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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bank Reserve | Rothbard | Rothbard III 810 Bank Reserve/Economic theories/Rothbard: VsBank reserves: 1) One popular criticism of 100-percent bank reserves charges that the bank could not then earn any income or cover costs of storage, printing, etc. RothbardVsVs: On the contrary, a bank is perfectly capable of operating like any goods warehouse, i.e., by charging its customers for its services to them and reaping the usual interest return on its operations. 2) Another popular objection is that a 100-percent-reserve policy would eliminate all credit. How would businessmen be able to borrow funds for short-term investment? RothbardVsVs: The answer is that businessmen can still borrow saved funds from any individual or institution. "Banks" may still lend their own saved funds (capital stock and accumulated surplus) or they may borrow funds from individuals and relend them to business firms, earning the interest differential.(1) Bonds: Borrowing money (e g., floating a bond) is a credit transaction; an individual exchanges his present money for a bond - a claim on future money. The borrowing bank pays him interest for this Ioan and in turn exchanges the money thus gathered for promises by business borrowers to pay money in the future. This is a further credit transaction, in this case the bank acting as the lender and businesses as the borrowers. Bank’s income: The bank's income is the interest differential between the two types of credit transactions; the payment is for the services of the bank as an intermediary, channeling the savings of the public into investment. Rothbard: There is, furthermore, no particular reason why the short-term, more than any other, credit market should be subsidized by money creation. 3) Interventions/VsInterventionism: (…) an important criticism of a governmentally enforced policy of 100-percent reserves is that this measure, though beneficial in itself, would establish a precedent for other governmental intervention in the monetary system, including a change in this very requirement by government edict. Free banking: These critics advocate "free banking," i.e., no governmental interference with banking apart from enforcing payment of obligations, the banks to be permitted to engage in any fictitious issues they desire. Yet the free market does not mean freedom to commit fraud or any other form of theft. Quite the contrary. >Fraud/Rothbard, >Banks/Rothbard, >Free market/Rothbard. Rothbard III 811 The criticism may be obviated by imposing a 100-percent-reserve requirement, not as an arbitrary administrative fiat of the government, but as part of the general legal defense of property against fraud. As Jevons stated: "It used to be held as a general rule of law, that any present grant or assignment of goods not in existence is without operation“.(2) Rothbard: and this general rule need only be revived and enforced to outlaw fictitious money-substitutes. Then banking could be left perfectly free and yet be without departure from 100-percent reserves“.(3) >Banks/Rothbard, >Money substitutes/Rothbard, >Money market/Rothbard. 1. Swiss banks have successfully and for a long time been issuing debentures to the public at varying maturities, and banks in Belgium and Holland have recently followed suit. On the purely free market, such practices would undoubtedly be greatly extended. Cf. Benjamin H. Beckhart, "To Finance Term Loans," The New York Times, May 31, 1960. 2. Jevons, Money and the Mechanism of Exchange, pp. 211-12. 3. Jevons stated: „If pecuniary promises were always of a special character, there could be no possible harm in allowing perfect freedom in the issue of promissory notes. The issuer would merely constitute himself a warehouse keeper and would be bound to hold each special lot of coin ready to pay each corresponding note.“ (Ibid., p. 208) |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Interventionism | Friedman | Brocker I 400 Interventionism/FriedmanVsInterventionism/Friedman: the central content-related point is Friedman's strict plea for competition as a form of organisation of societies, whereby citizens are called upon to accept in principle the results of market processes, not least with regard to the distribution of income and wealth. In any case, inequality is largely caused by accidental and therefore transient market constellations or by state-imposed restrictions on competition to protect certain actors(1). >Competition, >Markets, >Society. 1. Cf. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago 1962. German: Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit, München 2004. Peter Spahn, „Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Interventionism | Mises | Rothbard IV 30 Socialism/Interventionism/Mises/Rothbard: Austrian economics had always implicitly favored a free-market policy, but in the quiet and relatively free world of the late nineteenth century, the Austrians had never bothered to develop an explicit analysis of freedom or of government intervention. In an environment of accelerating statism and socialism, Ludwig von Mises, while continuing to develop his business cycle theory, turned his powerful attention to analyzing the economics of government intervention and planning. His journal article of 1920, “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,”(1) was a blockbuster: demonstrating for the first time that socialism was an unviable system for an industrial economy; … MisesVsSocialism: …for Mises showed that a socialist economy, being deprived of a free-market price system, could not rationally calculate costs or allocate factors of