Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper Names | Kenny | Prior I 168 Name/Kenny/Prior: Kenny has outlined a completely different theory of Non-Plural Names: Thesis: Names are logically unstructured (as with Russell). Def Name/Kenny: N is a name if and only if the user intends to refer to a singular object B. If the object does not exist, one can only say that the speaker with a sentence that contains B, only means B and that the sentence mentions B. Names, even if they are blank, are generally not merely abbreviations of Russell's specific descriptions. Although the speaker must have some particular description in mind! They are abbreviations of certain descriptions in sentences of the form: "B exists" or "B does not exist". See PriorVsKenny. |
Kenn I A. Kenny A New History of Western Philosophy Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Proper Names | Prior | I 119 ff Names/Hobbes: names are names of our ideas. >Th. Hobbes, >Ideas. MillVsHobbes: names convey to the others, what we think of someone (something), not only about our idea The idea of fire does not cause the heat, even though I must have terms to think. >Proper names/Mill, cf. >Connotation. I 158ff Name/existence/Prior: Vs the thesis, "Name is all what intends to identify a real object": Problem: indirect speech: E.g. The spokesperson believes Holmes exist, but the listener does not: then the speaker is in a position to identify Holmes the listener is not but then the listener cannot tell what the speaker has said (absurd). >Thought objects, >Belief objects, >Identification, >Individuation. I 168 Names/KennyVsRussell: there is a hideen description in "B exists". >Hidden descriptions. PriorVsKenny: when names must name something then no name can be used in indirect speech with a known non-existence. >Naming, >Non-existence, >Indirect speech. I 168ff Theory/PriorVsKenny: cannot set up his own theory. - Kenny Thesis: names must intend reference - then the theorist himself cannot even intend to use the name if he talks in his example sentences of non-existent persons. >A. Kenny. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kenny, A. | Prior Vs Kenny, A. | I 167 Names/Lejewski: for him, names can either be singular or empty, but not plural. "Non plural names": can be logically be complex (normal names cannot). For this, a special functor is needed with its own axioms. This functor could be e.g. the Lesniewskian individual identity, the form "a = a", which is true if "a" is applied to an object, and false if not. Names/Aristotle: can be singular or plural, but not empty! If complex names are introduced here, then it needs to be ensured that the composition is not empty. E.g. Even if "a" and "b" have applications, "a and b" need not! If "Socrates" is not plural, it does not follow that "Not Socrates" is not plural either. E.g. there could be a million "Not Socrates". Solution/Lejewski: introduces a "definition frame": Only allows only names like "He who alone is not Socrates". Point: nevertheless, the verb "is not Socrates" be applied to many objects! I 168 Names/Kenny/Prior: Kenny outlined a very different theory of non-plural names: These names are logically without structure (like Russell). Def Names/Kenny: N is a name iff. the user intends to refer to one singular object B. If the object does not exist, it can only be said that the speaker only means B with a sentence that contains B, and that B is mentioned in the sentence. Names, even if they are empty, are generally not mere abbreviations of Russell's defined descriptions. Although the speaker has to have some kind of particular description in mind! They are abbreviations of defined descriptions in sentences of the form: "B exists" or "B does not exist". Names/PriorVsKenny: I cannot find any clue in Kenny as to how it should work in indirect speech: E.g. "Paul thinks Elmer is a fellow traveler." According to Kenny, Paul will use the word "Elmer" as name, but the reporter who covers Paul's opinion will generally not use it as a name and could even make his statement if he knew that a person like Elmer does not exist! Question: how does the reporter use the word then? According to Kenny, he would have to use it as covert description. E.g. if he says "there is no such person as Elmer". Problem: e.g. if he knows that Elmar does not exist, but says "Paul thinks Elmer is a fellow traveler", does he use the name as covert description then? If not, then Kenny does not tell us what he does instead, bit if yes, then the reporter does not report correctly what Paul thinks! PriorVsKenny: this is not a peripheral problem, but infects Kenny's entire theory. I 169 E.g. if I myself (as Kenny) say: "what Paul thinks is not that such and such is his fellow traveler, but Elmar", how am I (as a theorist) using the word "Elmer" here? If the theorist himself uses it as a covert description, he himself does not make the distinction it is about for him! I can still use it as a name! Because I cannot intend to refer with it, because ex hypothesi I cannot do that if I know that a person like Elmer does not exist. Paul means Elmer with "Elmer", but what does Kenny mean with "Elmer"? And what does Kenny mean when he says Paul means Elmer with "Elmer"? Ex hypothesi Kenny cannot intend to mean Elmer. But if he uses the name as a covert description, then he says that Paul the means such and such, and we can do that a) with quotation marks b) without quotation marks. Then we say with this that Paul means that a single such and such is meant by Paul, to which he thus puts himself in relation. But ex hypothesi it is not. a) with quotation marks: then we say that with the word "Elmer" Paul means that which is meant by the expression "such and such". But according to Kenny's own theory, Paul does not use the word as a covert description! (Only in forms such as "B exists"). Names/Prior: Thesis: what does not exist, simply cannot be named, just as it cannot be pushed with the foot. Neither by someone who believes in the existence, nor by someone who does not believe in it. In circumstances where the object x is absent, x cannot be used as a proper noun in sentences and there are no facts with x. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Names | Prior, A. | I 155~ Namen/Existenz/Prior: Vs die These, "Name ist alles, was beabsichtigt, ein wirkliches Objekt zu identifizieren: Problem: indirekte Rede: Bsp der Sprecher glaubt, dass Holmes existiert, der Hörer aber nicht: dann ist der Sprecher in einer Position, um Holmes zu identifizieren der Hörer aber nicht, dann kann der Hörer nicht berichten, was der Sprecher gesagt hat - absurd. I 168 Namen/Kenny/Prior: Kenny hat eine ganz andere Theorie von Nicht-Plural-Namen skizziert: These: Namen sind logisch strukturlos (wie bei Russell). I 168 Theorie/PriorVsKenny: kann seine eigenen Theorie gar nicht aufstellen! - Kenny These: Namen müssen Referenz intendieren. Dann kann der Theoretiker selbst nicht intendieren den Namen zu gebrauchen, wenn in seinen Beispielsätzen von nichtexistierenden Personen die Rede ist. I 169 Namen/Prior: These: Was nicht existiert, kann einfach nicht benannt werden, genauso wie es nicht mit dem Fuß gestoßen werden kann. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Names | Kenny, A. | Prior I 168 Name / Proper Names/Kenny / Prior: Kenny has outlined a very different theory of non-plural-name: Thesis: names are logically without structure (Russell ditto). I 168 Theory / PriorVsKenny: he cannot establish his own theory! - Kenny thesis: names must intend to refer - then the theorists can not even intend to use the name if in his example sentences he is talking about nonexistent objects. |
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