteinVsInterpretation: "Interpretation of symbols" is misleading instead we call it "use of symbols".
II 46
Plan/Wittgenstein: we cannot put the interpretation into the plan; the rules of interpretation of a plan are not part of the plan itself. In science, one can compare one's actions with the construction of a house. In philosophy we do not build a foundation, but clean up a room.
II 47
Would it be possible to communicate more directly with "mind reading"? What would we understand by this? Language is not an indirect means of communication that is to be contrasted with "direct" mind reading. Mind reading could only take place through the interpretation of symbols and thus on the same level as language.
VI 160
Interpretation: of course, every rule can be interpreted in any way.
VI 161
Interpretation/Wittgenstein/Schulte: interpreting a rule simply means replacing one rule with another.
VI 162
Wittgenstein: a rule must be anchored in practice, not in private, otherwise any interpretation would be possible.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Interpretation Theory Fodor Vs Interpretation Theory IV 128
Interpretation: its actual objects are propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc., not representations. Representations: their content seems to depend on causal or nomic relations of objects in the world and neurological states,
IV 129
to which the interpreter usually has no access. Anyway, they are by definition inaccessible for radical interpretation. Fodor/LeporeVsVs: the representation theorists should bite this bullett.
It is plausible that there are no interesting relations between the epistemic situation of the interpreter and the facts on which the content metaphysically depends.
This is, of course, not to deny the the supervenience of the intentional on the physical. Only the interpreter does not have access. (Fodor/LeporeVsInterpretation Theory).
God knows what representations mean. And he is physicalist without doubt!
RI/Lewis: even the radical interpreter does not have access to all the physical facts. They are limited to the "behavioral" behaviorist facts.
Interpretation/Representation/Fodor/Lepore: the notion that only representations have original intentional content does not deny that there is indeed interpretation.
The idea is rather that the semantic properties of the propositional attitudes and speech acts depend on hidden things which only God knows.
Therefore, the inferences on which the interpretation depends are contingent! (?).
Fodor/LeporeVsInterpretation Theory: it is not obvious that we have original intentionality (which the interpreter needs) in the first instance (i.e. representation, uninterpretable).

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Interpretation Theory Wittgenstein Vs Interpretation Theory I 249
Interpretation/symbol/WittgensteinVsInterpretation: "Interpretation of symbols" is misleading, instead "use of symbols".

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960