Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behaviorism | Tugendhat | I 204 ~ Behaviorism/Tugendhat: similarity only identifiable by behavior (also for oneself) - does without notions - hence also without similarity. >Behavior, >Equality, >Similarity, >Imagination. Behaviorism: uses no (abstract) concepts. >Abstractness. Introspection: non-sensual notion of similarity, abstract concepts (conceptualism) (BehaviorismVs). >Introspection. VsIntrospection: does not find concepts either, merely postulates them. I 215f Language/Behaviorism/Tugendhat: purpose fundamental, pure signal language, circumstances important (TugendhatVsCircumstances). >Circumstances/Tugendhat. "Conditional rules": Use according to the circumstances. TugendhatVs. Behaviorism: Behaviorism has no place for declarative sentences. >Assertions. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Introspection | James | Diaz-Bone I 35f Intropspection/James: introspection shows an exact analogy to the observation of physical data as the detection of single facts. There are exact relations among each other. Like in natural science. VsIntrospection: introspection presupposes prior knowledge. ((s) The meanings used in dealing with ourselves come from public language. >Private Language, >Intersubjectivity.) James pro Introspection: Peculiarities of the inner world of experience require an extension of the method. |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Introspection | Ryle | I 208f Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: introspection cannot be what the tradition expects of it as its object is a myth. Consciousness: what I can find out about me is of the same nature as what I can find out about others - the small differences just do not favor self-knowledge (RyleVsNagel). >Self-knowledge, >Authority of the First Person, >Priviledged access, >Incorrigibility, >Self-consciousness, >Consciousness. I 216 RyleVsTradition: we do not encounter any symptoms inside - such events do not exist. I 221 f Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: there are no ghostly objects but suppose there were, then there is a regress: one would perceive then at the same time, that one perceives them. >Regress. Bad solution: then one would have to admit that there are imperceptible inner objects - a knowledge about it could not be based on introspection. >Mental objects, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mentalism. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Introspection | Searle | I 117 Introspection/Searle: The model of face perception works on the assumption that there is a distinction between what is seen and what is seen. In introspection, there is no distinction to be made. >Consciousness, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. I 126 SearleVsIntrospection: introspection requires separation between act and object. I 168 Introspection/Searle: introspection is without problems, but it is not a specific skill. Wittgenstein: introspection is expressive and therefore not right or wrong. SearleVs: introspection does exist. Incorrigibility is pointless in relation to consciousness. Consciousness/Searle: consciousness has nothing to do with incorrigibility and introspection. Self-deception presupposes Cartesian dualism. >Dualism, >cartesianism, >incorrigibility. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Kripke’s Wittgenstein | Stegmüller | Stegmüller IV 15 Skeptical Solution/Kripke's Wittgenstein/KW/Kripkenstein/Stegmüller: Reference to common language use and rule following instead of "facts" and truth conditions. >Language use, >Language community, >Rule following, >Facts, >Truth conditions. IV 19f "Bizarre Skepticism" KW/Stegmüller: Example "Quus": in additions of larger numbers 7 could always come out, only that such numbers have never been added in the past. - Therefore we ourselves do not know whether we apply the addition or the "Quaddition". - So far only finitely many cases have been followed. An extension to infinitely many cases allows infinitely many different interpretations of the previous practice, which explain the previous cases, but predict deviations for the future. N.B.: then in the past I meant something different than I thought I meant. >Meaning/Intending, >Beliefs. IV 23 Kripke's Wittgenstein: wrong solutions: 1. "Do what you did in the past": that's what he does! 2. algorithm (calculation method): one must have learned this somehow! I just cannot know that in the past I meant the "standard interpretation". 3. Exclusion of wrong rules: could only be done by further rules: Return of the old problem. IV 27 N.B.: that the current use is the right one is not doubted at all! IV 35ff Kripke's Wittgenstein/Disposition/KripkeVsRyle: the crucial dispositions were acquired in the past - the difference already existed in the past. >Dispositions. KripkeVsRyle: 1. Dispositions are irrelevant at all. a) If I have a hypothesis about my dispositions, I still do not know if it is the right one instead of another. IV 37 b) If we wanted to let "the past rest" and just ask what seems right to me now, we lose the term "right". IV 38 Kripke: N.B.: I have always had the same dispositions! IV 47 Kripke's Wittgenstein/KripkeVsDisposition Theory: If one understands mine in such a way that what I mean now determines what I should mean in the future, then that is normative, not descriptive. IV 50 KW: no fact: even an "omniscient being" could not know what we mean - the fact of thinking does not exist. IV 63 Kripke's Wittgenstein/VsIntrospection/Stegmüller: two people can agree completely in their inner experiences, and yet one can mean "plus" and the other "Quus". Experience content: can also tell us nothing about the treatment of new cases - grasping a meaning is not an experience. >Content. IV 65 Example experience: the beginner has another experience than the advanced one, e.g. when reading aloud. - But: the feeling "I can read" is not a sufficient condition for real reading. IV 72 Kripke's Wittgenstein: for Platonism, facts exist, yet there is a problem of access to these entities: it is not clear whether I grasp the right sense. >Private Language, >Rule Following. