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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Economic Cycle | Kalecki | Mause I 227 Economy/Kalecki: Unlike the New Political Economy, the post-Keynesian political economy in the Kalecki tradition (1) assumes that political decision-makers in economic policy are primarily oriented towards the goals of financially strong interest groups. In particular during an economic downturn, stabilisation measures could be omitted if a prolonged high level of unemployment appears necessary in order to obtain concessions from trade unions and workers in the area of wage claims or social security. The austerity policy resulting from the euro crisis from 2010 can be interpreted in this sense (Krugman 2013 (2)). VsKrugman, VsKalecki: see Economic Cycle/Public Choice. 1. Michal Kalecki, In Collected works of Michal Kalecki, Hrsg. Jerzy Osyatinski. Oxford 1973. 2. Paul Krugman, Phony fear factor. New York Times, 9. August 2013, A19. |
EconKale I Michal Kalecki The political aspects of full employment Oxford 1973 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Interventions | Kalecki | Mause I 231 Interventions/Post-Keynesianism/Kalecki: KaleckiVsNew Political Economy/KaleckiVsBarro/KaleckiVsGordon: While the New Political Economy (Public Choice) (1) wants to link selective state intervention to institutional framework conditions in order to limit the scope for monetary policy, post-Keynesianism rather sees the danger that discretionary ((s) selective) monetary and fiscal policies remain too passive and therefore the output level for political reasons remains unnecessarily long below the production potential, combined with economic unemployment. (2) John B. TalyorVsKalecki: See Taylor Rule/Taylor. 1. Barro, Robert J., und David B. Gordon, Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, (1), 1983. S. 101– 121. 2. Cf. Michal Kalecki, In Collected works of Michal Kalecki, Hrsg. Jerzy Osyatinski. Oxford 1973. |
EconKale I Michal Kalecki The political aspects of full employment Oxford 1973 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Politics | Nordhaus | Mause I 227 Politics/Nordhaus: Nordhaus Thesis: Fluctuations in the sense of political economic cycles are deliberately accepted in order to create a positive macroeconomic environment - especially on the labour markets - in the run-up to upcoming elections, which significantly increases the chances of political leaders being re-elected. (1) (2) See Economic Policy/Keynesianism, Economy/Neoclassical Theory, Economic Cycle/Kalecki. (NordhausVsKeynesians, NordhausVsKalecki, KaleckiVsNordhaus, KeynsianismVsNordhaus.) 1. William D. Nordhaus, The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies 42, (2), 1975, S. 169– 190. 2. W. D. Nordhaus, Alternative approaches to the political business cycle. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 1989, S. 1– 68. |
EconNordh I William D. Nordhaus The political business cycle 1975 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
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