Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Imagination | Sextus Empiricus | Taureck I 107 Imagination/Paradox/Subjectivism/Sextus Empiricus: If every imagination is true, then the judgment that not all imagination is true is founded on imagination and is itself true. Therefore, it is wrong that all imagination is true. ((s) >Cf. Counterargument against the Philosophy of Interpretation: If everything is an interpretation than this thesis that everything is an interpretation is an interpretation too and so it is not certain. VsInterpretation philosophy/Abel/Klenk, G., >VsAbel, Günter, VsKlenk, Hans) |
Taureck I B. H.F. Taureck Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995 |
| Interpretation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 249 Interpretation/Symbol/WittgensteinVsInterpretation: "Interpretation of symbols" is misleading instead we call it "use of symbols". >Use, >Symbols. II 46 Plan/Wittgenstein: we cannot put the interpretation into the plan; the rules of interpretation of a plan are not part of the plan itself. >Planning. In science, one can compare one's actions with the construction of a house. In philosophy we do not build a foundation, but clean up a room. II 47 Would it be possible to communicate more directly with "mind reading"? What would we understand by this? Language is not an indirect means of communication that is to be contrasted with "direct" mind reading. Mind reading could only take place through the interpretation of symbols and thus on the same level as language. VI 160 Interpretation: of course, every rule can be interpreted in any way. >Rules. VI 161 Interpretation/Wittgenstein/Schulte: interpreting a rule simply means replacing one rule with another. VI 162 Wittgenstein: a rule must be anchored in practice, not in private, otherwise any interpretation would be possible. >Rule following. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Interpretation Theory | Fodor Vs Interpretation Theory | IV 128 Interpretation: the actual objects of interpretation are propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc., not representations. Representations: their content seems to depend on causal or nomic relations of objects in the world and neurological states,... IV 129 ...to which the interpreter usually has no access. Anyway, they are by definition inaccessible for radical interpretation. Fodor/LeporeVsVs: the representation theorists should bite this bullett. It is plausible that there are no interesting relations between the epistemic situation of the interpreter and the facts on which the content metaphysically depends. This is, of course, not to deny the the supervenience of the intentional on the physical. Only the interpreter does not have access (Fodor/LeporeVsInterpretation Theory). God knows what representations mean. And he is physicalist without doubt! Radical Interpretation/RI/Lewis: even the radical interpreter does not have access to all the physical facts. They are limited to the "behavioral" behaviorist facts. Interpretation/representation/Fodor/Lepore: the notion that only representations have original intentional content does not deny that there is indeed interpretation. The idea is rather that the semantic properties of the propositional attitudes and speech acts depend on hidden things which only God knows. Therefore, the inferences on which the interpretation depends are contingent! (?). Fodor/LeporeVsInterpretation Theory: it is not obvious that we have original intentionality (which the interpreter needs) in the first instance (i.e. representation, uninterpretable). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Interpretation Theory | Wittgenstein Vs Interpretation Theory | I 249 Interpretation/symbol/WittgensteinVsInterpretation: "Interpretation of symbols" is misleading, instead "use of symbols". |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
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