production efficiently to their most needed tasks. Mises incorporated his insights into a comprehensive critique of socialism, Socialism (1922)(2). Interventions/Mises: If socialism cannot work, then neither can the specific acts of government intervention into the market which Mises dubbed “interventionism.” In a series of articles during the 1920s, Mises criticized and disposed of a host of statist economic measures, articles which were collected into Kritik des Interventionismus (1929)(3). If neither socialism nor interventionism were viable, then we are left with “laissez-faire” liberalism, or the free-market economy, and Mises expanded on his analysis of the merits of classical liberalism in his notable Liberalismus(4) (1927). In Liberalismus, Mises showed the close interconnection between international peace, civil liberties, and the free-market economy. >Laisser-faire, >Liberalism. 1. “Die Wirtschaftsrechnung im sozialistischen Gemeinwesen,” in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften 47 (1920): 86–121. Translated into English by S. Adler and inluded in F.A. Hayek, ed., Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies of the Possibilities of Socialism (London: G. Routledge & Sons, 1935). 2. Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis (Indianapolis: Liberty Press/Liberty Classics, 1981). German editions, 1922, 1932. English translation by J. Kahane, 1936; enlarged with an Epilogue, Planned Chaos, 1951; Jonathan Cape, 1969. 3. Ludwig von Mises, A Critique of Interventionism, trans. by Hans F. Sennholz (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1977); reprinted 1996 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Original German edition in 1976 by Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (Darmstadt, Germany), with a Foreword by F.A. Hayek. 4. Liberalism: A Socio-Economic Exposition, trans. Ralph Raico, Arthur Goddard, Ludwig von Mises, ed. (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1978); 1962 edition, The Free and Prosperous Commonwealth (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand). Coyne I 29 Interventionism/Mises/Coyne/Boettke: (…) Interventionism (…) requires employing the discretionary power of the administrative state to replace the preferences of private economic actors with those of policymakers. (…) government interference in a market generates a range of interrelated effects on economic activity. In addition, subsequent attempts by policymakers to counteract the emergence of unintended consequences and to make the initial intervention yield the desired results leads to increasingly extensive controls over economic activity, which threatens the dynamism of the market process. Cf. >Spontaneous order, >Markets. Interventionism is a form of non-comprehensive planning. It does not abolish ownership over the means of production or attempt to plan all economic activity, as under socialism. But it does involve piecemeal economic planning. Under Piece-meal planning, policymakers replace what emerged through the market process with their own judgments of what they believe should exist. >Planning, >Planned economy. The underlying implicit assumption of interventionism, therefore, is that policymakers have access to the economic knowledge necessary to engage in piecemeal planning to achieve their ends. More specifically, there are three types of economic knowledge that policymakers are assumed to possess. 1) First, since government interventions into the market are justified as a means of improving social welfare, the policymakers are assumed to possess knowledge of ways of allocating scarce resources that are superior to the market alternative. 2) Second, intervenors are assumed to possess knowledge of how to adjust interventions in the face of constant change. As broader economic conditions change, so too will the effcacy of even well-intentioned interventions. Given the goal of improving social welfare, past intervention will need to be continually revised, and perhaps removed or replaced, in the face of changing circumstances. This requires that policymakers possess knowledge of the new conditions as well as the knowledge of how best to revise existing regulations or introduce new regulations that improve social welfare in the face of circumstances different from those in the past. 3) Third, the policymakers are assumed to possess knowledge of what would have emerged absent the intervention. Claiming an intervention is necessary to achieve an outcome implies that the same outcome, or an even better outcome, would not have emerged in future periods absent the intervention. Knowledge/Mises/Hayek: The main constraint on policymakers in obtaining each of these categories of economic knowledge is the knowledge problem that Mises and Hayek highlighted during the socialist calculation debate. Absent the ability to rely on market-determined prices and profit and loss, there is no way for policymakers to know the highest-valued uses of scarce resources. >Ignorance/Kirzner. VsInterventionism/Problems: This ignorance poses issues for the initial design of interventions because there is no way for policymakers to acquire the tacit and context-specific knowledge of dispersed actors throughout society. As a result, they cannot have superior knowledge, relative to market participants, about the allocation of resources. This same issue also plagues attempts by policymakers to revise interventions as conditions change. Since they are unable to acquire the economic knowledge of time and place necessary to determine the best allocation of scarce resources, there is no way to ensure that interventions will be revised and adjusted to improve social welfare. Finally, since the market is an open-ended process of competition, discovery, and change, there is no way for policy-makers to know what would have emerged through voluntary interaction and exchange absent the intervention. This makes it impossible for policymakers to determine if an intervention has produced an outcome that is superior to the counterfactual - namely, the spontaneous order that would have emerged if economic actors were left to engage without intervention in discovery and exchange. >Interventions/Austrian School. |