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Philosophy of Consciousness | Habermas | IV 11 Philosophy of Consciousness/Subject-Object-Problem/Habermas: the subject-object model of philosophy of consciousness is attacked on two fronts at the beginning of the 20th century: on the part of analytic philosophy of language and psychological theory of behavior. Both do without direct access to consciousness phenomena and replace intuitive knowing-onself, reflection or intuition with procedures that do not rely on intuition. ((s) The representatives of Analytical Philosophy deny the existence of inner entities that could only be achieved through introspection or privileged access. Thus analytical philosophy behaves VsMentalism, VsIntrospection). >VsRelation Theory. See also Behaviorism, >Mentalism, >Introspection, >Self-knowledge, >Self-consciousness. Habermas: These efforts have their origin in the pragmatism of Ch. S. Peirce. One of the early representatives of the new direction is G. H. Mead, who is based among other things on observation methods and interpretation strategies of animal behaviour research.(1) >Pragmatism. 1.Siehe hierzu G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Subject-Object Problem | Habermas | IV 11 Subject-Object-Problem/Philosophy of Consciousness/Habermas: the subject-object model of philosophy of consciousness is attacked on two fronts at the beginning of the 20th century: on the part of analytic philosophy of language and psychological theory of behavior. >Analytic Philosophy, >Behaviorism. Both do without direct access to consciousness phenomena and replace intuitive knowing-onself, reflection or intuition with procedures that do not rely on intuition. ((s) The representatives of Analytical Philosophy deny the existence of inner entities that could only be achieved through introspection or privileged access. Thus analytical philosophy behaves VsMentalism, VsIntrospection, See also VsRelation theory, see also Behaviorism). Habermas: These efforts have their origin in the pragmatism of Ch. S. Peirce. One of the early representatives of the new direction is G. H. Mead, who is based among other things on observation methods and interpretation strategies of animal behaviour research.(1) >Pragmatism, >Ch.S. Peirce. 1.Siehe hierzu G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behaviorism | Chomsky Vs Behaviorism | Dantos2 I 268 Rotating figuresVsBehaviorism > Mental representation (inner r.)Vsintrospection (ChomskyVsBehaviorism) - FodorVsBehaviorism Chomsky I 278 ChomskyVsBehaviorism: has proven to be quite unfruitful. It excludes the concept of "what is perceived" and of "what is learnt" from the start. II 351 ChomskyVsBehaviorism: is just as if you were to call physics the "science of reading scales". Searle VIII 404 ChomskyVsBehaviorism: fundamental confusion between data and object of investigation. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Behaviorism | Fodor Vs Behaviorism | Danto I 268 Rotary FiguresVsBehaviorism > Mental Representation (inner r) VsIntrospection (ChomskyVsBehaviorism), FodorVsBehaviorism. Fodor/Lepore IV 56 VsBehaviorism/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. assuming "dog" and "shmog" are two words with which speakers react to exactly the same stimuli, namely dogs. Then for e.g. Skinner would follow that "dog" and "shmog" are synonymous. Then, the following sentence would be analytical in the language of the speaker: "Whatever is a dog, is a shmog." QuineVs: there are neither synonyms nor analytic sentences! IV 57 So Skinner’s semantics must be wrong. VsVs: it is namely a priori! Even worse: all the semantics must be wrong, a priori, because this nihilistic theory will say that there are no semantic properties at all. Fodor/Lepore: what went wrong this time? We have taken literally, that Quine has not shown in Two Dogmas (TD) (and also has not argued) that there are no semantic facts and no analytic truths. Meaning/Fodor/Lepore: what we rather concede is that if meaning is to have any sense at all, then it cannot be reconstructed by reference to the sentences to which the speaker agrees. Meaning/Two Dogmas/TD/Quine: meaning cannot be reduced to the inferences to which one is willing to agree. Reason: what inferences you agree to only depends on how you see the world, i.e. what you intend your words to mean. ((s)> interest, intention, meaning). Important argument: it is impossible to detect which of his/her views the speaker accepts a priori! So there are no analytic sentences. IV 195 Qualia/quality/sensation/exchanged spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the reversed spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong (and also functionalism: Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). You might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: his approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed. ((s) You could always describe them without knowing what feelings are present in the other.) |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Introspection | Chomsky Vs Introspection | Münch III 304 Museum myth/Chomsky: Vsintrospection: introspective evidence is not reliable, diffuse and sometimes influenced by prejudice to the meaning or structure of certain words and phrases. >Myth of the museum. Helmut Schnelle, Introspection and the Description of Language Use“, in: Florian Coulmas (Ed) Festschrift for native speaker, Den Haag 1981, 105-126. – dt: Introspektion und Beschreibung des Sprachgebrauchs, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 |
Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Introspection | Davidson Vs Introspection | Frank I 630 DavidsonVsintrospection: VsTradition of assuming a special observation ability of one’s mind for its content. Such a statement does not yet provide an explanation as to why there is such an uncorrectable observation ability for one’s own consciousness. Fra I 630/631 Such a postulate is only another denomination of the observed epistemic asymmetry. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Introspection | James Vs Introspection | I 37 Behaviorism: James B. Watson was a student of James! Declined introspection. VsIntrospection: assumes prior knowledge. ((s) The meanings used in dealing with ourselves come from public language. >Private Language, >Intersubjectivity.) James per introspection: peculiarities of the inner world of experience require extension of the method. |
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| Introspection | Rorty Vs Introspection | Frank I 582 RortyVsIntrospection: Circle: we must already presuppose the concept of the mental. >Introspection, >Self-Knowledge, >Incorrigibility. Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Introspection | Ryle Vs Introspection | I 208f Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: cannot be what the tradition expects from it, since its object is a myth - consciousness: what I can find out about me is of the same kind as what I can find out about others - The small differences do not favor self-knowledge (RyleVsNagel). >Priviledged Access, >Public language. --- I 216 RyleVsTradition: we do not encounter any phenomena in the inner - there are no such events. --- I 221 Introspection/Tradition/Ryle: an ideal of a true perception, attentive observation, only executed here and there. Whereas consciousness is an ongoing component of all mental processes. RyleVsIntrospection: assuming there are certain ghostly things that one could perceive, then this observer would always have to do two things at once: to stand up in time for the realization of the plan, he would also have to pay attention to the process of plan compliance. That would become fastly infinitely. (> Regress). --- I 222 But if one admits that the number of perceivable inner things is limited, it follows that there must be imperceptible inner things. Non-introspective act, namely, the act of introspection, which already contains the greatest possible number of simultaneous attentions acts. This knowledge could not be based on introspection. But then the question arises whether it was ever based on it. Then one would have to postulate another form of privileged access. Scylla and Charybdis. >Mentalism. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Introspection | Wittgenstein Vs Introspection | Stegmüller IV 63 Kripke's WittgensteinVsIntrospection/Kripkenstein/Stegmüller: two people can fully agree in their inner experiences, and yet, one can mean "plus" and the other "Quus". Experience content: can also not say anything about the treatment of new cases. Understanding of a meaning is not an experience. --- IV 65 E.g. experience: the beginner has a different experience than the advanced, for example, when reading out loud, but: the feeling "I can read" is not a sufficient condition for a real reading. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Stroud Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 183 Internal/external/Carnap/StroudVsQuine: in Carnap's distinction there must be something else. The fact that it can be answered as an internal question but not as an (identical) external one shows that the two must not be confused. Language/Carnap/Stroud: therefore Carnap distinguishes different "languages" or "systems". These answer only internal questions. Expressiveness: that a "philosophical" (external) question is then meaningless is not only due to the terminology. I 184 The terminology is always meaningful. For example, within mathematics, "There are numbers" makes sense. I 223 Knowledge/Skepticism/Quine: if all knowledge is put to the test at the same time, no part of it can be invoked. ((s) > Example "Everything he said is true"). Empiricism/knowledge/solution/Quine: this is the reason why knowledge must be justified on the basis of sensory experience. Psychology/knowledge/explanation/justification/Quine: a surrender of epistemology to psychology leads to circularity. ((s) Because psychology itself goes beyond the mere detection of stimuli). StroudVsQuine/StroudVsNaturalised Epistemology: is also a surrender of epistemology to psychology. And thus just as circulatory! Epistemology/Stroud: can it be that the traditional epistemology has been refuted, but not Quine's naturalized epistemology itself? Is the solution the relation between the two? Quine: sometimes suggests that the two points of view (NaturalizedVsTraditional Epistemology) differ: the "doctrinal" question should be put aside as false hope. Consciousness/knowledge/tradition/knowledge theory/justification/Stroud: the traditional epistemology insists on the isolation of certain objects of consciousness in order to identify undoubted information. Consciousness/QuineVsTradition: we can bypass the question of consciousness and simply try to explain, I 224 how our rich output arises from the events that occur on our sensory surface (nerve endings). N.B.: this can be approached scientifically. Then one can distinguish two types of events in the observable physical world, and that is the scientific goal. StroudVsQuine: