Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intersubjectivity | Brandom | I 823 BrandomVs I-We conceptions of social practices: they do not meet the adequacy condition. They base a distinction between what individuals deem to be correct use and the actually correct use on the comparison of the views of individuals and society. (VsInter-subjectivity) This is the usual way of treating objectivity as inter-subjectivity. >Objectivity. I 831 I-You style: the definitions are made by an individual (account holder), not by "the community". (definition is more than mere regularity) . VsIntersubjectivity (I-We style) it is faulty, because it is unable to grant the possibility of error on the part of the privileged perspective. I 832 I-You conception of intersubjectivity: no perspective is privileged. Perspective form instead of cross-perspective content. >Content. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Intersubjectivity | Descartes | Stroud I 37 Intersubjectivity/Community/Stroud: We might feel that our social life gives us security in terms of our knowledge. DescartesVsIntersubjectivity: His skepticism even affects the certainty that there is a community of people around us. >Solipsism, >Sketpicism. I 38 Important Point/StroudVsDescartes: Then there is also no common knowledge about the "veil". >Knowledge, >Certainty. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Intersubjectivity | Luhmann | AU Cass 7 Intersubjectivity/LuhmannVsIntersubjectivity: What is the "Inter"? - We do not find it in the subject. Subject: is a traditional notion, when a social theory was not yet possible. Later: one talks on the individual rather than the subject. Solution/System Theory/Luhamn: observation of observation instead of intersubjectivity. >Observation/Luhmann, >Systems Theory, >Individual/Luhmann, >Subject/Luhmann. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Intersubjectivity | Putnam | III 167 PutnamVsHabermas: general consent is neither in philosophy nor anywhere else ever criterion for accuracy. --- I (h) 214 Objectivity/intersubjectivity/Carnap/Husserl: objectivity is intersubjective and publicly verifiable. PutnamVsIntersubjectivity: intersubjectivity even seems to be incapable of "inter-subjective" evidence. Cf. >Objectivity/Putnam. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Objectivity | Brandom | I 136f Objectivity/Brandom: naive: from the success of representations - Objectivity is a characteristic of assessment practices regarding the correctness of representation - representation in response to what is representation, not as what the represented is conceived to be - so the status goes beyond the attitude - therefore representation is not a basic semantic concept. >Representation. I 692 Objective: socially instituted, but not intersubjectively. Objectivity: depends on what is true from what assertions and concept applications actually represent or what they are about, and not about what somebody or everybody deems to be true. >Intersubjectivity. I 736 Objectivity consist of the distinction between attribution, acceptance and definition. I 822 ff What is objectively right and true is determined by the objects being talked about, not by what is said about them; not even by the attitudes of any or all members of the community. >Truthmakers. I 314 Objectivity/Brandom: an objective or naturalistic theory of cognitive authorization cannot be derived only from reliability considerations; not even a naturalistic theory of the proper use of the concept. >Reliability theory. I 823 Objectivity/Standards/Community/Language/Brandom: Vs I-We conception of social practices: Incorrect comparison of the views of the individual with those of the community (inter-subjectivity) - BrandomVsIntersubjectivity as a model for objectivity - Problem: the community as a whole loses the ability to distinguish - that is what the community assimilates to its individuals. I 824 Objectivity/Reality/World/Brandom: that our concepts are about an objective world is partly due to the fact that there is an objective sense of accuracy to which their application is subjected. >Reality, >World. I 825 A propositional or other content may only be specified from one point of view and this is subjective, not in a Cartesian sense, but in the very practical sense (account managing subject) - BrandomVsTradition: instead of non-perspective facts one must pay attention only to the structural characteristics of the accounting practices. I 826 Objectivity consists in the distinction between attribution, acceptance and definition. >Attribution. I 828 Difference between objective and subjective correct content is allocated between an assigned definition and one that is approved by the speaker - within each perspective there is a difference between status and attitude - objectivity is then a structural aspect of the social-perspective form of conceptual contents. >Conceptual content. I 829 Objective representational content: de-re allocation: he thinks of quinine that... - thereby specification of objects. >Identification, >Individuation. I 831 I-You style/account management/Brandom: the definitions are made by an individual (account holder), not by "the community" - BrandomVsInter-subjectivity (I-We style): cannot grant the possibility of error on the part of the privileged perspective. Cf. >I-You-relationship/Gadamer. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brandom, R. | Seel Vs Brandom, R. | SeelVsBrandom: Who wants to ensure objectivity solely by inter-subjectivity, loses the sense of how much dependet the interchange between the subjects is on the existence of independent objects. (1) (s) But he does not! S. I BrandomVsintersubjectivity. 1. M. Seel in: Die ZEIT April 01 |
Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
| Intersubjectivity | Descartes Vs Intersubjectivity | Stroud I 37 Intersubjectivity/Community/Stroud: we might feel that our social life gives us security in terms of our knowledge. DescartesVsIntersubjectivity: his skepticism even affects the certainty that there is a community of people around us! I 38 Important Point: then there is also no common knowledge about the "veil"! |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Intersubjectivity | Putnam Vs Intersubjectivity | I (h) 214 Objectivity/Intersubjectivity/Carnap/Husserl: Objectivity is intersubjective, public verifiability. PutnamVsIntersubjectivity: this principle even seems to be incapable of "inter-subjective" evidence. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
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