Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analysis | Katz | Cresswell I 21 Lexical decomposition/analysis/Katz/word meaning/list/Cresswell: (Katz 1972(1), p. 49). Example: "Chair": (10) (object), (physical), (non-alive), (artifact), (furniture), (portable), (something with legs), (something with a back), (something with a sitting space), (seat for one). Problem: Katz declines to say what, e.g. an (object) is. N.B.: even in recent times (Harrison 1974(2), 601 ff), we find this "object" as an English word (!) ((s) i.e. not perceived) as a physical object.) Cresswell: that's all right, as long as we consider e.g. (seat for one) to be sufficiently similar to an electron in a physical theory. I 32 CresswellVsKatz: we simply have no idea what the most basic entities of his decomposition should be. On the other hand, we have an idea of it in the semantics of possible worlds. I 21 Semantics of possible worlds/word meaning/CresswellVsKatz: Example "chair": a function , so that for each world w and thing a, w ε ω (a) iff. a is a chair in w. See below I 51: omega/ω: evaluation of the predicate, w: possible world. ((s) ε ω (a)": the world w is an element of the set of the worlds in which this object is a chair "/" ω (a)": the function ω makes the object "ω(a)") from this object. >Semantics of possible worlds, >Possible world. I 32 Problem: this is not quite accurate: just as there is a reference to different worlds, there should also be one to different moments, where something is in one moment a chair, but not in another. Context dependence/Cresswell: is taken into account both in the semantics of possible worlds (Cresswell 1973, 180) and in the Katz/Fodor semantics. (Katz, 1972(1), 303ff). Circularity is only apparent here: if I use "chair" in my meta-language, I have, of course, presupposed the knowledge of the reader of this meta-language. So that the way in which the set of worlds where x is a chair was presented, the word "chair" was used. Katz/Fodor semantics/semantics of possible worlds/Cresswell: one can connect both: e.g. "chair": we would not treat "chair" as a single symbol whose meaning is w, but as a complex expression of the form (x is an object) & ... & (x is a seat for one). >Context-dependence. 1. Jerrold J. Katz. (1972). Semantic Theory. New York: Harper & Row 2. B. Harrison. (1974) KATZ, J. J. "Semantic Theory". Mind 83:599 |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Competence | Katz | Cresswell I 12 Competency/linguistic/linguistic competence/Chomsky/Cresswell: (Chomsky 1965, 3 - 15): the discussion continues to this day (1974). Definition linguistic competency: is an ability underlying the linguistic activity. It is about the class of sentences that the speaker finds grammatically acceptable. Semantic competency/Cresswell: (that is what I am concerned with here): I prefer a truth-conditional semantics (> truth conditions). I would like to distinguish between two things: A) CresswellVsKatz/CresswellVsFodor/Terminology/KF/Cresswell: "KF" (Katz/Fodor semantics): is incomplete, if not incorrect. B) CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsSearle/CresswellVsTactual Theory: is rather a theory of semantic performance than of semantic competence. --- Cresswell I 12 Definition Competence/linguistic competence/Katz/Nagel/Cresswell: (Katz and Nagel, 1974): explains the ability of a speaker to make judgments about the following properties: synonymy, redundancy, contradictoryness, entailment, ambiguity, semantic anomalies, antonymy and superordination. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Features | Gärdenfors | I 47 Feature/Feature Analysis/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: in the tradition of Fregean logic and Tarski's theory of truth, a different approach has emerged than the one I have pursued: the assumption that a set of features of a concept is necessary and sufficient to determine meaning. --- I 48 For this purpose see Jackendoff, 1983, p. 112(1); Goddard and Wierzbicka, 1994.(2) In particular Katz and Fodor (1963) (3), R. Lakoff (1971)(4), Schank, (1975) (5), Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976)(6). Group: GärdenforsVsFeature Analysis. Concept features/GärdenforsVsKatz/GärdenforsVsLakoff, R./GärdenforsVsFodor/GärdenforsVsFrege: Experimental results speak rahter for dimensional representations that are based on similarities than on representations of features. (See Rosch, 1978, Prototype theory).(7) Prototype theory/Rosch: thesis: objects are more or less typical examples of a category and there is a graduated containment in categories. 1. Jackendoff, R. (1983). Semantics and cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Goddard, C., & Wierzbicka, A. (1994). Semantic and lexical universals: Theory and empirical findings. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 3. Fodor, J. A., & Katz, J. J. (1963). The structure of a semantic theory. Language, 39, 170–210. 4. Lakoff, R. (1971). IFs, ANDs, and BUTs: about conjunction. In C. Fillmore & D. T. Langendoen (Eds.), Studies in linguistic semantics (pp. 114–149). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 5. Schank, R. C. (1975). Conceptual information processing. New York: Elsevier Science. 