EconMises I Ludwig von Mises Die Gemeinwirtschaft Jena 1922 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Libertarianism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 229 Libertarianism/Political philosophy/Lamont: (...) fruitful arguments for libertarianism are based on the value of liberty itself. The most famous twentieth-century champion of such arguments was Friedrich Hayek (1944(1); 1976a(2); 1976b(3)), though there are many varieties, often inspired by John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty (1982)(4). This group of libertarians have responded to critics with greater depth. To see this, consider two of the more general criticisms of libertarianism (Haworth, 1994)(5). 1) VsLibertarianism: First, critics complain that libertarianism excludes state measures to improve the lives of the people, including the provision of public goods (Morris, 1998(6): ch. 9; Van Parijs, 1995(7)). 2) VsLibertarianism: Second, libertarianism is also charged with preventing state measures to alleviate deprivation and suffering. Lamont: Most ownership-based libertarian theories have failed to respond to the first criticism, parting com- pany at this point with neoclassical economists, who have generally taken the public goods problem more seriously than political libertarians. The most common responses to the second criticism have been various versions of 'tough luck': while it might be nice if individuals transfer some of their property rights to others in order to relieve suffering, people cannot justly be coerced to do so. >Coercion, >Property, >Society, >Equality, >Egalitarianism. Nozick: Nozick's view, for instance, is that respect for people's absolute property rights is more important than improving the lot of the least fortunate. The harshness of this reply has been unappealing to the majority in liberal democracies. >Liberalism, >Democracy. Hayek/Mill: Millean and Hayekian versions of libertarianism have been able to provide more fruitful replies, by appealing more directly to the values of liberty and autonomy (Lomasky, 1987)(8). >J. St. Mill, >F. A. v. Hayek. People's optimism about the government's ability to aid and empower people grew in the first 60 years of the twentieth century, but stalled in the late 1960s and the 1970s. VsInterventionism: Greater government intervention in the economy, particularly to increase welfare in the general population rather than just for the most needy, proved considerably less successful than preceding interventions targeted only to the poor. Hayek's explanation for this failure was that governments do not, and never will, have the information required for successful intervention to help the majority of the population. Mill: In agreement, Mill 's view was that individuals themselves are in the best informational position for improving their own situation, so the government should allow them the liberty to act upon it. Gaus I 230 Interventions/costs: a related contribution of Millean and Hayekian libertarianism is to highlight the costs of govern- ment intervention. >Interventions, >Interventionism. Public choice: Public choice theorists, inspired by libertarians such as James Buchanan (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985(9); Buchanan and Tullock, 1962(10); Buchanan, 1975(11); Rowley et al., 1988(12)), also argued forcefully that increasing government size substantially increases rent-seeking by lobby groups, professions, and other powerful groups, distorting economic distribution in their favour. Lamont: Once these and other consequences are taken into account, the success of government interventions in realizing their intended benefits is quite uncertain, compared with the clear and demonstrable detrimental effects these interventions have on people's liberty and autonomy. >Freedom, >Autonomy. 1. Hayek, Friedrich A. (1944) The Road to Serfdom. London: Routledge. 2. Hayek, Friedrich A. (1976a) Law, Legislation, and Liberty. Vol. 2, The Mirage ofSocial Justice. London: Routledge. 3. Hayek, Friedrich A. (1976b) The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge. 4. Mill (1982. 4. Mill, J. St. (1892) On Liberty. London: Longmans, Green 5. Haworth, Alan (1994) Anti-Libertarianism. London: Routledge. 6. Morris, Christopher (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7. Van Parijs, Philippe (1995) Real FreedomforA11: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? Oxford: Oxford University Press. 8. Lomasky, Loren E. (1987) Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community. New York: Oxford University Press. 9. Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan (1985) The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10. Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1962) The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michi Press. 11. Buchanan, James M. (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 12. Rowley, C. K., R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds (1988) The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Boston: Kluwer. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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