it looks like Quine just changed the subject. Skepticism then still threatens. And Quine does not want that. "Liberated epistemology" (roots of reference, 3): is not the same as empirical psychology, it is rather an "enlightened persistence" (enlightened) of the traditional epistemic problem. Empiricism/knowledge/justification/reason/circle/Quine: (see above) Tradition: our knowledge cannot be empirically justified, otherwise it is circular. QuineVsTradition: this fear of circularity is unnecessary logical shyness. "Enlightenment/"liberated" epistemology/Quine: the insight into the fact that skepticism arises from science itself. And to fight it, we are entitled to bring in scientific knowledge. QuineVsTradition: did not recognize the strength of its position at all. I 225 Knowledge/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: Traditional epistemology has not recognized that the challenge of knowledge originated from knowledge itself. Thesis: the doubts about its reliability have always been scientific doubts. Consciousness/Quine: the confusion was based on the concentration on consciousness. Introspection/Tradition: thought that facts about our "lean" input would be brought to light through introspection. QuineVsIntrospection: the reasons for finding the input lean come from science. I 227 Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception simply consists in deviating from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, RR 3) Illusions exist only relative to a previously accepted assumption of real bodies. Given/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: this may be the reason to assume a non-binding given. (SellarsVsQuine). QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: N.B.: then it might seem impossible to invoke the possibility of deception because some knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion! Stroud: we have dealt with arguments of this form before (see above >Distortion of meaning). Violation of the necessary conditions for the use of certain terms. Quine/Stroud: it could now be answered analogously to StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine does not make these errors. Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no possibility to invoke what lies within the meaning of a particular term. StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts" I 228 the epistemologist is "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question is made even more difficult by Quine's explicit denial that: Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying he leaves the question unanswered, he is right to use science to reject science. I am simply saying that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts. TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical mistake to refute doubts from science itself, so that in the end there is certainty, then what is the crucial logical point that he has missed? StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science. SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic could answer with a "reductio ad absurdum", and then epistemology would no longer be part of science: "Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either a) Science is true and gives us knowledge, or b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the outer world is knowledge. I 230 Moore/Stroud: Moore should not be slandered either. According to Kant and Carnap, what he says is completely legitimate. Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: N.B.: the results of an independent scientific study would be in the same boat as e.g. Moore's hands. They would be "scientific" versions of Moore's argument with the common sense. Philosophy/Science/Quine: both merge continuously. Stroud: Descartes and other traditional philosophers could agree with that. StroudVsQuine: Problem: then maybe we have no scientific knowledge at all. We have no more reason to believe in it than we do not believe in it. No scientific investigation could provide clarity here. I 231 Nor would any challenge be conceivable "from the inside". So skepticism would follow. I 233 Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: but whether it is correct or not is not something that will be decided by future experience or experiments! If the epistemological question is correctly asked - as Quine asks it - then we already know how future experience will be! We will always be confronted with the question of the surplus of our rich output over lean input. Certainly, if we are confronted today with an experience that undermines our belief, skepticism will be justified today. But: N.B.: the same was already justified in 1630! I 234 Naturalism/StroudVsQuine: will not be enough if skepticism argues with the reductio ad absurdum. We just have to rebuild the ship on the high seas. The traditional epistemologist can saw (identify!) the piece out of the ship that represents the lean input. I 240 Knowledge/StroudVsQuine: even if I blamed the "meager" input for accepting a "projection," that would not be an explanation of his knowledge or true belief. I 245 Knowledge/knowledge theory/explanation/projection/StroudVsQuine: assuming that I assume with Quine that all my beliefs are just "overflowing output from lean input" (i.e. projection), that doesn't mean that I cannot think I have true beliefs, in the sense that there's nothing to stop my beliefs from being true. Problem: even if they were all true, I would not be in a position to explain, or even understand, how a knowledge theory should explain and understand them. I cannot explain how my true belief contributes to knowledge. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
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