6. Miller, G. A., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1976). Language and perception. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 7. Rosch, E. (1978). Prototype classification and logical classification: The two systems. In E. Scholnik (Ed.), New trends in cognitive representation: Challenges to Piaget’s theory (pp. 73–86). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Kripke’s Wittgenstein | Katz | Esfeld I 102 Disposition/Rule/Rule Sequencenes/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Esfeld: KripkeVsDispositions: (1982): they do not help because they are also limited. Nor can they solve the problem of normativity: why would the action that one has to dispose to do, the one that one should do if one were to follow the rule? No distinction correct/incorrect. Kripke: is here further than Quine, who is limited to the behavior (in Word and Object, explicitly referring to Wittgenstein). --- I 103 Meaning/content: assuming that they are Platonic objects, one only shifts the problem: How can a person grasp these senses? What makes it that a finite sequence of mental acts capture the right meaning? (e.g. addition). Katz: suggests that such Platonic objects (Fregean senses) are themselves finite. >Fregean sense. VsKatz: any finite sequence can express more than one such sense. What distinguishes the comprehension of addition from the comprehension of quaddition? See also >Private Language, >Rule Following. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Semantics | Katz | Cresswell I 20 f Katz-Fodor semantics/Cresswell: Thesis: meanings are theoretical constructions. - E.g. lexical decomposition: (object), (Physical), (not alive), (artifact), (furniture), (portable), (Something with legs), (something with a back), (something with a seating area) (seat for one). - CresswellVs: that does not explain what "object" is. Problem: "Electron" has no intelligible theoretical construction. - What should be the "most basic" construction? -> Possible worlds. Semantics/Word Meaning/CresswellVsKatz: E.g. "chair": a function w so that for every possible world w and thing a, w ε w (a) iff. a is a chair in w. I 32 Problem: this is not entirely accurate: as there is a reference to various possible worlds, there should also be one for various moments where something is a chair in a moment, but not in another. I 22 Katz: Thesis: the distinction between "logical" and "descriptive" words is arbitrary (Cresswell pro). CresswellVsKatz: he, of all things, uses implicit logical constants - and therefore relies on the distinction |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Situations | Eco | Eco II 118 Situation/semantics/Katz/Fodor/Eco: according to Katz and Fodor, the semantic components must not depend on the situation or circumstance to be interpreted (called settings) in which the sentence is pronounced. They point out different possible readings, but the theory does not want to specify... II 119 ...how and why the phrase has to be used in one sense or another. Clarity/Katz/Fodor: the theory can explain whether a sentence has different meanings, but not under which circumstances it must lose its ambiguity. EcoVsKatz/EcoVsFodor: 1. If you stop at the distinguishers, you do not consider all connotation possibilities of the lexeme. 2. Both the semantic markers and the distinguishers are signs or sign groups that are used to interpret the initial signs. (>Problem of interpretation: Situations/Eco, Situations/Katz). 3. The lineage of Katz/Fodor recognises the intentions usually determined by a dictionary. The code therefore coincides with the dictionary. The existence of special conventions and codes, such as those suggesting other branches, will not be... II 120 ...considered, neither the fact that different forms of branching can coexist in the same community. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Situations | Katz | Eco II 118 Situation/Semantics/Katz/Fodor/Eco: according to Katz and Fodor, the semantic components to be interpreted must not depend on the situation or circumstance (called settings) in which the sentence is pronounced. They point out different possible readings, but the theory does not want to specify... --- II 119 ...how and why the sentence has to be used in one sense or another. Unambiguity/Katz/Fodor: the theory can explain whether a sentence has different meaning, but not under which circumstances it must lose its ambiguity. EcoVsKatz/EcoVsFodor: 1. if you stop at the distinguishers, you do not measure all connotation possibilities of the lexeme. 2. Both the semantic markers and the distinguishers are sings or sign groups that are used to interpret the initial sign. (>Problem of interpretation). 3. the family tree of Katz/Fodor recognises the intentions usually determined by a dictionary. The code therefore coincides with the dictionary. The existence of special conventions and codes, such as those suggesting other branches, will not be... --- II 120 ...taken into account, nor the fact that different forms of branching can coexist in the same community. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Unambiguity | Eco | Eco II 118 Situation/semantics/Katz/Fodor/Eco: according to Katz and Fodor, the semantic components to be interpreted must not depend on the situation or circumstance (called settings) in which the sentence is pronounced. They point out different possible readings, but the theory does not want to specify... II 119 ...how and why the phrase has to be used in one sense or another. Clarity/Katz/Fodor: the theory can explain whether a sentence has different meaning, but not under which circumstances it must lose its ambiguity. >Circumstances, >Situations, >Sense, >Interpretation. EcoVsKatz/EcoVsFodor: 1. If you stop at the distinguishers, you do not consider all connotation possibilities of the lexeme. 2. Both the semantic markers and the distinguishers are signs or sign groups that are used to interpret the initial signs. (Problem of interpretation). 3. The lineage of Katz/Fodor recognises the intentions usually determined by a dictionary. The code therefore coincides with the dictionary. The existence of special conventions and codes, such as those suggesting other branches, will not be... II 120 ...considered, neither the fact that different forms of branching can coexist in the same community. (Problem of interpretation: Situations/Eco, Situations/Katz). |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Unambiguity | Katz | Eco II 118 Situation/Semantics/Katz/Fodor/Eco: according to Katz and Fodor, the semantic components to be interpreted must not depend on the situation or circumstance (called settings) in which the sentence is pronounced. They point out different possible interpretations, but the theory does not want to define,... --- II 119 ....how and why the phrase must be used in one sense or another. >Sense, >Ambiguity. Unambiguity/Katz/Fodor: the theory can explain whether a sentence has different meanings, but not under which circumstances it must lose its ambiguity. EcoVsKatz/EcoVsFodor: 1. If you stop at the distinguishers, you do not measure all connotation possibilities of the lexem. 2. Both the semantic markers and the distinguishers are characters or character groups that are used to interpret the initial character. (>Problem of interpretation). 3. The lineage of Katz/Fodor recognises the intentions usually determined by a dictionary. The code therefore coincides with the dictionary. The existence of special conventions and codes, such as those suggesting other branchings, will not... --- II 120 ...be taken into account, nor the fact that different forms of branching can coexist in the same community. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Disposition Theory | Kripke Vs Disposition Theory | Esfeld I 102 Disposition/Rule/Rule-following/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Esfeld: KripkeVsDispositions: Kripke (1982) (S.A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge, 1982): Do not help, because they are also limited. They are also unable to solve the Problem of Normativity: Why would the act that one is predisposed to do the same one should do if intending to follow the rule? No distinction possible between correct/incorrect. Kripke: He takes it on further than Quine who concentrated on behavior (Quine in Word and Object, explicitly based on Wittgenstein). I 103 Meaning/Contents: If one assumes that they were platonic objects, the problem is only deferred: How can a person capture these senses? What does it matter that a finite sequence of mental acts grasps the true meaning? (E.g. addition). Katz: Proposes that such platonic objects (Fregean Sense) themselves are finite. VsKatz: Every finite sequence can express more than one particular sense. What is the difference between both the conception of addition and quaddition? Form/KripkeVsAristotle: same problem: If you wanted to assume like A. that natural properties are inherent in all physical objects, the question is how to recognize the right ones! I 104 Grue/Natural Property: N.P. is e.g. "green" contrary to grue. Problem: Every finite number of examples instantiates more than just one natural characteristic. E.g. a table can be brown, and can also have four legs. We may not figure out which aspects a person refers to. Kripke: Asserts that Wittgenstein himself advocates the skeptical position I 105 and proposes a skeptical solution, in analogy to Hume’s solution regarding the Problem of Causation. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Katz, J. | Vendler Vs Katz, J. | I 260 Translation/Wittgenstein: was aware of these difficulties: he did not forbid the translation of his works, but insisted that they should only be printed together with the German original. Translation/Philosophy/Language/Vendler: in Hungarian the use of the copula is limited. Should one conclude from this that a Hungarian cannot understand Aristotle's being? Necessary Truth/Translation: For example, "You cannot know anything wrong" is true in all languages, provided it has been well translated! It is a necessary truth. (Vendler: Tautology). ((s) HegelVs: there can be false knowledge, e.g. incorrect gemoetrical figures (Preface of Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes). >Knowledge/Frith, >deception/Frith. One can find necessary truths embedded in individual languages. Thus one can come to necessary conclusions. But that does not give much. The regulative idea of language and thinking in itself gives nothing here. But this does not mean that we are trapped in the conceptual system of our mother tongue. We have already freed ourselves from terms like "magic power" etc. in the past. I 261 The philosopher, of course, makes suggestions for improving the imprecise natural language. But he does it in his natural language! I 262 Katz: Thesis: we may only consider those aspects of a language to be philosophically relevant that are common to all languages. VendlerVsKatz: In view of the above, I see no need for this. |
Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Markerese | Lewis Vs Markerese | IV 189/190 Semantic Markerese/Semantic Markers/LewisVsKatz: (after Jerrold Katz, Paul Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions (Cambridge, Mass. MIT, 1964). Semantic markers: are symbols, objects in an artificial language that we can call "semantic markerese". The semantic interpretation by this means merely leads to a translation algorithm from the object language into the Markerese help language! But then we can also know the markerese translation without knowing anything about the meaning of the original English sentence! Namely, without knowing the conditions under which it would be true. Semantics without truth conditions is not semantics! The translation into markerese depends either on our (future) competence as speakers of markerese or on our ability to apply semantics at least to markerese. But then translation into Latin would be just as sufficient if the semantics for markerese were perhaps also somewhat simpler. Markerese/Lewis: pro: is attractive because it only handles symbols. Finite combinations of familiar entities form a finite set of elements with finite applications of finite rules. No problem for ontological thriftiness. VsMarkerese: but it is precisely this pleasant finiteness that prevents the semantics of markerese from establishing relations between the symbols and the real world of non-symbols! So it's not real semantics. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Truth-conditional Sem. | Katz Vs Truth-conditional Sem. | Cresswell II 145 Semantics/Katz/Cresswell: (Katz 1972 and many other articles). KatzVsTruth-Conditional Semantics: 1. (Katz 1982): all other approaches except Katz's own reduce meaning to something else, including truth conditions. VsKatz: his own critique depends on the fact that he already knows that truth conditions are something other than meaning. ((s) So the approaches he criticizes cannot be circular). CresswellVsKatz: his semantics are not wrong, but they are incomplete. Semantics/Cresswell: "semantic data": e.g. meaning of sentences, e.g. synonymy of pairs of sentences, etc. Cresswell II 146 KatzVsTruth-Conditional Semantics/Cresswell: 2. it results in all logically equivalent propositions having the same meaning. Especially in the version of possible world semantics. (1982, 190): Katz acknowledges that there are attempts at a solution. Example Lewis (1972). KatzVsLewis/Cresswell: Katz's approach seems to demand structured meanings. Lexical Decomposition/Katz/Cresswell: this is used by Katz to trace meanings back to semantic basic concepts. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Semantics | Katz, J. | Cresswell I 20f Katz-Fodor-Semantics/Cresswell: Thesis: meanings are theoretical constructions - e.g. lexical decomposition: (object), (physical), (non-living), (artefact), (furniture), (portable), (something with legs), (something with a back), (something with a seat), (seat for one) - CresswellVs: does not explain what an "object" is - Problem: "electron" is not an understandable theoretical construction - what should be a "most basic" construction? - Possible World Semantics/Word meaning/CresswellVsKatz: For example "chair": a function w, so that for every world w and thing a, w e w(a) iff a is a chair in w. I 32 Problem: this is not quite accurate: just as there is a reference to different possible worlds, there should also be a reference to different moments where something is a chair in one moment, but not in another. I 22 Katz: Thesis: Distinction between "logical" and "descriptive" words is only arbitrary (Cresswell pro) - CresswellVsKatz: he of all people implicitly uses logical constants - and thus relies on the distinction. Cresswell II 27 Non-functional compositional/Semantics/Katz/Cresswell: such a semantics was introduced by Katz. But he assumes that truth and reference have no place at all in a semantic theory. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 |
| Language | Katz, J. | Vendler I 262 Katz: we may keep only those aspects of a language as philosophically relevant that are common to all languages. VendlerVsKatz: I see no need for this in the light of my above statements. |
Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Vs Katz | Vendler, Z. | I 262 Katz: we take only those aspects of a language to be philosophically relevant that are common to all languages. VendlerVsKatz: I see no need for this in the light of my above statements. |
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